W. C. Richards Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 27, 1972

199 N.L.R.B. 1069 (N.L.R.B. 1972)

W. C. RICHARDS CO. 1069
W. C. Richards Co. and James Whaley and ' Beryle
Garside and United Steelworkers of America, AFL-
CIO., Cases 13-CA-11092 and 13-CA-11133
October 27, 1972
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS , KENNEDY, AND PENELLO
On June 15, 1972, Administrative Law Judge I
Eugene George Goslee issued the attached Decision
in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed ex-
ceptions and a supporting brief and counsel for the
General Counsel and the Charging Party each filed an
answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that Respondent, W. C. Richards Co., Blue
Island, Illinois, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said rec-
ommended Order.
ted Section 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, by acts and conduct hereinafter
detailed. At the conclusion of the hearing all parties waived
oral argument, but briefs have been received from the Gen-
eral Counsel, the Respondent, and the Charging Parties,
and the briefs have been duly considered.
Upon the entire record in this proceeding, and from my
observation of the testimony and demeanor of the witness,
I hereby make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
I THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent is an Illinois corporation, maintains
an office and place of business at Blue Island, Illinois, and
is engaged in the manufacture of paints and industrial fin-
ishes. During the past calendar or fiscal year, the Respon-
dent sold goods and purchased materials, to and from
sources situated outside the State of Illinois, each in an
amount in excess of $1 million. The complaint alleges, the
answer admits, and I find that the Respondent is an employ-
er engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
II THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
By its answer the Respondent alleges lack of knowl-
edge to admit or deny that United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO , hereinafter called the Union or the Steelwork-
ers, is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act.
Upon the uncontradicted testimony of Samuel E. Parish,
subdistrict director of the Union , I find that the United
Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO, admits employees to
membership and exists for the purpose , in whole or in part,
of bargaining with employers concerning wages , hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment. Accordingly, I
further find that the Union is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
I The title of "Trial Examiner" was changed to "Administrative Law
Judge" effective August 19, 1972.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
EUGENE GEORGE GOSLEE, Trial Examiner : These cases
came on to be heard before me at Chicago, Illinois on
February 29 through March 3, 1972, on a consolidated com-
plaint I issued by the General Counsel of the National La-
bor Relations Board and an answer filed by W. C. Richards
Co., hereinafter called the Respondent. The issues raised by
the pleadings relate to whether or not the Respondent viola-
1 The charge in Case 13-CA-11092 was filed on December 14, 1971, and
served on the Respondent on December 15, 1971. The charge in Case 13-
CA-11133 was filed on December 29, 1971, and served on the Respondent
on January 3, 1972. On January 24, 1972, the Regional Director for Region
13 issued an order consolidating cases , complaint, and notice of hearing,
thereby consolidating said cases for hearing.
III. THE RESPONDENT 'S SUPERVISORS AND AGENTS
The complaint alleges and the Respondent's original
answer admitted that W. C. Richards, Lawrence D. Bums,
Arthur Gay, and Robert Cooley, who are, respectively, its
president, plant superintendent, technical director and as-
sistant to the president, and its production supervisor, are
the Respondent's supervisors and agents within the
meaning of Section 2(11) and (13) of the Act. After the
conclusion of 2 days of hearing, however, the General
Counsel amended the complaint to additionally allege that
Roy Wulatin, Donald Habich, Homer Cooley, Ricardo
Flores, and Ralph Quint are also supervisors and agents of
the Respondent. The Respondent amended its answer to
deny the additional allegations, and simultaneously retract-
ed its prior admission that Robert Cooley is its supervisor
and agent.
As related above, the Respondent is engaged in the
manufacture of paints and industrial finishes. On December
10, 1971,2 a crucial date in this proceeding, the Respondent
2 All dates recited hereinafter are in 1971 , unless otherwise specified.
199 NLRB No. 173
1070 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
had a complement of 23 production, maintenance, and ship-
ping and receiving personnel. Lawrence Bums is the
Respondent's plant superintendent, and he is directly re-
sponsible for all manufacturing and shipping and receiving
functions on a three-shift operation. Reporting to Bums are
five supervisors, including production supervisors Robert
Cooley, Homer Cooley, and Ricardo Flores; shipping su-
pervisor Roy Wulatin; and warehouse supervisor Donald
Habich. In addition, the Respondent employs one mainte-
nance mechanic, Ralph Quint, who is assisted by a single
helper.
According to the testimony of Bums , whose testimony
I credit to the extent it relates to the issues of supervisory
authority, he spends from 30 to 45 percent of his worktime
in the plant proper, and Bums communicates with the five
supervisors through both verbal and written instructions.
The five supervisors have authority to assign employees to
work and to transfer them from task to task. The supervisors
are responsible for the maintenance of order and discipline
in their respective work areas, they wain employees of in-
fractions of the Respondent's rules , and they can report
such infractions to Bums with recommendations for disci-
plinary action. According to Bums, the supervisors have
authority to recommend hire, discharge, discipline, and
wage increases, and Bums accepts these recommendations
unless his personal observations indicate that a contrary
result is warranted. Bums solicits the supervisors' opinions
concerning the work of the employees assigned to them,
they have the responsibility to inform Bums of the employ-
ees' progress, and have a particular responsibility for proba-
tionary employees. For purposes of retention and periodic
wage increases, the employees are rated by Bums and their
respective supervisors. In addition, the supervisors have au-
thority to grant time off, and they maintain and have au-
thority to correct the employees' timecards. The supervisors,
moreover, unlike other production, maintenance, and ship-
ping and receiving personnel, are salaried, and according to
the documentary evidence in the record have been accorded
the title of "supervisor" by the Respondent. On two occa-
sions at times relevant to these cases, the Respondent fur-
nished the General Counsel with lists of its employees
appropriate for a prospective bargaining unit, and on both
occasions the Respondent designated Wulatin, Habich,
Robert and Homer Cooley, and Ricardo Flores as "supervi-
sors."
On the basis of Bum's testimony, and all the pertinent
evidence in the record, I find that the five individuals de-
nominated by the Respondent as "supervisors," possess and
exercise some, even if not all, of the indicia of supervisor
authority designated in Section 2(11) of the Act .3 In arriving
at this findings, I have discredited the testimony of Robert
Cooley, Roy Wulatin, and Donald Habich, whose conclu-
sionary answers to conclusionary questions contradicts
Bums' testimony in all pertinent respects. I have also reject-
ed the Respondent's contention that a finding that the five
individuals are 2(11) supervisors is unwarranted on grounds
of an inordinately high ratio of supervisors to supervised.
The Respondent's operations extend over three shifts and,
3 N L R B v. Edward G Budd Mfg Co, 169 F.2d 571, 576 (C.A. 6), cert
denied 335 U S 908.
in any event, the test of the ratio of supervisors to supervised
is not a factor for consideration where the possession and
exercise of supervisory authority is as clear as in the instant
cases.
I find, accordingly, that W. C. Richards, Arthur Gay,
Lawrence Bums, Robert Cooley, Homer Cooley, Roy Wul-
atin, Donald Habich, and Ricardo Flores are supervisors of
the Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the
Act and are, and have been, its agents within the meaning
of Section 2(13) of the Act. As to Ralph Quint, I find he is
not a supervisor but a leadman. There is only one other
employee in Quint's department, and his authority over this
other employee extends only to routine matters . Unlike
those found above to be supervisors, Quint is paid an hourly
wage rather than a salary. The only evidence of Quint's
alleged authority is that, like the supervisors and unlike the
production, maintenance , and other employees, Quint
wears a yellow hard hat. Although the color of the hat may
be symbolic in a degree of his identification with manage-
ment, it does not, without more, constitute him as a supervi-
sor within the meaning of the Act.
IV THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES ALLEGED
The complaint alleges that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act. More specifically, it
is alleged that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) by
the discharge of its employees James Whaley and Beryle
Garside on December 10 because they had engaged in un-
ion and concerted activities. The complaint alleges that the
Respondent further violated Section 8(a)(3) on the same
date by the discharge of 13 additional employees because
these employees had engaged in union and protected con-
certed activities. The complaint also alleges that the Re-
spondent engaged in additional violations of Section 8(a)(3)
when it refused on and after December 15 to reinstate its
striking employees who had made an unconditional appli-
cation to return to work. As to independent violations of
Section 8(a)(1), it is alleged that on December 31 and again
on January 6 and 13, 1972, the Respondent harrassed its
employees by photographing them on the picket line. Final-
ly, the complaint alleges that the Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) of the Act by failing and refusing on and after
December 10 to recognize and bargain with the Union as
the majority representative of its employees.
In its answer the Respondent admitted to certain alle-
gations of the complaint, but generally denied that it had
engaged in any unfair labor practices within the meaning of
the Act. Accordingly, the Respondent prays that the com-
plaint be dismissed with prejudice. The evidence in support
of the several allegations of the complaint, and the
Respondent's defenses thereto, are considered below in an
order proximately related to the chronology of events.
A. The Discharges of Whaley
and Garside
James Whaley testified that at the time of his discharge
on December 10, he had been employed by the Respondent
for 2-1/2 or 3 months. Whaley was employed as a shipping
and receiving laborer on the first shift, and his supervisor
W. C. RICHARDS CO. 1071
was Roy Wulatin. One of Whaley's regular duties in the
shipping and receiving department was to assist in the un-
loading of solvents used in the Respondent 's manufacturing
processes. The solvents are delivered to the Respondent's
manufacturing premises by contract truckers, and are
pumped or allowed to flow by gravity into underground
storage tanks. It was Whaley's responsibility to be present
during the unloading process to insure against spillage, fire,
and other hazards.
In November, apparently before the Thanksgiving hol-
iday, Whaley was assigned to assist in unloading a tank
truck of solvent. While the solvent was being unloaded the
Respondent's president, W. C. Richards, observed Whaley
and the truckdriver standing at the east entrance to the
Respondent's premises while the truckdriver smoked a ciga-
rette. A few minutes later Richards observed Whaley spill
solvent on the ground while he was removing the filler hose
from the standpipe. Richards left his office and summarily
discharged Whaley. At a later time, however, and upon the
intervention of Supervisor Wulatin, Whaley's discharge was
revoked and he was given a 2-day suspension.
At the time of his discharge on December 10, Beryle
Garside had been employed by the Respondent for about
4 months. Garside was employed as a laborer on the first
shift under the supervision of Robert Cooley. Sometime in
November Garside received a bum on his side and shoulder
when he fell asleep under a sun lamp. On the following day
Garside was suffering some pain and left work, without
notice to his supervisor, to obtain some medication for the
bum. Robert Cooley discovered Garside's unauthorized ab-
sence and reported the matter to Bums. Bums gave Cooley
permission to exercise his discretion by either discharging
Garside, or suspending him. When Garside returned to the
plant about 1 p.m., Cooley questioned him about what had
happened, and suspended Garside for 2 days. During the
course of his testimony, Garside also admitted that he was
criticized on other instances by Bums, based on Robert
Cooley's reports that Garside was too often absent from
work, and was taking too many breaks. As a result of
Cooley's complaints, Bums denied Garside's request for a
wage increase.
The Respondent's employees have never been repre-
sented for purposes of collective bargaining by any labor
organization, although the Steelworkers had undertaken a
prior but unsuccessful attempt to organize the plant in 1968.
The record in these cases reflects that a revitalized interest
in union representation surfaced in the fall of 1971, and
there were some general discussions among some of the
employees both inside and outside the plant.
Whaley testified that in late November he approached
Supervisor Habich and asked what could be done to get a
union into the plant. Habich had been employed in the
plant in a nonsupervisory capacity during the 1968 organiz-
ing campaign, and Whaley asked him what steps could be
taken to organize a union and who should be contacted.
According to Whaley's testimony, Habich was unable to
provide any specifics, but he did agree with Whaley that it
was a good idea to bring a union into the plant.
Whaley also testified that a few days later he encoun-
tered Habich in the stock area, and Habich gave him a slip
of paper with the name and telephone of the United Auto
Workers. Habich told Whaley that he could contact the
UAW for information, but counselled him not to mention
the matter to anyone else. With some suggestion from the
General Counsel, Whaley also related that in this conversa-
tion Habich stated that Supervisor Wulatin had assisted in
finding the UAW's telephone number.
Within the next several days, Whaley visited Wulatin
in his office to advise that he had been unable to contact the
UAW, and to request Wulatin's permission to use the tele-
phone book to find the number for the AFL-CIO organiz-
ing committee. As related by Whaley, Wulatin agreed that
it would be a good idea to contact the AFL-CIO for infor-
mation. Whaley used the telephone book, but apparently
made no call at that time. Wulatin asked that Whaley keep
him advised of whatever happened.
Again, on an undisclosed date characterized as a few
days later, Whaley had a further conversation with Supervi-
sor Habich. According to Whaley, he informed Habich that
he had been able to contact a representative of the AFL-
CIO, and had a tentative date set for a meeting. Whaley
asked Habich for suggestions for an appropriate place for
a union meeting , and Habich first suggested the Rosewood
Inn. On further reflection, however, Habich cautioned that
the Rosewood Inn might be frequented by company offi-
cials, and recommended that Whaley hold his meeting at
Carson's Restaurant. At this juncture of the conversation
Supervisor Cooley approached and Habich changed the
subject by informing Cooley that Whaley was asking for a
good restaurant where he could take his girl friend for din-
ner. Cooley made a suggestion, and the conversation ended.
Whaley also recounted that on the same day as his last
conversation with Habich he discussed the proposed meet-
ing with the AFL-CIO with some of his fellow employees.
Whaley identified Andre Baron as an employee to whom he
spoke, and testified that he told Baron that there was going
to be a meeting between some of the employees and a staff
representative from the AFL-CIO. Baron replied that he
was interested in attending, and Whaley agreed to inform
him of the time and place. Whaley again talked to Baron on
December 7, and informed him that the meeting would be
held at Carson's Restaurant on December 9, at 7 p.m.
Whaley completed his work at about 5:30 p.m. on De-
cember 9, and as he was leaving the plant to attend the
meeting he observed Andre Baron . According to Whaley,
Baron was in W. C. Richards' office talking to Richards and
Plant Superintendent Bums. Whaley did not overhear any
of the conversation, and he proceeded to the union meeting.
At Carson's Restaurant on the evening of December 9,
Whaley met with Peter Harrison, a staff representative of
the AFL-CIO, and Charles Ponce, the only other employee
who attended the meeting. Whaley and Ponce asked Harri-
son what steps would have to be taken to obtain union
representation in the plant. Harrison explained that it would
be necessary to have authorization cards signed and to ob-
tain the support of the other employees. He showed the
employees some charts purporting to show the benefits of
union representation, and he' also showed them sample no-
tices and ballots for a National Labor Relations Board elec-
tion. Harrison gave the employees 17 AFL-CIO
authorization cards, and instructed them to pass the cards
out to the other employees on their own time with the expla-
1072 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
nation that the cards were a request by the employees for
representation by the AFL-CIO. According to the testimo-
ny of Ponce , Harrison also told the employees that when the
employees had signed the authorization cards he would re-
quest the Respondent to grant recognition , but if that was
refused he would petition the Board for an election . Whaley
and Ponce both signed cards and the meeting was terminat-
ed.
Beryle Garside testified that Whaley had informed him
of the meeting to be held at Carson 's Restaurant , but Gar-
side did not attend the meeting and he did not sign an
authorization card until after his discharge on the morning
of December 10. Garside did testify , however, that at unre-
called times during the course of his employment with the
Respondent he discussed with other employees the idea of
union representation. Garside named Whaley , Baron,
Ponce , and employee John larussi . On cross-examination
Garside related that his conversations concerning a union
started about 3 weeks after he began his employment. Gar-
side characterized his conversations with other employees
as "small talk," and he admitted that some of the conversa-
tions took place at locations off the Respondent's premises.
Aside from one incident related below , I find no evidence
in the record to suggest that Garside's union activities were
either extensive or conducted in such a manner as to arouse
the Respondent's suspicions or place its officials on notice
that Garside was in favor of unionizing the plant.
Garside testified in addition , however, that about 1
week before his discharge he asked Supervisor Habich what
the latter thought about the employees organizing a union
in the plant . As related by Garside , Habich replied, "I hope
you have more luck then we had." Habich then explained
that during the prior campaign Richards had promised the
employees wage increases if they voted against the union,
but after the Union lost the election Richards reneged on
his promise.
On December 10, Whaley arrived at work at his sched-
uled time of 8 a.m. and found that a truckdriver was already
unloading a tank truck of solvent into the underground
tanks on the Respondent 's premises . For about the next 3
hours, Whaley assisted the driver, although at the usual
hour of 10 a.m. he and the driver shut off the valves and the
truck engine and took a coffeebreak with other employees.
Garside, however, had arrived at work about 6:45 a.m.
About 8 a .m. Garside was at his work bench with employees
Roger Havlick and Ray Morris . Supervisor Robert Cooley
approached and instructed the employees not to engage in
conversations among themselves , but to go about their
work . Sometime later , apparently about I1 a.m., Cooley
again approached and asked Garside if he knew the wherea-
bouts of Whaley. Garside replied that he did not know, and
Cooley instructed him to report to the lunch room.
The record also reveals that employee John larussi was
given instructions on December 10 similar to those given by
Supervisor Robert Cooley to employees Garside , Havlick,
and Morris . About 8 a .m. Supervisor Habich approached
larussi and told him that Plant Superintendent Bums had
instructed Supervisors Robert Cooley and Ricardo Flores to
keep their men moving and not allow them to congregate
during the day. Habich told larussi that he believed the
Company had found out about the union and that he also
believed employee Andre Baron had informed on the em-
ployees . Habich also cautioned Iarussi to keep quiet about
the union and be careful who he talked to.
Garside complied with Supervisor Cooley's instruc-
tions and reported to the lunch room . In the interim Whaley
had completed unloading the solvent and had gone to the
locker room, which adjoins the lunch room , to change his
clothing . Supervisors Cooley and Wulatin arrived imme-
diately thereafter and Cooley informed Garside and Wha-
ley that the "unofficial word" was that the two employees
were fired . The employees asked the reason and Cooley
replied that the employees would have to talk to Larry
Burns in the front office.
Garside and Whaley proceeded to the front office and
Bums spoke first to Garside . Bums told Garside that Super-
visor Cooley was unhappy with Garside's production work,
that Garside was not working out the way the Company
desired, that his work had been slipping and lagging, and
that Garside hadn't been doing his share of the work. Gar-
side protested that he was being discharged because of his
long hair and sideburns, but Cooley insisted that this was
not the reason , and the real reason was Cooley's dissatisfac-
tion with Garside's work and his failure to perform up to
standards . Garside asked if he could bring Cooley in to
substantiate these reasons , but Bums refused the request.
Bums gave Garside his check, and Garside left the office.
Bums then spoke to Whaley and told him that he had
been on thin ice with the Company ever since his prior
suspension , that Whaley was not up to the Company's
standards, and was not working out as the Company had
planned . Whaley protested that these were not the reasons
for his discharge , and accused Burns of discharging him
because he had been singled out as the ringleader in an
attempt to organize a union in the plant. Burns denied the
accusation , and stated that while the Company had heard
nothing of a union , he found Whaley 's statement interest-
ing. Bums spoke of what he called the "fiasco" of spilling
solvent on the ground , and said that on that morning Wha-
ley had left the tank truck unattended and with the hatch
open while he took a coffeebreak . Bums also stated that
every time he walked through the plant he saw Whaley in
huddles with other employees , always talking to someone
here or there.
When Whaley left the office he started to return to the
locker room but passed through the maintenance depart-
ment where he informed employee Charles Ponce that he
and Garside had been fired . Whaley then proceeded toward
the locker room and Ponce asked his foreman , Ralph Quint,
if he would have a few minutes to find out what was going
on. Quint granted permission and Ponce proceeded into the
locker room , where he found Garside talking to Supervisor
Robert Cooley. Whaley was also present at the time and
overheard the conversation between Cooley and Garside.
As a composite of the testimony of Ponce and Whaley
reflects, Garside asked Cooley why he had been fired and
related Bum's remarks that Cooley had been dissatisfied
with Garside 's work . Cooley denied, and persisted in his
denial , that he had said anything about Garside's work
being unsatisfactory . Cooley stated that Garside 's work had
been fine , that he had been doing his job pretty good, and
that Bums was trying to pin the whole matter of Garside's
W. C. RICHARDS CO.
discharge on Cooley. Cooley added that for 2 cents he
would go up and tell Burns that he was a liar, to which
Ponce interjected, "You ain't got the nerve."
After the conversation Ponce returned to the mainte-
nance department and asked Quint for a few more minutes
to contact the rest of the employees because they intended
to close down the plant. Quint replied, "Go ahead and do
your thing." Ponce contacted some of the employees in
other departments, informed them of the discharges of
Whaley and Garside, and told them that the employees
were going to close the plant. The employees agreed, and
shut off their machines; Ponce instructed them to meet in
the lunch room. Through Ponce and others, the intent to
close the plant was made known to all the employees on the
day shift.
In the meantime Whaley had remained in the locker
room and placed a call to Peter Harrison of the AFL-CIO.
Whaley told Harrison of the discharges and Harrison coun-
selled that Whaley and Garside should leave the plant as
soon as possible, but should remain near the plant to ob-
serve whatever happened. While Whaley was talking to
Harrison, Ponce returned to the locker room and told Wha-
ley that the employees were going to walk out. Whaley
passed this information on to Harrison. Harrison agreed to
come to the area as soon as possible, and instructed Whaley
to make contact with him at a later time. Ponce then called
employee Ray Estrada, informed him of the discharges of
Whaley and Garside; and asked Estrada to contact the oth-
er employees on the night shift. Ponce told Estrada that the
employees intended to close the plant and asked that Estra-
da and the other night shift employees meet in front of the
plant. By the time Ponce had completed his conversation
with Estrada, the other employees had gathered in the lunch
room. About noon all of the employees on the day shift,
except Andre Baron, walked out of the plant in protest of
the discharges of Whaley and Garside. The events which
transpired subsequent to the beginning of the strike will be
related below.
In defense of the allegation that it discharged Whaley
and Garside for reasons prohibited by Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act, the Respondent asserts that both employees were on
probationary status and were discharged for good cause.
The Respondent also asserts that it had absolutely no
knowledge prior to the time the discharges were effectuated
that Whaley, Garside, or any other of its employees were
engaged in union activities, or harbored any desire for un-
ion representation. Accordingly, in response to the testimo-
ny of Whaley and Garside concerning their union activities
within the plant, the Respondent called as its witnesses W.
C. Richards, Lawrence Bums, Robert Cooley, Donald Ha-
bich and Roy Wulatin. Each of these managerial and super-
visory officials categorically denied any knowledge of the
activities of Whaley and Garside, and similarly denied any
knowledge that a union organizing campaign was in prog-
ress within the plant; Habich denied any and all conversa-
tions with Whaley and Garside pertaining to their interests
in organizing a union in the plant, and Wulatin voiced
identical denials.
Having observed the demeanor of all the witnesses ap-
pearing in this proceeding, and having fully reviewed their
testimony, I credit the versions of events and conversations
1073
related by Whaley and Garside, and I reject the
Respondent's assertion that it discharged the two employees
without knowledge of their union activities, sympathies, and
interests. Whaley and Garside testified credibly to conver-
sations with Habich and Wulatin in which they discussed
the steps necessary to secure union representation. Both
employees adhered to the contents of their direct testimony
throughout the course of extensive and prolonged cross-
examinations. Habich and Wulatin, on the contrary, were
not candid witnesses, and both equivocated in the testimony
concerning their supervisory status, in direct contravention
of evidence already established in the record through the
testimony of Plant Superintendent Bums. Contrary to the
Respondent's assertion, moreover, I fmd nothing incredible
in the testimony of Whaley and Garside that they discussed
their plans for a union with supervisory personnel. The
Respondent's plant and complement of personnel are small,
and the whole record reflects a rather casual and informal
relationship between supervisors and supervised. Habich
and Wulatin had recently been promoted from rank-and-
file jobs to supervisory positions, and Habich, at least, had
been employed as a regular employee during the course of
the Steelworkers' 1968 drive to organize the plant .4
Aside from the fact that I have credited Whaley and
Garside, the record contains some additional and uncon-
tradicted testimony to support a finding that the Respon-
dent discharged Whaley and Garside with knowledge that
a union organizing campaign was in progress, and that the
two employees were involved. Irrespective of whether the
Respondent obtained this information from its supervisors
or from some other source, it is clear the Respondent was
fully aware of the facts before Whaley and Garside were
discharged. As related above, about 8 a.m. on December 10,
Robert Cooley cautioned Garside and two other employees
to cease all conversations and attend to their work. Supervi-
sor Habich gave similar instructions to employee larussi,
with the additional explanation that Plant Superintendent
Bums had instructed the supervisors to keep their men mov-
ing and not allow them to congregate. Bums, Cooley, and
Habich testified as witnesses for the Respondent, but they
neither denied that such instructions were given, nor did
they seek to explain what, if any considerations other than
union activities, prompted the instructions. Similarly, Bums
did not refute Whaley's testimony that a reason given for
the latters discharge was Bums ' observation of Whaley in
huddles, conversing with other employees.
With respect to the good cause justification advanced
by the Respondent for the discharges, W. C. Richards testi-
fied that sometime prior to December 10, and because of the
prior incidents which lead to the 2-day suspension, he in-
structed Plant Superintendent Bums to watch Whaley. It is
the Respondent's contention that Whaley again violated the
Company's rules on December 10 when he left a tank truck
of solvent unattended and with a hatch open on the top of
4 1 find a similar lack of ment in the Respondent's argument that Whaley
should be discredited because the two preheanng statements he gave to the
Board's agents contained no mention of his conversations with Habich and
Wulatm. Wulatin had warned Whaley to remain silent about the information
and assistance he had provided , and Whaley's explanation that he withheld
the information from the Board's agents in order not to jeopardize the super-
visors is both credible and reasonable
1074 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the tank . The record is not clear as to who observed and
reported Whaley's alleged derelictions on this occasion, but
Whaley admitted that he and the driver did leave the truck
after shutting off the equipment to take a coffeebreak. Wha-
ley did not deny , moreover , that a hatch on the top of the
tank truck may have been open , and that it was raining on
the morning of December 10.
On the whole of the record in these cases , I am not
convinced that Whaley 's conduct on December 10 precip-
itated his discharge . While the Respondent makes much of
its rule requiring an employee to be present during the un-
loading of solvents , the record reveals that no employee was
present when the driver started the unloading process on the
morning in question . Whaley testified , moreover, and with-
out contradiction, that on prior occasions he had taken his
regularly scheduled coffeebreak while assisting in unloading
solvent, and no one had complained of the practice or repri-
manded him for leaving the truck . As to the open hatch,
there is no contradiction of Whaley 's testimony that he
could not see the hatch from the ground , and that it was the
driver's responsibility to secure the hatch . As Whaley's un-
controverted testimony further reveals , he had been in-
structed not to climb on top of the tank truck because of the
accident risk involved . In weighing the merits of the
Respondent's assertion of the dangers inherent in Whaley's
conduct on December 10, I have also considered the com-
plete absence of evidence in the record of any corrective
action taken with respect to the truckdriver . There is no
evidence that in connection with the December incident, or
the one which preceded it in November , the Respondent
counselled or cautioned the truckdriver , or his employer,
about the rules requiring constant attendance during the
unloading process.
Although the Respondent contends that Whaley's mis-
conduct on the morning of December 10 triggered his sum-
mary discharge , the record contains no evidence of any
immediate event or incident to explain the equally instanta-
neous discharge of Beryle Garside. Garside had been sus-
pended in November for leaving work without permission.
In addition, Supervisor Robert Cooley testified that he had
complained to Plant Superintendent Bums about Garside's
work . Cooley 's testimony, however, is replete with inconsis-
tencies and the absence of specifics as to what incidents
prompted his complaints to Burns , or when they were
voiced . It is clear that Cooley made no complaints about
Garside during the period immediately preceding the
latter's discharge . It is equally clear from Cooley 's testimo-
ny that he had similar or more serious problems with other
employees under his supervision , but his complaints did not
result in the same summary discipline meted out to Garside.
Again, in weighing the merits of the Respondent's as-
serted reasons for Garside 's discharge , I have considered
evidence in addition to the absence of any event or incident
to explain the summary nature of the termination. Bums
told Garside that his discharge was prompted by Cooley's
dissatisfaction with Garside 's work and his failure to fulfill
the Company's expectations . When Garside confronted
Cooley after the discharge , however, Cooley denied that he
had complained to Bums about Garside's work, and insist-
ed that Garside's work was fine . Cooley did not deny the
testimony of Whaley and Charles Ponce to this effect, and
he similarly did not deny the testimony that he told Garside
that Bums was trying to pin the whole matter of the dis-
charge on Cooley.
Accordingly , and upon all of the pertinent and ger-
mane evidence in the record , I find and conclude that the
Respondent discharged Whaley and Garside in violation of
Section 8 (a)(3) and ( 1) of the Act . As found above, the
Respondent was aware that a union organizing campaign
was in progress in the plant , and it knew or urgently suspect-
ed that Whaley and Garside were involved . As to timing, the
discharges of the two employees coincided to a remarkable
degree with the onset of the union organizing campaign.
With respect to the justifications for the discharges ad-
vanced by the Respondent , I reject them as not being the
motivating causes for the terminations . It is granted that
neither Whaley or Garside were model employees, and both
had been subjected to prior discipline for infractions of the
Company's rules . As reviewed above , however , the Respon-
dent seized upon the prior infractions as a cause for dis-
charge only after it had determined that Whaley and
Garside were involved in a campaign to obtain union repre-
sentation for its employees . Finally , as to animus, the
Respondent 's disregard for the rights of its employees to
engage in union and other protected activities is evinced by
the discharges themselves , and corroborated by the
Respondent 's conduct following commencement of the
strike and the Union 's demand for recognition . As I have
found that the discharges of Whaley and Garside violated
the Act, I also find and conclude that the strike of the
employees which began on December 10 was in protest of
the discharges , and, accordingly , was caused and has been
prolonged , at least in part, by the Respondent 's unfair labor
practices.
B. The Refusal to Bargain and the Discharge
of the Strikers
When the employees on the day shift walked out on
strike at noon on December 10, they first gathered in front
of the plant, and then decided to meet as a group at Chicken
Unlimited-a restaurant located some distance from the
plant . Whaley and Garside remained in front of the plant
to await the arrival of the night shift employees and to direct
them to the site of the meeting . After the first group of
employees arrived at Chicken Unlimited employee Charles
Ponce distributed the, authorization cards he had received
from Peter Harrison on the previous evening . Ponce ex-
plained to the employees that they should sign the cards if
they wished to be represented by a union. To the extent
Ponce had sufficient cards , the employees filled the cards
out in their own handwriting and signed them. Shortly af-
terwards Whaley and Garside arrived at Chicken Unlimited
with the employees from the night shift ; Ralph and Ray
Estrada , and Gabriel and Salvador Alvarez . Ponce obtained
additional cards from Whaley , which he distributed to those
employees who had not received a card , again with the
explanation that they should sign the cards if they wanted
union representation . The additional cards were filled out
and signed by the employees , and then returned to Ponce
or to Peter Harrison after he arrived at the restaurant.
After Whaley arrived at Chicken Unlimited he called
W. C. RICHARDS CO. 1075
Harrison to apprise him of the whereabouts of the employ-
ees. Harrison arrived shortly thereafter, accepted the au-
thorization cards , and informed the employees that they
would be going into the Steelworkers Union. As he had on
the previous evening , Harrison explained that he would
demand recognition from the Company , but if this was
refused he could petition for an election . Harrison then
suggested that the group return to the plant to demand
recognition and the reinstatement of Whaley and Garside.
Harrison and the employees, or at least some of them,
returned to the Respondent's plant. Accompanied by em-
ployees Whaley, Garside, and Ponce, Harrison entered the
plant and asked to speak to W. C. Richards. Richards was
not available, but Assistant to the President Arthur Gay
came out. Harrison informed Gay that the United Steel-
workers represented a majority of the Respondent's em-
ployees , requested the Respondent to recognize the Union
as the representative of its production and maintenance
employees, and demanded the reinstatement of Whaley and
Garside. Gay replied that the Respondent had been unable
to contact its lawyer , and there was no one at the plant with
authority to make a decision. Gay stated that he could not
make such a decision, and Harrison replied, "Well, the plant
won't work Monday [and] I will have the pickets up."
Harrison and the employees left the plant and congre-
gated at the edge of the parking lot. While Harrison was
instructing the employees on the details of the picketing
which was to begin on Monday, December 13, Gay came
out of the building and approached the group. Gay told the
employees that if they wanted to return to work the Respon-
dent would be glad to have them, but if they did not return
they would have to leave the Company's premises.
The picketing of the Respondent's plant began at 6
a.m. on December 13, and the strike and picketing were still
in progress at the time these cases were heard . Between 8
and 10 a.m. on December 13, Harrison , again accompanied
by employees Whaley, Garside, and Ponce, entered the
plant and asked to talk to W. C. Richards. The group was
informed that Richards was not available, but they were
ushered into an office where Gay and Bums were seated.
Harrison explained that the Union represented a majority
of the Respondent's employees, and he demanded recogni-
tion and the reinstatement of Whaley and Garside. Harri-
son also explained that if the Respondent doubted his claim
of majority representation, the Union would agree to a
check of the authorization cards by a neutral third party.
Gay who was taking notes, replied, "I understand, but I
can't make a decision ... Mr. Richards is meeting with the
lawyer now." Harrison repeated that the picketing would
continue until the Respondent granted recognition to the
Union, and he and the employees left the plant.
Harrison, accompanied by employees Garside, Ponce,
larussi, Havlich, and Rudy Ortiz again entered the plant on
December 15. Harrison told Arthur Gay that the group
wanted to speak to W. C. Richards. Gay replied that Rich-
ards didn't want to speak to the group, and in fact didn't
even want to speak to Gay. Accordingly, Harrison asked
Gay to deliver a message to Richards to the effect that the
employees were willing to come back to work. Gay left and
returned in a short while with the message that the employ-
ees had quit and were no longer employed by the Company.
Harrison protested that the employees had not quit, but
were striking for recognition, and the group then left the
plant .5 In the interim, on December 14, the Union formal-
ized its demand for recognition and bargaining by a letter
directed to W. C. Richards by Samuel E. Perish, subdistrict
director of the United Steelworkers. In the letter Perish
notified the Respondent of the Union's majority status, and
demanded recognition and a prompt meeting for bargain-
ing. In the letter Perish also agreed to submit the authoriza-
tion cards signed by the employees to a representative of the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service as a means of
verifying the Union's claim of majority status . Insofar as the
record reflects the Respondent made no reply to Perish's
letter. ThieRespondent did, however, on December 20 send
a letter to Peter Harrison, in which it attacked the legality
of the picketing of its premises and threatened a lawsuit
against the Union to recover damages.
The record also contains other correspondence perti-
nent to the Union's demand for recognition and the dis-
charge and refusal to reinstate the strikers which was sent
or received by the parties after the last face-to-face confron-
tation on December 15. On December 21, Miguel Arias, a
staff representative for the AFL-CIO, directed a letter to W.
C. Richards, and Anas followed this correspondence with
a second letter to Richards on the same date. In these letters
the Union repeated its claim of majority status and its de-
mand for recognition and bargaining, and again informed
the Respondent that the strike had been caused by the
discharges of Whaley and Garside. In the second letter
Arias related the cause of the picketing for recognition, but
also informed the Respondent that the 15 striking employ-
ees had not quit their employment and were ready and
willing to return to work. Again, there is no evidence that
the Respondent replied to either letter, but on January 4,
1972, the Respondent directed individual letters to the strik-
ing employees, informing them that they had been dis-
charged on December 10, and enclosing a form pertinent to
the continuation of their insurance coverage . In response,
on January 21, 1972, the attorney for the Union directed a
letter to the Respondent's attorney advising that the 13
employees engaged in the strike unconditionally offered to
return to work. Insofar as the record reflects the Respon-
dent did not reply to the letter, but during the course of the
hearing it again expressed its position that the striking em-
ployees had been discharged and would not be reinstated.
C. The Appropriate Bargaining Unit and
The Union's Majority Status
The complaint alleges, the answer admits , and I find
that the following described unit of the Respondent's em-
ployees constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of
the Act:
All production and maintenance employees employed
at Respondent's Blue Island , Illinois facility, but ex-
5 On December 16, the Union filed a petition for a representation election,
but the petition was withdrawn on January 24, 1972, with the approval of the
Regional Director for Region 11
1076 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
cluding office clerical and professional employees,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
The record reflects that on December 10, the date of
the Union's initial request for recognition and bargaining,
the Respondent employed a total complement of 23 produc-
tion and maintenance employees. This figure includes em-
ployees Whaley and Garside, who are found above to have
been discriminatorily discharged prior to the Union's re-
quest for recognition. The figure of 23 also includes Ralph
Quint, who, I have found above to be a leadman and not
a supervisor, but excludes supervisors Homer Cooley, Rob-
ert Cooley, Roy Wulatin, Donald Habich, and Ricardo
Flores.
At the time that Peter Harrison requested recognition
from Arthur Gay on the afternoon of December 10, the
Union had in its possession 15 authorization cards, includ-
ing two signed by employees Whaley and Ponce on Decem-
ber 9, and 13 signed by employees who were present at the
meeting at Chicken Unlimited on December 10. I find that
the cards, which contain the following statement, are valid
authorizations for collective bargaining representation, and
for the reasons related below I also find that they were duly
executed by the employees with knowledge that they would
be used to demand recognition and bargaining from the
Respondent:
AUTHORIZATION FOR REPRESENTATION BY
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR and
CONGRESS Of INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
I desire to be represented by a Union which is part
of the AFL-CIO and/or its appropriate affiliates as my
Bargaining Agent in matters of wages , hours and other
conditions of employment.
When Harrison met with employees Whaley and Ponce
on the evening of December 9, he responded to their ques-
tions about the necessary steps to secure union representa-
tion by informing them that it would be necessary for the
employees to sign authorization cards. Harrison furnished
Whaley and Ponce with 17 blank cards and instructed them
to secure the signatures of other employees by explaining
that the execution of the cards constituted a request by the
employees for representation by the AFL-CIO. Harrison
also informed Whaley and Ponce that when the employees
had signed the cards he would request recognition from the
Respondent, but if the request was refused he would file a
petition for an election with the Board.
After the employees left work in protest of the dis-
charges of Whaley and Garside, they met at Chicken Un-
limited and Ponce distributed the cards in his possession
with the explanation that the employees should sign the
cards if they desired to be represented by the Union. After
Whaley and Garside arrived at the meeting with the em-
ployees from the night shift, Ponce obtained and distributed
additional cards with the identical explanation that the em-
ployees should sign if they wanted union representation.
Harrison arrived shortly thereafter, the cards were turned
over to'him, and he informed the employees that they would
be represented by the Steelworkers Union. Harrison also
told the employees that he would demand recognition from
the Company, but if the demand was refused he would
petition for an election. Harrison suggested that the group
return to the plant to demand recognition, and the rein-
statement of Whaley and Garside. Harrison demanded rec-
ognition within the next few minutes, and the demand was
repeated and again rejected by the Respondent on Decem-
ber 13, 14, and 21 and January 21, 1972.
In contest of the authenticity of the authorization cards
and the Union's demand for recognition, the Respondent
has advanced several contentions. First, the Respondent
argues that the Union did not represent a majority of the
employees in the unit because all of the employees on the
day shift had been terminated before they signed the cards
and before Harrison's demand for recognition. In support
of this argument the Respondent relies on the testimony of
Bums and Richards that the employees who walked out of
the plant at noon on December 10 were discharged in ac-
cordance with its long established policy of summary termi-
nation of any employee who fails to report to work, and that
the discharges were made without knowledge to the Re-
spondent that the employees had gone on strike in protest
of the discharges of Whaley and Garside. According to
Bums' testimony, he discharged the day-shift employees
shortly after he discovered that they had failed to return to
work at the conclusion of the lunch period, and that he did
so without knowledge of the reasons which prompted the
employees to absent themselves from work. Bums also testi-
fied that simultaneously with the discharges of the day-shift
employees, he instructed the Respondent's supervisory per-
sonnel that the employees were not to be rehired. As to the
four employees on the night shift, Burns testified that he
discharged them when they failed to report for work at the
regularly scheduled time on the afternoon of December 10.
Accordingly, on the basis of its established employment
rules and Bums' testimony concerning the timing of the
discharges of the day-shift employees, the Respondent con-
tends that the Union lacked a majority when the demand
for recognition was made on the afternoon of December 10.
Further, the Respondent asserts that the walkout of the
employees on December 10 was not protected concerted
activity, and that the employees did not undertake any pro-
tected concerted conduct until they began picketing on De-
cember 13 in support of their demand for recognition. For
the reasons related below, I reject each of the Respondent's
contentions, assertions and arguments.
I have found above on the basis of clear and uncon-
tradicted evidence in the record that the strike which began
on December 10 was undertaken by the employees in pro-
test of the discharges of Whaley and Garside. As the dis-
charges of Whaley and Garside contravened the provisions
of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, the strike was an unfair labor
practice strike ab initio, and the Respondent's discharges
and subsequent refusals to reinstate the strikers because
they engaged in this form of protected concerted activity
constitute additional violations of Section 8(a)(3). However,
even if, contrary to my finding above, the discharges of
Whaley and Garside were determined to have been for non-
discriminatory reasons, the strike of the employees in pro-
test of the discharges would still constitute concerted
activity protected by Section 7 of the Act, and the
Respondent's termination and refusals to reinstate the strik-
W. C. RICHARDS CO.
ers would still constitute violations of the Act .6 As the Board
and the courts have held, "the determination of whether a
`labor dispute' exists does not depend on the manner in
which the employees choose to press the dispute, but rather
on the matter they are protesting. Where a `labor dispute'
exists, the employees may engage in a peaceful primary
strike or any other lawful manner of protest and still retain
the protection of the Act."' As for the Respondent's rule
requiring summary discharge of employees who absent
themselves from work, whatever its efficacy for other pur-
poses the rule cannot serve to justify the discharge of em-
ployees because they have engaged in activities protected by
Section 7 of the Act.8 "When a `labor dispute' exists, the Act
allows employees to engage in any concerted activity which
they decide is appropriate for their mutual aid and protec-
tion, including a strike, unless, unlike the situation here, that
activity is specificially banned by another part of the stat-
ute, or unless it falls within certain other well-established
proscriptions." 9 Inasmuch as the employees engaged in
protected concerted activity in conjunction with a "labor
dispute," the strike was protected, and the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(3) by discharging them. Accordingly, I
find that all of the 15 employees who designated the Union
as their bargaining representative enjoyed employment sta-
tus at the time the cards were executed, as well as at the
times the Union made its demand on the Respondent for
recognition and bargaining.
I also reject the Respondent's assertion that it had no
knowledge of the reason why the employees walked out on
December 10, as I reject its assertion that the employees
were discharged as soon as Bums determined that they had
failed to return from lunch. Considering the activities of the
employees in the plant which immediately preceded their
departure on December 10, it is incredible to suggest that
the strike and the reason which prompted it were unknown
to the Respondent's agents . Even if it were the fact, howev-
er, that the employees undertook a strike without notice to
the Respondent, this fact would neither detract from the
protection afforded their concerted activity nor justify the
Respondent's actions in discharging and refusing to rein-
state them.10 As to the timing of the discharges, the record
contains persuasive evidence to contradict the testimony of
Bums and Richards that the employees were discharged
before Harrison made the demand for recognition. The rec-
ord reflects that after Harrison and the employees left the
plant on the afternoon of December 10, Arthur Gay ap-
proached them and informed the employees that if they
wished to return to work the Respondent would be glad to
have them-but if not, they would have to leave the
Company's premises. Considering Gay's position as an offi-
cer and a responsible management official of the Respon-
dent, I find it unlikely that he would have invited the
employees to return to work if Richards and Bums had
already promulgated an order discharging the strikers and
prohibiting their rehire. Similarly, Harrison and some of the
6 N.L R B v Solo Cup Company, 237 F.2d 521, 526 (C.A. 8), enforcing 114
NLRB 121.
7 Plasuhte Corporation, 153 NLRB 180, 184 , citing N.L.R.B. v. Mackay
Radio & Telegraph Co„ 304 U S. 333, 334
8 N.L.R.B. v Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 16.
9 Plastihte Corporation, supra, citing N.LR B v. Solo Cup Company, supra
10 Washington Aluminum Co, supra.
1077
employees met with Gay and Bums on the morning of
December 13, but the record evidence I credit reflects that
no mention was made of the alleged discharges. It was not
until December 15, when Harrison made an unconditional
offer for the employees to return to work, that the
Respondent's management informed the employees of the
discharges. Finally, on January 4, 1972, after a further un-
conditional offer to return to work, the Respondent notified
the strikers, in writing, that they had been discharged as of
December 10.
The Respondent has admitted that it discharged the
strikers because they walked out of the plant on December
10, and I have found that the employees were engaged in
protected concerted activities and their discharges violated
the Act. On the whole of the record, however, I also find
that the discharges of the strikers and the Respondent's
subsequent refusal to reinstate them were motivated by ad-
ditional considerations, equally proscribed by the provi-
sions of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. Contrary to the
Respondent's assertion, the discharges did not occur until
after the employees had authorized the Union to act as their
bargaining representative, the Respondent had been ap-
prised of the Union's majority status, and the Union had
demanded recognition and bargaining. I find, accordingly,
that the employees were discharged and refused rein-
statement because they engaged in union activities, as well
as protected concerted activities.
In contest of the Union's majority status and the validi-
ty of its demand for recognition, the Respondent also relies
on other contentions. It is argued, alternatively, that the
employees never authorized the United Steelworkers to rep-
resent them, and that the only authorizations made were to
the AFL-CIO. I find no merit in this argument. On the face
of the cards executed by the employees is a clear and express
authorization for representation by "the AFL-CIO and/or
its appropriate affiliates ...." At the meeting with the
employees at Chicken Unlimited on December 10, Harrison
informed all of the card signers that they would be repre-
sented by the United Steelworkers, and he recommended
that the Respondent be immediately approached with a
demand for recognition. Although all of the employees had
signed cards at this juncture, there is no evidence that any
employee attempted to withdraw his authorization, and
there is no evidence that any employee voiced objection to
Harrison's suggestion to demand recognition from the Re-
spondent. I find, therefore, that the employees voluntarily,
and without coercion or misrepresentation, authorized the
United Steelworkers to represent them for purposes of col-
lective bargaining, with the knowledge that the cards would
be used to demand recognition from the Respondent."
During the course of the hearing the Respondent ob-
jected to the receipt in evidence of the cards executed by
employees Gabriel Alvarez, Raymond J. Morris, Marcos
Garcia, and Jose Flores, on grounds that the cards were not
authenticated by the signatories. More particularly, the Re-
spondent argues that since at least three of the named em-
ployees were present during the hearing, it was incumbent
upon the General Counsel to establish the authenticity of
the signatures, and the conditions under which the cards
11 Southbridge Sheet Metal Works, Inc, 158 NLRB 819, 820 , enfd . 380 F.2d
851 (G.A 1)
1078 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
were executed through testimony elicited from the individ-
ual signers. In my view the Respondent's objection goes to
the weight to be accorded the evidence, and not to the
admissability of the cards. The cards signed by the four
named employees were filled out and signed during the
course of the meeting at Chicken Unlimited on December
10. The cards were introduced in evidence through the testi-
mony of two other employees, Roger Havhck and Rudolph
Ortiz, who testified to the conditions under which the cards
were solicited, and who witnessed the employees as they
signed the cards. On the basis of this testimony, which is
unrefuted, I find that the cards of Gabriel Alvarez, Ray-
mond J. Morris, Marcos Garcia, and Jose Flores were prop-
erly authenticated and are valid authorizations for union
representation.12
Finally the Respondent contends that there is a conflict
in evidence as to whether the Union's demand for recogni-
tion was made on December 10 or December 13, that at no
time was there any specification of what unit was demand-
ed, and no proof was offered during the course of the hear-
mg with respect to the appropriateness of the unit.
As to these assertions, I credit the testimony of Peter
Harrison that on the afternoon of December 10 he told
Arthur Gay that he was from the United Steelworkers of
America, that the Union represented a majority of the
Respondent's employees, and that the Union was asking for
recognition for all production and maintenance employees.
On this testimony I find that Harrison made a clear and
concise demand for recognition on December 10 and spec-
ified the unit of employees sought. Assuming, arguendo,
however, that Harrison's demand of December 10 left the
Respondent in some doubt as to what was demanded, Har-
rison repeated the union's demand on December 13, again
specifying the claim of majority, the unit sought, and of-
fered to prove the Union's majority through recourse to a
card check by a neutral third party. On two occasions fol-
lowing December 13, the Union sent letters to the Respon-
dent repeating its demand for recognition, and specifying its
claim of majority in a unit of production and maintenance
employees. At no time did the Respondent ever question the
Union's claim of majority, and at no time did the Respon-
dent question the appropriateness of the unit, which by-the-
by the Respondent admitted by answer to be appropriate
for the purpose of collective bargaining. As the record clear-
ly reflects, Harrison's oral demands for recognition were
met with the singular plea that no one was present in the
Respondent's plant to entertain the Union's demand, and
the Union's written communications were ignored.
On the whole of the record I find and conclude that the
Union represented a majority of the Respondent's employ-
ees in an appropriate unit, and that the Union made a valid
demand for recognition and bargaining. I also find that the
Respondent refused the demand for reasons contrary to the
provisions of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
D. The Independent Violations of Section 8(a)(1)
The complaint alleges that on two separate instances
on December 31, through its agents Lawrence Bums and
Arthur Gay, and on another occasion on January 13, 1972,
12 The Colson Corporation, 148 NLRB 827, 839-40, enfd 347 F 2d 128
(C.A 8), cert. denied 382 U.S 904.
through its agent W. C. Richards, the Respondent harrassed
its striking employees by photographing them on the picket
line. The only witness who testified to the events surround-
ing these allegations was Peter Harrison, who related that
on January 6, 1972, a date suggested by the General
Counsel's question, he observed Arthur Gay at a window in
the office of the Respondent's plant, and that Gay was
pointing a camera toward the picket line. Gay then came
out a doorway and continued to point the camera at the
picket line. According to Harrison, Gay repeated this con-
duct on three other occasions on the same day. In addition
Harrison related that on January 13, again a date suggested
by the General Counsel's question, he observed W. C. Rich-
ards pointing a camera at Harrison and the pickets.
Harrison was cross-examined at length on the alleged
camera incidents, and without contradiction denied that the
picketing was attended by any violence or threats of vio-
lence. Harrison also denied mass picketing, physical ob-
struction of personnel or vehicles, and that the picketing
was conducted on any portion of the Respondent's prem-
ises. Harrison admitted that the pickets did talk to truck-
drivers entering the Respondent's premises to explain the
strike and solicit the drivers' cooperation not to cross the
picket line, but he denied that this activity was attended by
any physical force or threats to the drivers. Harrison also
admitted that on one occasion a picket entered onto the
Respondent's parking lot for the purpose of turning his
automobile around.
The Respondent adduced no testimony to controvert
the version of events related by Harrison, and it offered no
evidence to establish what, if any valid reason, prompted its
agents Gay and Richards to photograph or appear to photo-
graph the picket line. I find accordingly that the Respon-
dent's agent did photograph, or leave the impression of
photographing the picket line, and that the motive for this
conduct is that proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
There remains for consideration, nevertheless, the
question of whether this unlawfully motivated conduct in-
terfered with, restrained, or coerced the employees in the
exercise of their Section 7 rights. Harrison was the only
witness who testified to the camera incidents, and Harrison
is not an employee cloaked with the protection. There is no
direct evidence that employees witnessed the camera inci-
dents, although Harrison's testimony is clear that employees
were on the picket line when the incidents occurred, and the
camera was directed toward the pickets. Considering the
circumstances of the Respondent's photographing of the
picket line, the inference is permissible that the incidents
were witnessed by employees on the picket line. Assuming,
however, that no employee of the Respondent directly ob-
served the actual events when the picket line was photo-
graphed, the photographing was conducted under such
circumstances as to insure that the conduct would come to
their attention.13 I find, therefore, that the conduct of the
Respondent in photographing, or leaving the impression of
photographing, striking employees on the picket line consti-
tutes interference, restraint, and coercion of the employees
in the exercise of their Section 7 rights, and violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.14
13 Reeves-Ely Laboratories, Inc, et at, 76 NLRB 729, 733.
14 General Engineering, Inc, etc, 131 NLRB 901, 902, and cases cited at
908
W. C. RICHARDS CO. 1079
E. The Refusal to Bargain
and the Appropriateness of a
Bargain Order
As found above, the Union represented a majority of
the Respondent's employees in an appropriate production
and maintenance unit on and after December 10, 1971, and
on that date and several occasions thereafter requested the
Respondent to recognize the Union and bargain with re-
spect to wages , hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment. At no time prior to the hearing did the Re-
spondent advance any reason for its failure and refusal to
honor the Union's request. During the course of the hearing,
however, the Respondent asserted the absence on its part of
any obligation to recognize the Union on grounds that the
Union lacked majority status, that the request to bargain
was invalid, and the Union failed to designate an appropri-
ate unit. These contentions have been disposed of above,
contrary to the Respondent' s arguments . As I have also
found above, by failing and refusing to honor the Union's
request the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act. The question remains as to whether, under the
circumstances of these cases , an order requiring the Respon-
dent to recognize and bargain with the Union is appropri-
ate, and, if so, on what rationale.
In their brief arguments for the appropriateness of a
bargaining order, the General Counsel and the Charging
Union assert that such an order is warranted on grounds of
record evidence displaying the complete absence of the
Respondent's good-faith doubt of the Union's majority.
More particularly, the General Counsel and the Union rely
on the Respondent's failure to question the Union's claim
of majority and its bad faith as evinced by its unlawful
conduct, which they contend was calculated to undermine
the Union and destroy its majority status.
Under current precedent, however, I am persuaded to
the view that the efficacy of a bargaining order in these
cases is to be determined from application of the standards
promulgated by the United States Supreme Court in the
Gissel 1 case, rather than from application of the subjective
"good-faith doubt" test.16
In Gissel the Supreme Court reaffirmed what had been
long before established-a union does not have to be certi-
fied as the result of a Board-conducted election to invoke
a bargaining obligation. A union can "establish majority
status by other means under the unfair labor practice provi-
sion of Section 8(a)(5)-by showing convincing support for
instance, by ... possession of cards signed by a majority of
the employees authorizing the Union to represent them for
collective bargaining purposes." From the findings made
above, it is clear in these cases the Union established its
majority status by showing convincing support in the form
of valid authorizations obtained from 15 of 23 of the
Respondent's employees in an appropriate unit.
In discussing the appropriateness of issuing a bargain-
ing order in Gissel, the Supreme Court expressed cognizance
of the existing practice of the Board, approved by the courts,
of imposing such an order in "exceptional cases marked by
15 N.L.R.B. v. Gusel Packing Company, 395 U.S. 575.
16Joy Silk Mills, Inc, 85 NLRB 1263, enfd . 185 F.2d 732 (C A.D.C.).
`outrageous' and `pervasive' unfair labor practices ... of
such a nature that their coercive effects cannot be eliminat-
ed by the application of traditional remedies , with the result
that a fair and reliable election cannot be had." 17 The Su-
preme Court held in addition, however:
The only effect of our holding here is to approve
the Board's use of the bargaining order in less extraor-
dmary cases marked by less pervasive practices which
nonetheless still have the tendency to undermine majori-
ty strength and impede the election processes. The
Board's authority to issue such an order on a lesser
showing of employer misconduct is appropriate, we
should re-emphasize, where there is also a showing that
at one point the union had a majority; in such a case,
of course, effectuating ascertainable employee free
choice becomes as important a goal as deterring em-
ployer misbehaviour. In fashioning a remedy in the
exercise of its discretion, then, the Board can properly
take into consideration the extensiveness of an
employer's unfair practices in terms of their past effect
on election conditions and the likelihood of their recur-
rence in the future. If the Board finds that the possibility
of erasing the effects of past practices and of ensuring a
fair election (or a fair rerun) by the use of traditional
remedies, though present, is slight and that employee sen-
timent once expressed through cards would, on balance, be
better protected by a bargaining order, then such a order
should issue. [Emphasis supplied.]
In these cases the Respondent's unfair labor practices
may well be characterized as egregious, if not "outrageous"
and "pervasive." The Respondent discharged its employees
Whaley and Garside because of their union activities, sym-
pathies, and interests. When the employees undertook an
unfair labor practice strike in protest of the discriminatory
discharges, and thereafter authorized the Union to repre-
sent them and to demand recognition and bargaining, the
Respondent retaliated by discharging all of the strikers. On
the heels of refusing the Union's valid request for recogni-
tion and bargaining, the Respondent dishonored the em-
ployees' valid and unconditional offer to abandon the strike
and return to work. Thereafter, the Respondent capped off
its prior unlawful conduct by photographing the employees
while they were engaged in the exercise of their protected
right to picket its premises. All of this conduct caused and
prolonged the unfair labor practice strike which began on
December 10.18
It cannot be said, of course, that the discharges of
Whaley and Garside tended to undermine the Union's ma-
jority, since it had no majority at the time of these dis-
charges, but thereafter acquired a majority. Nor can it be
said on the basis of the record before me that the Union has,
in fact, lost the majority it acquired on December 10. It can
be said, nevertheless, that the Respondent' s continuing
course of unlawful conduct has the "tendency" to under-
17 Citing, among other cases , N.L R.B v Logan Packing Co, 386 F .2d 562,
570 (C.A. 4)
18 I am not unmindful of evidence in the record that the picketing was in
part directed to the Union's demand for recognition and bargaining, i.e.,
economic in nature The strike, nevertheless, was clearly caused by the dis-
cnmmatory discharges of Whaley and Garside, and the Respondent 's later
unfair labor practices , particularly its refusal to honor the employees ' uncon-
ditional requests to return to work, prolonged the strike.
1080 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
mine the Union's majority strength and to impede the elec-
tion processes. It can also be said, to paraphrase the ration-
ale of the Supreme Court, that the possibility of erasing the
effects of the Respondent's unfair labor practices is not only
slight, but remote, and the employees' sentiment for union
representation will be, on the balance, protected by the
issuance of a bargaining order, rather than by recourse to
traditional remedies and the election process. I find that a
bargaining order is appropriate in these cases.
In summary I find and conclude that the Respondent
(1) violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by photographing its
striking employees on the picket line, thereby interfering
with, restraining, and coercing them in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act; (2) that it violated
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by discharging James Whaley and
Beryle Garside because of their union sympathies, interests,
and activities; (3) that the Respondent additionally violated
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by discharging its striking employ-
ees because they had engaged in union and protected con-
certed activities; (4) that it further violated Section 8(a)(3)
of the Act by failing and refusing for the same unlawful
reasons to reinstate its striking employees after they had
made an unconditional offer to return to work; and (5) that
the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by failing
and refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union as the
majority representative of its employees in an appropriate
bargaining unit. I also find and conclude that the strike
which began on December 10, 1971, was caused and pro-
longed by the Respondent's unfair labor practices.
V THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent, set forth in section
IV, above, occurring in connection with its operations de-
scribed in section I, above, have a close, intimate and sub-
stantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States and tend to lead to and have led to labor
disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free
flow of commerce.
VI THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in,
and is engaging in unfair labor practices in violation of
Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, I shall recommend that it be ordered to
cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative
actions designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
As I have found that the Respondent discharged its
employees James Whaley and Beryle Garside in violation of
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, I shall recommend that it be
ordered to offer them immediate and full reinstatement to
their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substan-
tially equivalent positions, with seniority and all rights and
privileges previously enjoyed, and to make them whole for
any loss of earnings they suffered by reason of the discrim-
ination, by payment to them of a sum equal to what they
would have earned in the absence of the discrimination, less
net earnings during such period, with backpay computed on
a quarterly basis in the manner prescribed in F. W. Wool-
worth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and the backpay shall carry
interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum , as established
in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716.
As I have also found that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(3) by discharging and failing to reinstate its
striking employees upon their unconditional application to
return to work, I shall recommend that the Respondent be
ordered to offer the employees named below immediate and
full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no
longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, dis-
charging if necessary any employees hired after the com-
mencement of the strike on December 10, 1971, and the
Respondent shall accord to the employees ordered to be
reinstated all seniority and other rights and privileges they
previously enjoyed. I shall also recommend that the Re-
spondent be ordered to make whole the employees it dis-
charged and failed to reinstate by payment to them of a sum
equal to that which they would have earned as wages, from
the date of the Respondent's failure to reinstate them on the
date of December 15, 1971, until the offer of reinstatement,
less net earnings during such period, and said backpay shall
be computed and bear interest in the manner recommended
in the foregoing paragraph:
Gabriel Alvarez Marcos Garcia
Ignacio Alvarez Roger Havlick
Salvador Alvarez John larussi
Ray Estrada Raymond Morris
Rafael Estrada Rudolph Ortiz
Jose Flores Charles Ponce
Uriel Villagomez
As the record in this case reflects that on or about
January 4, 1972, the Respondent terminated certain insur-
ance coverage for those of its employees who were discrim-
inatorily discharged and refused reinstatement, I shall
recommend that it be ordered to reinstate the policy, or
provide essentially similar coverage, and make the employ-
ees whole for any losses they suffered or sums they were
required to pay as a result of the cancellation.
In order to determine the amounts of backpay due and
the rights of reinstatement under these recommendations, I
shall further recommend that the Respondent be ordered to
preserve and make available to the Board, upon request, all
payroll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, insurance records, and all
other records necessary and useful to effectuate the rec-
ommendations made above.
As I have found that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) of the Act by failing and refusing to recognize and
bargain with the Union, and as I have also found that a
bargaining order is warranted in these cases , I shall recom-
mend that the Respondent be ordered to recognize and,
upon request, bargain with the Union as the sole and exclu-
sive bargaining representative for the Respondent's employ-
ees in the bargaining unit specified in section IV, C above,
with respect to wage, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment.
As the unfair labor practices committed by the Re-
spondent are of such nature and character as to strike at the
basic rights of employees safeguarded by the Act, I shall
further recommend that the Respondent be ordered to cease
and desist from infringing in any other manner upon the
W. C. RICHARDS CO.
rights of its employees guaranteed by Section 7 of the
Act.'9
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, W. C. Richards Co., is an employ-
er engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-
CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
3. W. C. Richards, Arthur Gay, Lawrence Burns, Rob-
ert Cooley, Homer Cooley, Roy Wulatin, Donald Habich,
and Ricardo Flores are supervisors within the meaning of
Section 2(11) of the Act, and agents of the Respondent
within the meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act.
4. All production and maintenance employees em-
ployed by W. C. Richards Co. at its Blue Island , Illinois
facility, but excluding office clerical and professional em-
ployees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, con-
stitute a unit appropriate for the purpose of collective
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
5. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, is the
sole and exclusive representative of the employees of the
Respondent in the bargaining unit described above within
the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
6. By photographing, or giving the impression of photo-
graphing, its employees on the picket line, the Respondent
has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
7. By discharging its employees James Whaley and
Beryle Garside because of their union activities, sympathies,
and interests, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1), and
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
8. By discharging its employees who had engaged in the
strike which began on December 10, 1971, and by refusing
to reinstate the employees in accordance with their uncondi-
tional application to return to work on December 15, 1971,
the Respondent has engaged, and is engaging in, unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1)
and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
9. By failing and refusing on and after December 10,
1971, to recognize and bargain with the United Steelworkers
of America, AFL-CIO, as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of its employees in the unit described above,
the Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
10. The strike of the employees against the Respondent
which began on December 10, 1971, was caused and has
been prolonged by the Respondent's unfair labor practices
in violation of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) and Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and the entire record in this proceeding, and pursuant
to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following
recommended:
19 N.LR. B. v. Entwhistle Manufacturing Co., 120 F.2d 532, 536 (C.A. 4).
ORDER20
1081
The Respondent, W. C. Richards, Co., its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Photographing employees, or leaving the impres-
sion that it is photographing employees, while they are en-
gaged in concerted activities protected by Section 7 of the
Act.
(b) Discharging employees, or refusing to reinstate
striking employees upon their unconditional application,
because of the employees' interests, sympathies, or activities
on behalf of the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-
CIO, or any other labor organization, or because the em-
ployees have engaged in concerted activities protected by
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.
(c) Refusing to recognize and bargain with the United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, as the sole and exclu-
sive bargaining representative of its employees in the fol-
lowing described bargaining unit:
All production and maintenance employees em-
ployed by W. C. Richards Co. at its Blue Island, Illi-
nois, facility, but excluding office clerical and
professional employees, guards and supervisors as de-
fined in the Act.
(d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights to self-
organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion as guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, or to refrain from
any or all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer James Whaley and Beryle Garside immediate
and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs
no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, with-
out prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges
previously enjoyed, and make them whole for any loss of
earnings they may have suffered by reason of the discrim-
ination against them in the manner set forth in the section
hereof entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Offer the employees named below immediate and
full reinstatement to their jobs or, if those jobs no longer
exist, to substantially equivalent positions, discharging if
necessary any employees hired after December 10, 1971,
with all seniority and rights and privileges previously en-
joyed, and make the employees whole for any loss of earn-
ings they may have suffered by reason of the failure to
reinstate them in accordance with their unconditional appli-
cation of December 15, 1971, the make-whole provision to
be in the manner set forth in the section hereof entitled "The
Remedy:"
20 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102.46 of the
Rules and ' Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall , as provided in Section
102 48 of the Rules and Regulations be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions and Order , and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
1082 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Gabriel Alvarez Marcos Garcia
Ignacio Alvarez Roger Havlick
Salvador Alvarez John larussi
Ray Estrada Raymond Morris
Rafael Estrada Rudolph Ortiz
Jose Flores Charles Ponce
Uriel Villagomez
(c) Notify the employees named in subparagraphs (a)
and (b), above, if presently serving in the Armed Forces of
the United States, of their right to full reinstatement upon
application after discharge from the Armed Forces, in ac-
cordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal
Military Training and Service Act.
(d) Reinstate, or provide essentially similar insurance
coverage for the employees named in paragraph (b) above,
and make the employees whole for the losses they suffered
or costs they encountered, if any, as a result of the cancella-
tion of their insurance coverage on or about January 4,
1972.
(e) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
National Labor Relations Board and its agents, for exam-
ination and copying, all payroll records, social security rec-
ords, timecards, personnel records and reports, insurance
records, and all other records relevant and necessary to
determine the reinstatement rights and the amounts of
backpay due under the terms of this recommended Order.
(f) Recognize and, upon request, bargain collectively
with the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, as the
sole and exclusive representative of all employees in the unit
described in paragraph 1(c) above, and, if an understanding
is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agree-
ment.
(g) Post at its Blue Island, Illinois, facility copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix."21 Copies of said no-
tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region
11, after being duly signed by the Respondent's representa-
tive, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reason-
able steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that
said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by other
material.
(h) Notify the Regional Director for Region 11, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from receipt of this Decision as to what
steps have been taken to comply herewith.22
21 In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read
"Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board "
22 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board after
exceptions have been filed , this provision shall be modified to read : "Notify
the Regional Director for Region 11, in writing, within 20 days from the date
of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT photograph, or leave the impression
that we are photographing our employees while they
are engaged in concerted activities protected by Sec-
tion 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL NOT discharge our employees, or refuse to
reinstate them upon their unconditional application
because of their union activities, sympathies or inter-
ests on behalf of the United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization , or because
they have engaged in concerted activities protected by
Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL NOT refuse to recognize and bargain with
the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, as the
sole and exclusive bargaining agent of our employees
in the following appropriate bargaining unit:
All production and maintenance employees em-
ployed by W. C. Richards Co. at its Blue Island,
Illinois facility, but excluding office clericals and
professional employees, guards, and supervisors as
defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their
rights to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, to engage in concert-
ed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection as guaranteed by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act, or to refrain from any and all such
activities.
WE WILL offer James Whaley and Beryle Garside
immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs,
or if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equiva-
lent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or
other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and WE
WILL make them whole for any loss of earnings they
may have suffered as a result of our discrimination
against them, together with interest thereon at 6 per-
cent per annum.
WE WILL offer the employees named below imme-
diate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if
those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent
positions, discharging if necessary any employee hired
after December 10, 1971, with all seniority and rights
and privileges previously enjoyed, and WE WILL make
the employees whole for any loss of earnings they may
have suffered by reason of our refusal to reinstate them
in accordance with their unconditional application of
December 15, 1971; together with interest thereon at 6
percent per annum.
W. C. RICHARDS CO. 1083
Gabriel Alvarez
Ignacio Alvarez
Salvador Alvarez
Ray Estrada
Rafael Estrada
Jose Flores
Marcos Garcia
Roger Havlick
John Iarussi
Raymond Morris
Rudolph Ortiz
Charles Ponce
W. C. RICHARDS CO
(Employer)
Uriel Villagomez
WE WILL reinstate , or provide essentially similar
insurance coverage for the employees named above,
and make the employees whole for losses they suffered,
or costs they encountered, if any , by reason of our
cancellation of their insurance coverage on or about
January 4, 1972.
WE WILL recognize and, upon request , bargain col-
lectively with the United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO, as the sole and exclusive representative of
our employees in the unit described above, and, if an
understanding is reached, embody such understanding
in a signed agreement.
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
We will notify the above-named individuals, if pres-
ently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, of
their right to full reinstatement upon application after dis-
charge from the Armed Forces, in accordance with the Se-
lective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and
Service Act.
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning
this notice or compliance with its provisions may be direct-
ed to the Board's Office, 1624 Wachovia Building, 301
North Main Street, Winston-Salem, North Carolina 27101,
Telephone 919-723-2300.