Valerie Lewis, Appellant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 17, 1999
05971005 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 17, 1999)

05971005

06-17-1999

Valerie Lewis, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Valerie Lewis v. United States Postal Service

05971005

June 17, 1999

Valerie Lewis, )

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Request No. 05971005

) Appeal No. 01965413

William J. Henderson, ) Agency No. HI-0130-96

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

Agency. )

______________________________)

DENYING REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION

On August 9, 1997, Valerie Lewis (appellant) initiated a request

to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to reconsider

the decision in Valerie Lewis v. Marvin T. Runyon, Jr., Postmaster

General, United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01965413 (July

16, 1997). EEOC Regulations provide that the Commissioners may,

in their discretion, reconsider any previous Commission decision.

29 C.F.R. �1614.407(a). The party requesting reconsideration must

submit written argument or evidence which tends to establish one or

more of the following three criteria: new and material evidence is

available that was not readily available when the previous decision

was issued, 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(1); the previous decision involved

an erroneous interpretation of law, regulation or material fact, or

misapplication of established policy, 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(2); and the

previous decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications, 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(3). For the reasons

set forth herein, appellant's request is denied.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented is whether the previous decision properly affirmed

the agency's dismissal of appellant's complaint.

BACKGROUND

During the period in question, appellant was employed as a Clerk at the

agency's facility in Boynton Beach, Florida. Appellant contacted an EEO

Counselor on December 28, 1995, and thereafter filed a formal complaint

alleging discrimination based on race, color, religion, and reprisal

when, on March 17, 1995, her "secondary job of giving second notices and

returning certified mail [was] changed immediately to a job that no one

wanted." The agency thereafter issued a final decision (FAD) dismissing

the complaint for being both untimely and moot. Appellant appealed and

the prior decision affirmed the FAD.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

As discussed above, the Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider

any previous decision when the party requesting reconsideration submits

written argument or evidence which tends to establish that any of

the criteria of 29 C.F.R. �1614.407 is met. In order for a case to

be reconsidered, the request must contain specific information which

meets the requirements of this regulation. It should be noted that the

Commission's scope of review on a request to reconsider is limited. Lopez

v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Request No. 05890749 (September 28,

1989). Furthermore, a request to reconsider is not "a form of second

appeal." Regensberg v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request

No. 05900850 (September 7, 1990); Spence v. Department of the Army,

EEOC Request No. 05880475 (May 31, 1988).

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.105(a)(1) provides that an aggrieved

person must initiate contact with an EEO Counselor within 45 days of the

date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory or within 45 days of the

effective date of a personnel action. This period may be extended when

the appellant shows that she was not notified of the time limits and

was not otherwise aware of them; that she did not know and reasonably

should not have known that the discriminatory matter or personnel action

occurred; that despite due diligence she was prevented by circumstances

beyond her control from contacting an EEO Counselor within the time

limits; or for other reasons considered sufficient by the agency or

the Commission. 29 C.F.R. �1614.105(a)(2).

In this case, we find sufficient evidence in the record to conclude

that, although the date on which the challenged incident occurred was

March 17, 1995, appellant did not initiate EEO counseling until December

28, 1995. Although appellant now argues that she initially contacted

the EEO Counselor on March 17, 1995, this is the first time she has

made such an assertion. Furthermore, although appellant has submitted

documentation which she says supports that assertion, there is nothing in

this documentation which either states or indicates that she initiated

counseling as early as March 1995. Accordingly, because appellant's

initiation of EEO counseling was well beyond the 45-day period, and

because she has offered no justification for extending the period,

we find that her complaint was properly dismissed as untimely.

Furthermore, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(e), an agency shall dismiss a

complaint, or portions thereof, when the issues raised therein are moot.

An allegation is moot when (1) there is no reasonable expectation

that the alleged violation will recur; and (2) interim relief or

events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the

alleged violation. Henderson v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Request

No. 05940820 (August 31, 1995) (citing County of Los Angeles v. Davis,

440 U.S. 625 (1979)).

In this case, we find there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged

violation will recur insofar as appellant was removed in September 1995

and this removal was subsequently upheld by the Merit Systems Protection

Board (MSPB). See Magno v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05920662

(January 22, 1993).<0> Furthermore, insofar as appellant is no longer

employed at the agency, and because there is no monetary relief appellant

would be entitled to in the event she proved discrimination, we find that

interim events have eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.<0>

Accordingly, we find that appellant's complaint was properly dismissed

as moot.

CONCLUSION

After a review of appellant's request for reconsideration, the previous

decision, and the entire record, the Commission finds that appellant's

request fails to meet the criteria of 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c).

Therefore, it is the decision of the Commission to DENY appellant's

request. The decision in EEOC Appeal No. 01965413 (July 16, 1997)

remains the Commission's final decision. There is no further right of

administrative appeal on a decision of the Commission on this Request

for Reconsideration.

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (P0993)

This decision of the Commission is final, and there is no further right of

administrative appeal from the Commission's decision. You have the right

to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court. It

is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file a civil

action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN NINETY (90)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision. You should

be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have interpreted

the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that a civil action

must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action is considered

timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS

from the date that you receive this decision or to consult an attorney

concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction in which your

action would be filed. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE

DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court

appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to

file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �

2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��

791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole

discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not

extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and

the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the

paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

June 17, 1999

Date Frances M. Hart

Executive Officer

Executive Secretariat

01 We also note that the Commission concurred with the MSPB's decision.

Lewis v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Petition No. 03980110 (September 18,

1998).

02 Appellant did not request compensatory damages.