Victoria M. Gonzalez, Complainant,v.Norman Y. Mineta, Secretary, Department of Transportation, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMay 12, 2000
01A11621_r (E.E.O.C. May. 12, 2000)

01A11621_r

05-12-2000

Victoria M. Gonzalez, Complainant, v. Norman Y. Mineta, Secretary, Department of Transportation, Agency.


Victoria M. Gonzalez v. Department of Transportation

01A11621

June 25, 2002

.

Victoria M. Gonzalez,

Complainant,

v.

Norman Y. Mineta,

Secretary,

Department of Transportation,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A11621

Agency No. 5-98-5149B

DECISION

Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from an agency

final decision dated November 21, 2000, finding that it substantially

complied with the terms of the April 13, 1994 settlement agreement

executed by the parties. The Commission accepts the appeal. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.402; 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(b); and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.

The settlement agreement provided, in pertinent part, that:<1>

(1) The agency agrees to reassign complainant to the position of

Electronics Technician (Instruction), GS-856-12, developmental to the

GS-13 level, in the Principles Training Section, NAV/COM/ENV Branch,

Airway Facilities Division, FAA Academy, serving as an Instructor in

radar principles. Complainant will be eligible for the GS-13 when

qualification and time-in-grade requirements are met.

(2) ...complainant will be scheduled to attend and must successfully

complete the basic instructor training course (BIT) at the FAA Academy....

(3) Costs associated with the....move [from Denver to Oklahoma City]

will be paid by the agency. ...

(4) It is agreed by complainant and the FAA that the facts of this

resolution and all terms contained herein shall be kept confidential.

By letter to the agency dated August 6, 1998, complainant claimed that

the agency breached the settlement agreement. Specifically, complainant

contends that during her tenure at the agency, from June 1994 to her

resignation in March 1998, she never served as an instructor of radar

principles. Furthermore, complainant contends that the existence of

the agreement was improperly disclosed, resulting in negative comments

about how she obtained her position.

In its decision, the agency determined that it substantially complied

with the settlement agreement. Specifically, the agency found that a

developmental GS-12 was created for complainant, and that she received

a GS-13 promotion in February 1995, after she achieved sufficient

time-in-grade and completed the required training. The agency further

indicated that because of a major re-structuring of the training

office in July 1994, complainant could not be assigned to teach radar

principles, but instead was given a broad range of instructor assignments.

In this regard, the agency noted that complainant did not express any

dissatisfaction with this arrangement, and only expressed her displeasure

for the first time in a statement that accompanied her resignation.

The agency additionally determined that the confidentiality provision

had not been breached, finding that the witnesses complainant named

either did not know of the agreement or denied discussing the agreement.

On appeal, complainant submits lengthy statements, with supporting

documentation, refuting the agency's findings and further elaborating

on her arguments. In particular, complainant argues that provision

1 is the cornerstone of the settlement agreement, and it specifically

obligated the agency to provide her with a position as an instructor in

radar principles, and it breached the agreement when it failed to do so.

Complainant further argues that because the existence of the settlement

agreement was disclosed to agency supervisors, they retaliated against

her, ultimately resulting in her resignation. Complainant submits sworn

statements and testimony to this effect from her union representative,

based on purportedly inappropriate statements made to him by a certain

management official in December 1997.<2> The agency submits no response

to the appeal.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement

agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at

any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties.

The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a

contract between the employee and the agency, to which ordinary rules

of contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Department of Defense,

EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further

held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract,

not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction.

Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795

(August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard

to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally

relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon v. United States Postal

Service, EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states

that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face,

its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument

without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery

Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).

Upon review, we find that the agency substantially complied with

the settlement agreement. Review confirms that the agency paid for

complainant's move to Oklahoma City; placed her in a GS-12 developmental

position; provided her with training; and promoted her to a GS-13

instructor position. Regarding provision 1 in particular, the agency

admits that complainant did not receive a radar principles teaching

assignment, but instead received other teaching assignments due to the

re-organization. The agency further indicates that complainant performed

these assignments without complaint for approximately three years,

only indicating her displeasure for the first time when resigning in

March 1998. Complainant does not dispute these findings. Under these

circumstances, we find no breach of provision 1.

Regarding provision 5, we find that complainant claims that the purported

disclosure of the settlement agreement resulted in retaliatory treatment,

and that this treatment resulted in her resignation. We find that this

claim must be treated as a separate complaint of retaliation, and not as

a claim of breach. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(c). In this regard, review

of the record indicates that complainant filed a complaint of retaliatory

harassment/constructive discharge with the agency, identified as agency

number 5-98-5138, and that the agency decision in that case is currently

on appeal before the Commission, docketed as appeal number 01A10391.

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the agency's

decision finding no breach of the settlement agreement.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

June 25 ,2002

__________________

Date

1For ease of reference, these provisions have

been re-numbered herein.

2Commission records reflect that complainant previously filed an appeal

regarding this same breach claim, which the Commission dismissed as

being premature. See Gonzalez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC

Appeal No. 01993354 (May 12, 2000).