Virgil Woods, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionApr 20, 2005
01a45420 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 20, 2005)

01a45420

04-20-2005

Virgil Woods, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Virgil Woods v. United States Postal Service

01A45420

April 20, 2005

.

Virgil Woods,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A45420

Agency Nos. 4E-870-0092-99

4E-870-0009-01

Hearing

Nos. 350-2002-08130X

350-2001-08119X

DECISION

Complainant, a Letter Carrier, PS-05, filed a formal EEO complaint in

which he claimed that the agency discriminated against him on the bases

of his race (African-American), age (dob 6/20/41), and in reprisal for

his previous EEO activity under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act when (1) his amount of overtime was approximately twenty

hours less than other workers on the overtime desired list for the period

of December 5, 1998 - February 26, 1999; (2) a double standard was used in

the selection of overtime assignments on August 17, 2000 and September 13,

2000; and (3) he was not afforded the same opportunity as coworkers for

overtime assignments during the period of January 2001 through March 2001.

The agency accepted the complaint for investigation. Subsequent to

the completion of the investigation, the agency referred the matter

to an Administrative Judge (AJ), pursuant to complainant's request for

a hearing. Without holding a hearing, the AJ issued a summary judgment

decision finding no discrimination with regard to each of the claims

set forth in the complaint. On July 16, 2004, the agency issued a final

action implementing the AJ's decision.

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a

hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material

fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the

summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive

legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists

no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine

whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of

the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and

all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case

can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment

is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding,

an AJ may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination

that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.

With respect to each of complainant's claims concerning not being assigned

sufficient overtime, we shall assume arguendo that complainant set forth a

prima facie case under the alleged bases. The agency stated with regard

to claim (1) that complainant had fewer overtime hours during the second

quarter of 1999 because complainant took sick leave for over one week in

April and other carriers on the overtime desired list were required to

work a non-scheduled day in April due to other employees taking annual

and sick leave. According to complainant's supervisor, it was difficult

in general to assign overtime to complainant because complainant would

request overtime for his route, receive approval, but then frequently

return early because he was a fast carrier. Complainant's supervisor

stated that by then the overtime opportunity had already been assigned. We

find that the agency articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for its actions. With regard to claim (1), we find that complainant

has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's

stated reason was pretext intended to mask discriminatory motivation.

As for claim (2), we agree with the AJ that complainant has not shown

that his race, age, or reprisal were factors in the assignment of overtime

on August 17, 2000 and September 13, 2000.

With respect to claim (3), the record does not support complainant's

discrimination claim for the period of January 1, 2001 through March

31, 2001. Complainant worked 16.97 hours of overtime during this period.

Two coworkers received less overtime than complainant and four coworkers

received overtime amounts in the same range that complaint received.

We find that complainant has not established by a preponderance of the

evidence that he was discriminated against on the bases of race, age,

or reprisal with regard to the issuance of overtime opportunities for

the period of January 1, 2001 through March 31, 2001.

After a review of the record in its entirety, it is the decision of the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the agency's final

action finding no race, age, or reprisal discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

April 20, 2005

__________________

Date