Venture Industries, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 31, 2000

330 N.L.R.B. 1133 (N.L.R.B. 2000)

VENTURE INDUSTRIES 1133
Venture Industries, Inc. (formerly VEMCO, Inc.) and
International Union, United Automobile, Aero-
space and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America (UAW), AFL–CIO. Case 7–CA–39190
March 31, 2000
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FOX, LIEBMAN, AND BRAME
On September 19, 1997, Administrative Law Judge
George Carson II issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The
General Counsel filed cross-exceptions and a supporting
and answering brief, and the Charging Party filed an an-
swering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions as
modified below, and to adopt the recommended Order as
modified.2
1. The General Counsel excepts to the judge’s finding
that the Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(1)
through Manufacturing Manager Ken Winget’s alleged
threat that as far as he was concerned the plant would
never be a union shop. We find merit in this exception
and we find the violation. In about July 1996, Winget
approached employee Ken Doyka, who was working on
the floor of the facility, and asked him why he was wear-
ing a prounion button. When Doyka responded that he
was on the Union’s organizing committee, Winget asked
him why and said “[u]nions don’t do any good for you.”
Winget said that he had worked in a union shop and the
union had done nothing good for him. He stated that the
union took his dues and was just a waste of money.
Winget also stated that there would be no chance for
promotion in a union shop because supervision would be
hired from “outside.” During the course of their talk,
Winget also told Doyka that as far as he was concerned
the plant would never be a union shop. Winget asked a
nearby employee, Les Summers, if he knew what UAW
stood for, and when Summers replied that he was not
sure, Winget said that it means “You Ain’t Working.”
The conversation lasted about 45 minutes to an hour.3

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951).
2 No exceptions were filed to the judge’s dismissal of allegations that
Supervisor Walter Kellogg confiscated union literature; Manager Ken
Winget interrogated employees; Supervisor Roger Beamer implied
surveillance of employee union activity and threatened employees;
CEO Larry Winget coercively interrogated and threatened employees;
and Supervisor David McLaughlin-Smith implied surveillance of union
activity, all in violation of Sec. 8(a)(1).
The judge found, and we agree, that the Respondent’s
statements that UAW means “You Ain’t Working” and
that there would be no chance for promotion in a union
shop constitute unlawful threats that employees would
lose jobs and promotional opportunities if the Union
were to win representation.4 Contrary to the judge, how-
ever, we also find that an employee would reasonably
understand Winget’s statement that as far he was con-
cerned the plant would never be a union shop, to be a
threat that voting for union representation was futile and
that the Respondent would not recognize and bargain
with the Union. See, e.g., Maxi City Deli, 282 NLRB
742, 745 (1987) (employer’s comment that “there would
never be a union at his restaurant” found unlawful). The
context of the discussion adds to the threatening nature
of Winget’s comment because, as indicated above, he
made it in a lengthy conversation in which he unlawfully
threatened the loss of jobs and promotional opportunities.
Thus, we find that the nature of the statement, and the
context in which it was spoken, conveyed an unlawful
threat of futility of selecting the Union. See, e.g., Out-
board Marine Corp., 307 NLRB 1333, 1335 (1992),
enfd. mem. 9 F.3d 113 (7th Cir. 1993) (statement that the
company would never give employees a contract was an
unlawful threat of futility and not protected opinion).5
2. The Respondent excepts to the judge’s findings that
Molding Supervisors Walter Kellogg and David
McLaughlin-Smith are statutory supervisors and that
McLaughlin-Smith unlawfully interrogated employee
Chris Williams. We agree with the finding that Kellogg
3 Although the judge found that Winget’s “UAW” question was
posed to Summers in a subsequent separate conversation, the record
establishes that it was not. Doyka testified that he and Summers were
running press 13, and that they were the only two employees working
there when Winget approached them and asked Doyka why he was
wearing a prounion button and said that unions don’t do any good for
you, that they had not done any good for him and that they were a
waste of money. When Doyka was asked at the hearing what else was
said, he testified that Winget asked Summers if he knew what UAW
stood for. When Summers replied that he did not, Winget said it means
“You Ain’t Working.” When Doyka contradicted Winget, the latter
repeated that UAW meant You Ain’t Working.” Winget then left, but
returned about 5 minutes later with Bill Hart. Hart asked Summers if
he knew what UAW stood for, and Summers replied, “You Ain’t
Working.”
4 Hurst Performance, Inc., 242 NLRB 121, 127 (1979) (UAW
means “You Ain’t Working” found unlawful).
5 We adopt the judge’s finding that the Respondent did not violate
Sec. 8(a)(1) through Ken Winget’s comment during this conversation
that he had been in a union shop and that paying union dues had been a
waste of money. Members Liebman and Brame also adopt the judge’s
dismissal of the allegations that Larry Winget’s comment that the elec-
tion “would be tied up in court for a long time” and Supervisor Walter
Kellogg’s comment that the election “would be tied up in court for
years” were threats of futility of selecting the Union. Member Fox
finds it unnecessary to pass on these allegations because the findings
would be cumulative.
We further adopt the judge’s finding that the Respondent violated
Sec. 8(a)(1) through CEO Larry Winget’s solicitation of grievances.
330 NLRB No. 159
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1134
and McLaughlin-Smith are supervisors within the scope
of Section 2(11) of the Act.6 Accordingly, we affirm the
judge’s finding that the Respondent, through McLaugh-
lin-Smith, unlawfully interrogated Williams about his
support for the Union.
3. We also adopt the judge’s finding, essentially for the
reasons set forth in his decision, that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act through the confisca-
tion of union literature by Molding Department Manager
Dan Blankenship from tables in the employees’ break-
room and from the employees’ bulletin board. With re-
gard to the bulletin board, we note that the judge credited
employee Pamela Gill, who testified that she saw
Blankenship removing two pieces of prounion literature
from the bulletin board. The Respondent’s argument on
exceptions, based on Blankenship’s discredited testi-
mony, is that he removed only a single flyer and did so
because it had been defaced apparently by someone op-
posed to the Union. Even assuming that one of the two
pieces was defaced, Blankenship’s actions were still
likely to have a coercive impact. Even Blankenship did
not contend that he remarked on the defacement when he
was removing the flyer, and there is no evidence that the
other flier was defaced. Gill reasonably viewed
Blankenship’s action as simply removing prounion litera-
ture from the bulletin board that had been made available
to employees for notice posting.7

6 In Venture Industries, 327 NLRB 918 (1999), we previously found
Kellogg and McLaughlin-Smith to be statutory supervisors and there-
fore ineligible to vote in the representation election. Consistent with the
previous case, Members Fox and Brame, in finding Kellogg and
McLaughlin-Smith to be statutory supervisors here, rely on their au-
thority to discipline employees and to make effective recommendations
regarding the selection of production employees to fill in-plant jobs.
Member Liebman, as she did in the earlier case, relies only on the fact
that they effectively recommend the promotion and reassignment of
employees.
7 Contrary to our dissenting colleague, we find the court’s opinion in
Guardian Industries Corp. v. NLRB, 49 F.3d 317 (7th Cir. 1995), to-
tally inapposite on the facts of this case. The Seventh Circuit held that
where an employer had expressly limited a plant bulletin board to em-
ployee “swap-and shop” notices and in recent times prior to the union
campaign had consistently enforced that limitation, it was not unlawful
discrimination to prohibit other notices, including union literature, that
did not fall within the permissible category. No such employer policy
was established here, and indeed, as noted above, the Respondent does
not rely on any such contention. As for our colleague’s contention that
there was no adequate showing that other types of postings were treated
differently, we note that the Respondent does not dispute that employee
notices in numerous categories were permitted on the bulletin board.
Its claim concerning its reason for removing the union flyers rests on
discredited testimony. The facts in this case are more akin to those in
which unlawful discrimination has been found. E.g., Roadway Express,
Inc. v. NLRB, 831 F.2d 1285, 1290 (6th Cir. 1987) (where employer
permits employee access to bulletin boards for any purpose, the Act
secures the employees’ right to post union material).
We find it unnecessary to pass on whether Mark Hansel is the Re-
spondent’s agent and whether he unlawfully removed union literature
because the finding of an unfair labor practice would be cumulative
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Venture
Industries, Inc. (formerly VEMCO, Inc.), Grand Blanc,
Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the Order as modified.
1. Insert the following as paragraph 1(d) and reletter
the subsequent paragraphs.
“(d) Threatening employees that the plant will never
be a union shop.”
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.

MEMBER BRAME, dissenting in part.
I agree with my colleagues that the judge properly
found that Molding Supervisors Walter Kellogg and
David McLaughlin-Smith are statutory supervisors and
that McLaughlin-Smith unlawfully interrogated em-
ployee Chris Williams. I also agree that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) by Manufacturing Manager Ken
Winget’s threatened loss of promotional opportunities if
the Union were to win representation and by CEO Larry
Winget’s solicitation of grievances. I further agree that
the judge properly dismissed the allegation that the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by Ken Winget’s
comment that he had been in a union shop and that pay-
ing union dues had been a waste of money. In addition, I
agree with Member Liebman that the judge properly
dismissed the allegation that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) by Larry Winget’s comment that the elec-
tion “would be tied up in court for a long time” and Su-
pervisor Kellogg’s comment that the election “would be
tied up in court for years.”1
1 I also agree that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by removing
union literature from tables in the employees’ breakroom. However, I
would find that the Respondent did not unlawfully remove literature
posted on the bulletin board because I find that the Respondent’s prop-
erty interest permits it to limit the bulletin board’s use and the General
Counsel has not shown that the Respondent impermissibly discrimi-
nated in its treatment of similar types of information with respect to
bulletin board access. As found by the court in Guardian Industries
Corp. v. NLRB, 49 F.3d 317, 318–322 (7th Cir. 1995), discussed in my
concurring opinion in Hale Nani Rehabilitation & Nursing Center, 326
NLRB 335, 340 (1998), a union’s right to organize does not imply that
an employer must promote unions by giving them special access to
bulletin boards. As noted by that court, the party making a claim of
discrimination “must identify another case that has been treated differ-
ently and explain why that case is the ‘same’ in the respects the law
deems relevant or permissible as grounds of action.” Supra at 319.
Contrary to my colleagues, the principles set forth in Guardian require
that the General Counsel affirmatively show that the employer has
permitted postings of similar types of information, not simply that
“other [different] types” of postings were permitted. That requirement
must be satisfied irrespective of whether the employer has previously
defined an express limitation for bulletin board postings. In the present
case, the General Counsel has failed to do so.
I agree with my colleagues that we need not pass on whether Mark
Hansel is an agent of the Respondent and whether he unlawfully con-
fiscated literature because such findings would be cumulative.
VENTURE INDUSTRIES 1135
Contrary to my colleagues, and in agreement with the
judge, I would also find that the Respondent did not vio-
late Section 8(a)(1) through Ken Winget’s comments that
as far as he was concerned the plant would never be a
union shop. Contrary to my colleagues and the judge,
however, I also find that the General Counsel did not
establish that Winget’s comment that UAW means “You
Ain’t Working” constituted a threat of job loss in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(1).
In about July 1996, Winget approached Ken Doyka on
the shop floor and engaged him in a conversation that
yielded a number of allegations of conduct violative of
Section 8(a)(1). Winget asked Doyka why he was wear-
ing a prounion button. Doyka stated that he was on the
Union’s organizing committee. Winget asked why and
commented that “[u]nions don’t do any good for you.”
Winget said that he had worked in a union shop and that
the union had done nothing good for him. He stated that
the union took his dues and was just a waste of money.
Winget also stated that there would be no chance for
promotion in a union shop because supervision is hired
from “outside.” During the course of their talk, Winget
also expressed his opinion that as far as he was con-
cerned the plant would never be a union shop. Winget
later asked a nearby employee, Les Summers, if he knew
what UAW stood for, and when Summers replied that he
was not sure, Winget said that it means “You Ain’t
Working.”
To determine whether a statement constitutes an im-
permissible threat, it must be viewed in light of the
circumstances existing when spoken and not in a
vacuum. Shen Automotive Dealership Group, 321
NLRB 586, 591 (1996), citing TRW, Inc. v. NLRB, 654
F.2d 307, 313 (5th Cir. 1981). The Board has dismissed
8(a)(1) allegations involving statements related to plant
closure or job loss where the remarks were clearly
labeled as the supervisor’s opinion.2
In the totality of the circumstances, I find that a rea-
sonable employee would not find Winget’s comments
described above and discussed below to be threatening or
coercive. Winget’s comment that UAW means “You
Ain’t Working” was a play on the initials and would not
by its plain meaning reasonably convey a threat that the
Respondent would take adverse action against Doyka or
other employees because of their union activity. Specifi-
cally, the General Counsel presented no evidence that
Winget’s statement, in the context of his discussion of
his personal views on the effects of unionization, could
reasonably be interpreted as coercive by indicating that
management would cause the loss of jobs if the Union
were successful. Thus, without more, I cannot find that
the General Counsel has established that Winget’s vague
comment is a threat that the Respondent would cause

2 See, e.g., Standard Products Co., 281 NLRB 141, 151 (1986),
enfd. in part 824 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1987).
employees to lose their jobs if the Union were to win
representation.3
I also find that Winget’s comment that as far as he was
concerned the plant would never be a union shop did not
reasonably convey a threat that management would be
obstructionist if the Union were to win the election.
Rather, as noted above, he was conveying his own per-
sonal experience with a unionized workplace and ex-
pressed his own personal opinion about the practical is-
sues relevant to employees considering union representa-
tion. As the judge concluded, the comment was made in
the context of predicting which side would be successful
in the election. Thus, the comment can be nothing more
than Winget’s personal opinion because he had no ability
to predict the likelihood of the Union’s success. Further,
the General Counsel has failed to establish any facts sup-
porting an interpretation of Winget’s comment as a coer-
cive attempt to affect the outcome. Absent such a coer-
cive character, the statement cannot be seen to violate
Section 8(a)(1). See NLRB v. K & K Gourmet Meats,
Inc., 640 F.2d 460, 464 (3d Cir. 1981) (supervisor’s
statement that “the Union was blocked before and would
be blocked again” did not constitute a threat that organiz-
ing was futile absent evidence of coercion).
In any event, as the court observed in Graham Archi-
tectural Products Corp. v. NLRB, 697 F.2d 534, 541 (3d
Cir. 1983), the First Amendment and Section 8(c) of the
Act permit “employers to communicate with their em-
ployees concerning an ongoing union organizing cam-
paign.” See also Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 566
F.2d 1245, 1251 (5th Cir. 1978) (Sec. 8(c) guarantees the
right of management to converse with employees). My
colleagues’ finding that Ken Winget’s remarks implied
that the employees’ union activity might harm their in-
terests in some way is based on sheer speculation and is
not supported by the law or the facts. Accordingly, I find
that the Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(1)
through Winget’s comments.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
3 Accordingly, I disagree with the Board’s holding in Hurst Per-
formance, Inc., 242 NLRB 121, 127 (1979), that the statement UAW
means “You Ain’t Working” is unlawful.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1136
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.

WE WILL NOT confiscate or destroy union literature.
WE WILL NOT coercively question you about your union
support or activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten loss of promotional opportuni-
ties and job loss if you select the International Union,
United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Imple-
ment Workers of America (UAW), AFL–CIO, or any
other labor organization, as your collective bargaining
representative.
WE WILL NOT threaten that the plant will never be a un-
ion shop.
WE WILL NOT solicit your grievances and promise to
remedy them in an effort to dissuade you from support-
ing the Union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.

VENTURE INDUSTRIES, INC. (FORMERLY
VEMCO, INC.)

Jeff Wilson, Esq., for the General Counsel.
David M. Buday and Kenyatta L. Brame, Esqs., for the Respon-
dent.
Judith A. Sale, Esq., for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
GEORGE CARSON II, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in Grand Blanc, Michigan, on July 10 and 11, 1997.
The charge was filed on November 12, 1996,1 and the com-
plaint was issued on January 21, 1997. The complaint, as
amended at hearing, alleges numerous violations of Section
8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act. Respondent’s
timely answer denies all violations of the Act.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed
by the General Counsel, the Charging Party, and Respondent, I
make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, a corporation, is engaged in the manufac-
ture, sale, and distribution of plastic molded automotive parts
and related products at its facility in Grand Blanc, Michigan,
where it annually purchases and receives goods and materials
valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the
State of Michigan. The Respondent admits, and I find and
conclude, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.

1 All dates are 1996 unless otherwise indicated.
The Respondent admits, and I find and conclude, that Inter-
national Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricul-
tural Implement Workers of America (UAW), AFL–CIO, the
Union, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background and Supervisory Issues
Respondent, at its Grand Blanc facility, is primarily engaged
in the manufacture of molded plastic automobile bumpers and
side moldings. This facility is one of a number of facilities
operated by Respondent. Larry Winget is the chief executive
officer (CEO) of the corporation. The general manager at
Grand Blanc is Warren Brown. Ken Winget, Larry Winget’s
nephew, is the current operations manager. In the summer of
1996, he was manufacturing manager.
The Respondent won a prior election at Respondent’s facility
in 1989. The Union filed unfair labor practice charges and ob-
jections to the election. Following a hearing, the Board
adopted the decision of the administrative law judge and di-
rected that Respondent bargain with the Union. Vemco, Inc.,
304 NLRB 911 (1991). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit modified the Board’s order, deleting the bargaining
order, but finding that Respondent had committed unfair labor
practices that were sufficient to require a rerun election. NLRB
v. Vemco, Inc., 989 F.2d 1468 (6th Cir. 1993). The Board or-
dered a rerun election “whenever the Regional Director deems
appropriate.” Vemco, Inc., 315 NLRB 200, 201 (1994). In
June 1996, the Union filed and then withdrew a petition for an
election. On July 1, the Regional Director ordered that the
rerun election be held on August 8. Respondent sought a stay of
the election from the Court Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, argu-
ing that various changes had occurred in the bargaining unit
and that, therefore, a supplemental hearing was required to
determine whether the 1989 unit was still appropriate. The
court of appeals refused to stay the election. The violations
pled in the complaint, prior to the amendments made at the
hearing, arise from conduct that allegedly occurred in July and
early August, preceding the rerun election held on August 8.
Respondent employs over 500 persons at Grand Blanc. The
manufacturing facility consists of several buildings that are
designated by number, as well as a color code. The molding
operation is performed in building 2, which is color coded red.
All the employee witnesses who testified in this proceeding
worked on the second or third shift in this building, referred to
as “red molding.” There are approximately 40 employees on
the red molding second shift and some 20 employees on third
shift. Respondent, at the hearing, stipulated that Molding Man-
ager Dan Blankenship is a supervisor as defined in Section
2(11) of the Act.
The complaint alleges, and Respondent’s answer denies, the
supervisory status of Second Shift Red Molding Supervisors
Walt Kellogg and David McLaughlin-Smith and Third Shift
Red Molding Supervisor Roger Beamer. These individuals
work out of an office located adjacent to the red molding break-
room. The office opens onto the plant floor. The names of
Kellogg, McLaughlin-Smith, and Beamer appear on the door of
the office. Blankenship, who regularly works from about 7:30
a.m. until 5 or 6 p.m., overlaps for a couple of hours with the
second shift, which reports at 3:30 p.m. The two second-shift
supervisors are the only members of management present in the
building after Blankenship leaves. Beamer is the only member
VENTURE INDUSTRIES 1137
of management present in red molding on third shift. Kellogg,
McLaughlin-Smith, and Beamer assign work to the employees
on their respective shifts, using their knowledge of the capabili-
ties of the individual employees whose work they oversee.
They have the authority to, and do, issue both verbal and writ-
ten disciplinary warnings. They independently determine
whether a warning is to be verbal or written.2 They grant time
off and permission to leave early. I find that these shift super-
visors possess and exercise the authority to assign, discipline,
and responsibly direct the employees assigned to their respec-
tive shifts, that they exercise independent judgment when doing
so, and that they are supervisors as defined in Section 2(11) of
the Act.
The complaint also alleges, and Respondent’s answer denies,
that Mark Hansel is a supervisor and agent of Respondent.
There is no evidence that Hansel directly supervises anyone.
Rather, he has plantwide responsibility for safety, which in-
cludes monitoring the use of hazardous material, assuring that
appropriate safety procedures, such as the wearing of safety
glasses, are followed, and regularly conducting safety and
housekeeping audits of the entire facility, which includes walk-
ing throughout the plant, including employee breakrooms. He
publishes documents issued under his name as “safety coordi-
nator.”3 Thus, it appears that his duties are similar to that of the
safety engineers in General Chemical Co., 57 NLRB 524, 533
(1944); and Richard Ore Co., 37 NLRB 544, 546 (1941).
Hansel carries out his duties independently. He determines
when he will conduct safety and housekeeping audits. In view
of the foregoing, the possession of supervisory authority by
Hansel is immaterial. The record establishes, and I find, that
Hansel, when conducting safety and housekeeping audits, is
acting as an agent of Respondent.
B. The 8(a)(1) Allegations
1. Confiscation of union literature
The complaint alleges three instances in which Respondent’s
supervisors or agent removed prounion literature. On July 8,
second-shift employee Pamela Gill, a facilitator, was preparing
to mop the floor of the red molding breakroom, a task regularly
performed by facilitators. As Gill entered the room with her
mop and bucket, she observed Molding Department Manager
Blankenship picking up prounion literature, two fliers, one on
green paper, the other on white paper. Gill, who supported the
Union, had previously read these documents. Blankenship
already had some of the prounion literature in his hand, and, as
Gill watched, he picked up the prounion literature from “the
last two” of the four tables in the breakroom. Blankenship then
went to the bulletin board where he removed two pieces of
prounion literature. After doing this, he left the room and re-
turned to his office. He placed the documents on a corner of
his desk. Blankenship, although denying that he carried any
literature to his office, did not deny that he may have thrown
away prounion literature, testifying that he “did not know that
for sure.” Blankenship acknowledged removing one prounion

2 Human Resource Manager Joan Bartus testified that shift supervi-
sors do not have the authority to suspend employees. I find the absence
of authority to suspend of little significance in view of the authority that
shift supervisors admittedly have and exercise.
3 The complaint alleges Hansel’s title as “safety supervisor.” Bartus
gave his title as “safety technician.” Testimony establishes that he signs
documents as “safety coordinator.”
flier from the bulletin board, asserting that it has been defaced.
He denied leaving antiunion literature on the tables.4 I credit
Gill.5
On July 26, employee Terry Snyder, a machine operator, was
on the plant floor. Another employee told him that safety coor-
dinator Hansel was throwing away prounion literature in the red
molding employee breakroom. Snyder immediately went to the
breakroom and confronted Hansel, asking where “our” proun-
ion literature was. Hansel responded, “I threw the shit away.”
Snyder protested that employees had the right to have the litera-
ture. Hansel stated that if Snyder did not like it he could “deal
with him outside of work.”6
On August 2, Gill states that she observed Supervisor Kel-
logg throwing away prounion literature; however, I find she
was mistaken in this regard.7 Although Gill observed Kellogg
throwing away something, Kellogg credibly testified that he did
not do so because a representative of the human relations de-
partment, either Joan Bartus or Pam Moore, specifically passed
down the instruction that prounion literature “was not to be
touched.” I credit his testimony that he obeyed this instruction.
I also note that Kellogg testified that he would throw away
trash in the breakroom, but would stack literature in a neat pile.
This is consistent with one aspect of Hansel’s testimony.
Hansel testified that he would “probably not” throw away
documents if they were in a neat pile. It further confirms the
testimony of Gill that materials that employees would read
4 Gill testified that Blankenship left antiunion literature, a flier with a
cartoon, on the tables. Respondent denied producing antiunion litera-
ture until late July, but Bartus acknowledged that she received anti-
union literature, a letter written and duplicated by an employee, during
the campaign. This letter contains a piece of clip art on the bottom.
Whether Blankenship discriminated between prounion and antiunion
literature is of no consequence. Employees were permitted to read
newspapers, Avon books, and other literature in the breakroom.
Whether the confiscation of prounion literature was accompanied by
the leaving of antiunion literature is immaterial.
5 Respondent contends that Gill was not credible for various reasons,
including certain responses she made relating to the Union’s employee
bargaining committee. Gill was asked whether John Bettman was a
committee person for the Union. She responded, “We don’t have any
committee people.” After that she was asked whether there was “a vote
for there to be a bargaining committee.” She responded, “I don’t know
if there was or not.” Documentary evidence establishes that both Bett-
man and Gill were elected to an employee bargaining committee
shortly after the election in 1994. Respondent argues that Gill’s failure
to recall this reflects upon her credibility. I do not agree. The question
was ambiguous. Counsel asked whether there was a vote to establish a
bargaining committee. I credit Gill’s testimony that she did not know
whether there had been such a vote. Respondent did not establish
whether there is currently, in 1997, a bargaining committee.
6 Hansel, in his direct testimony, acknowledged that he “could” have
thrown away prounion literature in the course of cleaning the break-
room, which he said was a mess when he entered it. On cross-
examination, it was shown that he was well aware that he had thrown
away prounion literature. He testified that Snyder “came in with a chip
on his shoulder,” telling him that he could not “throw those things
away.” The “those things” to which Hansel states Snyder referred was
obviously the prounion literature that he had destroyed and which Sny-
der was protesting. I credit Snyder.
7 Although Gill testified that Kellogg was crumpling up prounion lit-
erature and throwing it in the trash, when asked how she knew it was
prounion literature, Gill said that the prounion literature was what was
missing from the table. Unlike her observation of Blankenship, Gill did
not identify any of the literature in Kellogg’s hand.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1138
during breaks were not thrown away.8 Consistent with Page
Avjet, Inc., 278 NLRB 444, 450 (1986), cited by Respondent, I
find that the prounion literature left in the break area assumed
the same character as other literature. Respondent’s practice, as
established by the testimony of Gill and Kellogg, was to place
literature in a neat pile. Blankenship and Hansel not only devi-
ated from that practice during the union organizational cam-
paign, they disobeyed the instruction not to touch prounion
literature. Neither was asked about, or acknowledged receiv-
ing, the instruction not to touch prounion literature that Kellogg
received and obeyed.9
The removal of prounion literature from bulletin boards that
employees used for posting notes and announcements violates
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Jennings & Webb, Inc., 288 NLRB
682, 692 (1988). Likewise, the confiscation of prounion litera-
ture from employee break tables violates the Act. Vemco, Inc.,
304 NLRB at 927. Respondent, by the actions of Blankenship
and Hansel in confiscating prounion literature from the em-
ployee breakroom, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. Interrogation
The complaint alleges four instances of interrogation; how-
ever, evidence was adduced regarding only three instances.10
In late July, machine operator Ken Doyka was working at press
13. Ken Winget, who was then manufacturing manager and
who regularly walked through the plant, approached Doyka
and, noticing that he was wearing a UAW button, asked, “What
are you wearing that button for?” Doyka replied, “Because I
[am] on the organizing committee.” K. Winget responded,
“Well, what would you want to do that for? Unions don’t do
any good for you.” The complaint characterizes K. Winget’s
questioning regarding the UAW button as coercive interroga-
tion of employees “about their activities” on behalf of the Un-
ion. I find no evidence of any probing into specific union activ-
ity by K. Winget. Following this repartee, K. Winget, Doyka,
and employee Les Summers engaged in a conversation that
lasted some 45 minutes, as Doyka and Summers continued to
work. I find no evidence of coercion in K. Winget’s asking
organizing committee member Doyka why he was wearing a
UAW button. Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176 (1984). Re-
spondent did not violate Section 8(a)(1) when K. Winget ques-
tioned why Doyka was wearing a union button.
In July, prior to the August election, Chris Williams was
walking towards the employee breakroom. As he passed the
supervisors’ office, Kellogg called to him. Williams entered the
office where both Kellogg and McLaughlin-Smith were pre-

8 Uneaten food, half empty drink cups, and out of date newspapers
were thrown away. Current reading materials were not thrown away.
In the midst of a union organizational campaign, both prounion and
antiunion literature would be “current.”
9 This same Respondent, in opposing the Union’s efforts in the or-
ganizational campaign in 1989, was found to have violated Sec. 8(a)(1)
in various respects, including specifically the confiscation of union
literature. Vemco, Inc., 304 NLRB 911, 927 (1991), enfd. in relevant
part 989 F.2d 1468 (6th Cir. 1993).
10 Supervisor Kellogg, with Supervisor McLaughlin-Smith, was in-
volved in the interrogation of employee Chris Williams. There is no
evidence of a separate occasion in which Kellogg “coercively interro-
gated employees about who their representatives would be if they chose
the . . . Union as their bargaining representative.” Kellogg did state to
Gill his opinion that John Bettman, one of the leading union activists,
would be a shop steward. This statement of opinion is protected by
Sec. 8(c) of the Act.
sent. Kellogg remained standing. Williams sat in a chair in
front the desk. McLaughlin-Smith was seated in the desk chair.
McLaughlin-Smith handed Williams some antiunion literature,
a document about five pages long, and asked Williams how he
felt about the Union.11 Williams, who had not openly shown
his support for the Union, did not give a straight answer, re-
sponding to the effect that he was not certain, that he was unde-
cided. After looking over the first couple of pages of the docu-
ment he had been handed, Williams skimmed the last three
pages. McLaughlin-Smith commented sarcastically, “You’ve
seemed really interested in that thing I handed you.” He then
commented, “I’ll file this in file 13 for you,” referring to the
waste basket.
Although McLaughlin-Smith gave general denials when
asked if he interrogated Williams, on cross-examination he
acknowledged that, after he gave Williams the literature,
“[t]here was a conversation that we had and I don’t remember
what it was.”12 I credit Williams. At the time of this conversa-
tion, Williams had not openly declared his support for the Un-
ion. Indeed. McLaughlin-Smith stated that he “had no idea” of
Williams union sympathies. Respondent’s contention that this
encounter was not a coercive interrogation, but just friendly
joking, is belied by McLaughlin-Smith’s acknowledgment that
during the encounter he did not smile. The conversation was
not “casual and amicable.” Cf. Sunnyvale Medical Clinic, 277
NLRB 1217, 1218 (1985). Williams, whose union sympathies
were not known, was called into the supervisors’ office by one
supervisor, Kellogg, who remained and stood as the other su-
pervisor, McLaughlin-Smith, questioned Williams and ob-
served his reaction to the antiunion literature that he gave him.
As a result of Williams’ reaction, McLaughlin-Smith deter-
mined that Williams supported the Union. The coercive nature
of this interrogation is confirmed by Kellogg. Later that day,
after Williams had returned to his job, Kellogg approached him
and apologized, stating that “we shouldn’t have done that be-
cause its kind of illegal for us to have done that.” Kellogg was
correct. Respondent, by coercively interrogating Williams,
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.13
11 The complaint alleges, as a violation separate from the interroga-
tion, that Respondent “coerced employees by requiring them to read
antiunion literature.” I find McLaughlin-Smith’s presentation of the
antiunion literature to Williams and his observation of Williams’ reac-
tion did not constitute a separate violation. Rather, it was an integral
part of the interrogation.
12 McLaughlin-Smith acknowledged that he observed that Williams
was obviously not interested in the anitunion literature that he had
given to him. He defensively asserted that determining Williams’
union sympathies “wasn’t my mission really.”
13 Sometime after this interrogation, McLaughlin-Smith commented
to Williams that he, Williams, was a “closet union member like Gary
Jarvis.” This statement is alleged as implying surveillance of employee
union activities. The General Counsel did not adduce any evidence
regarding whether Jarvis was open in his support of the Union or
whether he was a “closet union member,” as McLaughlin-Smith stated.
McLaughlin-Smith testified that Jarvis wore a UAW button and made
no secret of his support for the Union. Insofar as the evidence that
Jarvis openly supported the Union is unrebutted, I dismiss this allega-
tion of the complaint. This incident does confirm that McLaughlin-
Smith, by his interrogation of Williams, learned that Williams sup-
ported the Union. The complaint does not allege, and I do not find, any
violation as a result of McLaughlin-Smith’s asking, after the election,
whether Williams was going to go to the union hall with his “solidarity
brothers.”
VENTURE INDUSTRIES 1139
The complaint alleges that CEO Larry Winget, when he ad-
dressed the employees on August 5, coercively interrogated
them regarding why they wanted a union. I find that L. Winget
did ask employees why they wanted a union; however, the
question was asked rhetorically, was not coercive, and was not
an unlawful interrogation. The rhetorical question was used to
solicit employee grievances. As hereinafter discussed, Respon-
dent did violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by soliciting em-
ployee grievances and implying that they would be remedied.
3. Threats of futility
The complaint alleges that Ken Winget advised employees
that selection of the Union was futile when he stated that it was
a waste of time to pay union dues and that Respondent would
never be a union shop. K. Winget, in the conversation at press
13 with Doyka and Summers, told them that he had worked in a
union shop and that the union “did nothing good for him.” He
stated that the union took his dues and that it was “just a waste
of money.” In this same conversation, K. Winget also ex-
pressed his opinion that the plant would not be a union shop;
however, the General Counsel did not establish the context in
which this remark was made.
The foregoing remarks concerning union dues contain no
threat of futility. K. Winget did not believe that the union of
which he had been a member had done anything for him.14 In
view of this, his opinion that paying dues was a waste of money
logically followed. The remark regarding the plant not being a
union shop was unaccompanied by any threat. Regarding this
remark, Doyka testified that “on my side we were hoping we
were going to be [Union] and the Company . . . didn’t want it.”
I find that the comment was made in the context of predicting
which side would be successful in the election and, in that con-
text, was an expression of opinion protected by Section 8(c) of
the Act.
The complaint also alleges that CEO Larry Winget and Su-
pervisor Kellogg threatened futility by advising that the elec-
tion “would be tied up in court for years.” Near the end of July,
Kellogg and employee Ken Doyka were discussing the upcom-
ing election. Employee John Bettman stated that he would bet
with Kellogg that the Union was going to win the election.
Kellogg refused to bet, saying, “Well, it [will] be tied up in
court for years. So, it really doesn’t matter.”15 On August 5 and
6, L. Winget, when addressing the red molding employees at
the beginning of the third shift, expressed his displeasure with
the Board for proceeding with a rerun election. He then stated
that “it would be tied up in court for a long time.” In a letter
dated August 5 that was distributed to all employees, L. Winget
refers to the order of the court of appeals, in which the court
refused to order a stay of the election. The order, after finding
that the court of appeals was without jurisdiction to grant the
requested relief, sets out the process for obtaining review of a
Board directed election, stating that the “accepted procedure is
for the employer to refuse to bargain . . . for the Board to find

14 K. Winget did not testify. My findings are based on the uncontra-
dicted testimony of Doyka. When counsel for the Charging Party
sought to have Doyka elaborate on what K. Winget had said about
union dues, he testified that K. Winget stated that he had worked in a
union shop and “they’d never done anything for him and he just paid all
the money and never got any return.”
15 Kellogg acknowledged making this statement, and I credit him.
Bettman testified to a slight variation of this statement, saying that he
heard Kellogg say, “Well it doesn’t matter if you win or not, because
it’s going to be dragged out in court for a long period of time.”
an unfair labor practice, and for the order containing that find-
ing be brought to this court.” L. Winget quotes this language
and concludes this paragraph of the letter by stating that “Ven-
ture will exercise its rights in this manner, but it may take years
to resolve. You can, however, put an end to this quickly by
voting NO on Thursday.”
Kellogg testified that he made his remark based upon his
knowledge that the first election was not “settled” until a cou-
ple of years after he was hired, and that he was not even em-
ployed when the first election was held. As noted previously,
there was extensive litigation following the 1989 election. Re-
spondent sought to obtain a stay of the election scheduled for
August 8, but the court of appeals refused. Its order sets out the
procedure for contesting the election, and L. Winget quoted this
language in his letter. The Board, in CWI of Maryland, Inc.,
321 NLRB 698, 707 (1996); and Daniel Construction Co., 145
NLRB 1397, 1410 (1964), has held that comments relating to
delay due to litigation unlawfully conveyed the impression that
selection of a union would be futile; however, in both of those
cases, the statements relating to litigation were coupled with
threats. In neither case was the respondent directly quoting
from an order of a court of appeals. In these circumstances,
and specifically noting the absence of any contemporaneous
threat, I find that the remark of Kellogg, based on the lengthy
record of litigation that had followed the first election, did not
violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I also find that the state-
ments of L. Winget, relating to Respondent’s intention to fol-
low the specific procedure that the court of appeals set out in its
order, was unaccompanied by any threat and, therefore, did not
violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. Threats relating to promotion and job loss
The complaint alleges that Ken Winget threatened loss of
promotion opportunities and job loss. In the course of the con-
versation previously referred to between K. Winget and Doyka,
K. Winget stated that there would be no chance for promotion
in a union shop because supervision is hired from “outside.”
Doyka challenged this statement, telling K. Winget, “[T]hat’s
not always true.”
Unlike the statement regarding union dues, K. Winget’s
statement regarding hiring supervision from “outside” was not
made as an expression of opinion based on past experience. K.
Winget was the manufacturing manager. His statement that, if
Respondent became a union shop, supervision would be hired
from outside, thus eliminating employee promotion opportuni-
ties, specifically threatened a change in working conditions if
employees selected the Union as their collective-bargaining
representative. National Micronetics, 277 NLRB 993, 1000
(1985). I find that by threatening the loss of promotion oppor-
tunities if employees selected the Union as their collective-
bargaining representative, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
In a separate conversation, K. Winget asked Summers if he
knew what “UAW” stood for. Summers stated that he was not
sure and K. Winget said it means “you ain’t working.”16
16 Bettman was getting material at the time K. Winget made this
comment, and he overheard it. Bettman’s testimony that Blankenship
and Operations Manager Hart were also present is corroborated by
Doyka who recalled that, at one point, K. Winget left and, a few min-
utes later, returned with Hart. In view of the hiatus between the initial
conversation and the making of this comment, I consider it to have
been made in a separate conversation.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1140
This exact statement has specifically been found to constitute
a threat of loss of employment since “there is no other permis-
sible interpretation for the statement that ‘UAW’ stands for
‘you ain’t working.’” Hurst Performance, Inc., 242 NLRB
121, 127 (1979).17 By threatening job loss if employees se-
lected the Union as their collective-bargaining representative,
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. Threatened loss of benefits
The complaint alleges that CEO Larry Winget threatened
employees with a loss of benefits in his August 5 letter to em-
ployees. The letter refers to Respondent’s successful business,
notes that the average employee made over $43,000 in wages,
overtime, and benefits in the past year, and then states:

Remember this, all these items become negotiable and put at
risk at the bargaining table if you choose to be represented by
a third party. Venture currently has union agreements at our
Australia, Bailey and Atlantic facilities. Comparing your
benefits to these organization’s benefits will reveal that Ven-
ture Grand Blanc’s gainsharing and health benefits package
are outstanding.

The General Counsel alleges that the “put at risk” remark
violates the Act in that it threatens loss of benefits. Allegedly
unlawful statements, such as this, are properly evaluated in
context. United Technologies Corp., 313 NLRB 1303 (1994);
Mantrose-Haeuser Co., 306 NLRB 377 (1992). Although the
letter does not engage in an extended discussion of the collec-
tive-bargaining process, it correctly notes that, if the employees
select the Union as their collective-bargaining representative,
wages, overtime, and benefits become negotiable. The “put at
risk” remark is made in the context of the bargaining table.
There is no threat to decrease benefits. Immediately following
this statement, the letter suggests that employees compare the
Respondent sponsored benefit packages at Grand Blanc and the
benefits negotiated at its organized facilities. I find no implicit
threat in Respondent’s letter. It is protected speech pursuant to
Section 8(c) of the Act. Patrick Industries, 318 NLRB 245,
254 (1995).
6. Solicitation of grievances and promise to remedy them
On August 5 and 6, CEO Larry Winget traveled to Grand
Blanc. At his request, various other high ranking corporate
officials were present including Thomas Krueger, vice presi-
dent of human resources and administration, and Dave Arnsdt,
who has corporate responsibility for planning, training, and
communications.18 In an effort to reach all employees, L.
Winget held a series of informal meetings, generally at the end
or beginning of each shift.19 At red molding he spoke to the
employees at the beginning of third shift, starting about 11:30
p.m. on August 5. The meeting lasted over an hour. A few

17 Respondent argues that the comment was made in jest and that
comments made in jest do not violate the Act. I initially note that the
appropriate inquiry is not whether the comment was made in jest but
whether, “under all the circumstances . . . [it] would not reasonably
have been viewed as” a threat. La-Z-Boy, 281 NLRB 338 fn. 2 (1986).
K. Winget did not testify. There is no probative evidence establishing
that this comment was made in jest.
18 L. Winget did not testify. Respondent presented Krueger as its
only witness regarding these meetings.
19 The General Counsel adduced no evidence that L. Winget dispar-
aged prounion employees by referring to them as “‘anti-Venture’ or
disloyal employees.”
second-shift employees who had completed work heard his
remarks, but the bulk of the audience was third shift. L. Winget
began by explaining the recent growth of the Company and,
specifically referring to the Grand Blanc facility, noting its
profitability and quality improvement. He rhetorically asked
why the employees felt they needed a union and what a union
could do that was not being done pursuant to the Respondent’s
open door policy.20 In response to this invitation, employees
brought various individual complaints to his attention. One
employee questioned why he had not received a 50-cent-an-
hour general wage increase given to all employees. Other em-
ployees questioned why there had been a change in the third-
shift starting time. In response to these and similar complaints,
L. Winget turned and looked to the management official stand-
ing with him who had responsibility for the specific area to
which the complaint related. That individual typically re-
sponded, “I will look into it.”21 Employee Michelle Seng-
thammavong explained to L. Winget that she had been placed
on third shift despite having seniority superior to some employ-
ees who remained on first shift. She noted that she had brought
the situation to the attention of Bill Hart, the plant manager at
the time this occurred, and that he had said he would get back
with her, but did not do so. Sengthammavong asked L. Winget
why her situation was not of importance to anyone except her.
L. Winget responded that he was not sure why, but he would
check into it.22 He then told her to contact the front office to
get the telephone number at which she could contact him di-
rectly at his office in Fraser, Michigan. In response to em-
ployee complaints about favoritism, L. Winget stated that he
would be more visible in the future. He told the employees that
“if you’ll give me six months, we can take care of our prob-
lems.”23
Respondent argues correctly that there is no evidence that L.
Winget made a specific promise in the course of his remarks.
The absence of a specific promise, however, is not dispositive
of this allegation. The appropriate inquiry is whether, under all
the circumstances, Respondent’s actions implied that employ-
ees’ complaints would be addressed if they rejected the Union.
L. Winget gathered the employees informally, with his top
management present and visible to the employees.24 He then
solicited the employees’ complaints, asking why they felt they
needed a union rather than Respondent’s open door policy.25 L.
Winget listened to the complaints that the employees addressed
20 I do not credit Krueger’s too carefully phrased testimony that L.
Winget opened the floor for questions by asking, “[I]f the employees
had any questions about anything that he had said or about what was
going on in the Company.”
21 Regarding the change in shift starting time, L. Winget looked at
Plant Manager Warren Brown who stated that he would look into it.
22 I do not credit Krueger that L. Winget never personally committed
himself to look into any specific problem that was brought to his atten-
tion by the employees. Although he may also have referred questions
to the management official having responsibility for the area in which a
concern was raised, I credit Sengthammavong that he personally as-
sured her that he would check into the matter that she raised.
23 Krueger did not deny that L. Winget made this statement. Counsel
for Respondent asked Krueger whether L. Winget told any employee
that he would be back “in six months to see if things had changed.”
Krueger denied that L. Winget made that statement.
24 L. Winget specifically requested Krueger to attend the meetings.
25 Respondent argues that L. Winget did not solicit employee com-
plaints. I have found, consistent with the credible testimony of Seng-
thammavong, that he did.
VENTURE INDUSTRIES 1141
to him. He responded directly to some complaints, including
specifically the one raised by Sengthammavong. Often, by a
nod of his head, he referred the problem to the appropriate
member of the management team standing with him. That
individual typically responded that he would look into it.26
Respondent would have me find that this midnight meeting in
which the chief executive officer fielded employee questions
and complaints, referring them to the appropriate member of
the management team, was a sterile action, signifying nothing.
I disagree. By receiving employee complaints and referring
them immediately to the appropriate member of the manage-
ment team, L. Winget clearly was conveying the impression of
a concerned and responsive management. He verbalized this
impression when he told the employees that “if you give me six
months, we can take care of our problems.” Respondent clearly
implied that “management would react favorably to the under-
lying problems that gave impetus to the organization drive.”
Kinney Drugs, 314 NLRB 296, 299 (1994).27 In so doing, Re-
spondent solicited employee grievances and implied that it
would remedy them in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
7. Alleged violations attributed to Supervisor Beamer
Counsel for the General Counsel, at the hearing, amended
the complaint to allege that, on or about September 20, Super-
visor Roger Beamer, by two statements, implied surveillance of
employee union activities, that he threatened employees by
stating that Manager Blankenship wanted him to break up third-
shift molding, and that he threatened that management can get
rid of employees easily. Employee Terry Dungey, a third-shift
facilitator in red molding, testified that, at a meeting held dur-
ing a break period, Beamer, in the presence of herself and five
other facilitators, stated that he believed some of the facilitators
were trying to get new employees to become Union, that man-
agement thought Dungey was the leader, and that “we were
trying to persuade these people.” In further comments, after a
suggestion was made that Respondent was trying to get rid of
“some of us,” Dungey testified that Beamer allegedly com-
mented that the Respondent did not have to have a reason for
terminating an employee, that management could simply say,
“You’re just not what Venture wants.” I do not credit
Dungey’s uncorroborated testimony.28 Beamer credibly denied
making the above comments.29
The only evidence that the General Counsel adduced regard-
ing the allegation that, on or about September 20, Beamer
threatened employees by telling them that Dan Blankenship had

26 There is no evidence that any complaint was ignored or dismissed
as being unworthy of management’s attention.
27 This case was remanded to the Board, but the relevant finding was
not disturbed. Kinney Drugs, Inc. v. NLRB, 74 F.3d 1419, 1421 fn. 5
(2d Cir. 1996).
28 I am satisfied that Dungey did not intentionally misrepresent any
fact to which she testified; however, I have little confidence in her
recollection of specific details. Thus, although she testified to the con-
frontation between Snyder and Hansel, she incorrectly reported that it
occurred in the smoking breakroom, rather than the regular breakroom
where both Snyder and Hansel agree the confrontation actually oc-
curred. Snyder was asked about the September meeting with Beamer,
but he had no clear recollection of it. Four other facilitators were pre-
sent, but none were called to corroborate Dungey regarding this meet-
ing.
29 Beamer acknowledged, stating that Dungey was the “leader” of
third shift, but the statement was not made in the context of union activ-
ity or attempting to persuade new employees.
directed him to break up third shift consisted of testimony by
employee Snyder.30 Snyder testified that he recalled Beamer
“saying something about he was supposed to split our shift up
or something to that matter;” however, he could not recall any-
thing else said at or about the time this comment was made. He
further testified that “I don’t know where it came from prior to
that.” In the absence of any evidence that the statement had any
connection with employee union activity, I have no basis for
making any finding that this alleged comment violated the Act.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
By confiscating and destroying union literature, coercively
interrogating an employee, threatening loss of promotion op-
portunities and job loss if employees selected the Union as their
collective-bargaining representative, and soliciting employee
grievances and promising to remedy them in an effort to dis-
suade employees from supporting the Union, the Respondent
has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.31
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended32
ORDER
The Respondent, Venture Industries, Inc., Grand Blanc,
Michigan its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Confiscating and destroying union literature.
(b) Coercively interrogating any employee about union sup-
port or union activities.
(c) Threatening loss of promotion opportunities and job loss
if employees selected the International Union, United Automo-
bile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of Amer-
ica (UAW), AFL–CIO as their collective-bargaining repre-
sentative.
(d) Soliciting employee grievances and promising to remedy
them in an effort to dissuade employees from supporting the
Union.
30 Michelle Sengthammavong testified that a couple of days after L.
Winget’s meetings of August 5 and 6, Beamer told her that L. Winget
had directed him to “break up us on third shift” because “we were the
ones who created the union problem.” The General Counsel did not
amend the complaint in this regard and Counsel for Respondent did not
address it when he presented Beamer in response to the amendments
made at the hearing. Insofar as this matter was not fully litigated, I
make no finding regarding it.
31 Counsel for the General Counsel, at the hearing, stated that the
General Counsel was seeking a broad order as a remedy and amended
the pleadings to so reflect. In brief, the General Counsel did not pre-
sent any specific argument in support of such an order. Insofar as the
unfair labor practices found herein were limited to the second and third
shift of red molding, I find no basis for an exceptional remedy.
32 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1142
(e) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in Grand Blanc, Michigan, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”32 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 7, after being signed by the
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60

32
If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In
the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility in-
volved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by the Respondent at
any time since November 12, 1996.
(b) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.