VMWARE, INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 8, 2021

2020004504 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 8, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/444,350 02/28/2017 ALOK NEMCHAND KATARIA C901 3918
152569 7590 10/08/2021
Patterson + Sheridan, LLP - VMware
24 Greenway Plaza
Suite 1600
Houston, TX 77046
EXAMINER
MEJIA, FELICIANO S
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2492
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/08/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ipadmin@vmware.com
psdocketing@pattersonsheridan.com
vmware_admin@pattersonsheridan.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ALOK NEMCHAND KATARIA, WEI XU, RADU RUGINA,
JEFFREY W. SHELDON, JAMES S. MATTSON, RAKESH AGARWAL,
and DAVID DUNN

Appeal 2020-004504
Application 15/444,350
Technology Center 2400
____________

Before JUSTIN BUSCH, CATHERINE SHIANG,
and NORMAN H. BEAMER, Administrative Patent Judges.

BEAMER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 1–20.1 We have jurisdiction over the pending rejected
claims under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We REVERSE.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies VMware, Inc. as the real party in
interest. (Appeal Br. 3.)
Appeal 2020-004504
Application 15/444,350

2

THE INVENTION
Appellant’s disclosed and claimed invention is directed to
mechanisms to protect the integrity of memory of a virtual machine.
(Abstr.)
Independent claim 1 is representative:
1. A method for protecting memory of a virtual computing
instance executing within a host computer, the method
comprising:
receiving a first request, from a component
executing within the virtual computing instance, to
protect a first memory page;
determining, by examining a privilege mode of the
virtual computing instance, that the component is
permitted to make the first request;
protecting the first memory page by updating a
data structure that tracks protected memory pages thereby
defining a first protected memory page;
detecting a write to the first protected memory
page;
responsive to the detecting, identifying an alert
action for the first protected memory page; and
performing the alert action.
(Appeal Br. 15 (Claims Appx.))
REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 11, and 16 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Rajagopal et al. (US 2007/0055837 A1,
pub. Mar. 8, 2007). (Final Act. 7–9.)
Appeal 2020-004504
Application 15/444,350

3

The Examiner rejected claims 2, 4–6, 12, 14, 15, 17, 19, and 20 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Rajagopal and Wright et al. (US
8,799,879 B2, iss. Aug. 5, 2014). (Final Act. 9–15.)
The Examiner rejected claims 3, 13, and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Rajagopal and Sallam (US 9,038,176 B2, iss. May
19, 2015). (Final Act. 15–16.)
The Examiner rejected claims 7–10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Rajagopal and Lukacs et al. (US 2017/0286673 A1, pub.
Oct. 5, 2017). (Final Act. 16–20.)
ISSUE ON APPEAL
Appellant’s arguments present the following dispositive issue:2
Whether the Examiner erred in finding that Rajagopal discloses the
independent claim 1 limitation, “determining, by examining a privilege
mode of the virtual computing instance, that the component is permitted to
make the first request,” and the commensurate limitations in independent
claims 11 and 16. (Appeal Br. 9–10.)
ANALYSIS
In rejecting the independent claims anticipated by Rajagopal, the
Examiner finds, with respect to the claim requirement at issue:
Rajagopal does not explicitly teach examining a “privilege
mode” of a software application. However Rajagopal teaches
well-known methods, procedures, components, and circuits

2 Rather than reiterate the arguments of Appellant and the legal conclusions
and findings of the Examiner, we refer to the Appeal Brief, filed Dec. 9,
2019 (“Appeal. Br.”); the Reply Brief, filed May 29, 2020 (“Reply Br.”); the
Final Office Action, mailed June 5, 2019 (“Final Act.”); and the Examiner’s
Answer, mailed Apr. 2, 2020 (“Ans.”) for the respective details.
Appeal 2020-004504
Application 15/444,350

4

such as typical memory protection schemes [used] to control
memory access can be based upon an application’s privilege
level, e.g., kernel mode and application/user mode (Rajagopal,
pars. 0006 and 0012).
. . . .
[Rajagopal] may include a Guest Software Agent capable of
attempting to allocate and access specific memory portions, and
a Process Memory Table utilized to correlate memory portions
with various access and control flags, i.e., marking the allocated
memory portion as protected from access, such as, for example
memory reads and writes. As to examining a “privilege mode”,
Rajagopal, (pars. 0006 and 0012) discloses well-known
methods, procedures, components, and circuits such as typical
memory protection schemes [used] to control memory access
can be based upon an application’s privilege level, e.g., kernel
mode and application/user mode). . . .
(Final Act. 6, 8; see also Ans. 6. (emphasis omitted).)
Appellant argues that, rather than examining a privilege mode to
determine if there is permission to make the asserted protection request,3
Rajagopal discloses a process wherein a software agent or application that
requests memory is verified by comparing the application’s code image to a
“golden image,” such as a hash of the application’s code, which is not
examining a privilege mode of the application. (Appeal Br. 9–10; Reply
Br. 2.) Appellant further argues that the Examiner’s concedes that
Rajagopal does not explicitly teach examining a privilege mode of a
software application, instead relying on a general reference to privilege
modes in the background section of Rajagopal, is inconsistent with an
anticipation rejection. (Id. at 10.)

3 Appellant also argues that Rajagopal does not disclose the independent
claim requirement of receiving a request to protect a memory page. (Appeal
Br. 8.) We do not need to address that argument to resolve this Appeal.
Appeal 2020-004504
Application 15/444,350

5

In response, the Examiner clarifies that the statement that “Rajagopal
does not explicitly teach examining a ‘privilege mode’” only meant that
Rajagopal used instead a term “privilege level” instead. (Ans. 7.)
Nonetheless, the Examiner only relies on the background section of
Rajagopal, stating that “‘examining a privilege mode’ is a well-known
practice in the art . . . .” (Ans. 6.) We agree with Appellant that this is an
insufficient basis for an anticipation rejection. (Reply Br. 2.)
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
independent claims 1, 11, and 16 as anticipated by Rajagopal. The
rejections of the dependent claims as obvious over the combination of
Rajagopal with Wright, Sallam, or Lukacs rely also on the Examiner’s
finding that Rajagopal discloses the claim limitation at issue. (Final Act. 9–
20.) Therefore, we also do not sustain the obviousness rejections of claims
2, 4–6, 12, 14, 15, 17, 19, and 20 over Rajagopal and Wright, of claims 3,
13, and 18 over Rajagopal and Sallam, and of claims 7–10 over Rajagopal
and Lukacs.

Appeal 2020-004504
Application 15/444,350

6

DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 11, 16 102(a)(1) Rajagopal 1, 11, 16
2, 4–6, 12,
14, 15, 17,
19, 20
103 Rajagopal, Wright 2, 4–6, 12,
14, 15, 17,
19, 20
3, 13, 18 103 Rajagopal, Sallam 3, 13, 18
7–10 103 Rajagopal, Lukacs 7–10
Overall
Outcome
1–20

REVERSED