Varina Electric Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 23, 1993

311 N.L.R.B. 1347 (N.L.R.B. 1993)

1347
311 NLRB No. 186
VARINA ELECTRIC CO.
1 We deny the Respondent’s cross-exception 1 to the judge’s rec-
ommended make-whole order. The Respondent’s memorandum pro-
vides no supporting factual or legal arguments. Rather, the memo-
randum attempts to introduce into the record alleged facts regarding
pretrial settlement negotiations and the Respondent’s asserted inabil-
ity to satisfy a backpay award. We find that those portions of the
memorandum concern evidence which is irrelevant to the issue of
the appropriate remedy for the Respondent’s unlawful conduct and
that their admission would improperly augment the record contrary
to Secs. 102.46(e) and 102.45(b) of the Board’s Rules and Regula-
tions. Accordingly, we grant the General Counsel’s motion to strike
paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and the conclusion of the Respondent’s
memorandum in support of its cross-exceptions and the cor-
responding exhibits (which were not included with the Respondent’s
submission to the Board).
We also deny the Respondent’s cross-exception 2, in which it con-
tends that the judge erred in not allowing the Respondent to ‘‘probe
into the decision whether the discriminatee was a paid union orga-
nizer.’’ The Respondent has not adverted to a specific ruling by the
judge, and we cannot discern the Respondent’s precise concern from
our reading of the record. Further, we note that during direct exam-
ination of Union Business Agent Sweeney, the General Counsel
asked whether the Union paid Bresco any wages while he was em-
ployed by the Respondent, and Sweeney responded ‘‘no.’’ The Re-
spondent did not cross-examine Sweeney on this point. Even if
Bresco had been a paid union organizer at the time he obtained work
with the Respondent, that fact, alone, would not affect his status as
an employee entitled to the protections of the Act. Sunland Con-
struction Co., 309 NLRB 1224 (1992).
Varina Electric Co., Inc. and International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No.
666, AFL–CIO. Case 5–CA–22346
August 23, 1993
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
DEVANEY AND RAUDABAUGH
On November 3, 1992, Administrative Law Judge
Claude R. Wolfe issued the attached decision. The
General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting
brief, and the Respondent filed cross-exceptions and a
supporting memorandum. The General Counsel also
filed a motion to strike portions of the Respondent’s
cross-exceptions and the Respondent filed a motion in
opposition to the motion to strike.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions
and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rul-
ings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt the rec-
ommended Order, as modified below.
The judge found that the Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening and interrogating
employee Thomas Bresco and twice violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1), first by denying Bresco employment at
an airport project and then by laying him off because
he had engaged in protected union activity. There were
no exceptions to these findings, and we adopt them.
In addition to the usual cease-and-desist order and
notice to employees, the judge recommended that the
Respondent remedy its unlawful conduct by making
Bresco whole for any loss of earnings he suffered as
a result of being denied employment at the airport
project beginning on August 13, 1991. The General
Counsel has excepted to the judge’s failure to rec-
ommend a complete make-whole remedy, requiring the
Respondent to offer Bresco reinstatement. We find
merit in the General Counsel’s exception.1
The issue whether the Respondent would have re-
tained Bresco or laid him off at the conclusion of the
airport job was not litigated during the hearing. Ac-
cordingly, the General Counsel contends, and we
agree, that Dean General Contractors, 285 NLRB 573,
573–574 (1987), controls this case. In Dean, the Board
rejected a presumption that employees in the construc-
tion industry are terminated following completion of a
job, despite the unique, job-by-job employment pat-
terns that are characteristic of some companies in the
industry. The Board ordered the respondent in Dean to
undertake the traditional make-whole remedy with the
understanding that, since the question had not been liti-
gated below, the respondent could introduce evidence
at compliance regarding the likelihood of the dis-
chargee’s transfer or reassignment to other projects
subsequent to the job from which he had been unlaw-
fully discharged. Id. at 575.
Accordingly, we shall order the Respondent to offer
Thomas Bresco reinstatement to the same or substan-
tially equivalent employment at other projects of the
Respondent, without prejudice to the Respondent’s
raising its arguments in this respect during the compli-
ance stage of these proceedings.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below, and orders that the Respondent,
Varina Electric Co., Inc., Richmond, Virginia, its offi-
cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the ac-
tion set forth in the Order as modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(a).
‘‘(a) Offer Thomas Bresco immediate and full rein-
statement to his former job or, if that job no longer ex-
ists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prej-
udice to his seniority or any other rights or privileges
previously enjoyed, and make him whole, with interest,
for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as
a result of the discrimination against him in the man-
ner set forth in the remedy section of the judge’s deci-
sion.’’
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the ad-
ministrative law judge.
1348 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 All dates are 1991 unless otherwise indicated.
2 The facts found are in large part based on the credible testimony
of Thomas Bresco which is uncontroverted except for rather general-
ized denials, and appeared to be an earnest account of the facts as
he recalled them. His recitation is not improbable and is believable.
3 Bresco is credited that he filed the application with a female em-
ployee in Respondent’s office named Pat.
4 All dates are 1991. Bresco places the interview on July 13. Ste-
vens puts it on July 15.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protec-
tion
To choose not to engage in any of these pro-
tected concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT lay off or deny employment to em-
ployees, or otherwise discriminate against them in any
manner with respect to their tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment because they
support International Brotherhood of Electrical Work-
ers, Local Union No. 666, AFL–CIO or any other
labor organization.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with any kind of
retaliation because they engage in union activities.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate employees con-
cerning their union activities or desires.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL offer Thomas A. Bresco immediate and
full reinstatement to his former job or, if that job no
longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position,
without prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or
privileges previously enjoyed and WE WILL make him
whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits re-
sulting from our denial of employment and layoff, less
any net interim earnings, plus interest.
VARINA ELECTRIC CO., INC.
Bruce F. Goodman, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Elizabeth G. Stevens, President, Varina Electric Co., Inc.
Charles B. Sweeney, Assistant Business Manager, Local 666.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
CLAUDE R. WOLFE, Administrative Law Judge. This pro-
ceeding was litigated before me at Richmond, Virginia, on
July 22 and August 24, 1992, pursuant to charges filed on
October 25, 1991,1 and complaint issued on January 31,
1992, and amended at hearing alleging an unlawful failure to
transfer Thomas A. Bresco to another jobsite and subse-
quently laying him off, one unlawful threat, and an unlawful
interrogation. Respondent denies the commission of unfair
labor practices.
On the entire record, and after considering the comparative
testimonial demeanor of the witnesses and the arguments of
the parties, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a Virginia corporation with an office and
place of business in Richmond, Virginia, is engaged in in-
dustrial and commercial electrical contracting. During the 12
months preceding the issuance of the complaint, a representa-
tive period, Respondent purchased materials and supplies val-
ued in excess of $50,000 from firms located in the State of
Virginia which received the materials and supplies directly
from outside the State of Virginia. Respondent is now, and
has been at all times material, an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
The Union is now, and has been at all times material, a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES2
At the urging of Charles Sweeney, assistant business man-
ager and organizer for the Charging Union, Thomas Bresco,
an unemployed electrician, filed an application for employ-
ment with Respondent on July 9, 1991.3 In addition to the
simple fact Bresco was in need of employment, he and
Sweeney agreed that he would try to get on an airport project
Respondent was about to start for the purposes of monitoring
compliance with wage levels required by the Davis-Bacon
Act and to organize for the Union while so employed.
Several days after he filed his application, on or about July
15,4 Bresco was interviewed by Elizabeth Stevens, Respond-
ent’s president. She explained that there was no work then
available. The two agree that Stevens encouraged Bresco to
make frequent telephone checks to see if a vacancy occurred.
Thereafter until July 31 he called several times a week. Dur-
ing this period there was some conversation about hiring for
the airport job within a few weeks, but no promise of em-
ployment at the airport was made by Stevens during this pe-
riod. Stevens acknowledges however that Bresco did express
great interest in working at the airport. Finally, on or about
July 31, Stevens offered Bresco a job as a helper at $8 an
hour on a job at the Regency Mall in Richmond, Virginia.
Bresco accepted, but told Stevens it would only be temporary
1349VARINA ELECTRIC CO.
5 Bresco’s account of this meeting with Guidt is uncontroverted
and credited. 6 Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176 (1984).
until the airport job started. According to Bresco, Stevens
agreed that he would go to the airport job within a few days
of August 17, starting at $12 an hour and then cutting back
to $11 an hour. Stevens remembers that when she first inter-
viewed Bresco he had said he wanted an $11 wage. She de-
nies there was any understanding he would go to the airport
job, but recalls Bresco had indicated during her first meeting
with him that the airport job sounded very good to him. Ste-
vens was as credible as Bresco in terms of demeanor, but the
conversation between them on or about August 23, of which
more later, in which she acknowledged such an agreement
persuades me that there was an understanding between Ste-
vens and Bresco on July 31 that Bresco would be employed
on the airport job as an electrician when the work there com-
menced.
Bresco then worked on the Limited Store job at Regency
Mall under the direct supervision of Robert Chaffinch, fore-
man. On the morning of August 1, Bresco was given direc-
tions to the jobsite by Mitchell Guidt, Respondent’s oper-
ations manager and a supervisor and agent of Respondent
within the meaning of Section 2(11) and (13) of the Act.
During this meeting Guidt told Bresco that the fact Bresco
was a union member would cause no problem, but added that
Charles Sweeney had been at the airport sticking his nose
into a Davis-Bacon job where it did not belong. Bresco
asked what that had to do with him. Guidt rejoined that if
Sweeney came to the job again Bresco would find out.5 As
the complaint alleges, this last statement of Guidt that Bresco
would find out what Sweeney’s presence had do do with him
was a threat of unspecified action against Bresco if Sweeney
returned to the jobsite and reasonably tended to interfere
with, restrain, and coerce Bresco (whom Respondent knew to
be a union man from the stickers on his vehicle and his
union membership receipt which he had previously presented
to Stevens) in the exercise of his rights guaranteed in Section
7 of the Act and therefore violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
When Bresco arrived at the job on August 1, he reported
to Chaffinch. The two agree that thereafter Bresco handed
out union literature during his nonworking time. Chaffinch
reported this to Stevens and received no instructions to
hinder this activity. To the contrary, Jonathan Snelson, who
supervised Chaffinch after Guidt became involved in prep-
arations for the airport work, instructed Chaffinch that
Bresco was free to pass out literature on his own time. In
addition to literature distribution, Bresco solicited employees
to support the Union, gave them the Union’s phone number,
gave their names and phone numbers to Sweeney, and ac-
companied union agents on at least one weekend recruiting
visit to an employee of Respondent. All of this conduct was
well known to Respondent. Morris Davis, construction fore-
man for the general contractor on the Regency Square job,
advised Stevens that Bresco was walking around the job or-
ganizing for the Union on his breaks, at lunch hour, and after
work. Stevens responded that she did not approve of
Bresco’s organizing on the job but she would soon be laying
people off in any event because that job would soon be com-
pleted.
On August 13, Bresco heard from Snelson that the airport
job had started. It appears from the testimony of Guidt that
it started that very day. Bresco immediately called Stevens
and asked when he would be sent to the airport job. Stevens
asked if it was true Bresco had asked Morris Davis for per-
mission to bring Sweeney on the job to organize. Bresco de-
nied it was true. Stevens advised she had decided it was in
her best interests to leave him where he was for the time
being. The complaint alleges the questioning of Bresco by
Stevens concerning his efforts to bring Sweeney on the job
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I conclude the allegation
is well-founded. This questioning is distinguishable from per-
missible general inquiry concerning the union sympathies of
an employee who publicly parades his allegiance to a union
cause6 because although it is true Bresco was openly orga-
nizing for the Union, and Stevens’ question concerned an as-
pect of that conduct, it is also true that Bresco had been
warned by Guidt of possible retaliation against him if
Sweeney reappeared on the jobsite. Stevens’ inquiry objec-
tively viewed in context with Guidt’s prior warning reason-
ably tended to convey to Bresco the message that Respond-
ent was checking to see if he had heeded Guidt’s warning.
In these circumstances a conclusion that Stevens’ question
tended to interfere with, coerce, and restrain Bresco in the
pursuit of his union organizing activities is warranted.
On or about August 19, Bresco again called Stevens, in-
quired about the airport job, and was told he would not be
sent to the airport at that time.
On or about August 23, Bresco called Stevens from a
speakerphone in the Union’s office with Sweeney listening
in. Stevens was not made aware of Sweeney’s presence.
Bresco reminded Stevens they had agreed she would send
him to the airport, and pointed out he had not yet been so
assigned. Stevens concurred they had had that agreement, but
added that she had changed her mind and was not sending
him to the airport. Bresco was never sent to the job, but con-
tinued to work at Regency Square.
On August 27, Bresco suffered an on-the-job injury. He
was advised by a physician not to work for a couple of days.
On August 28, Bresco called Chaffinch and told him that he
would be off for a day or two. Chaffinch told him not to re-
turn to that job but to call the shop when ready to return.
Later that day Bresco called Stevens. She advised that she
had cut back the work force on the Regency Square job.
Bresco asked if he was laid off or fired. To each she said
he was not. He persisted by asking if he was on furlough.
When she professed not to know what that meant, he asked
if he was in limbo. She replied that was a good way to de-
scribe it. That same day Bresco filed a claim for unemploy-
ment compensation with the Virginia Employment Commis-
sion giving ‘‘Lack of Work’’ as the reason for his separation.
On or about September 27 or 28, Bresco telephoned Ste-
vens. When she answered the phone she asked if Bresco ap-
preciated that she had given him a job. Receiving an affirma-
tive answer, she asked why Bresco was trying to put her out
of business. Bresco professed not to know what she was talk-
ing about. Stevens again accused Bresco of trying to destroy
her business. He denied the accusation. She said, ‘‘Thank
you very much,’’ whereupon Bresco hung up. He called
again later that day and asked if he was still employed by
1350 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
7 This remark, I find, had reference to the fact Bresco had earlier
filed for unemployment compensation.
8 Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. NLRB v. Wright
Line, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981).
9 Guidt advises the job ended the first of November 1991.
Respondent. Stevens said she supposed not. Bresco persisted
by asking if he was laid off or fired. Stevens’ reply was to
the effect Bresco could put down whatever he wanted to on
whatever form he next filed,7 and she would react appro-
priately. The original charge in this case was filed with the
Board by the Union on October 25, 1991.
I have found that there was an understanding between Ste-
vens and Bresco on July 31 that he would be employed as
a helper until the beginning of work at the airport, at which
time he would be employed there as an electrician. I am per-
suaded however that Stevens changed her mind about car-
rying through with that understanding when she was advised
Bresco was actively engaged in organizational efforts among
Respondent’s employment. This change of mind is clearly
evidenced by her statement to Davis, which Davis places
about a week before Bresco’s layoff, that she did not ap-
prove of Bresco’s organizing but there would soon be a lay-
off in any event. She was plainly advising Davis that Bresco
would no longer be an employee when the Regency Square
layoff occurred. This is persuasive evidence she had aban-
doned her previous intention to further employ Bresco at the
airport and had done so because he was an active organizer
for the Union. This conclusion is not placed in doubt by Re-
spondent’s employment of other union members because
there is no evidence proffered or adduced that any employee
other than Bresco actively and openly attempted on behalf of
a union to organize Respondent’s employees.
The General Counsel has shown that Respondent, by its
president, agreed to hire Bresco as a helper and then employ
him on the airport job when it began but then failed and re-
fused to provide the airport employment after Respondent
discovered and expressed opposition to Bresco’s union orga-
nizing. With respect to that opposition, there is no evidence
whatsoever of any reason other than Bresco’s union activities
for Respondent to accuse him of attempting to destroy the
Company. An inference that opposition to Bresco’s union ac-
tivity was a motivating factor in the decision to deny him
employment at the airport is appropriate.
Respondent asserts that (1) it placed advertisements in the
newspapers for airport employees and hired its airport work
force from those who applied at its airport office trailer; (2)
at least 2 of those hired, of about 90 in all, were union mem-
bers; (3) the work force averaged about 30; (4) Bresco did
not apply at the airport; (5) no employees were transferred
to the airport from other jobs; and (6) there were no prom-
ises to Bresco that he would be transferred. Items 1 through
4 were testified to by Respondent’s witnesses and are not
contested. Item 5 seems to be accurate but for the use of at
least one employee from another job on a temporary emer-
gency basis. Item 6 is not correct. Bresco was promised em-
ployment at the airport. Whether it be characterized as a
transfer is a matter of semantics probative of nothing mate-
rial to this case. With respect to the application at the airport
bit, it is meaningless because Stevens had determined not to
hire Bresco at the airport before the work there commenced.
Moreover, Bresco was entitled to rely on her promise and
had in effect already applied and been accepted for airport
work by virtue of the agreement between him and Stevens.
That being the case the burden fell on Respondent to advise
him he needed to file an application at the airport if Re-
spondent wanted to tidy up its procedure. In this connection,
Guidt, who did all the hiring at the airport, concedes he
knew Bresco wanted to work at the airport. Even so, there
is no evidence he ever told Bresco of any need to apply at
the airport trailer. In any event, the requirement of filing a
new application by an employee of less than a month who
is already on the payroll and promised the new work strikes
me as an inartistic effort to conjure up a reason to justify Re-
spondent’s conduct toward Bresco. There is no persuasive
evidence that Bresco was not a capable electrician, and Re-
spondent has not presented a single convincing reason for not
hiring him at the airport. That no other employees were di-
rectly transferred to that job proves nothing because there is
no showing anyone but Bresco was promised a transfer, and
because Respondent could easily have arranged the hire of
Bresco through whatever procedure it required if it had
wished to abide by its original promise to Bresco. There is
no need to further belabor the point that Respondent has not
shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Bresco would
have been denied airport employment absent his union activ-
ism. Accordingly, I find the General Counsel has proved by
a preponderance of the evidence that since on or about Au-
gust 13, 1991, the date the airport work commenced,8 Re-
spondent denied Thomas Bresco employment at that location
because he engaged in protected union activity.9 That denial
violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
Turning to the allegation that Bresco was unlawfully laid
off on August 27, 1991, and taking note that had Respondent
abided by its agreement he would have been employed at the
airport by then, Bresco’s layoff at Regency Square occurred
when Chaffinch advised him on August 28 not to return to
that site but to contact the office for further job assignments.
When Stevens told Davis that she did not approve of
Bresco’s organizing but there would soon be a layoff, there-
by implying Bresco would soon be laid off and his orga-
nizing would therefore end, she there and then preselected
Bresco for the first layoff at Regency Square Mall which was
expected to be very soon. Chaffinch’s testimony that selec-
tions for layoff were made by the office confirms my conclu-
sion Stevens made the selections for layoff. Chaffinch re-
calls, as does Davis, that Respondent had as many as 14 em-
ployees on that job at one time. Chaffinch further recalls that
four or five other employees were laid off within a week of
Bresco’s layoff due to lack of work. Davis confirms several
employees were laid off with Bresco. The need for a layoff
is not contested. The selection of Bresco is the real issue.
Respondent does not explain why he was selected for that
first layoff. Chaffinch and Davis credibly relate that the Re-
gency Square job ended several weeks after Bresco’s layoff.
Davis recollects there were about four Varina employees still
at the job when it ended.
Respondent’s hostility toward Bresco’s organizing, its un-
lawful refusal to honor its agreement to employ him at the
airport, and his preselection for layoff because he was orga-
nizing are more than enough to infer that his union activity
was a motivating consideration in selecting him for layoff.
Inasmuch as Respondent advances no colorable reason for
1351VARINA ELECTRIC CO.
10 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec-
ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
11 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.’’
preselecting Bresco for the layoff, I find the inference of un-
lawful selection in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act has not been rebutted by a showing he would have been
selected absent his organizing activities and the General
Counsel has therefore shown said violations occurred by a
preponderance of the credible evidence. I further find the an-
nouncement by Chaffinch on August 28 that Bresco should
not return to the job fixes August 28 as the date of his lay-
off.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent, Varina Electric Co., Inc., is an employer
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union, International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, Local Union No. 666, AFL–CIO, is a labor organi-
zation within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By threatening an employee with unspecified retaliation
if a union agent visited the jobsite, Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. By coercively interrogating an employee concerning his
union organizing efforts, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
5. By denying Thomas Bresco employment at an airport
project because he engaged in protected union activity, Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
6. By laying Thomas Bresco off because he engaged in
protected union activity, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act.
7. The unfair labor practices set forth above affect com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
In addition to the usual cease and desist order and notice
posting requirements, my recommended order will require
Respondent to make Thomas A. Bresco whole for any loss
of earnings he may have suffered by not being employed as
an electrician at Respondent’s airport project from August
13, 1991, until that project’s completion, said backpay to be
computed in the manner prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co.,
90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest as computed in New Ho-
rizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987). Although
in normal circumstances Thomas A. Bresco would be entitled
to be made whole for wages lost as a result of his layoff,
such an order is unnecessary in the instant case because
Bresco will be made whole at a higher rate of pay for the
failure to employ him at the airport for a period of time en-
compassing the lesser period of time Bresco could possibly
have worked at the Regency Square Mall job until its com-
pletion. If, however, the Board not find the failure to employ
at the airport unlawful then he must be made whole for
wages lost due to his layoff, said backpay with interest to
be computed in the same manner as previously described
above.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended10
ORDER
The Respondent, Varina Electric Co., Inc., Richmond, Vir-
ginia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Discouraging membership in or activities on behalf of
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union
No. 666, AFL–CIO, or any other labor organization by lay-
ing off or denying employment to employees or by otherwise
discriminating in any manner in respect to their tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment.
(b) Threatening employees with retaliation if union agents
visit Respondent’s jobsites.
(c) Coercively interrogating employees concerning their
union activities.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guar-
anteed to them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Make Thomas A. Bresco whole for any loss of wages
he may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against
him in the manner set forth in the remedy section of this de-
cision.
(b) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board
or its agents for examination and copying, all payroll records,
social security payment records, timecards, personnel records
and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order.
(c) Post at its business office and current construction
projects copies of the attached notice marked ‘‘Appendix.’’11
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Di-
rector for Region 5, after being signed by the Respondent’s
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent
immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive
days in conspicuous places including all places where notices
to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has
taken to comply.