VectorProducts, Inc.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 30, 2006

No. 76514374 (T.T.A.B. Jun. 30, 2006)

Mailed:
June 30, 2006

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
________

In re Vector Products, Inc.
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Serial No. 76514374
_______

George W. Lewis of Jacobson Holman PLLC for Vector
Products, Inc.

Roberto Ledesma, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office
113 (Odette Bonnet, Managing Attorney).
_______

Before Seeherman, Holtzman and Kuhlke, Administrative
Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Seeherman, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Vector Products, Inc. has appealed from the final
refusal of the Trademark Examining Attorney to register
JUMP’N CHARGE, in standard character form, as a trademark
for “jump starter and automotive battery chargers, sold as
a unit.”1 Registration has been refused pursuant to Section

1 Application Serial No. 76514374, filed May 15, 2003. The
application was originally based on Section 1(b) of the Trademark
Act (intention to use). Applicant subsequently filed an
amendment to allege use asserting first use anywhere and first
THIS DISPOSITION IS NOT
CITABLE AS PRECEDENT OF
THE TTAB
Ser No. 76514374
2
2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1), on the
ground that applicant’s mark is merely descriptive of its
identified goods.
The appeal has been fully briefed. Applicant did not
request an oral hearing.
A term is merely descriptive of goods or services, and
therefore prohibited from registration by Section 2(e)(1)
of the Trademark Act, if it forthwith conveys an immediate
idea of an ingredient, quality, characteristic, feature,
function, purpose or use of the goods or services. See,
e.g., In re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216, 3 USPQ2d 1009 (Fed. Cir.
1987), and In re Abcor Development Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 200
USPQ 215, 217-18 (CCPA 1978). Whether a term is merely
descriptive is determined not in the abstract, but in
relation to the goods or services for which registration is
sought, the context in which it is being used on or in

use in commerce at least as early as February 3, 2004. The
drawing of the mark in the application as originally filed
depicted the mark as JUMP N CHARGE, and the mark was in this form
throughout the examination/prosecution of the application,
including the filing of the notice of appeal. Subsequent to the
filing of the notice of appeal applicant submitted its Amendment
to Allege Use. The Examining Attorney noted that the specimen
accompanying the AAU showed the mark as JUMP’N CHARGE, and
required that applicant submit a new drawing of the mark which
agreed with the specimen but did not materially alter the mark.
Applicant thereupon submitted an amended drawing showing the mark
as JUMP’N CHARGE. This amendment was accepted by the Examining
Attorney, thereby indicating that JUMP’N CHARGE and JUMP N CHARGE
are substantially the same, and convey the same commercial
impression.
Ser No. 76514374
3
connection with those goods or services, and the possible
significance that the term would have to the average
purchaser of the goods or services because of the manner of
its use. That a term may have other meanings in different
contexts is not controlling. In re Bright-Crest, Ltd., 204
USPQ 591, 593 (TTAB 1979).
It is the Examining Attorney’s position that
applicant’s mark is merely descriptive of its goods because
the individual words merely describe the purpose and
function of applicant’s goods, and when combined the mark
retains its merely descriptive significance. In support of
this position, the Examining Attorney has submitted
dictionary definitions2 of “jump” as meaning “to jump-start
(a motor vehicle)” and of “charge” as meaning “to energize
(a storage battery) by passing current through it in the
direction opposite to discharge.” The Examining Attorney
has also requested that we take judicial notice that “N” is
defined as a “contraction of and,” a request that we hereby
grant.3

2 The definitions were taken from The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language, 3d ed. © 1992.
3 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 4th
ed. © 2000. The Board may take judicial notice of dictionary
definitions. University of Notre Dame du Lac v. J. C. Gourmet
Food Imports Co., Inc., 213 USPQ 594 (TTAB 1982), aff’d, 703 F.2d
1372, 217 USPQ 505 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Ser No. 76514374
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In addition, the Examining Attorney has submitted
excerpts from articles taken from the NEXIS database and
from Internet webpages in which the term “jump” or “charge”
is used to refer to starting and charging an automotive
battery, including the following (emphasis added):
Every person who is issued a driver’s
license should know how to change a
tire, check the oil, check the water
level in the radiator and jump a
battery....
“Akron Beacon Journal,” June 12, 2004

If your car battery dies and you jump
it, you do not have to keep the car
running in order for the alternator to
recharge the battery.
“The News-Press” (Fort Myers, FL),
December 13, 2003

Culpepper had plenty of company while
he waited for someone to come and jump
the very special battery in his car.
“Star Tribune” (Minneapolis, MN),
September 21, 2003

...an Alexandria man who was helping
him jump his car’s battery....
“The News-Star” (Monroe, LA), July 23,
2003

Now with the batteries connected, let
the strong [sic] car run for awhile,
possibly as long as five minutes to
charge the dead battery.
“Contra Costa Times” (CA), November 14,
2003

Car Battery Charger
The charger will quickly and easily
charge most any lead acid battery. The
charger delivers a full current....
www.aaroncake.net
Ser No. 76514374
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Definition of “battery charger”
1. [n] a device for charging or
recharging batteries.
http://lookwayup.com

We also note that applicant has identified its goods
as a “jump starter” and “automotive battery charger,” and
that the specimen submitted by applicant with its Amendment
to Allege Use states that the goods are a battery charger
and a jump-starter.
In view of the foregoing, we have no doubt that the
elements “jump” and “charge” in applicant’s mark are merely
descriptive of significant characteristics of applicant’s
goods, namely that two purposes or functions of the goods
are to jump start and to charge an automotive battery.
Applicant has submitted the declaration of Robert L.
Powell, Jr., its general counsel. Mr. Powell has stated
that “the term ‘jump’ alone is not generally used to refer
to the act of starting a car (the accepted terminology
being ‘jump start’).” ¶8. However, the excerpts from the
articles reported above show that the public does, in fact,
use “jump” as an alterative to the term “jump start.” Mr.
Powell has also stated that “the term ‘jump’ as employed in
the mark of the instant application is NOT intended to
refer to the act of ‘jumping’ an automobile battery.” ¶9.
Whatever applicant’s intentions might have been, it is the
Ser No. 76514374
6
perception of the consuming public that we must consider in
determining whether a term is merely descriptive. As we
stated above, the evidence demonstrates that the public
would view “jump” in applicant’s mark, which is used for a
“jump starter and automotive battery charger, sold as a
unit,” as referring to a jump starter.
When these two merely descriptive terms JUMP and
CHARGE are combined in the mark JUMP’N CHARGE, the
individual words retain their merely descriptive character,
and the mark as a whole is also merely descriptive. There
is, of course, no question that “’N” is a recognized
abbreviation or alternative to the word “AND.” Thus, the
mark immediately tells consumers of two significant
functions of applicant’s goods: that applicant’s jump
starter and battery charger can be used to jump start a car
and to charge the battery.
Applicant has pointed out that a mark comprising a
combination of merely descriptive components is registrable
if the combination of terms creates a unitary mark with a
unique, nondescriptive meaning. Relying on this principle,
applicant has argued that JUMP’N CHARGE is a double
entendre, that refers both to the jump starter and battery
charger functions of the goods, “but it also conveys an
image of an enthusiastic consumer.” Brief, p. 5. We are
Ser No. 76514374
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not persuaded by this argument. To qualify as a double
entendre, the second meaning must be readily apparent.
See, for example, In re Colonial Stores Inc., 394 F.2d 549,
157 USPQ 382 (CCPA 1968) (SUGAR & SPICE is a phrase from a
familiar nursery rhyme); Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United
Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 131 USPQ 55 (2d Cir. 1961)
(POLY PITCHER suggests the Revolutionary War figure Molly
Pitcher). To put it kindly, we find it unlikely that
consumers would readily understand JUMP’N CHARGE as the
depiction of an enthusiastic consumer. Therefore, it
cannot be considered a double entendre. On the contrary,
the single meaning conveyed by the mark, as used in
connection with a “jump starter and automotive battery,
charger sold as a unit,” is that the product both jump
starts and charges a battery. As such, it is merely
descriptive of applicant’s goods.
Decision: The refusal of registration is affirmed.