VID SCALE, INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 19, 2021

2020002197 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 19, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/957,887 04/19/2018 Yuriy Reznik IVOW_11902US03 8166
15800 7590 08/19/2021
Condo Roccia Koptiw LLP
1800 JFK Boulevard
Suite 1700
Philadelphia, PA 19103
EXAMINER
NGUYEN, PHUNG HOANG JOSEPH
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2651
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/19/2021 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte YURIY REZNIK, and GREGORY S. STERNBERG,
ARIELA ZEIRA, LIANGPING MA, YONG HE,
ANANTHARAMAN BALASUBRAMANIAN, YAN YE,
LOUIS KEROFSKY, RALPH NEFF, and
ZHIFENG CHEN

Appeal 2020-002197
Application 15/957,887
Technology Center 2600
____________

Before MARC S. HOFF, CARL L. SILVERMAN, and
MATTHEW J. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judges.

SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 45–62, which constitute all pending
claims. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a) (2018). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as
Vid Scale, Inc. which is a subsidiary of InterDigital, Inc. Appeal Br. 3.
Appeal 2020-002197
Application 15/957,887
2
We reverse.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s disclosure is directed to controlling video
communications. Abstr., Spec. ¶¶ 4, 87, 89, 97, 102, 142, 143, 149, 150,
Figs. 1A, 3, 4.
Claim 45 is representative2 of the invention and reads as follows
(emphases added):
45. A first wireless transmit/receive unit (WTRU) comprising:
a memory; and
a processor configured to:
receive an incoming video stream from a second WTRU;
decode incoming video content of the incoming video
stream;
display the decoded incoming video content on a first
screen of the first WTRU;
analyze the decoded incoming video content to determine
a property of a viewing environment in which the second WTRU
is operating, the property of the viewing environment comprising
at least one of a presence of a user in a vicinity of the second
WTRU, a user’s distance from a second screen of the second
WTRU, or an ambient lighting condition associated with the
second WTRU;
capture video content using a camera of the first WTRU;
encode the captured video content to produce an outgoing
video stream, wherein the captured video content is encoded
based on the determined property of the viewing environment in
which the second WTRU is operating; and
send the outgoing video stream to the second WTRU.

2 Based on Appellant’s arguments (Appeal Br. 8–14) and our discretion
under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the appeal of obviousness
rejection of claims 45–62 on the basis of representative claim 45.
Appeal 2020-002197
Application 15/957,887
3
Appeal Br. 15 (Claims Appendix).
REFERENCES AND REJECTIONS
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Wan et al. (“Wan”) US 2010/0074341 A1 Mar. 25, 2010
Robinson et al.
(“Robinson”)
US 2012/0274736 A1 Nov. 1, 2012
Osorio et al.
(“Osorio”)
US 2013/0179931 A1 July 11, 2013
Dorso et al.
(“Dorso”)
US 2013/0205163 A1 Aug. 8, 2013

Claims 45–48, 50–57, and 59–62 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as unpatentable over Dorso and Robinson. Final Act. 2–6.
Claims 49 and 58 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Dorso, Robinson, and Osorio or Wan. Final Act. 6–7.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
contentions in the Appeal Brief and the Reply Brief that the Examiner has
erred, as well as the Examiner’s response to Appellant’s arguments in the
Appeal Brief. Arguments which Appellant could have made, but did not
make are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). On the
record before us, we are persuaded the Examiner has erred.
In the Final Action, the Examiner finds the combination of the
teachings of Dorso and Robinson teaches the limitations of representative
claim 45 and provides reasoning why one of ordinary skill in the art would
have been motivated to combine the teachings. Final Act. 2–4 (citing Dorso,
Figs. 5, 6, Abstr., ¶¶ 24, 47, 94; Robinson, Abstr.). The Examiner finds that
Dorso does not explicitly detail the limitation “the property of the viewing
Appeal 2020-002197
Application 15/957,887
4
environment comprising at least one of a presence of a user in a vicinity of
the second WTRU, a user’s distance from a second screen of the second
WTRU, or an ambient lighting condition associated with the second WTRU”
and relies on Robinson for this limitation. Id. at 4.
The Examiner finds Robinson teaches,
[t]he at least one remote participant’s video streams are
presented in separate viewing areas of the local participant’s
display. The viewing areas presenting the remote participants
are modified to indicate to the local participant each remote
participant’s focus of attention, based on the focus of attention
data . . . of the remote participant’s head location.
Id. (citing Robinson, Abstr.).
Appellant argues, inter alia, the Examiner errs in finding the
combination of the teachings of Dorso and Robinson teaches the following
claim 45 limitations:
(1) analyze the decoded incoming video content to determine a
property of a viewing environment in which the second WTRU
is operating, the property of the viewing environment
comprising at least one of a presence of a user in a vicinity of
the second WTRU, a user’s distance from a second screen of
the second WTRU, or an ambient lighting condition
associated with the second WTRU;
(2) encode the captured video content to produce an outgoing
video stream, wherein the captured video content is encoded
based on the determined property of the viewing environment
in which the second WTRU is operating.
Appeal Br. 8–14 (emphasis and (1) and (2) added; also referred to as
“disputed limitations”).
Appellant argues the Examiner errs because
Appeal 2020-002197
Application 15/957,887
5
i.3 Dorso and Robinson do not analyze the decoded incoming
video content to determine a property of a viewing environment
in which another WTRU is operating. Appeal Br. 8–10.
ii. Dorso and Robinson do not analyze the decoded incoming
video content to determine a property of a viewing environment
in which another WTRU is operating. Id. at 10.
iii. Dorso and Robinson do not encode captured video content
of the first WTRU based on the determined property of the
viewing environment in which the second WTRU is operating.
Id. at 10–12.
iv. Dorso and Robinson do not teach or suggest the property of
the viewing environment comprising at least one of a presence
of a user in a vicinity of the second WTRU, a user’s distance from
a second screen of the second WTRU, or an ambient lighting
condition associated with the second WTRU. Id. at 12–13.
Appellant argues the Examiner errs in finding the Dorso Abstract
discloses the claim 45 limitation “analyze the decoded incoming video content
to determine a property of a viewing environment in which the second WTRU
is operating.” Appeal Br. 8 (citing Final Act. 4). According to Appellant, the
set of capabilities for a user device in Dorso is not determined by analyzing
decoded video content from the second user because Dorso simply discloses
that a personal computer with a high speed internet connection has disparate
capabilities than a smart phone connected to a mobile network. Id. at 8–9
(citing Dorso ¶ 24). Appellant argues that assessing the capabilities of a peer
based on contact with that peer cannot be said to teach or suggest analyzing
decoded video content to determine a property of a viewing environment and
Dorso is completely silent with respect to analyzing decoded video content
received from the second user device. Id. at 9.

3 Appellant and the Examiner utilize designations i–iv and for clarity, the
Board also utilizes these designations. See Appeal Br. 8–13; Ans. 10–17;
Reply Br. 2–4.
Appeal 2020-002197
Application 15/957,887
6
Regarding Robinson, Appellant agrees that images captured by
remote participants in Robinson are transmitted to each local participant
device, but argues the local device in Robinson does not determine the focus
of attention of the remote users, much less a property of a viewing
environment. Id. Instead, According to Appellant, Robinson discloses that
“a focus of attention of a local participant in a video conference is
determined by that local participant's computing device.” Id. (citing
Robinson ¶ 22). Appellant argues the “local participant’s computing device
in Robinson then sends the determined focus of attention (i.e., focus of
attention data) of its local participant to the remote participants in the video
conference.” Id. (citing Robinson ¶¶ 22, 23, 26, 27, 44, Fig. 14).
Appellant argues,
[t]hat is, the local computing device(s) in Robinson do not
analyze decoded video content received from a remote
participant’s computing device to determine the focus of
attention of the remote participant. Rather, the computing
devices of each of the local participants in the video conference
receive, along with respective video and audio streams, focus of
attention data from each remote participant’s computing devices
(Robinson, para. [0022], [0023], [0026], [0027], [0044], and
FIG. 14). Thus, Robinson cannot be said to teach or suggest a
first wireless transmit/receive unit (WTRU) . . . configured to . .
. analyze the decoded incoming video content to determine a
property of a viewing environment in which the second WTRU
is operating.
Id.
In the Answer, the Examiner finds that Dorso analyzes decoded
incoming video content and that Dorso transcodes a portion of the
communication to a base layer and an enhanced layer. Ans. 11 (citing Dorso
Fig. 4, element 404). The Examiner finds,
Appeal 2020-002197
Application 15/957,887
7
Furthermore, Dorso teaches in one embodiment, adjusting
a parameter may be adjusting a resolution communication in one
embodiment, adjusting a parameter may be changing a codec
used for the communication. In one embodiment, adjusting a
parameter may be changing the error protection scheme of the
communication, [0047]. Also see Fig. 2, at 208, an appropriate
compression scheme is selected for the communication at the
user device. At 210, a media format is selected for the
communication. The media formats used may be those well
known in the art for digital communications comprising speech,
audio, video, images, text, error correction code and other digital
media. For example h.264 video format may be employed, speex
for audio and parity codes for error correction. And at 212, a
type of encoding is selected for the communication. Encoding
and decoding procedures and protocols may those that are well
known in the art or may be based on unique algorithms.
Ans. 11–12.
Regarding Appellant’s argument that Dorso and Robinson do not
analyze the decoded incoming video content to determine a property of a
viewing environment in which another WTRU is operating, the Examiner
asserts the Specification defines the terms in the disputed limitations and the
broadest reasonable interpretation of these terms is applicable to the
teachings of Dorso and Robinson. Id. at 12–14.
The Examiner finds the Specification does not use the terms “a
property of a viewing environment” and the Examiner proffers a broadest
reasonable interpretation based on the Specification discussion of “viewing
parameter” wherein viewing parameter “include a user viewing parameter, a
device viewing parameter, and/or a content viewing parameter.” Id. at 12
(citing Spec., ¶ 4). According to the Examiner, the Specification describes
the device may modify a video stream based on the viewing parameter, and
modifying the video stream may include re-encoding the video stream,
adjusting an orientation, removing a video detail, and/or adjusting a bit rate
Appeal 2020-002197
Application 15/957,887
8
as well as adjusting the resolution, based on the current viewing conditions
and/or viewing parameters. Id. (citing Spec., ¶¶ 4, 8). The Examiner finds
the Specification further defines “property of viewing environment” as
content viewing parameter, based on the current viewing conditions and/or
viewing parameters. Id. at 13. According to the Examiner, the video
content may be encoded using a video resolution (e.g., a lowest level). Id. at
13 (citing Spec., ¶¶ 89, 112).
With the above interpretations, the Examiner finds that the disputed
limitation (1) is taught by Dorso’s teachings that each device can adjust a
parameter from another device such as adjusting an encoding rate, adjusting
a resolution communication, changing a codec used for the communication
and changing the error protection scheme of the communication. Id. at 12
(citing Dorso ¶ 47). The Examiner finds that the transcoding comprises base
layer and enhanced layer as well as resolution and bandwidth capabilities.
Id. (citing Dorso, Abstr., ¶ 24). The Examiner finds Dorso also teaches a
video portion divided into two sub-portions may similarly provide a low-
resolution portion and a hi-resolution portion. Id. at 13 (citing Dorso ¶ 38).
The Examiner finds that Robinson also teaches content being shared
in the viewing areas as shown in multiple Figures where shared video
content identified as slides 1, 2, and 3 can be provided by any one or more of
the participants with each slide to be presented on the display 104 in a
separate viewing area. Id. at 13 (citing Robinson, Figs. 7A, 8A, 8C, 9A–9D,
11B, 12B–12C; ¶ 21).
In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues the Examiner relies upon an
incorrect interpretation of the term “a property of a viewing environment” as
recited in claim 45. Reply Br. 2–4. In particular, Appellant argues the
Examiner ignores that this term is defined in claim 45 as “a property of a
Appeal 2020-002197
Application 15/957,887
9
viewing environment” “in which the second WTRU is operating, the
property of the viewing environment comprising at least one of a presence of
a user in a vicinity of the second WTRU, a user’s distance from a second
screen of the second WTRU, or an ambient lighting condition associated
with the second WTRU” (emphasis added). Id. at 2. Appellant argues the
Examiner’s interpretation of “property of a viewing environment” as “a
capability for displaying video content” is inconsistent with the language of
claim 45. Id. (citing Ans. 12). Appellant argues “property of a viewing
environment” relates to the environment in which the video is being viewed.
Id. at 2–3. According to Appellant, a capability for displaying video content
relates to a device’s ability to display the actual content of the video itself.
Id. at 3. For example, the capability for displaying video content on a device
relates to the device’s capability to display a video resolution or a bit rate.
Id. (citing Ans. 6). Appellant argues a capability to display a bit rate is not
part of the environment or surroundings in which the video is being viewed
and a capability for displaying video content is not equivalent to the claimed
term a “property of a viewing environment.” Id. at 3.
Appellant additionally argues the disputed limitation recites that the
term “property of a viewing environment” comprises “at least one of a
presence of a user in a vicinity of the second WTRU, a user’s distance from
a second screen of the second WTRU, or an ambient lighting condition
associated with the second WTRU.” Id. at 3. According to Appellant, none
of these relate to a device’s capability to display a video resolution or a bit
rate, and a capability for displaying video content is not the equivalent of the
term “property of a viewing environment” as defined in claim 45. Id.
Regarding Dorso, Appellant argues that Dorso does not disclose
analyzing a video to determine a property that relates to the environment in
Appeal 2020-002197
Application 15/957,887
10
which the video is being viewed, rather Dorso discloses a device that
converts a video from one bit rate to another when instructed to do so by
another device. Id. Appellant additionally argues the capabilities of the
devices are not determined by the relay device by analyzing the video as the
relay device does not use the video to figure out that another device has low
processing capabilities. Id. Instead, according to Appellant, the relay device
is told what the capabilities a device has and then converts the video into an
appropriate bit rate. Id. Appellant argues Dorso does not disclose
determining a property of the environment or surroundings in which the
video is being viewed, and, instead, Dorso focuses on the capability of a
device. Id.
As discussed below, we are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments
because the Examiner’s findings are not based on a reasonable and broad
interpretation of the disputed limitations, and the Examiner provides
insufficient evidence to support the finding that the combination of Dorso
and Robinson teaches the disputed limitation based on a reasonable and
broad interpretation.
During prosecution, claims must be given their broadest reasonable
interpretation when reading claim language in light of the Specification as it
would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of
Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Although we interpret
claims broadly but reasonably in light of the Specification, we nonetheless
must not import limitations from the Specification into the claims. See In re
Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Our reviewing court
states that “the words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and
customary meaning.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citation omitted). However, the broadest reasonable
Appeal 2020-002197
Application 15/957,887
11
interpretation differs from the broadest possible interpretation. In re Smith
Int’l, Inc., 871 F.3d 1375, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The correct inquiry in
giving a claim term its broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the
specification is “an interpretation that corresponds with what and how the
inventor describes his invention in the specification, i.e., an interpretation
that is ‘consistent with the specification.’” Id. at 1382–83 (quoting In re
Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
Disputed limitation (1) recites
analyze the decoded incoming video content to determine a
property of a viewing environment in which the second WTRU
is operating, the property of the viewing environment
comprising at least one of a presence of a user in a vicinity of
the second WTRU, a user’s distance from a second screen of
the second WTRU, or an ambient lighting condition associated
with the second WTRU.
The ordinary meaning of “property of viewing environment” is a property of
the viewing environment such that the property relates to the viewing
environment. And, the disputed limitation further recites that the property is
at least one of (1) a presence of a user in a vicinity of the second WTRU, (2)
a user’s distance from a second screen of the second WTRU, or (3) an
ambient lighting condition associated with the second WTRU. This is a
broad and reasonable interpretation.
A capability for displaying video content relates to a device’s ability
to display the actual content of the video itself. The capability for displaying
video content on a device relates to the device’s capability, and is not part of
the environment or surroundings in which the video is being viewed and is
not equivalent to the claimed term a “property of a viewing environment.”
The Examiner’s interpretation is unreasonably broad, and the Examiner does
not point persuasively to the Specification to support the Examiner’s claim
Appeal 2020-002197
Application 15/957,887
12
interpretation. Additionally, the Examiner’s interpretation does not
adequately comprehend the disputed limitation (1) recitation that “the
property is at least one of (1) a presence of a user in a vicinity of the second
WTRU, (2) a user’s distance from a second screen of the second WTRU, or
(3) an ambient lighting condition associated with the second WTRU”
(emphasis added).
Regarding Dorso, we are persuaded by Appellant’s argument that
Dorso does not teach the disputed limitation because Dorso’s capability
determination and modifications do not teach the disputed limitation as
broadly and reasonably interpreted.
Regarding Robinson, we are persuaded by Appellant’s argument that
Robinson does not teach the disputed limitation. In particular, Robinson’s
teaching of sensing position is performed (analyzed) at the local site and
then shared with other sites. Robinson ¶ 22. Therefore, Robinson does not
“analyze the decoded incoming video content to determine a property of a
viewing environment in which the second WTRU is operating” as recited in
the disputed limitation (emphasis added).
Although we agree with the Examiner’s findings that Dorso and
Robinson teach controlling video communications, on the record before us,
the Examiner does not sufficiently describe how the combination of Dorso
and Robinson teaches the disputed limitation.
Accordingly, the Examiner does not provide prima facie support for
the rejection. “[T]he examiner bears the initial burden, on review of the
prior art or on any other ground, of presenting a prima facie case of
unpatentability.” In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
On the record before us, we are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments
because the Examiner provides insufficient evidence to support the findings
Appeal 2020-002197
Application 15/957,887
13
and conclusions. Therefore, we conclude the Examiner errs in rejecting
representative claim 45, and claims 46–62.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we do not sustain the obviousness
rejections of representative claim 45, and claims 46–62.
Because our decision with regard to the disputed limitation is
dispositive of the rejections made, we do not address additional arguments
raised by Appellant.

Appeal 2020-002197
Application 15/957,887
14
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
45–48,
50–57,
59–62
103 Dorso, Robinson 45–48,
50–57,
59–62
49, 58 103 Dorso, Robinson,
Osorio, Wan
49, 58
Overall
Outcome
45–62

REVERSED