01a10072
01-19-2001
Victoria Johnson, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
Victoria Johnson v. United States Postal Service
01A10072
January 19, 2001
.
Victoria Johnson,
Complainant,
v.
William J. Henderson,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A10072
Agency No. 4-I-630-0013-99
Hearing No. 280-99-4326
DECISION
INTRODUCTION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order
concerning her formal complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as
amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.<1> The appeal is accepted pursuant
to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the reasons that follow, the agency's
final order is AFFIRMED.
ISSUE PRESENTED
The issue presented herein is whether complainant has established, by
preponderant evidence, that she was discriminated against on the bases
of race (Black) and sex (female) when she was not placed on the hiring
worksheet for a Mail Handler or Mail Processor position.
BACKGROUND
Complainant filed a formal complaint on November 25, 1998, in which she
alleged what has been identified as the issue presented. The agency
accepted the complaint for investigation. At the conclusion of the
investigation, complainant received a copy of the investigative file
and was informed of her right to request either a hearing before an EEOC
Administrative Judge (AJ) or an immediate final decision from the agency
without a hearing. Complainant requested the former. After examining
the evidence presented by the parties during the pre-hearing phase,
the AJ determined that there were no genuine issues of material
fact, and therefore decided to issue a decision without a hearing.
That decision ruled that complainant failed to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination. The agency's final order implemented the
AJ's decision. This appeal followed.
Information in the evidentiary file indicates that complainant was
employed by the agency as a T.E. carrier at the time of the alleged
discriminatory event. Her appointment in this position expired on August
28, 1998. Complainant was able to obtain employment with the agency
due to her performance on the Battery 470 Test. Her performance on the
test allowed her name to be placed on the hiring register by the National
Test Administration Center. Complainant's test scores were as follows:
Mail Processor (76.0); Machine Distribution Clerk (74.4);Automated Markup
Clerk (76.0); and Mail Handler (76.0).
On or about July 16, 1998, the responsible management official (RMO)
received a request to hire a Part-Time Flexible Mail Processor. Due to
her workload and summer vacation, the RMO was not able to issue a hiring
worksheet until September 1, 1998. Complainant's name was not on the
hiring worksheet because her appointment with the agency expired on
August 28, 1998.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Summary Judgment Ruling
The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a
hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material
fact. This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure
set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The United
States Supreme Court has stated that summary judgment is appropriate
where the trier of fact determines that, given applicable substantive
law, no genuine issue of material fact exists. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). An issue is "genuine" if the
evidence is such that a reasonable fact-finder could find in favor of
the non-moving party. Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103,
105 (1st Cir. 1988). In determining whether to grant summary judgment,
the trier of fact's function is not to weigh the evidence and render
a determination as to the truth of the matter, but only to determine
whether there exists a genuine factual dispute. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
248-49. After examining the testimonies of the various witnesses and
other evidence provided by the parties, we find that no genuine issue
of material fact exists in this case; and therefore the AJ's decision
to issue a ruling without a hearing was appropriate.
Race and Sex Discrimination
In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, the allocation of
burdens and order of presentation of proof in a Title VII case alleging
discrimination is a three-step process. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802-803 (1973); see, Hochstadt v. Worcestor Foundation
for Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318 (D. Mass. 1976),
aff'd 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976) (applying McDonnell Douglas to
retaliation cases). First, complainant must establish a prima facie
case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,
reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination; i.e., that a
prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Next, the agency must articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason(s) for its actions. Texas Department
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). If the agency
is successful, then the complainant must prove, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the legitimate reason(s) proffered by the agency was
a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 256.
Although the initial inquiry in a discrimination case usually focuses
on whether the complainant has established a prima facie case, following
this order of analysis is unnecessary when the agency has articulated a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Washington
v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).
In such cases, the inquiry shifts from whether the complainant has
established a prima facie case to whether s/he has demonstrated by
preponderance of the evidence that the agency's reasons for its actions
merely were a pretext for discrimination. Id.; see also United States
Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714-717 (1983).
In this case, the agency has stated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for its actions. Specifically, the agency stated that complainant's
name was not on the hiring worksheet because her appointment with the
agency had expired before the worksheet was issued.
Because the agency has proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the alleged discriminatory events, complainant now bears the burden
of establishing that the agency's stated reason is merely a pretext for
discrimination. Shapiro v. Social Security Administration, EEOC Request
No. 05960403 (December 6, 1996). Complainant can do this by showing
that the agency was motivated by a discriminatory reason. Id. (citing
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993)). In this case,
complainant has failed to meet that burden. In attempting to prove
pretext, complainant stated that her name should have been included on
the hiring worksheet because her name was on the hiring register when the
worksheet was requested in July, 1998. She also stated that if the office
responsible for compiling the worksheet had been adequately staffed,
then the worksheet would have been issued before her appointment expired.
Finally, complainant stated that although she had received the same score
as her husband on the Battery Test, her husband's name was placed on the
hiring worksheet. The Commission notes that complainant's husband's
eligibility had not expired. Of the statements made by complainant,
none of them indicates that the reason proffered by the agency was a
pretext for discrimination.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's
contentions on appeal, the agency's response thereto, and arguments and
evidence not specifically addressed in this decision, we hereby AFFIRM
the agency's final order.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0900)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the office of federal operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
January 19, 2001
__________________
Date
1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal
sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all
federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative
process. The regulations, as amended, may be found at the Commission's
website at www.eeoc.gov.