Vinay Varadan et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 11, 2021

2020001633 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 11, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/983,651 10/09/2013 Vinay Varadan 2011P00166WOUS 3445
24737 7590 03/11/2021
PHILIPS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & STANDARDS
465 Columbus Avenue
Suite 340
Valhalla, NY 10595
EXAMINER
DEJONG, ERIC S
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
1631
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/11/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
katelyn.mulroy@philips.com
marianne.fox@philips.com
patti.demichele@Philips.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte VINAY VARADAN, PRATEEK MITTAL,
SITHARTHAN KAMALAKARAN, NEVENKA DIMITROVA,
ANGEL JANEVSKI, and NILANJANA BANERJEE
Appeal 2020-001633
Application 13/983,651
Technology Center 1600

Before RICHARD M. LEBOVITZ, TAWEN CHANG, and
MICHAEL A. VALEK, Administrative Patent Judges.

CHANG, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 2, 4–12, and 15–21. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant did not identify a real party in interest in the
Appeal Brief.
Appeal 2020-001633
Application 13/983,651

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Specification states:
Several diseases, in particular cancerous diseases,
are complex and involve the alteration of multiple gene
functions or underlying cellular processes. These diseases
constitute severe challenges to clinicians, who struggle
for reliable stratification approaches with high sensitivity
and specificity. One possibility of improving the
stratification process is based on the use of molecular
profiles, which are known to correspond to different
clinically relevant groups. These profiles are often used
for high throughput analyses through the statistical
selection of a set of features, which jointly differentiates
between clinically relevant classes of patients. . . . .
However, the molecular signatures discovered so far
typically do not capture the underlying cellular
mechanisms and the high throughput and pathway-
recognition approaches do not sufficiently capture how
genes or proteins interact inside the cell and are therefore
limited in their ability to reliably stratify patients.
There is, thus, a need for improved diagnostic tools
enabling the clinician to use high-throughput data to
stratify patients, in particular cancer patients.
Spec. 1:24–2:5.
Accordingly to the Specification, “[t]he present invention addresses
this need and provides means and methods, which implement an enhanced
recognition of cellular interactions, and thus allow an improved stratification
of patients into clinically relevant groups.” Spec. 2:8–10.

Appeal 2020-001633
Application 13/983,651

3
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a method for assignment of a cancer patient
into a clinically relevant group of cancer patients. Claim 1, the only
independent claim, is illustrative:
1. A computer-implemented method for flow vector-based
assignment of a cancer patient into a clinically relevant group of
cancer patients, said computer-implemented method
comprising:
[(a)] obtaining cancer molecular profiling data from a
patient sample of the cancer patient;
[(b)] inputting said cancer molecular profiling data onto a
processor configured to receive such cancer molecular profiling
data;
[(c)] obtaining a dataset, for an individual cancer patient,
comprising molecular data of expression of one or more of said
cancer patient’s genes;
[(d)] inputting said patient molecular data onto said
processor;
[(e)] providing a database of cancer molecular data of
known phenotypes;
[(f)] applying, by said processor, a statistical analysis to
identify a probability of there being altered molecular data
within the patient molecular data in comparison to the database
of cancer molecular data of known phenotypes, wherein the
probability is identified by integrating said altered molecular
data using a probabilistic graphical model framework;
[(g)] identifying, by said processor, a biological network
by calculating activity of said biological network based upon
the identified probability;
[(h)] identifying, by said processor, a network
information flow probability, for said cancer patient by
applying statistical techniques to determine a probability of
interactions in said biological network based on said probability
of altered molecular data;
[(i)] applying, by said processor, a statistical analysis to
create multiple instances of network information flow vectors
Appeal 2020-001633
Application 13/983,651

4
for said cancer patient from a full interaction probability
distribution of the biological network;
[(j)] calculating, by said processor, a distance of said
cancer patient from other cancer patients using said multiple
instances of network information flow vectors;
[(k)] assigning, by said processor, said cancer patient to
the clinically relevant group based on the calculated distance of
said cancer patient from the other cancer patients; and
[(l)] providing a visualization of the assignment of the
cancer patient to the clinically relevant group in the context of
the network information flow vectors.
Appeal Br. 16–17 (Claims App.) (bracketed alphabetical notations
added).

REJECTION(S)
A. Claims 1, 2, 4–12, and 15–21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
being directed to a judicial exception to patent-eligibility (i.e., a law of
nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea), without
significantly more. Ans. 3.
B. Claims 1, 2, 4–12, and 15–21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112 (Pre-
AIA), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description
requirement. Ans. 5.
C. Claims 1, 2, 4–12, and 15–21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112 (Pre-
AIA), second paragraph, as being infinite.2 Ans. 7.

2 We note that the Examiner did not list claims 16–21 in the indefiniteness
rejection in the Final Rejection or Answer. Final Act. 6; Ans. 7. However,
Appellant states in the Appeal Brief that “[o]n page 6-8, the [Final] Office
Action rejected all pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112 as allegedly
indefinite.” Appeal Br. 14. Moreover, each of claims 16–21 depends,
Appeal 2020-001633
Application 13/983,651

5
OPINION
A. Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter (claims 1, 2, 4–12, and 15–21)
1. Issue
The Examiner concludes that
[t]he instant claims are directed to a method and related
computer system for stratifying a patient into a clinically
relevant group. The recited process comprises the steps
of obtaining data and analyzing said data. While for a
specific purpose, the claims only delineate what patient
information is to be gathered and what information is to
be distilled therefrom. All recited steps in the instant
claims (obtaining information, identifying, inferring,
identifying, creating multiple instances of information
flow, calculating, and assigning) are abstract steps carried
out by employing a configured processor.
Ans. 3–4. The Examiner notes that courts have found such a process, which
“employs mathematical algorithms to manipulate existing information to
generate additional information,” to be patent-ineligible. Id. at 4 (quoting
Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351
(Fed. Cir. 2014)).
The Examiner further finds that “the claims . . . rely on the use of
generic computer serving as conventional computational vehicle on which to
apply the recited data analysis procedure.” Ans. 4. The Examiner finds that,
accordingly, the claims “fail to amount to something significantly more than
a recitation of generic computer components and implementation as the
vehicle to simply ‘apply’ the abstract ideas and functionally defined

directly or indirectly, from claim 1, which is the subject of an indefiniteness
rejection. Thus, we understand that the indefiniteness rejection encompasses
claims 16–21 as well.
Appeal 2020-001633
Application 13/983,651

6
computer operations as set forth in the instant claims.” Id. With specific
reference to claim 17, the Examiner finds that, although the claim recites
certain physical steps of data collection, these steps do not “improve[] or
alter[] . . .data collection procedures that are . . . routine and conventional in
the art” and thus “do not . . . present something significantly more than the
judicial exception[s]” recited in the claim. Id. at 4–5.
Appellant contends that the Examiner failed to follow the PTO’s 2019
Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance (“Revised Guidance”).
Appeal Br. 4–6.
Appellant does not separately argue the claims. We thus focus our
analysis on claim 1 as representative. The issue with respect to this rejection
is whether a preponderance of evidence of record supports the Examiner’s
determination that claim 1 is directed to a judicial exception to patent-
eligible subject matter, without significantly more.

2. Analysis
We analyze this case under the framework set forth by the Supreme
Court in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566
U.S. 66 (2012), and applied by our reviewing court in Ariosa Diagnostics,
Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015). As the Ariosa court
explained:
In Mayo . . . , the Supreme Court set forth a framework
for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that
claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.
First, we determine whether the claims at issue are
directed to a patent-ineligible concept. . . . If the answer
is yes, then we next consider the elements of each claim
Appeal 2020-001633
Application 13/983,651

7
both individually and “as an ordered combination” to
determine whether additional elements “transform the
nature of the claim” into a patent-eligible application.
. . . The Supreme Court has described the second step of
this analysis as a search for an “inventive concept”—i.e.,
an element or combination of elements that is “sufficient
to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself.”
Id. at 1375.
Step 2A of the Revised Guidance:
Whether Claim 1 Is Directed to Patent-Ineligible Concept
We begin with the first step of the Mayo test, namely whether a claim
is “directed to” a patent-ineligible concept. On January 7, 2019, the Director
of the USPTO issued the “2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance” (“Revised Guidance”), which provides further details regarding
how the Patent Office analyzes patent-eligibility questions under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. 84 Fed. Reg. 50–57 (Jan. 7, 2019). Under the Revised Guidance, the
first step of the Mayo test (i.e., Step 2A of the Revised Guidance) is “a two-
prong inquiry.” Id. at 54. In prong one, we evaluate whether the claim
recites a judicial exception, such as laws of nature, natural phenomena, or
abstract ideas. Id. The Revised Guidance explains that
the abstract idea exception includes the following
groupings of subject matter, when recited as such in a
claim limitation(s) (that is, when recited on their own or
per se):
(a) Mathematical concepts—mathematical
relationships, mathematical formulas or equations,
mathematical calculations;
(b) Certain methods of organizing human activity—
fundamental economic principles or practices (including
hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal
Appeal 2020-001633
Application 13/983,651

8
interactions (including agreements in the form of
contracts; legal obligations; advertising, marketing or
sales activities or behaviors; business relations);
managing personal behavior or relationships or
interactions between people (including social activities,
teaching, and following rules or instructions); and
(c) Mental processes—concepts performed in the
human mind (including an observation, evaluation,
judgment, opinion).
Id. at 52 (footnotes omitted). The Guidance states that, except in rare
circumstances, “[c]laims that do not recite matter that falls within these
enumerated groupings of abstract ideas should not be treated as reciting
abstract ideas” and thus would be patent-eligible. Id. at 53. If the claim
recites a judicial exception, the claim is further analyzed under prong two,
which requires “evaluat[ion of] whether the claim recites additional elements
that integrate the exception into a practical application of that exception.”
Id. The Revised Guidance explains that, “[i]f the recited exception is
integrated into a practical application of the exception, then the claim is
eligible at Prong Two of . . . Step 2A [of the Revised Guidance].” Id.

Prong One of Step 2A of Revised Guidance
With respect to the first prong of Step 2A of the Revised Guidance,
we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites patent-ineligible subject
matter. In particular, mathematical concepts are abstract, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52,
and steps (f)–(j) of claim 1 recite such mathematical concepts. For instance,
step (f) recites “applying . . . a statistical analysis to identify a probability . . .
by . . . using a probabilistic graphical model framework”; step (h) recites
“identifying . . . a network information flow probability . . . by applying
statistical techniques to determine a probability of interactions in said . . .
Appeal 2020-001633
Application 13/983,651

9
network”; step (i) recites “applying . . . a statistical analysis to create
multiple instances of network information flow vectors . . . from a full
interaction probability distribution of the . . . network”; and step (j) recites
“calculating . . . a distance . . . using said multiple instances of network
information flow vectors.” Appeal Br. 16–17 (Claims App.).
Finally, step (g) recites “identifying . . . a biological network by
calculating activity of said biological network based upon the identified
probability” of there being altered molecular data.” Appeal Br. 16 (Claims
App.). The Specification teaches that “the activity of a biological network
may be inferred on the basis of the probability of an alteration within the one
or more sets of molecular data.” Spec. 11:9–11. The Specification further
states that “[t]he term ‘inferred’ as used herein relates to a suitable
derivation or calculation activity resulting in the identification of biological
networks” and further states that “suitable algorithms such as the junction
tree inference algorithm, preferably with HUGIN updates, the Belief
Propagation with sequential updates, or the expectation-maximization (EM)
algorithm may be used.” Id. at 11:27–31.
Our reviewing court has held that similar claims directed to methods
for performing certain statistical analyses are patent-ineligible because
“[t]heir subject is nothing but a series of mathematical calculations based on
selected information and the presentation of the results of those calculations
(in the plot of a probability distribution function).” SAP Am., Inc. v.
InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In that case, the
selected information was investment information, id., while in the instant
appeal the information analyzed is molecular data. Nevertheless, the same
rationale articulated in SAP applies here. As the SAP court noted,
Appeal 2020-001633
Application 13/983,651

10
“limitation of the claims to a particular field of information . . . does not
move the claims out of the realm of abstract ideas.” Id. at 1169.
Likewise, mental processes such as observation, evaluation, judgment,
and opinion are abstract ideas. 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. “[I]dentifying . . . a
biological network” based on network activity, as recited in the first part of
step (g), falls within this category of abstract idea. Similarly, claim 1 recites
“assigning . . . cancer patient to the clinically relevant group based on the
calculated distance of said cancer patient from the other cancer patients”
(step (k)). Although the calculation of the distance of a cancer patient from
other cancer patients using multiple instances of network information flow
vectors (i.e., step (j)) may not be practically performed in the mind, the
assignment in step (k) of a patient to a group based on the calculated
distance is a step involving observation, evaluation and/or judgment that
could be “performed in the human mind[] or by a human using a pen and
paper.” CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372
(Fed. Cir. 2011). Thus, claim 1 also recites mental processes.

Prong Two of Step 2A of Revised Guidance
With respect to the second prong of Step 2A of the Revised Guidance,
we find that claim 1 does not recite sufficient additional elements that
integrate the recited judicial exception(s) into a practical application of the
exception(s). 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. More specifically, the additional elements
of claim 1 that are not either mathematical concepts or mental processes
include (1) “obtaining cancer molecular profiling data from a patient
sample” (step (a)); (2) “inputting said . . . data” (step (b)); (3) “obtaining a
dataset . . . comprising molecular data of expression of one or more of said
Appeal 2020-001633
Application 13/983,651

11
cancer patient’s genes” (step (c)); (4) “inputting said patient molecular data”
(step (d)); (5) “providing . . . cancer molecular data of known phenotypes”
(step (e)); and (6) “providing a visualization of the assignment of the cancer
patient to the clinically relevant group in the context of the network
information flow vectors” (step (l)). Appeal Br. 16–17 (Claims App.).
Certain steps of claim 1 (see, e.g., steps (b), (d), and (f)–(k)) also recite a
“processor,” and step (e) recites a “database” (i.e., a “database of cancer
molecular data of known phenotypes”). Id.
These additional elements, individually and in combination, do not
suffice to integrate the recited judicial exceptions into a practical application.
More specifically, steps (a)–(e) merely gather the data to be used in the
claimed method, and step (l) presents a result based on the recited abstract
mental processes and mathematical calculations. Thus, they are
“insignificant extra-solution activity.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (explaining that an
additional element that adds insignificant extra-solution activity to the
judicial exception does not integrate the exception into a practical
application); see also In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 794 (CCPA 1982) (a
claimed step that “test[s] for a response . . . is nothing more than a data
gathering step,” which “cannot make an otherwise nonstatutory claim
statutory”); In re Richman, 563 F.2d 1026, 1030 (CCPA 1977) (holding that
antecedent steps that “merely determine values for the variables used in the
mathematical formulae used in making the calculations . . . do not suffice to
render the claimed methods, considered as a whole, statutory subject
matter”); Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d at 1350, 1353–
1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that claims involving “merely presenting the
results of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing information, without
Appeal 2020-001633
Application 13/983,651

12
more . . . , is abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and analysis”).
Similarly, the recitation of a “database” and “processor” in claim 1 merely
recites using these computer elements “as a tool to perform an abstract idea,”
which does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application. 84
Fed. Reg. at 55.

Step 2B of the Revised Guidance:
Whether Claim 1 Amounts to “Significantly More”
Having determined that claim 1 is directed to a patent-ineligible
abstract idea, we next consider whether claim 1 recites “an element or
combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself.’” Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1375 (citation omitted). We agree
with the Examiner that it does not.
As discussed above, the additional elements in claim 1 that are not
either mental processes or mathematical concepts include (1) “obtaining
cancer molecular profiling data from a patient sample” (step (a)); (2)
“inputting said . . . data” (step (b)); (3) “obtaining a dataset . . . comprising
molecular data of expression of one or more of said cancer patient’s genes”
(step (c)); (4) “inputting said patient molecular data” (step (d)); (5)
“providing a database of cancer molecular data of known phenotypes” (step
(e)); (6) “providing a visualization of the assignment of the cancer patient to
the clinically relevant group in the context of the network information flow
vectors” (step (l)); and (7) a processor that receives a patient’s “cancer
molecular profiling data” and “molecular data comprising molecular data of
expression of one or more . . . genes” (steps (b) and (d)) and further
Appeal 2020-001633
Application 13/983,651

13
performs various mathematical/statistical analysis (steps (f)–(k)). Appeal
Br. 16–17 (Claims App.).
These limitations, however, are recited at a high level of generality
and/or are described in the Specification as well known, routine, and
conventional. For example, as for obtaining and inputting a cancer patient’s
molecular profiling data or data set comprising molecular data of expression
of one or more of said cancer patient’s genes (steps (a)–(d)), the
Specification states that “‘molecular data’ as used herein refers to data on a
genetic, medical, biochemical, chemical, biological or physical condition or
modality linked to a subject” and include, e.g., presence or absence or
amount/level of transcripts “as well as further conditions or modalities
known to the person skilled in the art.” Spec. 9:17–32 (emphasis added).
The Specification states that “molecular data may be obtained by any
suitable technique, method or approach known to the person skilled in the
art.” Id. at 20:5–6 (emphasis added).
In the same vein, the Specification states that “‘datasets comprising
one or more sets of molecular data’” may be provided “in any suitable form
known to the person skilled in the art, e.g. in suitable input formats for
bioinformatic applications.” Id. at 9:33–10:10 (emphasis added). The
Specification further states, in the context of stratifying cancerous disease,
that “molecular profiles . . . are known to correspond to different clinically
relevant groups” and “are often used for high throughput analyses through
the statistical selection of a set of features.” Spec. 1:24–31.
Likewise, the limitations relating to a database (step (e)), to inputting
data into a processor (steps (b) and (d)), and to using the processor to
perform various statistical and/or mathematical calculations (steps (f)–(k))
Appeal 2020-001633
Application 13/983,651

14
merely recite a generic and/or already available computer component
performing generic/already available computer functions, such as storing,
receiving and/or analyzing data and performing mathematical calculations.
For example, as a preferred embodiment, the Specification generically
describes “a database of molecular data of known phenotypes” as “a
biological annotation database, a pathway database, a database on biological
processes and/or a database on biological functions” and refers to such
known databases as “the National Cancer Institute Pathway interaction
database, the KEGG pathway database, the BioCarta database, the Panther
database, the Reactome database, and/or the DAVID database” as examples.
Spec. 3:14–19. Similarly, the Specification generically describes a “clinical
decision support system” for carrying out the disclosed method, Spec. 39:3–
12, and points to Philips’ iSite PACS systems as an example of such a
clinical decision support system, id. at 40:22–29.3

3 The Specification does state that clinical decision support systems such as
the Philips’ iSite PACS system may be “adjusted or modified” to “comply
with the requirements of the methods of the present invention and/or in order
to be able to carry out a computer program or algorithm as described herein,
and/or in order to store expression or other molecular parameters or patient
data or parts of patient databases as defined herein.” Spec. 40:25–29.
However, as discussed above, the Specification teaches that the molecular
data are provided in suitable formats known to a skilled artisan. Spec. 9:33–
10:10. Likewise, the Specification describes the various algorithms used in
the method as generic statistical calculations and/or algorithms well known
to the skilled artisan. See, e.g., Spec. 10:25–28 (probability of alteration in
molecular data may be determined by algorithm known to skilled artisan);
24:32–34 (citing known probabilistic graphical model frameworks including
Bayesian networks and Markov random fields); 11:27–34 (biological
networks may be identified by algorithms known to skilled artisan); 12:4–7,
31–34 (network information flow probability and vector refer generically to,
Appeal 2020-001633
Application 13/983,651

15
As our reviewing court has explained with respect to similar claims,
where database and processor limitations “require no improved computer
resources,” but rather rely on “already available computers, with their
already available basic functions, to use as tools in executing the claimed
process,” such limitations “are insufficient to pass the test of an inventive
concept in the application of an abstract idea.” SAP, 898 F.3d at 1170. Put
another way, “an invocation of already-available computers that are not
themselves plausibly asserted to be an advance, for use in carrying out
improved mathematical calculations, amounts to a recitation of what is
‘well-understood, routine, [and] conventional.’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 556
U.S. at 73).

respectively, “information provided by interactions amongst genes or other
factors captured in the identified network” and “vector of probabilities,
where each probability is the likelihood that a particular interaction in the
biological network was activated in the patient”); 13:17–20 (“sample states
or sample state vectors may be generated from the probabilities in the
network information flow vector” with algorithms known to skilled artisans,
such as “Metropolis-Hastings sampling algorithm, Gibbs sampling, slice
sampling, or any Monte Carlo sampling methods”); 15:24–30 (distance of
patient from other subjects in patient database “refers to a mathematical or
statistical distance between two or more instances of the network
information flow” and “may be calculated with any suitable method, process
or algorithm known to the person skilled in the art”). The Specification
similarly states that “visualization [in the context of the information flow in
the networks and other clinically relevant groups and healthy subjects] may
be implemented with suitable algorithms known to the person skilled in the
art.” Id. at 40:11–19. Thus, we find that the already available systems, such
as Philips’ iSite PACS system, together with any needed adjustments or
modifications, would nevertheless be well-known, routine, and/or
conventional.
Appeal 2020-001633
Application 13/983,651

16
Finally, considered as an ordered combination, the components of
claim 1 add nothing that is not already present when they are considered
separately. Viewed as a whole, claim 1 simply recites the abstract
mathematical calculations and/or mental processes used to assign a cancer
patient to a clinically relevant group, as performed by generic computer
components and/or conventional, already available systems, obtaining the
necessary data inputs for the algorithms, and displaying the results.
In sum, the combination of elements recited in claim 1 does not
amount to significantly more than the judicial exceptions themselves, and
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 the claimed method is not eligible for patenting.

Appellant’s Arguments
Appellant contends that the Examiner’s § 101 rejection should be
reversed because the Examiner failed to follow the steps set out in the
Revised Guidance for supporting a § 101 rejection. Appeal Br. 4–9; Reply
Br. 2–3. Appellant first argues that the Examiner “unreasonably broadened
the scope of” and “‘abstracted’ . . . Appellant’s claim language”; “failed to
identify the specific limitations in the claim . . . that . . . recites an abstract
idea”; and “made no attempt to determine whether the claimed subject
matter fell within the subject matter groupings of abstract ideas” set out in
the Revised Guidance. Appeal Br. 5–6; Reply Br. 2. Appellant contends
that the claims do not recite limitations falling within any of the groupings of
abstract ideas – i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity, and mental processes – set forth in the Revised Guidance.
Appeal Br. 6.
Appeal 2020-001633
Application 13/983,651

17
We are not persuaded. The Examiner notes in the rejection that the
claims recite steps of obtaining and analyzing data (e.g., “obtaining
information, identifying, inferring, identifying, creating multiple instances of
information flow, calculating, and assigning”) and more specifically notes
that, with regard to such claims, the courts have been clear that “a process
that employs mathematical algorithms to manipulate existing information to
generate additional information is not patent eligible” without additional
limitations. Ans. 3–4 (quoting Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for
Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). As noted above,
mathematical concepts is one of the categories of abstract ideas enumerated
in the Revised Guidance. 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Likewise, for the reasons set
forth above, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites mathematical
concepts, as well as mental processes.
Appellant next contends that the Examiner failed to consider whether
any abstract ideas recited in claim 1 has been integrated into a practical
application, as required by prong two of Step 2A. Appeal Br. 7–8.
Appellant contends that, even if the claims recite an abstract idea, such as
mental processes, “the claimed processes include critical . . . physical steps
that involve the use of non-abstract tangible components.” Id. at 6. In
particular, citing Example 42 in the PTO’s 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance
Examples 37 Through 42 (issued Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance Examples”),
Appellant contends that “the revised guidance emphasizes that the practical
application of computer functions can qualify as patent-eligible subject
matter.” Id. at 7.
We are not persuaded. Appellant’s citation to Example 42 in the
Guidance Examples, which relates to methods for transmission of
Appeal 2020-001633
Application 13/983,651

18
notifications when medical records are updated, is inapposite. In the
Guidance Examples, the PTO explained that claim 1 of Example 42 “as a
whole recites a method of organizing human activity” — one of the
enumerated categories of abstract ideas — because “a method that allows for
users to access patient’s medical records and receive updated patient
information in real time from other users . . . is a method of managing
interactions between people.” Guidance Examples 18. Nevertheless, the
PTO explains that the claim is patent-eligible because the additional
elements in the claims — i.e., “storing information, providing remote access
over a network, converting updated information that was input by a user in a
non-standardized format to a standardized format, automatically generating a
message whenever updated information is stored, and transmitting the
message to all of the users” — “recite a specific improvement over prior art
systems by allowing remote users to share information in real time in a
standardized format regardless of the format in which the information was
input by the user.” Id. at 18–19.
In contrast, as discussed above, the elements of claim 1 that are not
mathematical concepts or mental processes either (1) recite insignificant
extra-solution activities because they merely gather the data to be used in the
claimed method (steps (a)–(e)) or merely present a result based on the
recited abstract mental processes and mathematical calculations (step (l)), or
(2) use already available computer elements “as a tool to perform an abstract
idea.” Thus, unlike in Example 42, these claim elements do not integrate the
recited abstract ideas into a practical application by reciting a specific
improvement over prior art. 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
Appeal 2020-001633
Application 13/983,651

19
Appellant contends that “[t]he recited subject matter is directed to a
practical application of flow vector-based assignment, which is a format for
sharing information, akin to Example 42,” and further argues that “[t]he
claimed flow vector-based assignment, like Example 42, has the practical
application of providing improved visualization in the context of information
flow in the networks.” Appeal Br. 7–8; Reply Br. 2.
We are not persuaded. The improvement in claim 1 of Example 42
lay in “allowing remote users to share information in real time in a
standardized format regardless of the format in which the information was
input by the user,” which was not possible in the prior art systems.
Guidance Examples 17–19 (explaining that prior to the invention “medical
providers must continually monitor a patient’s medical records for updated
information” and that such information is “often-times incomplete since
records in separate locations are not timely or readily-shared or cannot be
consolidated due to format inconsistencies as well as physicians who are
unaware that other physicians are also seeing the patient for varying
reasons”). In other words, the improvement lay not in a particular format in
which information is presented, but the fact that the information may be
shared by remote users, in real time, regardless of its input format.
In contrast to claim 1 in Example 42, which recites a specific
improvement in the manner in which a networked computer system
functions, Appellant’s alleged improvement is at most an improvement to a
mathematical algorithm used to stratify a cancer patient into a clinically
relevant group. However, abstract ideas such as mathematical algorithms do
not confer patent eligibility on a claim even if such abstract ideas are
“[g]roundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant.” buySAFE, Inc. v. Google,
Appeal 2020-001633
Application 13/983,651

20
Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Assoc. for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013)); see also
SAP, 898 F.3d at 1167 (finding “a claimed improvement in a mathematical
technique with no improved display mechanism” to be patent-ineligible).
In this regard, we note that assigning a cancer patient to a clinically
relevant group based on “flow vectors” is less similar to the format
conversion recited in patent-eligible claim 1 of Example 42, and more
similar to the statistical analysis of investment data found to be patent-
ineligible in SAP. For example, the Specification defines “network
information flow vector” as “a vector of probabilities, where each
probability is the likelihood that a particular interaction in the biological
network was activated in the patient.” Spec. 12:31–34. The Specification
then teaches calculating “the distance of the patient . . . from other subjects
in a patient database” based on “multiple instances of the network
information flow,” wherein “distance” refers to “a mathematical or statistical
distance between two or more instances of the network information flow.”
Id. at 15:24–29. The patient is then assigned to a “clinically relevant group”
based on “the results and outcome of the calculation of distance,” where
assignment refers to “the determination of a probability that a patient is
similar or identical with a subject in a patient database regarding molecular
data, phenotypes, symptoms etc.” Id. at 17:31–18:2. In short, in this case as
in SAP, “the focus of the claims is not a physical-realm improvement but an
improvement in wholly abstract ideas – the selection and mathematical
analysis of information, followed by reporting or displaying of the results.”
SAP, 898 F.3d at 1168.
Appeal 2020-001633
Application 13/983,651

21
We are likewise unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument that “[t]he
claimed flow vector-based assignment, like Example 42, has the practical
application of providing improved visualization in the context of information
flow in the networks.” Id.; Reply Br. 2. While claim 1 does recite a step of
“providing a visualization of the assignment of the cancer patient to the
clinically relevant group in the context of the network information flow
vectors,” the claim lacks specificity as to both the manner of such
visualization and how it is achieved. Neither does the claim recite any
specific improvement in visualization. Indeed, the Specification states that
“[s]uch visualization may be implemented with suitable algorithms known to
the person skilled in the art.” Spec. 40:11–19.
Finally, Appellant contends that, “[e]ven if the claims are deemed
directed to an abstract idea . . . , the claims are directed to an inventive
concept under step 2B and, thus, directed to patent eligible subject matter.”
Appeal Br. 8. Appellant contends that “the Examiner has not satisfied the
requirements as set forth by Berkheimer [v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368
(Fed. Cir. 2018),] with regard to step 2B.” Id. at 9; Reply Br. 2–3.
We are not persuaded. In particular, as discussed above, the
additional elements in claim 1 that are not abstract ideas (i.e., either mental
processes or mathematical concepts) include (1) “obtaining cancer molecular
profiling data from a patient sample” (step (a)); (2) “inputting said . . . data”
(step (b)); (3) “obtaining a dataset . . . comprising molecular data of
expression of one or more of said cancer patient’s genes” (step (c)); (4)
“inputting said patient molecular data” (step (d)); (5) “providing a database
of cancer molecular data of known phenotypes” (step (e)); (6) “providing a
visualization of the assignment of the cancer patient to the clinically relevant
Appeal 2020-001633
Application 13/983,651

22
group in the context of the network information flow vectors” (step (l)); and
(7) a processor that receives a patient’s “cancer molecular profiling data”
and “molecular data comprising molecular data of expression of one or more
. . . genes” (steps (b) and (d)) and further performs various
mathematical/statistical analysis (steps (f)–(k)).
As also discussed above, however, these limitations are recited at a
high level of generality and/or are described in the Specification as well
known, routine, and conventional. See, e.g., supra pp. 12–16 (citing Spec.
1:24–31, 3:14–19, 9:17–10:10, 10:25–28, 11:27–34, 12:4–7, 12:31–34,
13:17–20, 15:24–30, 20:5–6, 24:32–34, 39:3–12, 40:11–19, 40:22–29);
MPEP § 2106.05(d) (explaining that, while Berkheimer requires “[a] factual
determination . . . to support a conclusion that an additional element (or
combination of additional elements) is well understood, routine,
conventional activity,” “in many instances[] the specification . . . may
indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional”).
Accordingly, we affirm the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. Claims 2, 4–12, and 15–21 are not argued separately and fall with
claim 1. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

B. Lack of Written Description and Indefiniteness (claims 1, 2, 4–12,
and 15–21)
1. Issue
The Examiner asserts that
[a]ll recited steps in the instant claims . . . are carried out
by employing a generic computer processor. Lacking any
definition, the claims fail to provide for how a general
purpose processor is actually configured or specifically
Appeal 2020-001633
Application 13/983,651

23
programmed to achieve the functionally defined
operations and analytical results set forth in the claims.
Ans. 5–6. The Examiner asserts that, similarly, “the instant specification
only reiterates the functional language that is correlated to a generic
computer implementation (i.e. a ‘processor’) as is recited in the instant
claims” and concludes that “the instant disclosure is inadequate as it fails
[to] describe any additional algorithms or algorithmic procedures
corresponding to the recited computer implemented analytical activities.”
Id. at 6.
The Examiner concludes that,
[s]ince the instant claims only recite generic computer
implementation . . . , the claims lack sufficient written
support from the instant specification for the algorithm(s)
and/or algorithmic procedures that, when executed on a
computer system, achieve the results that are functionally
defined in the instant claims. Therefore, lacking any
specific definition that limits the claimed functions to a
specifically described configured computer system,
applicant has failed to demonstrate that they were in
possession of the full scope of the claimed invention at
the time the application was filed.
Ans. 7.
For the same reasons, the Examiner concludes that “the functionally
defined steps implemented ‘by a processor’” render the claims indefinite.
Ans. 7–9. More particularly, the Examiner asserts that
[t]here is no corresponding disclosure of the algorithm(s)
or algorithmic procedures that would limit the scope of
the computer implemented analysis to a specific set of
the algorithms or algorithmic procedures. Rather, at this
time the computer implemented steps are bounded only
Appeal 2020-001633
Application 13/983,651

24
by the results that are to be achieved and not to any
specified set of the algorithms or algorithmic procedures.
Id. at 9.
The Examiner does not cite 35 U.S.C. § 112 (pre-AIA), sixth
paragraph, in the Answer. However, in the Final Action the Examiner
explicitly refers to 35 U.S.C. § 112 (pre-AIA), sixth paragraph, in both
written description and indefiniteness rejections. Final Act. 5–6, 7. With
respect to the written description rejection, the Examiner further states that
“the instant disclosure is inadequate as it fails [to] specify any structure
corresponding to the means as instantly claimed.” Id. at 6. With respect to
the indefiniteness rejection, the Examiner further states that “the functionally
defined modules causes the metes and bounds of the instant claims to be
indefinite because there is no corresponding disclosure of what structures are
encompassed by said generic configured processor means.” Id. at 8.
Appellant contends that “none of the claims invoke 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(f).”4 Appeal Br. 11, 14.

2. Principles of Law
Whether a specification complies with the written description
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (pre-AIA), first paragraph, is a question of
fact and is assessed on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Purdue Pharma L.P.
v. Faulding, Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Vas-Cath Inc.
v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). The specification does
not need to describe the claimed subject matter in haec verba in order to

4 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) corresponds to 35 U.S.C. § 112 (pre-AIA), sixth
paragraph.
Appeal 2020-001633
Application 13/983,651

25
satisfy the written description requirement; however, it must convey with
reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date,
Appellant was in possession of the claimed invention. See id.
On January 7, 2019, the Director of the USPTO issued specific
guidance on “Examining Computer-Implemented Functional Claim
Limitations for Compliance With 35 U.S.C. 112 (“2019 § 112 Guidance”).
84 Fed. Reg. 57 (Jan. 7, 2019). The 2019 § 112 Guidance explains that,
where a claim limitation recites “a term and associated functional language,
the examiner should determine whether the claim limitation invokes 35
U.S.C. 112(f).” Id. at 58. This determination involves a 3-prong analysis,
which evaluates (1) whether “[t]he claim limitation uses the term ‘means’
(or ‘step’) or a generic placeholder,” (2) whether “the term is modified by
functional language,” and (3) whether “the term is not modified by sufficient
structure, material or acts for performing the function.” Id. If the answer to
all three questions is yes, then 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) applies to the limitation.
Id.
As further explained in the 2019 § 112 Guidance, the broadest
reasonable interpretation (“BRI”) of a claim limitation subject to 35 U.S.C.
112(f) “is the structure . . . described in the specification as performing the
entire claimed function and equivalents to the disclosed structure.” 84 Fed.
Reg. at 59. For a computer-implemented 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) claim
limitation, moreover, “the corresponding structure . . . is not simply a
general purpose computer by itself but a special purpose computer as
programmed to perform the . . . algorithm” disclosed for performing the
specific computer function. Id. Thus, the specification must disclose such
Appeal 2020-001633
Application 13/983,651

26
an algorithm, “or else the claim is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. 112(b).”5 Id.
Finally, the 2019 § 112 Guidance explains that, “[w]hen a claim containing a
computer-implemented 35 U.S.C. 112(f) claim limitation is found to be
indefinite under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) for failure to disclose sufficient
corresponding structure . . . in the specification that performs the entire
claimed function, it will also lack written description under 35 U.S.C.
112(a).”6 Id. at 61.
The 2019 § 112 Guidance emphasizes that, “[e]ven if a claim is not
construed as a means-plus-function limitation under 35 U.S.C. 112(f),
computer-implemented functional claim language must still be evaluated for
sufficient disclosure under the written description and enablement
requirements of 35 U.S.C. 112(a).” 84 Fed. Reg. at 61. For example, “a
specification must describe the claimed invention in sufficient detail (e.g., by
disclosure of an algorithm) to establish that the applicant had possession of
the claimed invention as of the application filing date.” Id. The
2019 § 112 Guidance notes that “[t]he written description requirement is not
met if the specification merely describes a ‘desired result.’” Id. (citing
Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. MicroStrategy, Inc., 782 F.3d 671, 682 (Fed.
Cir. 2015)).
In the context of “computer-implemented, software-related claims,”
therefore,
examiners should determine whether the specification
discloses the computer and the algorithm(s) that achieve

5 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) corresponds to 35 U.S.C. § 112 (pre-AIA), second
paragraph.
6 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) corresponds to 35 U.S.C. § 112 (pre-AIA), first
paragraph.
Appeal 2020-001633
Application 13/983,651

27
the claimed function in sufficient detail that one of
ordinary skill in the art can reasonably conclude that the
inventor possessed the claimed subject matter at the time
of filing. An algorithm is defined, for example, as “a
finite sequence of steps for solving a logical or
mathematical problem or performing a task.” Microsoft
Computer Dictionary (5th ed., 2002). Applicant may
“express that algorithm in any understandable terms
including as a mathematical formula, in prose, or as a
flow chart, or in any other manner that provides
sufficient structure.” Finisar [Corp. v. DirecTV Grp.,
Inc.], 523 F.3d [1323,] 1340 [(Fed. Cir. 2008)] (internal
citation omitted). It is not enough that one skilled in the
art could theoretically write a program to achieve the
claimed function, rather the specification itself must
explain how the claimed function is achieved to
demonstrate that the applicant had possession of it. See,
e.g., Vasudevan, 782 F.3d at 682–83.
84 Fed. Reg. at 61–62.

3. Analysis
Based on the principles of law set forth above, we are not persuaded
that the Examiner has sufficiently articulated a prima facie case that the
claims are lacking in written description and/or are indefinite.
As an initial matter, although the Examiner cites to 35 U.S.C. § 112
(pre-AIA), sixth paragraph, in the Final Action, this reference is not present
in the Answer. Thus, it is not clear to us whether the Examiner is continuing
to base the rejections on a construction of the claims as including means-
plus-function limitations.
To the extent the Examiner’s rejections are based on construing the
claims as containing means-plus-function limitations, we are not persuaded
Appeal 2020-001633
Application 13/983,651

28
that the Examiner has sufficiently articulated his reasoning with respect to
the analysis set forth in the 2019 § 112 Guidance.
For example, the 2019 § 112 Guidance requires consideration of
whether “[t]he claim limitation uses the term ‘means’ (or ‘step’) or a generic
placeholder.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 58. In this case, because the claims do not use
the terms “means” or “step,” the question is whether a skilled artisan would
consider “processor” to be a generic placeholder in the context of the claims.
The Examiner asserts that “the claims fail to provide for how a
general purpose processor is actually configured or specifically programmed
to achieve the functionally defined operations and analytical results set forth
in the claims.” Ans. 6. However, we note that disclosure of an algorithm is
not required where a claim recites only the general purpose functions of a
computer, because in such a case the recited functions are “coextensive with
the structure disclosed, i.e., a general purpose processor,” and in such a case
“processor” would not be a “generic placeholder.” In re Katz Interactive
Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The
Examiner has not made findings as to whether, for example, the step of
“receiv[ing] . . . cancer molecular profiling data”7 and/or the analytical steps

7 It is unclear whether the Examiner construes “processor configured to
receive . . . cancer molecular profiling data” as a means plus function claim
limitation and/or otherwise find that limitation to be lacking in adequate
written description. On the one hand, the Examiner states in the Answer that
“[a]ll recited steps in the instant claims,” including obtaining information,
“are carried out by employing a generic computer processor,” but that “the
claims fail to provide for how a general purpose processor is actually
configured or specifically programmed to achieve the functionally defined
operations and analytical results set forth in the claims.” Ans. 5–6
(emphasis added). On the other hand, in another portion of the Answer, the
Appeal 2020-001633
Application 13/983,651

29
recited in the claims, such as “applying . . . a statistical analysis,” are those
that may be performed by a general purpose processor. See, e.g., Ans. 4
(stating, in the context of the § 101 analysis, that “the claims still rely on the
use of generic computer serving as conventional computational vehicle on
which to apply the recited data analysis procedure”).
Similarly, although we agree with the Examiner that the term
“processor” is modified by functional language in several claim limitations
— e.g., “receiv[ing] . . . cancer molecular profiling data,” “applying . . . a
statistical analysis to identify a probability,” “identifying . . . a biological
network,” “identifying . . . a network information flow probability,”
“calculating . . . a distance . . . using . . . multiple instances of network
information flow vectors,” “assigning . . . cancer patient to the clinically
relevant group” (Appeal Br. 16–17 (Claims App.); Ans. 8), we are not
persuaded that the Examiner has sufficiently analyzed whether the term is
also, in one or more instances, modified by further structure, in addition to
“processor,” for performing the function.
For example, claim 1 recites
applying, by said processor, a statistical analysis to
identify a probability of there being altered molecular
data within the patient molecular data in comparison to
the database of cancer molecular data of known
phenotypes, wherein the probability is identified by

Examiner states only that “the instant disclosure is inadequate as it fails [to]
describe any additional algorithms or algorithmic procedures corresponding
to the recited computer implemented analytical activities (i.e.[,] the recited
series of computer implemented analytical steps . . . ).” Id. at 6 (emphasis
added).
Appeal 2020-001633
Application 13/983,651

30
integrating said altered molecular data using a
probabilistic graphical model framework.
Appeal Br. 16 (Claims App.) (emphasis added). The Specification further
explains that
[i]n a specific embodiment said probability of an
alteration may be estimated by using a probabilistic
graphical model framework, i.e. the probability of an
alteration within the one or more sets of molecular data
may be identified by estimating altered molecular values
as defined herein above (gene expression, copy number
etc.) by integrating said molecular data using a
probabilistic graphical model framework. The term
“probabilistic graphical model” as used herein refers to
an approach to characterize joint probability distributions
where nodes in the graph are random variables and edges
in the graph represent probabilistic relationships between
these variables. The graph may accordingly represent the
way in which the joint probability of all the variables can
be decomposed into a product of factors, each depending
on only a subset of all the variables.
Suitable examples of probabilistic graphical model
frameworks . . . include Bayesian networks and Markov
random fields.
Spec. 24:22–34. To the extent the application of statistical analysis as
claimed cannot be performed by a generic processor, the Examiner does not
explain why the claim limitation that “the probability is identified by
integrating . . . altered molecular data using a probabilistic graphical model
framework” would not, in the view of a ordinarily skilled artisan at the time
of the invention, be a structure (i.e., algorithm) that further modifies the
generic processor so as to remove the particular limitation from the realm of
means-plus-function claiming.
Similarly, to the extent the Examiner is not construing the claim
limitations as means-plus-function limitations, but nevertheless finds the
Appeal 2020-001633
Application 13/983,651

31
claims to be lacking in written description because the Specification has not
“disclose[d] the computer and the algorithm(s) that achieve the claimed
function in sufficient detail that one of ordinary skill in the art can
reasonably conclude that the inventor possessed the claimed subject matter
at the time of filing,” 84 Fed. Reg. at 61, we are not persuaded that the
Examiner has sufficiently considered the algorithms that appear to be
described in the Specification as performing certain claimed functions.
For example, we have discussed above the disclosure in the
Specification relating to algorithms that may be used to “identify a
probability of their being altered molecular data,” as recited in claim 1.
Similarly, with respect to the limitation of “identifying . . . a biological
network by calculating activity of said biological network based upon the
identified probability,” the Specification states:
In a further step of the method of the present
invention the activity of a biological network may be
inferred on the basis of the probability of an alteration
within the one or more sets of molecular data as defined
above. . . . The term “inferred” as used herein relates to a
suitable derivation or calculation activity resulting in the
identification of biological networks. For example,
suitable algorithms such as the junction tree inference
algorithm, preferably with HUGIN updates, the Belief
Propagation with sequential updates, or the expectation-
maximization (EM) algorithm may be used. These and
further suitable algorithms would be known to the person
skilled in the art, or could be derived from suitable
scientific documents, such as Vaske et al., 2010,
Bioinformatics, 26(12): i237-i245, which is incorporated
herein by reference in its entirety.
Spec. 11:9–34; see also supra n. 3 (citing additional algorithms described in
the Specification as useful for performing various claimed steps).
Appeal 2020-001633
Application 13/983,651

32
We acknowledge that, as a general matter, the Examiner establishes
an adequate prima facie case of lack of written description so long as the
Examiner “sufficiently explain to the applicant what, in the examiner’s view,
is missing from the written description.” Hyatt v. Dudas, 492 F.3d 1365,
1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Nevertheless, because of the lack of clarity in this
case as to (1) whether the written description rejection is based on
construing certain claim limitations as means-plus-function limitations and
(2) the specific limitations the Examiner finds to be lacking in description,
and because the Examiner has not adequately articulated his reasoning as to
the factors set forth in the 2019 § 112 Guidance, we reverse the Examiner’s
rejection of the claims as lacking in written description. The Examiner’s
indefiniteness rejection is essentially identical to the written description
rejection. Accordingly, we reverse the indefiniteness rejection for the same
reasons.

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 4–12,
15–21
101 Eligibility 1, 2, 4–12,
15–21

1, 2, 4–12,
15–21
112 first
paragraph
Written Description 1, 2, 4–12,
15–21
1, 2, 4–12,
15–21
112 second
paragraph
Indefiniteness 1, 2, 4–12,
15–21
Overall
Outcome
1, 2, 4–12,
15–21

Appeal 2020-001633
Application 13/983,651

33
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED