VISA INTERNATIONAL SERVICE ASSOCIATION

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 22, 2020

2019005150 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 22, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/275,775 05/12/2014 Oleg Makhotin 79900-906422 3168
66945 7590 06/22/2020
KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP/VISA
Mailstop: IP Docketing - 22
1100 Peachtree Street
Suite 2800
Atlanta, GA 30309
EXAMINER
RAZA, ZEHRA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3685
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/22/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
KTSDocketing2@kilpatrick.foundationip.com
ipefiling@kilpatricktownsend.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte OLEG MAKHOTIN and ERICK WONG

Appeal 2019-005150
Application 14/275,775
Technology Center 3600

Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., DAVID M. KOHUT, and
IRVIN E. BRANCH, Administrative Patent Judges.

PER CURIAM

DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 2, 4, 8–13, 15, 19, and 20.2 We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use “Appellant” to reference the applicant as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as “Visa
International Service Association.” Appeal Br. 3.
2 Claims 3, 5−7, 14, and 16−18 were previously cancelled.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s Invention
Appellant’s invention relates to “mobile payment account generation
and provisioning.” Spec. ¶ 4. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of
argued subject matter.
1. A method for processing a wallet request from a wallet
provider through an interconnectivity hub, the wallet request
associated with a mobile communication device including a
secure element through an interconnectivity hub, the method
comprising:
storing, at a server computer associated with the
interconnectivity hub, a routing table including routing
information corresponding to predetermined secure element
management relationships, the routing table further including
protocol indicators for each of a plurality of trusted service
managers;
updating, by the server computer, the routing table to further
include additional routing information corresponding to
predetermined secure element management relationships for a
secure element trusted service manager computer, and to further
include a second protocol indicator of a second protocol
associated with the secure element trusted service manager
computer, the secure element trusted service manager computer
associated with the secure element;
receiving, by the server computer associated with the
interconnectivity hub, the wallet request associated with the
mobile communication device, the wallet request including an
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account identifier and a mobile communication device
identifier, the wallet request being in a first protocol;
determining, by the server computer, an issuer associated with
the account identifier;
obtaining, by the server computer, application data associated
with the issuer and the account identifier;
sending, by the server computer, the wallet request to a central
trusted service manager computer using a third protocol, the
central trusted service manager computer being associated with
the interconnectivity hub;
receiving, by the server computer, an acknowledgement
response message from the central trusted service manager
computer, the acknowledgement response message indicating
that the central trusted service manager computer has validated
the wallet request;
determining, by the server computer, a destination address of
the secure element trusted service manager computer using the
routing information corresponding to the predetermined secure
element management relationships stored in the routing table;
determining, by the server computer, the second protocol
associated with the secure element trusted service manager
computer using the routing table;
receiving, by the server computer, an eligibility check request
from the central trusted service manager computer to check an
eligibility of the mobile communication device for
provisioning;
sending, by the server computer, the eligibility check request to
the secure element trusted service manager computer using the
second protocol and the destination address;
receiving, by the server computer, an eligibility check response
from the secure element trusted service manager computer, the
eligibility check response including an indication of the
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eligibility of the mobile communication device for
provisioning;
sending, by the server computer, the eligibility check response
to the central trusted service manager computer using the third
protocol;
obtaining, by the server computer, a secure element key from
the secure element trusted service manager computer associated
with the secure element using the second protocol; and
providing, by the server computer, the application data and the
secure element key to a provisioning computer for delivery to
the secure element of the mobile communication device.
Appeal Br. 24–25 (Claims Appendix).
Rejections
Claims 1, 2, 4, 8–13, 15, 19, and 20 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to a judicial exception of § 101 (i.e., of
statutory subject matter) without significantly more. Final Act. 6–7.
Claims 1, 2, 4, 8, 9, and 11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as
failing to comply with the written description requirement. Final Act. 8–9.
Claims 1, 2, 4, 8, 9, and 11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as
being indefinite in scope. Final Act. 9–10.
Claims 1, 10, 11, and 12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Koh (US 2012/0130838 A1; May 24, 2012) and
Arvidsson (US 9,572,025 B2; Feb.14, 2017). Final Act. 10–13.
Claims 2, 4, 8, 9, 13, 15, 19, and 20 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Koh, Arvidsson, and Ginter
(US 5,892,900; Apr. 6, 1999). Final Act. 13–18.
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Principles of Law
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014) (citation omitted).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217−18 (citing Mayo Collaborative
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75−77 (2012)). In accordance
with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed
to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are
drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party
to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611
(2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept
of hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent-ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219−20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594−95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent-eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56
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U.S. 252, 267−68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that ”a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting
to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.”
Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace
that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim
that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure
‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing]
generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into
a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
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PTO Guidance
The PTO provides guidance for 35 U.S.C. § 101. USPTO’s 2019
Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7,
2019) (“Guidance”). Under the Guidance, we first look to whether the claim
recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, and mental
processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
(MPEP) § 2106.05(a)−(c), (e)−(h) (9th ed. 2018)).
84 Fed. Reg. at 52−55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and
(2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then
conclude the claim is directed to a judicial exception (id. at 54) and look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
Id. at 56.
OPINION
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35 U.S.C. § 112(a), WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
We are persuaded of error in the § 112(a) rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, 8,
9, and 11. We accordingly do not sustain the rejection.
We address the errors with reference to claim 1. The Examiner rejects
claims 2, 4, 8, 9, and 11 only because they depend from claim 1.
Final Act. 9.
A first at-issue claim limitation recites “updating, by the server
computer, the routing table to further include additional routing information
. . . and . . . a second protocol indicator of a second protocol.” Id. at 8. The
Examiner finds the Specification is “silent” as to the routing information and
protocol indicator. Id. Appellant contends:
The Specification provides written description . . . in stating the
[invention’s] hub may be a server computer, . . . includes a
routing table module, … [and] may use the routing table
module to determine an address and protocol . . . received
during the . . . registration process[.] . . . Thus, the routing
table is updated (e.g., during a registration process) to include
additional routing information and protocol indicators[.]
Appeal Br. 18 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 8, 51, 57, 167; internal quotation marks
omitted).
We agree with Appellant in view of the Specification’s cited
paragraph 167 stating that “the hub may use the routing table module to
determine an address and protocol . . . received during the on-boarding or
registration process.” Though the at-issue claim limitation requires
“updating” and paragraph 167 does not use this term to describe the receipt
and storing of an address and protocol, a plain meaning of “update” includes
“Computers. to incorporate new or more accurate information in (a database,
program, procedure, etc.).” Dictionary.com (https://www.dictionary.com/
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browse/update?s=t) (last visited May 26, 2020). As Appellant contends in
the Reply Brief, the Examiner’s response to the above argument does not
address paragraph 167 (Reply Br. 10; Ans. 7), much less show the disclosed
receipt and storing of an address and protocol fails to describe an “update.”
A second (and last) at-issue claim limitation recites receiving and
sending, “by the server computer,” both an eligibility check request and
eligibility check request response. Final Act. 8–9. The Examiner finds the
Specification describes these operations as being performed by the
invention’s “hub”—not by the invention’s “server computer.” Id. at 9.
Appellant contends, and the Examiner does not dispute, the Specification’s
paragraph 51 confirms “the hub may be a server computer.” Appeal Br. 18.
We agree with Appellant in view of the Specification’s cited
paragraph 51 stating that “the hub may be a server computer.” We add
that Appellant’s Figure 4 shows an “interconnectivity service hub 130” as
performing the at-issue receiving and sending steps and the Specification’s
paragraph 185 describes a “server computer of [that] hub (hub computer)
130.”
35 U.S.C. § 112(b), INDEFINITENESS
We are persuaded of error in the § 112(b) rejection of claims 1, 2, 4,
8, 9, and 11. We accordingly do not sustain the rejection.
We address the errors with reference to claim 1. The Examiner rejects
claims 2, 4, 8, 9, and 11 only because they depend from claim 1.
Final Act. 10.
A first at-issue claim limitation recites “receiving, by the server
computer associated with the interconnectivity hub, the wallet request.”
Id. at 11. The Examiner finds “this step is silent as to what sends the request
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to the server.” Id. at 9. Appellant contends, and we agree, the Examiner
fails to identify an uncertainty of claim scope that results from claim 1 not
identifying the sender of the wallet request or, generally speaking, from a
claim not identifying a sender of a message. Appeal Br. 19; Ans. 6–7;
Final Act. 9. We add the Examiner seems to take issue with the claim’s
resulting breadth—not indefiniteness. Application of Miller, 441 F.2d 689,
693 (CCPA 1971) (“[W]e cannot agree . . . that the omission of the
temperature . . . renders the claims indefinite. . . . [B]readth is not to be
equated with indefiniteness.”).
A second (and last) at-issue, claim 1 recites “receiving, by the server
computer, an eligibility check request from the central trusted service
manager computer” (CTSMC) and “sending, by the server computer, the
eligibility check request to the secure element trusted service manager
computer” (SETSMC).. The Examiner finds the limitation is indefinite
because it requires the claimed server computer to relay the eligibility check
request from the CTSMC to the SETSMC, whereas the Specification states
the CTSMC forwards the request to the SETSMC. See Final Act. 9–10
(citing Spec. ¶ 123). Appellant contends, and the Examiner does not
dispute, the Specification’s paragraph 123 describes the CTSMC as
generating the eligibility check request “to be” sent to the SETSMC and
paragraph 126 then states the hub 130 of step 410 (e.g., the claimed server
computer (see supra 12)) may receive this eligibility check request for
forwarding to the SETSMC. Appeal Br. 19; Ans. 6–7; see also Appellant’s
Fig. 4, steps 409–10.
We agree with Appellant in view of the Specification’s paragraph 125
disclosing the CTSMC sends the eligibility request and paragraph 126
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disclosing “the hub may receive the eligibility request . . . and may forward
the eligibility request to the [SETSMC].” We add that the Examiner seems
to take issue with the Specification’s disclosure of the at-issue claim
limitation—not an indefiniteness of claim scope. See Augme Techs., Inc. v.
Yahoo! Inc., 755 F.3d 1326, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Appellants argue
that the limitation is indefinite because the ‘320 patent [does not disclose] a
unique identifier as required by the claims. Appellants’ arguments appear to
be based on the wrong legal standard, i.e., written description or enablement
as opposed to indefiniteness.”).
35 U.S.C. § 101, PATENT ELIGIBILITY
We are persuaded of error in the § 101 rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, 8–
13, 15, 19, and 20. We accordingly do not sustain the rejection.
The error occurs for each of claims 1, 2, 4, 8–13, 15, 19, and 20,
which the Examiner addresses collectively (Final Act. 6–7; Ans. 4–6) aside
from noting minor differences between the independent claims (1 and 12)
(Final Act. 6). We address the errors with reference to claim 1.
The Examiner does not “take into consideration all the claim
limitations and how those limitations interact and impact each other.”
October 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance Update 12 (“Guidance Update”)
(available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
peg_oct_2019_update.pdf); see also 84 Fed. Reg. 55942 (Oct. 18, 2019)
(notifying the public of the Guidance Update). Rather, the Examiner
summarily characterizes all claim features as mere “communications
between financial institutions” (Ans. 4) and/or as “use [of] computer[s] as a
tool” (id.) to perform those communications. See also, generally, id. at 3–5.
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In doing so, the Examiner presents only three determinations. First,
the Examiner characterizes the claimed method as “receiving a wallet
request, determining an issuer, obtaining application data associated with the
issuer and account identifier, determining a trusted a service manager from
among a plurality of trusted service managers using a routing table[,] and
providing application data for delivery.” Id. at 4. Second, the Examiner
finds the above steps fall within the Guidance’s judicial-exception category
of “certain methods of organizing human activity’ . . . [because they] involve
. . . steps for processing [a] wallet request and facilitat[ing] . . .
communications between financial institutions.” Id. (internal quotation
marks, citation, and emphases omitted). Third, the Examiner finds the
claimed method’s “use of [a] server computer, mobile communication
device[,] and trusted service manager computer… requires no more than a
computer performing” the above steps. Id.
As Appellant argues, the Examiner’s determinations do not account
for the entirety of claim 1. Reply Br. 5–6. Rather, the determinations are
akin to finding claim 1 only recites financial transactions and a hub
that communicates those transactions. Id. at 3–4. Claim 1 also recites a
combination of actions for provisioning application data to a mobile device
and these actions are not shown to merely constitute a financial concept. Id.
These details cannot be summarily dismissed because each involves a
financial institution and/or customary use of a computer. The claimed
information and rules must be considered for their specificity. The need to
do so is perhaps best reflected in McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games
Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016), which addresses a patent-eligible
software implementation of an abstract idea (id. at 1307, 1316). McRO
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determined the at-issue claim overcame the underlying preemption concern
of § 101 by applying a specific combination of data and rules (“a keyframe
at a point that no phoneme is being pronounced”) to the identified abstract
idea (using “morph weights” to lip synchronize animation). Id. at 1306–07,
1314–15; see also Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53 n.19 (“McRO, 837 F.3d
at 1313[,] recognizing that the court must look to the claim[] as an ordered
combination . . . whether at step one or step two of the Alice test” (internal
quotations marks and brackets omitted)). The Examiner has not addressed
whether the claimed method constitutes a combination of information and
rules sufficiently specific to “prevent broad preemption of all rules-based
means” for implementing judicially-excepted subject matter (e.g., financial
activity). McRO, 837 F.3d at 1315; see also Guidance Update at 11 (“The
specificity of the claim limitations is relevant to the evaluation of several
considerations.”), 15 (examiner has an “initial burden . . . to explain why a
claim . . . [is] ineligible for patenting . . . specifically”).
In sum, the Examiner attempts to show claim 1 is directed to an
abstract idea without significantly more by alleging that some claim steps
involve financial activities and the claimed hardware uses “a computer as a
tool” to perform those steps. Ans. 4; see also generally id. at 3–5. Such
analysis lacks the requisite extent of examination.

35 U.S.C. § 103
We are unpersuaded of error in the § 103 rejections of claims 1, 2, 4,
8–13, 15, 19, and 20. We accordingly sustain these rejections.
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Appellant presents all arguments with reference to only claim 1.
Appeal Br. 20–21.3 We select claim 1 as representative.
Appellant contends the Examiner erred by reading the claimed
account identifier on Koh’s application identifier of paragraph 99 because
claim 1 recites “determining, by the server computer, an issuer associated
with the account identifier” and Koh does not describe the application
identifier as being used to determine an issuer. Appeal Br. 20; Reply Br. 11.
We are unpersuaded because the argument is not commensurate with the
at-issue claim scope. The claimed determining step does not require use of
the account identifier to determine the issuer. The step, rather, only requires
that the issuer is (1) determined by the server computer and (2) associated
with the account identifier. Appellant does not dispute that Koh teaches
these features.

3 Appellant contends: “[T]he Examiner did not consider the [claim]
amendments filed on August 7, 2017 in the rejections under 35 U.S.C. 101
and 35 U.S.C. 103.” Appeal Br. 13 (emphasis added). Appellant further
contends that these “claims [as] filed on August 7, 2018, which should have
been examined, recite numerous limitations that are not taught or suggested
by the applied references.” Id. at 21–22 (emphasis added). These
contentions do not raise issues for appeal, but rather constitute a petitionable
matter. Specifically, the Examiner’s alleged failure to examine claim
amendments is addressable by a petition to compel examination. See
Ex Parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1077–78 (PTAB 2010) (precedential)
(“Petitionable Matters” section); 37 C.F.R. § 1.181(a)(1) (petition from an
examiner requirement); 37 C.F.R. § 1.104 (required “[n]ature of
examination”). Furthermore, rather than refusing examination, the Examiner
interprets at least some of the claim amendments as “intended use”
limitations that accordingly lack patentable weight. Final Act. 4–5.
Appellant does not address the argued claim amendments in light of these
“intended use” interpretations. Appeal Br. 13, 21–22.
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Appellant also contends the Examiner erred by finding Koh’s
paragraphs 63–69 teach or suggest the following claim limitations:
“determining, by the server computer, the second protocol associated with
the [SETSMC]” and “obtaining, by the server computer, a secure element
key from the [SETSMC] . . . using the second protocol.” Appeal Br. 20–21.
Specifically, Appellant contends “paragraphs 63–69 of Koh . . . do not
describe a ‘protocol’ associated with the [SETSMC] nor do they describe
obtaining a ‘key’ using a ‘protocol.” Id. Appellant further contends the
Examiner merely quotes Koh’s paragraphs 64–65 in response to the above
contentions and thereby categorically fails to address the arguments.
Reply Br. 11–12; see also Ans. 8–9.
We are unpersuaded because the Examiner is clearly reading the
claimed second protocol and secure element key respectively on Koh’s
CPLC (card product life cycle) information and key set. See Ans. 8–9. We
discern as much for two reasons.
First, as shown in Koh’s paragraph 63, the CPLC information is
secure element (SE) information, e.g., SE “manufacturer information,” that
the server determines and then uses to communicate with the SE
manufacturer or the like (i.e., with a SETSMC). Thus, the CPLC
information teaches the second protocol of the claimed “determining, by the
server computer, the second protocol associated with the [SETSMC].”
Second, as shown in Koh’s quoted text of paragraphs 64–65, the
CPLC information is used by the server to obtain an SE key set from the SE
manufacturer or the like. Thus, the CPLC information and key set
respectively teach the claimed second protocol and secure element key of
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“obtaining, by the server computer, a secure element key from the
[SETSMC] . . . using the second protocol” as recited in claim 1.
Appellant does not dispute that Koh’s above disclosures teach or
suggest the at-issue limitations in the above manner—i.e., that Koh’s CPLC
information and key set respectively teach the claimed second protocol or
secure element key.
OVERALL CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 2, 4, 8–13, 15,
19, and 20.4

DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 4, 8–13,
15, 19, 20 § 101
Subject Matter
Eligibility
1, 2, 4, 8–13,
15, 19, 20
1, 2, 4, 8,
9, 11 § 112, ¶ 1 Written Description
1, 2, 4, 8,
9, 11
1, 2, 4, 8,
9, 11 § 112, ¶ 2 Indefiniteness
1, 2, 4, 8,
9, 11
1, 10, 11, 12 § 103(a) Koh, Arvidsson 1, 10, 11, 12
2, 4, 8, 9, 13,
15, 19, 20 § 103(a)
Koh, Arvidsson,
Ginter
2, 4, 8, 9, 13,
15, 19, 20
Overall
Outcome
1, 2, 4, 8–13,
15, 19, 20

4 “The affirmance of the rejection of a claim on any of the grounds specified
constitutes a general affirmance of the decision of the examiner on
that claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.50.
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TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this Appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See
37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED