Vickie J. Louthen, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMay 24, 2002
01a11558 (E.E.O.C. May. 24, 2002)

01a11558

05-24-2002

Vickie J. Louthen, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Vickie J. Louthen v. United States Postal Service

01A11558

5/24/02

.

Vickie J. Louthen,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A11558

Agency No. 4G-780-0248-97 et al

Hearing No. 360-98-8575X

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order

concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act),

as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to

29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS

the agency's final order.

The record reveals that complainant, a Supervisor in the Business Mail

Entry Section of the agency's San Antonio District Office facility,

filed four formal EEO complaints alleging:

discrimination on the bases of sex (female), national origin

(Anglo-Saxon), disability (depression), and retaliation (prior EEO

activity), when she learned on July 7, 1997, that an illegal search

had been conducted of her desk and file cabinet;

discrimination on the bases of sex, national origin, and reprisal,

when a pay adjustment was made on July 10, 1997, converting 40 hours

of annual leave to sick leave;

discrimination on the bases of sex, national origin, disability (stress),

and reprisal, when she was denied an accommodation on July 30, 1997,

which placed her in an absence status for more than 14 days and she

was not returned to her regular position; and

discrimination on the bases of sex, national origin, and reprisal when

she was moved on January 28, 1998, from an enclosed office space to an

open lobby work area.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy

of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ issued a decision without a hearing,

finding no discrimination.

The AJ concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case

of disability discrimination because she failed to establish she was

an �individual with a disability� as defined by the Rehabilitation Act.

In that regard, the AJ found that the only evidence in the record that

complainant submitted revealed complainant had taken some leave from work

due to stress and depression. Upon her return to work, complainant's

physician recommended that complainant not work the night shift.

The AJ found this evidence was not sufficient to establish complainant

had a substantial limitation to a major life activity. Furthermore,

complainant failed to establish she had a record of a disability, or

that the agency regarded her as an individual with a disability.

The AJ did find complainant established sufficient evidence that

would present an inference of retaliation. Specifically, the AJ found

complainant established that the agency officials who were responsible

for the actions alleged were aware of complainant's prior EEO activity,

such that a causal connection could be established.

The AJ then examined whether the agency articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The AJ found complainant's

desk, which was shared by other supervisors, was cleaned out during

a housekeeping activity as requested by complainant's supervisor.

Furthermore, the AJ found the record revealed complainant's annual leave

was changed to sick leave partly due to complainant's failure to submit

appropriate leave documentation. As for complainant's claim that she

was moved to another office, the AJ found the evidence revealed other

supervisors outside of complainant's protected classes were also moved

so that the supervisors could keep closer attention on employees.

The AJ noted that complainant alleged that the agency failed to

accommodate her August 1, 1997 request for reassignment to the day shift.

The evidence reveals the agency was initially unable to accommodate

complainant's request on a permanent basis, and complainant went out on

sick leave. However, on September 3, 1997, complainant's request for a

daytime shift was approved.

On November 28, 2000, the agency issued a final order that implemented

the AJ's decision. Complainant makes no new contentions on appeal,

and the agency requests that we affirm its final order.

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a

hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material

fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the

summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive

legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists

no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine

whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of

the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and

all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case

can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment

is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding,

an AJ may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination

that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that grant

of summary judgment was appropriate, as no genuine dispute of material

fact exists. We find that the AJ's decision properly summarized the

relevant facts and referenced the appropriate regulations, policies,

and laws. Assuming complainant is an individual with a disability,

we agree with the AJ that complainant failed to present sufficient

evidence that would raise a genuine dispute as to whether any of the

agency's actions were taken because of her disability. Furthermore, the

evidence reveals complainant received the accommodation she requested.

As for her claims of disparate treatment based upon her gender, national

origin, and reprisal, we agree with the AJ that construing the evidence

to be most favorable to complainant, complainant failed to present

sufficient evidence that would raise a genuine dispute as to whether

the agency's reasons for its actions were a pretext for discrimination.

Accordingly, the agency's final order is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to

file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be

filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right

to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

5/24/02

Date