Virginia Cockerham, Complainant,v.Shaun Donovan, Secretary, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 28, 2009
0120080651 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 28, 2009)

0120080651

09-28-2009

Virginia Cockerham, Complainant, v. Shaun Donovan, Secretary, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Agency.


Virginia Cockerham,

Complainant,

v.

Shaun Donovan,

Secretary,

Department of Housing and Urban Development,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120080651

Hearing No. 270-2005-00089X

Agency No. FW 04-19

DECISION

On November 21, 2007, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's

October 12, 2007 final order concerning her equal employment opportunity

(EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42

U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of

1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. The appeal is deemed

timely and is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the

following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final order.

ISSUE PRESENTED

Whether the EEOC Administrative Judge's (AJ) decision, finding that

complainant was not subjected to discrimination based on her race, color,

age and in reprisal for her prior protected EEO activity, is supported

by substantial evidence in the record.

BACKGROUND

At the time of the events giving rise to this complaint, complainant

worked as a Contractor and Industrial Relations Specialist, GS-12, in the

agency's Office of Labor Relations. Although her direct supervisor was

located in an agency facility in Fort Worth, Texas, complainant was an

"outstationed" employee working in New Orleans, Louisiana.

The record reflects that on October 2, 2003, the Director, Office of

Labor Relations issued a memorandum advising that the journeyman level for

Contractor Industrial Relations Specialist (Labor Relations Specialist)

position had been upgraded from GS-12 to the GS-13 level. The Director

noted that some Labor Relations Specialists at the GS-12 level would

have the opportunity for promotion to the GS-13 level during the fiscal

year once certain prerequisites were met. The Director instructed the

Regional Labor Relations Officers to submit promotion recommendations on

a case-by-case basis. Sometime that fall, the Regional Labor Relations

Officer (RLRO1), complainant's direct supervisor, recommended complainant

and four or five other GS-12 employees for promotion to the GS-13 level.

On October 16, 2003, RLRO1 provided complainant with a Progress

Review Record for the rating period beginning on February 1, 2003.

RLRO1 rated complainant "highly successful" on two of her critical

elements and "fully successful" on her remaining three critical elements.

Complainant disagreed with RLRO1's assessment of her performance, and

she refused to sign her Progress Review Record.

In January 2004, RLRO1 retired. Upon his retirement, another

Regional Labor Relations Officer (RLRO2) became complainant's new

direct supervisor. The employee rating period ended on January 31,

2004, and, as a result, RLRO2 requested a ninety (90) day extension

to further evaluate her employees' performance. In May 2004, RLRO2

issued complainant her Performance Appraisal for the rating period

from February 1, 2003 to April 4, 2004. RLRO2 rated complainant as

"outstanding," the highest possible rating, on two critical elements,

"highly successful" on her remaining three critical elements, and "highly

successful" for her summary rating. Complainant felt that her overall

work performance merited an "outstanding," and she refused to sign her

Performance Appraisal.

In late May 2004, RLRO2 learned that complainant was out on travel, but

for administrative reasons her travel had not yet been approved. RLRO2

attempted to contact complainant to discuss her travel authorization,

and she left voicemails for her at work and at home. On July 12, 2004,

complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that she was discriminated

against on the bases of race (African American), color (Black), age

(48 years old at the time of the incidents), and in reprisal for prior

protected EEO activity arising under Title VII when:

(1) On May 17, 2004, RLRO2 issued her a "Highly Successful" Performance

Appraisal rating for the period February 1, 2003 through January 31,

2004;

(2) On May 27, 2004, RLRO2 created an embarrassing and unprofessional

situation by leaving a telephone message with a Housing Authority

Executive, to inform her not to touch a file until she spoke with her;

and

(3) RLRO2 delayed her promotion to the GS-13 level until June 2004,

while two (2) White employees received their promotions in March 2004.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and a notice of her right to request

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely

requested a hearing, and the AJ held a hearing on September 26, 2006.

On September 24, 2007, the AJ issued a decision finding no discrimination.

The AJ found that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case

of discrimination based on reprisal for prior protected EEO activity.

The AJ further found that complainant failed to establish that the

agency's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions were a

pretext for unlawful discrimination. The agency subsequently issued a

final order adopting the AJ's finding that complainant failed to prove

that she was subjected to discrimination as alleged.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, complainant argues that the AJ erred in finding no

discrimination. She argues that RLRO2 was not her supervisor during

the rating period and did not have the authority to rate her during

the relevant time period. She further argues that management officials

improperly delayed her promotion from the GS-12 to the GS-13 level due

to her leave usage and that she had "cleared up" any issues regarding

her leave issues in January 2004.

In response, the agency urges the Commission to affirm the final decision.

The agency argues that the AJ properly found that "complainant failed

to establish a prima facie case of reprisal discrimination or that the

[a]gency's articulated reason for its actions was pretext to mask illegal

discrimination on the bases of her race, color, age, or reprisal."

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by

an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal

Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)

(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory

intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a

de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held. An AJ's

credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness or on the

tone of voice of a witness will be accepted unless documents or other

objective evidence so contradicts the testimony or the testimony so

lacks in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it.

See EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.B. (November 9, 1999).

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim, complainant must satisfy the

three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant must initially

establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that she was subjected

to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support

an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438

U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will vary depending

on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804

n. 14. The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department of Community

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail,

complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the

agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993).

Assuming arguendo that complainant established a prima facie case of

discrimination based on race, color, age, or in reprisal for her prior

protected EEO activity, we find that the agency articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. With respect to claim (1),

RLRO2 testified at the hearing that she issued complainant's Performance

Appraisal for the rating period because RLRO1 had retired in January 2004.

RLRO1 stated that complainant's rating period was extended ninety (90)

days to allow her more time to rate her. RLRO2 stated that she evaluated

complainant's work performance by considering her work products, the

"LR-2000" report, and the October 2003 Progress Review Record RLRO1 had

issued to complainant. RLRO2 stated that she did not feel that the level

of work complainant provided deserved an outstanding summary rating,

but some elements of complainant's work performance were outstanding,

as reflected in her Performance Appraisal. RLRO1 did not testify at the

hearing, but he submitted an affidavit into the record stating that he

felt complainant's work performance was "satisfactory" during the rating

period.

With respect to claim (2), RLRO2 stated that she left a message with

complainant at work because she was out on travel without proper

authorization. RLRO2 stated that she left a voicemail for complainant

at home because she realized that complainant would be on travel in the

next day or two, and she felt it was necessary to inform her that her

travel was also not authorized for her next work related trip. In her

affidavit, RLRO2 denied ordering complainant not to not to touch a file

until she spoke with her.

Regarding claim (3), the Director testified that he forwarded

complainant's promotion package to the Office of Human Relations.

He stated that once the package was forwarded to the Office of Human

Resources, he had no control over the actual date that the promotion

would take place. He stated that another management official had

to "sign off" on complainant's promotion after the Office of Human

Resources had processed her paperwork, and the time it took for all

of the parties involved in processing her promotion caused the delay.

He noted that there was no "time sequence" delineating when promotions

would be processed and that some employees outside complainant's protected

classes received their promotions after her.

Complainant now bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of

the evidence that the agency's articulated reasons were a pretext for

discrimination. Complainant can do this directly by showing that the

agency's proferred explanation is unworthy of credence. Burdine, 450

U.S. at 256. Upon review, we find that the AJ's determination that

complainant failed to establish pretext is supported by substantial

evidence in the record. We find no evidence that the agency's actions

were motivated by discriminatory animus towards her protected classes.

The evidence reflects that RLRO2 was authorized to issue complainant her

Performance Appraisal for the relevant rating period, and there is no

evidence that any of complainant's alleged leave issues caused a delay in

the processing of her promotion to the GS-13 level. Although complainant

disputed the testimony provided by agency officials at the hearing,

the AJ found that the management officials provided credible testimony.

We find no evidence in the record that undermines the testimony provided

by the management officials at the hearing.

Finally, to the extent that complainant is alleging that she was subjected

to a hostile work environment, we find under the standards set forth in

Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) that complainant's

claim of hostile work environment must fail. See Enforcement Guidance

on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (March

8, 1994). A prima facie case of hostile work environment is precluded

based on our finding that complainant failed to establish that any of

the actions taken by the agency were motivated by discriminatory animus

or a retaliatory motive. See Oakley v. United States Postal Service,

EEOC Appeal No. 01982923 (September 21, 2000).

CONCLUSION

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the AJ's

factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record.

We discern no basis to disturb the AJ's decision. Accordingly, after

a careful review of the record, including complainant's contentions

on appeal and arguments and evidence not specifically addressed in the

decision, the agency's final order is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the

request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as

stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

______09/28/09____________

Date

2

0120080651

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

7

0120080651