VMware, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 26, 2022

2020003813 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 26, 2022)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/752,794 06/26/2015 Tal Zamir C292.02 5148 152689 7590 01/26/2022 Novum Patent Services 515 Powhattan Ave San Francisco, CA 94110 EXAMINER CHU JOY, JORGE A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2195 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 01/26/2022 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): aram@novumpatent.com ipadmin@vmware.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte TAL ZAMIR Appeal 2020-003813 Application 14/752,794 Technology Center 2100 Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., ERIC S. FRAHM, and DAVID M. KOHUT, Administrative Patent Judges. KOHUT, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claim s 1, 4-8, 11-15, 18-20, 22, 24, and 26- 29, which constitute all the claims pending in this application. Claims 2, 3, 9, 10, 16, 17, 21, 23, and 25 have been cancelled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use “Appellant” to reference the applicant as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as “VMware, Inc.” Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2020-003813 Application 14/752,794 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant’s Invention Appellant’s invention “generally relates to computer virtualization and more particularly relates to propagating changes from a virtual machine clone to a physical host computing device in hosted hypervisor environments.” Spec. ¶ 2. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of argued subject matter. 1. A method for retaining changes made in a virtual machine clone of a host computing device, the method comprising: executing a virtual machine clone of the host computing device by using a hosted hypervisor operating within a host operating system on the host computing device, the host computing device being a physical device, wherein the virtual machine clone has been cloned from the host computing device on which the virtual machine clone is executed, wherein the virtual machine clone is booted from a synthesized virtual disk that is synthesized by the hosted hypervisor operating on the host computing device, wherein the synthesized virtual disk is comprised of a master boot record (MBR) of the host computing device, a read-only snapshot, and a delta virtual disk, wherein the synthesized virtual disk is a thinly provisioned virtual machine disk (VMDK) that contains the MBR that has been replicated from the host computing device in a first sector of the thinly provisioned VMDK such that a size of the thinly provisioned VMDK is one sector at the time of booting the virtual machine clone; recording one or more changes that were made on the virtual machine clone to the delta virtual disk of the synthesized virtual disk; receiving a request to propagate the one or more changes from the synthesized virtual disk of the virtual machine clone to the host computing device on which the virtual machine clone was executed and from which the virtual machine clone was cloned; Appeal 2020-003813 Application 14/752,794 3 scanning the one or more changes in the synthesized virtual disk by a first agent operating in the virtual machine clone, wherein the one or more changes are communicated from the first agent to a second agent operating in the host operating system by using a local in-memory communication interface without establishing a network connection, wherein the first agent and the second agent reside on the same host computing device; determining whether the one or more changes in the synthesized virtual disk contain installed applications, operating system changes or settings; if the one or more changes in the synthesized virtual disk contain installed applications, operating system changes, or settings, storing the one or more changes in a designated staging directory on the host operating system by the second agent operating in the host operating system; and during a reboot of the host computing device, merging the one or more changes from the staging directory to the host computing device. Appeal Br. 17-18 (Claims Appendix). Rejections Claims 1, 4-8, 11-15, and 18-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Banga (US 2013/0132691 Al; publ’d May 23, 2013), Marshall (US 2012/0246640 A1; publ’d Sept. 27, 2012), Chester (US 8,346,727 B1; issued Jan. 1, 2013), Waldspurger (US 7,529,897 B1; issued May 5, 2009), Khandelwal (US 8,156,301 B1; issued Apr. 10, 2012), and Mellor (US 2015/0033217 A1; publ’d Jan. 29, 2015). Final Act. 2-19. Claims 22, 24, and 26 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Banga, Marshall, Chester, Waldspurger, Khandelwal, Mellor, and Naik (US 8,453,145 B1; issued May 28, 2013). Final Act. 19- 20. Appeal 2020-003813 Application 14/752,794 4 Claims 27-29 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Banga, Marshall, Chester, Waldspurger, Khandelwal, Mellor, and Bata (US 6,901,403 B1; issued May 31, 2005). Final Act. 21- 23. OPINION Appellant addresses independent claim 1 with particularity (Appeal Br. 9-15), asserts the “remarks made with reference to claim 1 are . . . equally applicable to [independent] claims 8 and 15” (id. at 15), and asserts dependent claims 4-7, 11-14, 18-20, 22, 24, and 26-29 “are allowable . . . over the cited references at least for being dependent on an allowable base claim” (id.). As such, we select claim 1 as representative of the group comprising claims 1, 4-8, 11-15, 18-20, 22, 24, and 26-29. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). For the below reasons, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s decision to reject claim 1. We accordingly sustain the rejections of claims 1, 4-8, 11-15, 18-20, 22, 24, and 26-29. Appellant first argues that the applied prior art does not teach or suggest2 the following claim limitations: determining whether the one or more changes in the synthesized virtual disk contain installed applications, operating system changes or settings; 2 More particularly, Appellant states that “[t]he proposed combination of references fails to disclose” the quoted claim limitations. Appeal Br. 9. We understand this statement as contending, and correctly so, that the combination must achieve each claim feature. We note, however, the combination need not implement a prior-art teaching of each claim feature. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (“[Obviousness] analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim [. A] court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.”). Appeal 2020-003813 Application 14/752,794 5 if the one or more changes in the synthesized virtual disk contain installed applications, operating system changes, or settings, storing the one or more changes in a designated staging directory on the host operating system[.] Appeal Br. 9-12 (arguments), 17 (Claim s Appendix). According to Appellant, the Examiner finds that Mellor teaches the argued claim features and errs as follows: The Examiner’s position appears to be that [Mellor’s] allowing [of] a developer to make changes to an XML configuration file . . . is equivalent to [the claimed] determining [of] whether changes made to a synthesized virtual disk during execution of a virtual machine clone contain installed applications, operating system changes or settings[.] This position cannot be supported by any reasonable interpretation of Mellor. Firstly, an XML configuration file is not the same as a synthesized virtual disk of a virtual machine. Secondly and more importantly, Mellor is completely silent with regard to the step of determining whether the changes to the synthesized virtual disk made during execution of the VM clone contain installed applications, operating system changes or settings. [M]erely tracking a user’s edits to a file would not enable the system to determine what type of changes were made to the synthesized virtual disk during execution of the VM clone. . . . Virtual disks are not generally edited by users in the way that configuration files or text files are and it would not make any sense to track a user’s edits in the context of a virtual disk. Certainly, the simple ability to track a user’s edits to a file would not enable the system to determine whether the changes made by the system to the synthesized virtual disk during execution of the VM contain any installed applications, OS changes or settings, as recited in claim 1. . . . . . . . [Also,] Mellor does not take the changes from a synthesized virtual disk made during execution of the VM and store them in a staging directory on the host computing device on which the VM clone was executed, as required by the claimed limitations. Appeal 2020-003813 Application 14/752,794 6 At most, Mellor merely describes placing a configuration file into a shared library, which is clearly not equivalent to the limitations recited in claim 1. Id. at 10-11. We are not persuaded because Appellant is distinguishing the argued claim limitations over Mellor’s invention, whereas the Examiner reads the limitations on Banga’s invention as modified in view of Mellor. See In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“Non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking references individually where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a combination of references.”). Before addressing Appellant’s contentions, we first explain the Examiner’s reading of the argued claim limitations on Banga’s modified invention. The claimed host computing device (CD), virtual machine (VM) clone, synthesized virtual disk (VD), and delta VD (of the synthesized VD) are respectively read on Banga’s legacy VM (LVM) 240, untrusted code VM (UCVM), VD 630, and delta store disk (of the VD 630). Final Act. 3- 4. The claimed “one or more changes that were made on the [VM] clone to the delta [VD] of the synthesized [VD]” are read on changes “within UCVM 260 . . . [to] files in restricted file system 260A” stored by the VD 630 (id. at 3), captured by the delta store disk (id. at 5), and “propagated, with[] express consent from the user, to file system 242 maintained by LVM 240” stored by the (id. at 3). See also Banga ¶ 62 (“[The] local copy of the file system in the UCVM contains all the usual Windows and Program files[.]”). Thus, the Examiner’s proposed combination of the applied prior art implements Banga’s invention as follows: some changes to the UCVM 260’s files of the restricted file system 260A are selectively propagated to the LVM 240; and this propagation occurs by way of the delta Appeal 2020-003813 Application 14/752,794 7 store disk capturing those changes to the VD 630 and the UCVM 260 providing those changes to the LVM 240’s file system 242. Final Act. 3-5. The claimed “determining whether the one or more changes in the synthesized virtual disk contain installed applications, operating system changes or settings” is read on Banga’s invention as modified in view of Mellor. Final Act. 13-14; Ans. 4-5. Specifically, in view of Mellor’s teaching that a “delta file 408 can be created by tracking a user’s edits to the copy of the file[,] . . . created by comparison between the starting and ending documents[, and] . . . include[] only the differences between config file 406 and blank config file 404” (Final Act. 13 (citing Banga ¶¶ 72, 95)), the Examiner concludes it would have been obvious for Banga’s invention to determine and capture, on the delta store disk, the UCVM 260’s changes to applications, the OS, or settings stored by the files of the restricted file system 260A (id. at 13-14; Ans. 4-5). The claimed “if the one or more changes in the synthesized virtual disk contain installed applications, operating system changes, or settings, storing the one or more changes in a designated staging directory on the host operating system” is read on Banga’s invention as further modified in view of Mellor. Final Act. 13-14; Ans. 4-5. Specifically, in view of Mellor’s teaching that “[t]he delta file [408] is . . . included in an Oracle metadata services (MDS) customization file [that] is then sent back to the cloud service provider and put in a shared library (i.e., staging directory) of class files” (Final Act. 14 (citing Banga ¶ 17)), the Examiner concludes it would have been obvious for the above propagating to include providing of the delta store disk’s respectively captured changes to a staging directory of the LVM 240 (id. at 13-14; Ans. 4-5). Appeal 2020-003813 Application 14/752,794 8 In view of the above, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s above-quoted contention that the Examiner finds “[Mellor’s] developer . . . changes to an XML configuration file . . . [are] equivalent to [the claimed] determining whether changes made to a synthesized virtual disk during execution of a virtual machine clone contain installed applications, operating system changes or settings.” Appeal Br. 10 (block-quoted above). Rather, we understand the Examiner’s pertinent determinations to be as follows: Banga’s propagated changes of the UCVM 260’s files in the restricted file system 260A may include changes of applications, the OS, or settings; a person of ordinary skill in the art (herein “artisan”) would contemplate a user selecting those changes for propagation (e.g., as part of consenting to those changes); and Mellor’s above teachings show an artisan would have contemplated performing the selective propagation of the changes via by the proposed use of Banga’s delta store disk. Appellant does not sufficiently rebut these findings. For example, Appellant does not show that Mellor’s use of the delta file 408 fails to evidence an obviousness of using Banga’s delta store disk as proposed. See In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (concurrence) (“[Under t]he practice referred to as the ‘prima facie case[,]’ the PTO may meet its burden of persuasion initially by showing reasons why the applicant is not entitled to a patent” and “[t]his shifts the burden of production (of evidence) to the applicant to show why the PTO is wrong-to rebut the prima facie case.” (citations omitted)); see also In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining an examiner’s burden to establish a prima facie case). Appeal 2020-003813 Application 14/752,794 9 We are also not persuaded by Appellant’s above-quoted contention that “[Mellor’s] mere[] tracking [of] a user’s edits to a file would not enable the system to determine what type of changes were made to the synthesized virtual disk during execution of the VM clone.” Appeal Br. 11 (block-quoted above). As discussed, the Examiner does not propose a combination of the applied prior art whereby Banga’s invention bodily incorporates Mellor’s exact manner of determining and propagating changes of configuration data. See supra 7-8 (discussion of Mellor); see also In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981) (“The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference[.]”). Rather, the Examiner determines that Mellor shows it would have been obvious for Banga’s invention to perform the selective propagating of the UCVM 260’s changes by using the delta store disk in the manner proposed. See supra 7-8 (discussion of Mellor). To persuasively contend the Examiner’s reliance on Mellor is not enabled, as is argued, Appellant must rebut that (but does not even address whether) the proposed manner of selectively propagating the UCVM 260’s changes was beyond an artisan’s technical grasp. Further, even assuming (arguendo) the Examiner proposes a bodily incorporation of Mellor’s cited features into Banga’s invention, Appellant’s above contention-Mellor “would not enable the system” (Appeal Br. 11)- is presented as a mere conclusion of Appellant’s attorney that enabling such incorporation was beyond an artisan’s technical grasp. Such contentions are not persuasive. See In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“An assertion of what seems to follow from common experience is just attorney argument and not the kind of factual evidence that is required to Appeal 2020-003813 Application 14/752,794 10 rebut a prima facie case of obviousness.”); Leapfrog Enterprises, Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Leapfrog presents no evidence that the [proposed modification] was uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art.” (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007)); see also In re Morsa, 713 F.3d 104, 110 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Once an applicant makes a non-frivolous argument that cited prior art is not enabling, . . . the examiner must address that challenge.”); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 1312, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[I]ssues . . . adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.”3 (quotation marks and citation omitted)). We are also not persuaded by Appellant’s above-quoted contention that Mellor does not “take the changes from a synthesized virtual disk made during execution of the VM and store them in a staging directory.” Appeal Br. 12 (block-quoted above). As discussed, the Examiner analogizes Mellor’s shared library to a staging directory, finds that Mellor teaches to propagate the delta file 408’s captured changes to the shared library, and accordingly determines it would have been obvious for Banga’s modified invention to propagate the UCVM 260’s changes (to files in the restricted file system 260A) from the delta store disk to a staging directory of the LVM 240. See supra 7-8 (discussion of Mellor). Appellant does not address this proposed implementation of Banga’s invention in view of 3 But see In re Google Tech. Holdings LLC, 980 F.3d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“[F]orfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right[. W]aiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” (brackets, quotation marks, and internal citations omitted)). Appeal 2020-003813 Application 14/752,794 11 Mellor. For example, Appellant does not rebut that an artisan would analogize Mellor’s shared library to a staging directory. Appellant rather attacks Mellor’s invention, alone, as not propagating “changes from a synthesized virtual disk made during execution of the VM” to a staging directory. Appeal Br. 12; see also Merck, 800 F.2d at 1097 (parenthetically described at supra 6). Appellant secondly argues that the applied prior art does not teach or suggest the following claim limitations: scanning the one or more changes in the synthesized virtual disk by a first agent operating in the virtual machine clone, wherein the one or more changes are communicated from the first agent to a second agent operating in the host operating system by using a local in memory communication interface without establishing a network connection, wherein the first agent and the second agent reside on the same host computing device; . . . . if the one or more changes in the synthesized virtual disk contain installed applications, operating system changes, or settings, storing the one or more changes in a designated staging directory on the host operating system by the second agent operating in the host operating system[.] Appeal Br. 11-12 (arguments), 17 (Claims Appendix). Appellant addresses only the claimed use of two agents to respectively perform the VM clone operation (scanning) and host CD operation (storing). Id. at 12. Specifically, Appellant contends (and only so) that “Mellor never once mentions any first or second agent operating in any context whatsoever[.]” Id. at 12. We are not persuaded because the claimed use of “agents” was added to the proposed combination of prior art in view of Khandelwal. Appeal 2020-003813 Application 14/752,794 12 Final Act. 11-13; Ans. 5. The Final Action is clear as to this reliance on Khandelwal. Final Act. 11-13. For example, the Final Action states “[i]t would have been obvious . . . to include modules/agents to perform delta file replication to the main system locally . . . because . . . utilizing modules/agents in both ends of the system would minimize down time [and] thereby improv[e] clone VM data backup availability to restore upon recovery after a failure.” Id. at 13 (citing Khandelwal col. 1, ll. 37-39). The Final Action also maps Khandelwal’s teachings to “i.e., first agent” (Final Act. 11) and “i.e., second agent” (id. at 12). No other prior art is cited as teaching or suggesting an agent nor even mentioned in connection with an agent. In the Reply Brief, Appellant contests the Examiner’s above reliance on Khandelwal. Reply Br. 2. Given the Final Action’s clarity as to this reliance, the Reply Brief’s contentions should have been presented in the Appeal Brief and were accordingly forfeited. See SmithKline, 439 F.3d at 1320 (“An issue is waived4 unless a party raises it in its opening brief[.]” (quotation marks and citation omitted)); Ex parte Nakashima, 93 USPQ2d 1834 (BPAI 2010) (informative) (“An expanded panel was convened in this appeal to consider whether arguments that could have been presented in the Principal Brief on Appeal, but were not, may be presented in the Reply Brief in the absence of a showing of good cause. We conclude that the regulations set out in 37 C.F.R. § 41 (2009) . . . do not require the Board to consider such belated arguments.”). Appellant thirdly argues that the applied prior art does not teach or suggest the following claim limitations: 4 But see supra n.3. Appeal 2020-003813 Application 14/752,794 13 executing a virtual machine clone of the host computing device . . . , the host computing device being a physical device, wherein the virtual machine clone has been cloned from the host computing device on which the virtual machine clone is executed[.] Appeal Br. 12-13 (arguments), 17 (Claims Appendix). According to Appellant, the Examiner finds that Marshall teaches these claim limitations and errs as follows: Marshall teaches the possibility that a clone [VM] and the original [VM] from which the cloned VM was cloned may execute on the same [CD]. However, this [is] different from [the claimed] executing [of] a VM clone of a physical device on the same physical device from which the VM clone was cloned, as recited in claim 1. . . . . . . Marshall also [teaches] that a machine instance can correspond to an actual physical machine or to a virtual machine. However, once again, Marshall contains no teaching that a VM clone of a physical device is launched on that same physical device, as recited in claim 1. Id. at 12-13. We are not persuaded because Appellant is distinguishing the argued claim limitations over Marshall’s invention, whereas the Examiner reads the limitations on Banga’s invention as modified in view of Marshall. See Merck, 800 F.2d at 1097 (parenthetically described at supra 6). Before addressing Appellant’s contentions, we first explain the pertinent features and modification of Banga’s invention. The combination implements Banga’s UCVM 260 clone of the LVM 240 (Banga ¶ 57) and thereby provides several features. First, the cloning provides a “guest” UCVM 260 and respective OS (Banga ¶ 36) in addition to the “host” LVM 240 and respective OS (id. ¶ 51). See also id., abst. Second, the changes to the UCVM 260’s files in restricted file Appeal 2020-003813 Application 14/752,794 14 system 260A do not impact (are not propagated to) the LVM 240’s files in file system 242 (i.e., the guest does not impact the host) without user consent (e.g., of an administrator-user). Id., abst., ¶ 60. Third, by these properties, the UCVM 260-“Untrusted Code Virtual Machine”-provides a “dedicated VM” for the user to “create[] on-demand” and “run any application that requires access to . . . untrusted data.” Id. ¶ 56. Banga explains the purpose of the UCVM 260 as follows: A UCVM operates under the assumption that, in general, any code that connects to the network and interacts with arbitrary code executing on an external device may at some point be compromised. This assumption also applies to trusted applications that interact with data originating from outside the computer system executing the trusted application, because such data may, at some point, contain embedded malicious code. To address such possibilities, such applications are executed in a UCVM to prevent any malicious code, inadvertently introduced into the UCVM, from having the capacity to affect any change outside of the UCVM. Id. Given the above, the proposed combination provides a reason (even a specific circumstance and respective advantage) for an administrator-user to create the UCVM 260 clone on the same physical CD as the LVM 240; the reason being to use the UCVM 260 clone to safely introduce code to the LVM 240. The proposed combination of applied prior art modifies Banga’s invention, in view of Marshall, by implementing the host LVM 240 as a physical CD. Final Act. 6-7; Ans. 7-8. Marshall supports this modification by teaching that “a machine instance 127 [can] correspond[] to an actual physical machine or to a virtual machine” with respect to an “original machine instance” and “clone machine instance.” Marshall ¶ 11; see also Final Act. 6 (citing this disclosure). Appeal 2020-003813 Application 14/752,794 15 In view of the above features, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s above-quoted contentions that Marshall merely teaches a clone VM and cloned/original VM may execute on the same physical CD. Appeal Br. 12- 13; see also supra 13 (block quote). These contentions do not rebut the following, above-noted support for modifying Banga’s invention in view of Marshall: Banga and Marshall teach executing of a clone VM and cloned VM on the same physical CD; Marshall teaches a cloned VM can instead be a cloned physical CD; and Banga’s invention would provide the above benefits of executing a clone VM (safely introducing code) regardless of whether (i) a clone VM and cloned VM execute on the same physical CD or (ii) a clone VM executes on a cloned physical CD. Supra 13-14. For example, Appellant does not show that the above-discussed benefit of Banga’s invention safely interacting with possibly-malicious code would be inapplicable to the proposed executing of the UCVM 260 as a clone VM on a cloned physical CD. Nor does Appellant show that executing a clone VM on a cloned physical CD was beyond an artisan’s technical grasp. Appellant fourthly argues that the Examiner’s reliance on Waldspurger is based on impermissible hindsight. Appeal Br. 13-14. Specifically, and contesting the Examiner’s reasons to modify Banga’s invention so as to perform the claimed “receiving a request to propagate the one or more changes . . .” in view of Waldspurger, Appellant contends: [T]he Examiner’s own proposed motivation “to receive a request to propagate the changes done to a clone [VM] to the main computing system to retain any changes the user might want to keep” is taken directly from the specification and claim s of the present Application. The Waldspurger reference teaches using checkpoints in virtual machines[;] it does not provide any suggestion of propagating changes done to a clone Appeal 2020-003813 Application 14/752,794 16 [VM] back to the main computing system from the which the [clone] VM . . . was cloned. Appeal Br. 14. We agree with Appellant inasmuch that Waldspurger’s cited disclosures do not describe a request to propagate data changes of one entity to another. See Waldspurger col. 8; col. 13, ll. 22-24, 50-58; col. 27, ll. 12- 44; Final Act. 9-10 (citing Waldspurger col. 8; col. 13, ll. 22-24, 50-58; col. 27, ll. 12-44). However, for two reasons, we are unpersuaded of reversible error (see Jung, 637 F.3d at 1365 (“reversible error”)) in the Examiner’s determination that the applied prior art suggests the claimed “receiving a request to propagate the one or more changes . . . .” First, inclusion of such a request by the proposed combination of the applied prior art is suggested by Banga’s teaching that the UCVM 260’s propagating of changes to the LVM 240 occurs in response to consent (e.g., a request) of a user. See Banga ¶ 60; see also Final Act. 3 (citing this disclosure). Second, even assuming (arguendo) a further suggestion is needed, the Examiner’s above-quoted reason for the combination to include such a request-“to retain any changes the user might want to keep” (Final Act. 10)-is common sense and consistent with Banga’s teaching to allow changes of the impermanent “guest” UCVM 260 to be selectively kept by requiring consent to propagate the changes to the permanent “host” LVM 240. See Banga, abst. (describing a “guest” and “host” architecture); id. ¶¶ 51 (describing the LVM 240 as “the primary entity” and “analogous to the managed enterprise OS of corporate computer system . . . [that] maintains various enterprise applications”), 56 (describing the UCVM 260 as “created on-demand”). Appeal 2020-003813 Application 14/752,794 17 Appellant fifthly argues that the Examiner’s reliance on Mellor is based on impermissible hindsight. Appeal Br. 14-15. Specifically, and contesting the Examiner’s reasons to modify Banga’s invention so as to perform the claimed “merging the one or more changes from the staging directory to the host computing device” in view of Mellor, Appellant contends: [T]he Examiner’s proposed motivation of “desire of implementing the changes to the main/parent system if the user determines that the changes should be permanent” is taken from the teachings of the present Application and not from any of the cited references. Mellor . . . does not provide any motivation of implementing changes to any “main/parent system” if the user determines that the changes should be permanent, as proposed by the Examiner. Appeal Br. 14-15 (quoting Final Act. 15). We agree with Appellant inasmuch that the Examiner’s above-quoted reason to modify Banga’s invention in view of Mellor-to propagate changes of a clone VM to the cloned system-is not a teaching of Mellor’s cited disclosures. See Mellor ¶¶ 16-18, 72, 77, 95; Final Act. 13-14 (citing these disclosures). However, for the following reasons, we are unpersuaded of reversible error (see Jung, 637 F.3d at 1365 (“reversible error”)) in the Examiner’s reliance on Mellor. Contrary to Appellant’s argument, the Examiner does not rely on Mellor as teaching a mechanism to propagate changes of a clone VM to the cloned system. Final Act. 14-15. Rather, and as discussed, the Examiner determines that Mellor suggests a mechanism for Banga’s propagating of changes by the UCVM 260 to the LVM 240. Supra at 7-11 (describing the Examiner’s reliance on Mellor). Specifically, the Examiner determines that Mellor’s description of the delta file 408 shows it would have been Appeal 2020-003813 Application 14/752,794 18 obvious for the propagation to occur via Banga’s delta store disk as proposed (and described above). Id. And, the Examiner’s reasoning is that an artisan would analogize Banga’s delta store disk to Mellor’s delta file 408 and would accordingly contemplate using the delta store disk to propagate a user’s changes to the UCVM 260 in a manner similar to Mellor’s use of the delta file 408 to propagate a developer’s changes to a configuration file. Id. Appellant does not rebut the Examiner’s above, specific reliance on Mellor. For example, Appellant does not rebut that Mellor’s delta file 408 and Banga’s delta store disk are sufficiently similar for the delta file 408 to suggest the proposed modification of Banga’s invention in view of Mellor.5 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claim s 1, 4-8, 11-15, 18-20, 22, 24, and 26-29. 5 The analogy seems reasonable because Banga’s delta store disk and Mellor’s delta file 408 are both described as capturing changes to configuration data by a user. Supra at 7-11 (describing the Examiner’s reliance on Mellor). Further, like Banga’s invention and as reflected by the Examiner’s above quoted reason to modify Banga’s invention in view of Mellor (Final Act. 15; see also supra 17 (block quote)), Mellor’s delta file 408 propagates the captured changes from a VM to a host system inasmuch as sending such changes from a client device to the client’s service provider for incorporation into a library (see supra 7-8 (describing Mellor’s delta file 408)). Appeal 2020-003813 Application 14/752,794 19 DECISION SUMMARY Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 4-8, 11-15, 18-20 103 Banga, Marshall, Chester, Waldspurger, Khandelwal, Mellor 1, 4-8, 11-15, 18-20 22, 24, 26 103 Banga, Marshall, Chester, Waldspurger, Khandelwal, Mellor, Naik 22, 24, 26 27-29 103 Banga, Marshall, Chester, Waldspurger, Khandelwal, Mellor, Bata 27-29 Overall Outcome 1, 4-8, 11-15, 18-20, 22, 24, 26-29 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this Appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED