Vienna Sausage Mfg. Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 30, 1980

252 N.L.R.B. 1317 (N.L.R.B. 1980)

1317
VIENNA SAUSAGE MANUFACTURING CO.
Vienna Sausage Manufacturing Company and Driver
Sales & Warehouse Local Union No. 117, affili-
ated with International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers
of America. Case 19-CA-12446
September 30, 1980
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS
JENKINS AND PENELLO
Upon a charge filed on May 23, 1980, by Driver
Sales & Warehouse Local Union No. 117, affiliated
with International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Amer-
ica, hereinafter called the Union, and duly served
on Vienna Sausage Manufacturing Company, her-
einafter called Respondent, the General Counsel of
the National Labor Relations Board, by the Re-
gional Director for Region 19, issued a complaint
and notice of hearing on June 25, 1980, against Re-
spondent, alleging that Respondent had engaged in
and was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended. Copies of the
charge and the complaint and notice of hearing
before an administrative law judge were duly
served on all parties to this proceeding.
With respect to the unfair labor practices, the
complaint alleges in substance that on or about
February 15, 1980,' the Union notified Respondent
by letter of its desire to modify the terms of their
contract and on April 4, sent Respondent a list of
proposed changes and a request for negotiation;
that on April 17, Respondent refused to negotiate
and continues to refuse to negotiate with the Union
about the proposed changes. Respondent filed an
answer, admitting in part, and denying in part, the
allegations of the complaint.
On July 11, Respondent filed a motion for trans-
fer and summary judgment. On July 29, the Gener-
al Counsel filed a motion to transfer case to the
Board and cross-motion for summary judgment,
with a supporting brief. On August 5, the Board
issued an order transferring the proceeding to the
Board and a Notice To Show Cause why the Gen-
eral Counsel's or Respondent's motion should or
should not be granted. On August 19 Respondent
filed a brief in support of its motion for summary
judgment and in opposition to the General Coun-
sel's cross-motion for summary judgment.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
' All datle are in 1980() unless oltherwise indicated
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
Upon the entire record in this proceeding, the
Board makes the following:
Ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment
At all times relevant to this dispute, the Union
has been the recognized exclusive collective-bar-
gaining representative of Respondent's employees
in the appropriate unit. 2 On November 11, 1977,
the Union and Respondent signed a collective-bar-
gaining agreement to be in effect from May 1,
1977, until May 1, 1980, and thereafter on a year-
to-year basis by automatic renewal. Article
XXXIV of the contract, titled "Duration and Re-
newal Clause," provides that:
. . .for the purpose of negotiating alterations
in wages and other working conditions, either
party may open this Agreement or any con-
tract effectuated through automatic renewal by
giving written "Notice of Opening" not later
than sixty (60) days prior to the expiration
date. "Notice of Opening" is in nowise intend-
ed by the parties to effectuate termination nor
shall it in anywise be construed as a termina-
tion of this Agreement nor as forestalling auto-
matic renewal as herein provided. The parties
reserve the right to economic recourse in ne-
gotiations.
Termination of this Agreement or any agree-
ment effectuated through automatic renewal
must, to the exclusion of all other methods, be
perfected by giving written "Notice of Termi-
nation" not later than sixty (60) nor more than
ninety (90) days prior to the expiration date,
whereupon the contract shall, on its expiration
date, terminate.
Any "Notice of Opening" or "Notice of Ter-
mination" given within sixty (60) days of any
automatic renewal date shall be absolutely null
and void and completely ineffective for all
purposes and shall not forestall automatic re-
newal nor effectuate termination.
On February 15, more than 60 days before the
contract expiration date, the Union notified Re-
spondent by letter of its desire to amend the con-
tract. The letter also informed Respondent that the
Union reserved the right to strike in support of its
collective-bargaining demands if agreement had not
been reached by May 1, the date upon which the
I he apprTprriale unit cmprises
All mplyees of Respiondent emplo)ed as wholesale a.rd relall de-
liver 5 drivers. drlSer-,alcsperons, and alcespersion. hut excluding ;ll
oither employces. guard,. and super.liors as defined in Ih Act
252 NLRB No. 183
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
contract would either expire or renew itself auto-
matically. Respondent did not reply to the Union's
notice. On April 14, the Union's business represen-
tative sent Respondent a list of proposed changes
to the labor agreement and requested negotiations
as soon as possble.3
On April 17, Respondent's branch manager, Bart
Masterson, informed the Union by letter that unless
the Union agreed in writing to regard its February
15 notice of opening as a notice of termination of
the contract, Respondent would refuse to negotiate
over the proposed modifications. Respondent main-
tained that the notice of opening had been ineffec-
tive to forestall automatic renewal, that the con-
tract was therefore in force by its terms until May
1, 1981, and that "negotiations for a contract to
succeed that agreement would be premature at this
time." Respondent also maintained that since the
current contract was in effect until May 1, 1981,
the Union's reservation of the right to strike in sup-
port of its bargaining demands after May 1, 1980,
was in direct contravention of Section 8(d) of the
National Labor Relations Act.
By letter dated May 6, the Union's lawyers again
requested that Respondent negotiate with respect
to changes and modifications to the current con-
tract. The Union declined to treat the notice of
opening sent on February 15 as a notice of termina-
tion and maintained that under its interpretation of
Article XXXIV of the contract, the parties were
bound to negotiate modifications, "but, of course,
with the understanding that the current Collective
Bargaining Agreement remains in full force and
effect." The Union also interpreted the contract to
permit either party to take economic action after
the May I expiration date if agreement had not
previously been reached. On May 9, Respondent
wrote the Union to inquire if the Union intended to
strike. On May 13, the Union again requested im-
mediate bargaining and notified Respondent that if
it continued to refuse to bargain, the Union would
treat the refusal as an unfair labor practice. The
parties had no further communication, and, on May
23, the Union filed the unfair labor practice
charges with the Board that initiated this proceed-
ing.
The issue presented for our determination is
whether Respondent has violated and is violating
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by its continuing
refusal to bargain with the Union over proposed
modifications to the existing collective-bargaining
' hc changes proposed by he Uion related to union scurity to
· ages, hours. arid cost--of-linilg Illcreases; to car allossancec to) aca-
ions, holidays, sick lease, aid funeral leave to health and welfare,
dental, vision, and drug insurance; and retirees' welfare trust: to pensions
to equal employnmenlt to pa;yroll deductions; to mandatorv "sage rind
price control pOs isions and to the duration and renelual clause
agreement. The General Counsel argues that under
Board law the Union need not give notice of con-
tract termination in order to trigger Respondent's
statutory obligation to bargain and that Respondent
has therefore violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act by refusing to negotiate with the Union.4 Re-
spondent, on the other hand, claims that the con-
tract renewed itself automatically on May I to be
in effect for a -year term, that thereafter any bar-
gaining over proposed changes was entirely volun-
tary under the provisions of Section 8(d), and that
Respondent therefore has no statutory duty to ne-
gotiate with the Union. Respondent contends fur-
ther that the Union has ignored the strictures of
Section 8(d) by threatening to strike within 60 days
of giving notice of its desire to modify the con-
tract.
We deal first with Respondent's assertion that
the Union's reservation of the right to strike in sup-
port of its economic demands after May 1 was con-
trary to the provisions of Section 8(d) of the Act.
Since no charges have been filed against the Union,
Respondent's contention is essentially irrelevant to
this proceeding. Nevertheless, because both in its
brief to the Board and in its correspondence with
the Union, Respondent has relied upon this inter-
pretation of Section 8(d) to justify its refusal to
bargain, we note in passing that Respondent's reli-
ance is misplaced. Were this a case in which the
Union had in fact struck in support of its bargain-
ing demands within the 60-day statutory waiting
period imposed by Section 8(d) upon negotiations
to modify an existing contract, the Supreme
Court's decision in N.L.R.B. v. Lion Oil Co.,5 and
subsequent Board Decisions 6 would be applicable,
and the Union would be held in violation of Sec-
tion 8(b)(3) for refusing to bargain according to the
statutory procedures. In the case before us, howev-
er, not only did the Union refrain from an econom-
4 The General Counsel relies heavily on our decision in K.C W Furni-
ture Company, Inc., 247 NLRB No. 79 (1980), as precedent in this case
In our opinion, K.C. W Furniture Company has little bearing on the issue
swe now confront. In that case, we held that an employer who had nego-
tiated to impasse with the union under the reopener provisions of a con-
tract identical in all pertinent respects to Respondent's violated Sec.
8(a)(5) when it instituted unilaterally its last contract offer, since the con-
tract under which the negotiations were conducted had not been termi-
nated by the parties and therefore renewed automatically when they
failed to agree. K.C W Furniture Company, while certainly not incom-
patible with our decision in the instant case, does not address the statu-
tory obligation to bargain under such contract provisions, as the parties
there had in fact willingly negotiated concerning modifications to the
contract.
r 352 U S. 282 (1957).
i E g. United Marine Dlviion Local 333 (General Marine Transportation
Corp.). 228 NRB 1107 (1977). Telephone Workers Union of New Jersey.
.ocal 827, International Broithrhhood ofElectrcal Workers. AFL-CIO (New
Jer , Bell Telephone Company 19 NLRB 726 (1971); Carpenters District
Council of Denver and Vicinity. 4FL-CIO and United Brotherhood of Car.
pcnirrs and Joiners of 4oluria, Local Union .No. L55. -CIO (Rxock
rliunuil Presires. Inc ), 172 NLRB 793 (1968)
1318
VIENNA SAUSAGE MANUFACTURING CO.
ic strike for 60 days after the February 15 notice of
opening, as Section 8(d) requires, but it did not
even reserve the right to strike before the contract
expiration date. Under these circumstances, there-
fore, in order to find Respondent's argument with-
out merit, we need not, and do not, consider
whether mere reservation during the statutory
waiting period of the right to take economic action
after the statutory period ends can ever constitute a
violation of the Act.
We find Respondent's primary argument equally
disingenuous. In essence, Respondent contends that
because the contract explicitly provides that notice
of opening will not forestall automatic renewal of
the terms of the contract on May 1, neither party is
ever under a statutory obligation to negotiate
modifications to the contract, as the contract will
renew itself in perpetuity. Under Respondent's in-
terpretation of the contract and of Federal law, a
legal duty to bargain arises only if the parties first
terminate the existing contract. In support of its ar-
gument, Respondent relies on Section 8(d) of the
Act, which provides that the duty to bargain col-
lectively "shall not be construed as requiring either
party to discuss or agree to any modification of the
terms and conditions contained in a contract for a
fixed period, if such modification is to become ef-
fective before such terms and conditions can be re-
opened under the provisions of the contract."
We do not believe that Section 8(d) will bear the
contruction Respondent urges upon us. The provi-
sion of Section 8(d) quoted above is intended to
promote stability in contractual relationships and,
to that end, relieves parties to an existing contract
from possible disruption in their relationship at a
time other than that which the contract itself pro-
vides.7 The provision is consistent with the broad
policy of the national labor law, which is to foster
productive and peaceful industry self-regulation.
Section 8(d) thus defines certain procedural aspects
of the duty to bargain collectively when the parties
have a preexisting contractual relationship. It does
not create additional substantive rights.
The contract before us contains a provision
under which the Union or Respondent may at a
specified time reopen negotiations in order to
modify the rules by which they have agreed to op-
erate the workplace. The Union has complied with
the contract reopener provision and, so far as here
relevant, with the notice and waiting-period re-
quirements of Section 8(d). The only unusual fea-
7 Of course. if he contract does not provide fr reopenilng or if it cn -
tains ntice provi imons ill connilct Aith Ihe nolice arid aiiting-perilodl r-
quirements of Sec. 8(d), the statutory restricions arc considcred para-
mounlt See Crpenter'r Do:rrc Ctountcil f,' D.lnr. 172 NIRB at 795
Here. the duration and renesal clau e of the clleltle-lhargaining agree-
ment corrcs,xnds exactl w ith the strictures of Sec S(d)
ture of this dispute is the automatic renewal clause,
which provides that the contract will remain in
effect on a year-to-year basis unless terminated by
procedures incorporated in the contract or unless
the parties agree to modifications during the period
of reopening, which may continue after the auto-
matic renewal date. We observe that even if the
contract did not contain the provision that notice
of opening would not forestall automatic renewal,
under Federal law the contract would remain in
effect until negotiations under the reopener clause
were concluded.8 Thus the only substantive effect
of the provision-and the one to which, we
assume, Respondent really objects-is that if, after
negotiating under the reopener clause, the parties
fail to agree upon changes, the present contract
will continue until it can again be reopened or ter-
minated by the procedures to which these parties
have previously agreed.
We conclude that such a result is not contrary to
the national labor policy; nor, under these circum-
stances, does Section 8(d) relieve Respondent of its
statutory duty to bargain with the Union, even if
negotiations continue past the May I automatic re-
newal date. Respondent is seeking a ruling that
would in effect require an employer or a union to
bargain only when it can bargain from scratch, that
is, upon formal termination of the contract rather
than under the reopener provision of an existing
contract. Section 8(d) confers no such right on a
party to a labor agreement. Had we the inclination,
we do not have the authority to absolve Respon-
dent of a contractual obligation that does not vio-
late the statute we administer.
Respondent also relies on language used by the
Board in certain contract-bar cases, to the effect
that when an employer and an incumbent union
agree to bargain after automatic renewal of an ex-
isting contract, those negotiations, because volun-
tary, do not reflect a disruption of the collective-
bargaining relationship sufficient to permit inter-
vention by a rival union. We find those cases inap-
posite for two reasons. Aside from the fact that the
inquiry in a contract-bar situation is not the same
as that in a case concerning violation of the duty to
bargain, both of the cases to which Respondent
refers required interpretation of contract provisions
essentially different from the one Respondent has
signed. In Michigan Gear & Engineering Company,9
the contract in question expressly required the par-
ties to reach agreement on modifications before the
end of the agreement year in order to forestall
automatic renewal of the existing contract, and in
Sec. e g . VI. R B Hcnnlr Katz, c. d h/a HWllarnshurg Steel
Priduct (, 36q U S 736 (9 l)2)
' 114 NI R 1 2(). 20)9 (1 55)
1319
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Mallinckrodt Chemical Works,' ° the reopener pro-
vision implicitly imposed the same requirement.
When parties to a contract have agreed to limit the
negotiation period under a contract reopener clause
to a period prior to the automatic renewal date, the
Board is justified in considering bargaining after
the specified period to be voluntary and therefore
in erecting a contract bar. To be sure, Michigan
Gear and Mallinckrodt both indicated, in language
perhaps mere sweeping than necessary, that the
automatic renewal clause in each contract triggered
the provision of Section 8(d) upon which Respon-
dent now relies. The protective purpose of Section
8(d) cannot be fulfilled, however, if we apply the
proviso in question literally and inflexibly to every
contract that contains an automatic renewal clause,
and our interpretation of Section 8(d) must, there-
fore, to some extent be colored by the arrange-
ments that parties to a contract have themselves
made for its perpetuation. Here, the reopener
clause does not require that negotiations be com-
pleted before the May I automatic renewal date.
We therefore decline to apply the rationale of the
contract-bar cases.
Moreover, in neither Mallinckrodt nor Michigan
Gear were we faced with a situation in which
either party to a collective-bargaining agreement
had deliberately delayed negotiations until after the
contract's automatic renewal date. In the contro-
versy we now decide, Respondent has consistently
refused to negotiate after receiving timely notice of
reopening from the Union. Respondent does not
deny that even under the reasoning of Mallinckrodt
and Michigan Gear it had a statutory duty to bar-
gain during the 60 days before the May I renewal
date. Respondent contends, however, that having
successfully avoided that obligation by an argu-
ment we have already found specious, it cannot
now be required to bargain because the contract
has renewed automatically. Even if we were pre-
pared to conclude that bargaining under this con-
tract became voluntary after May 1, a conclusion
that, as we have indicated, we do not accept, our
power to remedy Respondent's refusal to fulfill its
legal obligation to negotiate between February 15
and May 1 would not be circumscribed simply by
the passage of time.
We therefore conclude that Respondent's duty to
bargain under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act arose
when the Union gave timely notice of its desire to
reopen the contract and that its duty to bargain is a
continuing obligation not abrogated by the fact
that negotiations concerning modification of the
contract were not completed before the contract
automatically renewed on May 1. Since we have
found Respondent's arguments to be without merit,
we deny its Motion for Summary Judgment and
accordingly grant the General Counsel's Motion
for Summary Judgment.
On the basis of the entire record, the Board
makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent is an Illinois corporation with an
office and place of business in Seattle, Washington,
where it is engaged in manufacturing meat prod-
ucts. During the past 12 months, a representative
period, Respondent, in the course and conduct of
its business operations, sold and shipped goods or
provided services from its facilities within the State
of Washington to customers outside the State or
sold and shipped goods or provided services to
customers within the State who were themselves
engaged in interestate commerce by other than in-
direct means, such goods and services having a
total value in excess of $50,000.
We find, on the basis of the foregoing, that Re-
spondent is, and has been at all times material
herein, an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and
that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to
assert jurisdiction herein.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
We find that Driver Sales & Warehouse Local
Union No. 117, affiliated with International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America, is, and has been at all
times material herein, a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
Commencing on or about April 17, 1980, and
continuing at all times thereafter, Respondent has
refused to bargain with the Union concerning alter-
ations in the wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment established in the parties'
current collective-bargaining agreement. Accord-
ingly, we find that Respondent has, since April 17,
1980, and at all times thereafter, engaged in con-
duct that constitutes an unfair labor practice within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) and 8(d) of
the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICE UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent described in section
III, above, occurring in connection with its oper-
ations described in section I, above, have a close,
1320
'° 114 NRB IR7. 1 8 (1955)
VIENNA SAUSAGE MANUI:ACTlJRING CO.
intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traf-
fic, and commerce among the several States and
tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and ob-
structing commerce and the free flow of com-
merce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in
and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (I) of the Act, we
shall order that it cease and desist therefrom, and
to take certain affirmative action designed to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
The Board, upon the basis of the foregoing facts
and the entire record, makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Vienna Sausage Manufacturing Company is an
employer engaged in commerce within the mean-
ing of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Driver Sales & Warehouse Local Union No.
117, affiliated with International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers
of America, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All employees of Vienna Sausage Manufactur-
ing Company at its Seattle, Washington, facility
employed as wholesale and retail delivery drivers,
driver-salespersons, and salespersons, but excluding
all other employees, guards, and supervisors as de-
fined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for
the purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. At all times material herein the above-named
labor organization has been the exclusive represen-
tative of all the employees in the aforesaid appro-
priate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
5. By refusing on or about April 17, 1980, and at
all times thereafter, to bargain collectively with the
above-named labor organization as the exclusive
bargaining representative of all the employees of
Respondent in the appropriate unit, concerning al-
terations in the wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment established in the parties'
current collective-bargaining agreement, Respon-
dent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of
the Act.
6. By the aforesaid refusal to bargain, Respon-
dent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced,
and is interfering with, restraining, and coercing,
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them in Section 7 of the Act, and thereby has en-
gaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board hereby orders that the Respondent,
Vienna Sausage Manufacturing Company, Seattle,
Washington, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall:
i. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively concerning
alterations in the rates of pay, wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment estab-
lished in the current collective-bargaining agree-
ment with Driver Sales & Warehouse Local Union.
117, affiliated with International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers
of America, as the exclusive bargaining representa-
tive of its employees in the following appropriate
unit:
All employees of Respondent at its Seattle,
Washington, facility employed as wholesale
and retail delivery drivers, driver-salespersons,
and salespersons, but excluding all other em-
ployees, guards, and supervisors as defined in
the Act.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering
with, restraining, or coercing employees in the ex-
ercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of
the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which
the Board designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with
Driver Sales & Warehouse Local Union 117, affili-
ated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Amer-
ica, concerning alterations in the wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment estab-
lished in the parties' current collective-bargaining
agreement, and, if an understanding is reached, to
embody such understanding is a signed agreement.
(b) Post at its Seattle, Washington, facility copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix.""
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 19, after being duly
signed by the Employer's representative, shall be
posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt
I In the eent that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of The National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant To a Judgment of The United States Court of appeals Enforcing an
Order of The National Labor Relations Board"
1 321
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respon-
dent to insure that said notices are not altered, de-
faced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 19,
in writing, within 20 days from the date of this
Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply
herewith.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively
concerning alterations in the wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment es-
tablished in our current collective-bargaining
agreement with Driver Sales & Warehouse
Local Union No. 117, affiliated with Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, as the
exclusive representative of the employees in
the bargaining unit described below.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employ-
ees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain with the
above-named Union, as the exclusive represen-
tative of all employees in the bargaining unit
described below, concerning alterations in the
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment established in our current col-
lective-bargaining agreement, and, if an under-
standing is reached, embody such understand-
ing in a signed agreement. The bargaining unit
s15:
All employees of the Employer at its Seat-
tle, Washington, facility, employed as
wholesale and retail delivery drivers, driver-
salesperson, and salepersons, but excluding
all other employees, guards, and supervisors
as defined in the Act.
VIENNA SAUSAGE MANUFACTURING
COMPANY
1322