VERISIGN, INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 17, 2021

2020004450 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 17, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/603,499 05/24/2017 Gregory Crouse 11569.0317 3587
110084 7590 09/17/2021
MH2 Technology Law Group LLP (w/Verisign)
1951 Kidwell Drive
Suite 310
Tysons Corner, VA 22182
EXAMINER
KIM, SISLEY NAHYUN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2196
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/17/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@mh2law.com
khicks@mh2law.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte GREGORY CROUSE, VIJAY GAROTHAYA, and
LAVANYA GATAMANENI
____________________

Appeal 2020-004450
Application 15/603,499
Technology Center 2100
____________________

Before JOHN A. EVANS, JUSTIN BUSCH, and
JOHN P. PINKERTON, Administrative Patent Judges.

EVANS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject Claims 1–17. See Appeal Br. 1. Claims
18–20 are withdrawn. Response After Final 7–9 (filed September 3, 2019).
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 6 and 134.
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “Applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Verisign,
Inc. Appeal Br. 3.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellant generally describes the disclosed and claimed invention as
relating to “a scheduling system for scheduling computing jobs.” Spec. ¶ 3.2
Claims 1 and 10 are independent. Claim 1, which is reproduced
below, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal:
1. A scheduling system for scheduling computing
jobs, the scheduling system comprising a processor, a data
storage device, and program instructions stored on the data
storage device that, when executed by the processor, control the
scheduling system to perform operations comprising:
determining that a first computing job of a plurality of
computing jobs has a dependency on a second computing job of
the plurality of computing jobs, wherein each of the plurality of
computing jobs is computer executable;
determining a type of the dependency on the second
computing job;
determining a completion status of the second computing
job; and
executing the first computing job based on the completion status
of the second computing job and the type of the dependency on the
second computing job.
Appeal Br. 14, Claims App.
Rejections on Appeal
Claims 1–6, 10, 11, 13, and 14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§§ 102(a)(1) or 102(a)(2) for anticipation based on Bansal.3 Final Act. 4–11.

2 Our Decision refers to the Final Office Action mailed July 1, 2019 (“Final
Act.”) and the Advisory Action mailed October 4, 2019 (“Advisory Act.”);
Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.”) and Claims Appendix (“Claims
App.”) filed January 2, 2020; the Examiner’s Answer mailed February 5,
2020 (“Ans.”); and the Specification filed May 24, 2017 (“Spec.”).
3 US 2018/0321935 A1, published November 8, 2018 (“Bansal”).
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Claims 7–9, 12, and 15–17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 for
obviousness based on Bansal and Kishore.4 Id. at 11–24.

ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–17 in light of
Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief. See Appeal Br. 8–12. Any other
arguments Appellant could have made, but chose not to make, are waived.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2018). For the reasons discussed below,
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive of error by the Examiner. Unless
otherwise indicated, we agree with, and adopt as our own, the Examiner’s
findings of fact and conclusions as set forth in the Final Office Action from
which this appeal is taken, in the Advisory Action, and in the Answer. Final
Act. 2–24; Advisory Act. 1–2; Ans. 3–15. We provide the following
explanation primarily for emphasis.
Appellant argues independent claims 1 and 10 together and does not
present separate arguments for dependent claims 2–9 and 11–17. See
Appeal Br. 8–12. Independent claim 1 (system) and independent claim 10
(method) recite substantially similar limitations. Compare id. at 14, Claims
App., with id. at 16, Claims App. Accordingly, we select claim 1 as
representative, and the remaining claims stand or fall with claim 1. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2018).
The Examiner rejects claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(1) or
102(a)(2) for anticipation based on Bansal. Final Act. 4–6; see Ans. 3–15.
Appellant argues that Bansal does not disclose or suggest “wherein each of
the plurality of computing jobs is computer executable;” and “executing the

4 US 2015/0160969 A1, published June 11, 2015 (“Kishore”).
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first computing job based on the completion status of the second computing
job” as recited. Appeal Br. 8–12; id. at 14, 16, Claims App. We consider
these arguments below, but we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred.
“wherein each of the plurality of computing jobs is computer
executable”
Appellant argues Bansal does not disclose this limitation because “its
‘projects’, ‘waterfall model’, ‘agile model’, ‘tasks’, ‘sprints’, and ‘stories’
refer to real-world software development actions performed by software
developers, rather than being ‘computer executable’ computing
jobs.” Appeal Br. 8; see also id. at 9–11. Appellant similarly argues that
“Bansal’s ‘executing phase’ is part of its ‘waterfall model,’ which is
completed by a software developer during an application development
process” and “refers to human application developers executing a project
development phase.” Id. at 11 (citing Bansal ¶¶ 24, 37, 40). Appellant also
argues that “Bansal is silent as to executing any software that is developed
using Bansal’s software development tool,” . . . [n]or is such developed
software inherently executed as part of Bansal’s disclosed invention.” Id.
For example, Appellant explains that “Bansal’s ‘testing phase’ does not
inherently include executing developed software, because such software may
be tested using a software debugger, rather than by execution.” Id. (citing
Bansal ¶ 24).
We are not persuaded of Examiner error. As an initial matter,
Appellant’s arguments are not commensurate with the scope of the claim
language. Contrary to Appellant’s arguments, the claim language at issue
does not require a disclosure of computing jobs that are being, or have been,
performed by a computer. Rather, the claim language merely requires jobs
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that are “computing” jobs, or related to computing, and that the jobs are
“computer executable,” which means that they can be executed by a
computer. Accordingly, the broadest reasonable interpretation of “each of
the plurality of computing jobs is computer executable” encompasses not
only a computing job that is being, or has been, performed by the computer,
but any job related to computing that can be executed by a computer. This
is consistent with Appellant’s Specification, which does not provide a
limiting definition of “computing jobs” that are “computer executable,” but
instead merely describes non-limiting examples such as “[b]atch processing
. . . jobs that are computationally intensive and/or involve large amounts of
information” whose “execution . . . involve substantially no human
interaction or control.” See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 1.
Applying the broadest reasonable interpretation of “each of the
plurality of computing jobs is computer executable,” we agree with the
Examiner that Bansal discloses this limitation. See Final Act. 5–6 (citing
Bansal, Figs. 1–13, ¶¶ 8, 24, 37, 38, 41, 43); see also id. at 2 (additionally
citing Bansal ¶¶ 7, 46, 47); Ans. 3–9 (additionally citing Bansal, ¶¶ 39, 42,
44, 45, 48).
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Figure 4 of Bansal, reproduced below, is illustrative.

Figure 4 of Bansal depicts an example user interface displaying phases in a
waterfall model to complete during the application development process.
Bansal ¶ 37. As shown in Figure 4, a list of tasks 106 executing 98 in a
software application development process includes “GO LIVE,”
“DEVELOP SOFTWARE SYSTEM,” “USER TRAINING,” “INSTALL
LIVE SYSTEM,” “TESTING PHASE,” and “INSTALL DEVELOPMENT
SYSTEM.” Id. ¶ 38, Fig. 4. We agree with the Examiner that each task
relates to computer software development and, thus, is a “computing job,”
and each task is “computer executable” at least because it can be executed
by a computer. See Ans. 4.
Moreover, even if we were to accept Appellant’s assertion that certain
tasks (or portions thereof) in the software development process are
performed at least in part by the software developers themselves, these tasks
are being executed in a computer software system. See, e.g., Final Act. 4
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(citing Bansal ¶ 7, which describes Bansal’s system as being implemented
on a computing device having a processor that executes instructions on a
memory to generate a hybrid project including a waterfall phase during
which one or more tasks are to be completed). Accordingly, as the
Examiner explains, “[a] PHOSITA would understand that these tasks would
require, at least partially, the execution of a computer and as such, constitute
as a plurality of computer executable jobs.” Ans. 4–5 (emphasis omitted).
Figure 9 of Bansal is also illustrative and is reproduced below.

Figure 9 of Bansal depicts a user interface 142A including a plurality of
tasks 180 to be executed for an external project, the tasks including
“EXECUTING,” “BUILD DASHBOARD,” and “PERFORM
ACCEPTANCE TESTING.” Bansal ¶ 45. For reasons similar to those
discussed above regarding Figure 4 of Bansal, we agree with the Examiner
that “[a] PHOSITA would understand that tasks[] such as executing and
performance [acceptance] testing are computer executable and, as such,
constitute as a plurality of ‘computer executable’ jobs” as claimed. Ans. 8
(emphasis omitted); see also id. at 9–10; see also Bansal, Fig. 10 (showing
similar tasks to be executed).
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“executing the first computing job based on the completion
status of the second computing job”
Appellant argues that Bansal fails to disclose “executing a first
computing job” because its tasks are completed by a human software
application developer and are not executed by a computer. See Appeal Br.
10–12. This argument falls short because, as discussed above, Bansal’s
tasks are “computing jobs” that are “computer executable” as claimed. See
discussion supra.
Appellant further argues that Bansal’s tasks are not executed based on
a completion status of a second computing job. Appeal Br. 12. According
to Appellant, “[e]ven assuming . . . that Bansal executes some software at
each task, such execution is not ‘based on the completion status of the
second computing job’” because it is “based on completion of a task, rather
than based on the completion of a computing job.” Id.
We disagree. Bansal discloses “executing the first computing job
based on the completion status of the second computing job” because it
describes a computer system in which project phases and tasks within those
phases are to be completed in sequential order, the system also including the
ability to add task dependencies. See, e.g. Final Act. 4–5 (citing Bansal,
Figs. 4, 8–10, ¶¶ 7, 24); Ans. 5 (citing Bansal ¶ 37, “Each of the tasks in the
list of tasks 106 may include . . . dependencies of the task”), 6–7 (citing
Bansal, Fig. 8 (which allows user to add a hard or soft dependency for a
task), ¶¶ 43–44); Advisory Act. 2. For example, Bansal describes that its
waterfall model, such as the one depicted in Figure 4 above, “may refer to a
process in which phases of a project are completed in sequential order,” such
that “tasks of later phases may depend upon the completion of tasks in
earlier phases.” Bansal ¶ 24. In addition, Figures 9 and 10 of Bansal show
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the start date of the “EXECUTING” task as after the end date of the
“ANALYZE AND FINALIZE REQUIREMENTS” task, and the start date
of the “PERFORM ACCEPTANCE TESTING” task as equal to the end date
of the “BUILD DASHBOARD” task. See, e.g. Bansal, Figs. 9–10.
Moreover, Bansal’s tasks are “computing jobs” that are “computer
executable,” for example, because they are software development tasks
related to computing and are being performed in a computer software
system. See discussion supra. And so, contrary to Appellant’s arguments,
software is being executed during the performance of each task in Bansal,
and while such execution may be based in part on human analysis or input
associated with a previous task, it is also based on the software executed on
the computer system to complete that task.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant does not persuade us of
Examiner error. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
independent claims 1 and 10 under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(1) or 102(a)(2) for
anticipation. For the same reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
dependent claims 2–6, 10, 11, 13, and 14 under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(1) or
102(a)(2) for anticipation, and the Examiner’s rejection of claims 7–9, 12,
and 15–17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 for obviousness. As discussed above,
Appellant does not argue these claims separately.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–6, 10, 11, 13,
and 14 under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(1) or 102(a)(2).
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We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 7–9, 12, and 15–
17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.

SUMMARY
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§§ Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–6, 10, 11,
13, 14
102(a)(1),
102(a)(2) Bansal
1–6, 10, 11,
13, 14
7–9, 12,
15–17 103 Bansal, Kishore
7–9, 12,
15–17
Overall
Outcome 1–17

No period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this
appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED