Valerie J. Romo, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Pacific Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 8, 2009
0120080654 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 8, 2009)

0120080654

10-08-2009

Valerie J. Romo, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Pacific Area), Agency.


Valerie J. Romo,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service

(Pacific Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120080654

Hearing No. 480-2007-00484X

Agency No. 1F-908-0010-06

DECISION

On November 19, 2007, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's

October 15, 2007 final decision concerning her equal employment

opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.

The appeal is deemed timely and is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �

1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the

agency's final decision.

ISSUE PRESENTED

Whether the agency properly found that complainant was not subjected to

discrimination based on her national origin, sex, age, and in reprisal

for prior protected EEO activity.

BACKGROUND

At the time of the events giving rise to this complaint, complainant

worked as a Mail Processing Clerk at the agency's Processing and

Distribution Center in Long Beach, California. The record reflects

that on or around January 10, 2005, complainant was a passenger in a

vehicle stopped by local police officers. The officers observed, in

plain view, various items in the vehicle used to commit identity theft.

Complainant was subsequently arrested and charged with conspiracy to

commit identity theft.

Complainant was incarcerated from January 11, 2005 through January 26,

2005, when she was released on bail. When she attempted to return to

work on January 31, 2005, she was placed on emergency suspension until

her case was resolved and/or she was cleared of all charges.1 On July 1,

2005, she was issued a Notice of Indefinite Suspension-Crime Situation

because there was "reasonable cause to believe [she was] guilty of a

crime for which a sentence of imprisonment [could] be imposed."

Complainant and several other individuals were tried before a jury in

July 2005. Complainant was ultimately found guilty of a felony for

"conspiracy to commit any crime." In September 2005, she was sentenced

to serve two years of imprisonment. On December 29, 2005, she was issued

a Notice of Removal for Failure to Report for Duty as Scheduled - Absent

Without Leave (AWOL).2

On May 11, 2006, complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that she

was discriminated against on the bases of national origin (Hispanic),

sex (female), age (40 years old at the time of the incidents), and in

reprisal for prior protected EEO activity arising under Title VII when:

(1) On July 1, 2005, she was issued a Notice of indefinite

Suspension-Crime Situation; and

(2) On December 29, 2005, she received a Notice of Removal for "Failure

to Report for Duty as Scheduled - AWOL, effective January 29, 2006.

The agency initially dismissed the complaint pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �

1614.107(a)(2) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. Romo v. United States Postal Service, Agency No. 1F-908-0010-06

(June 5, 2006). On appeal, the Commission reversed the agency's final

decision and remanded the case to the agency for further processing

in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.108. Romo v. United States Postal

Service, EEOC Appeal No. 0120064069 (January 9, 2007).

On remand, at the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was

provided with a copy of the report of investigation and a notice of her

right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ).

Complainant timely requested a hearing but subsequently withdrew her

request. Consequently, the agency issued a final decision pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b), finding no discrimination. Specifically,

the agency's decision found that complainant failed to establish a prima

facie case of discrimination and that she failed to establish that the

agency's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions were a

pretext for discrimination.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, complainant argues that the agency erred in finding no

discrimination. She argues that two similarly situated comparators

outside her protected classes were given preferential treatment by

management officials. She further argues that the record evidence

establishes that the agency's reasons for its actions, including

terminating her due to her AWOL status, were a pretext for discrimination.

She notes that after, she won an arbitration decision rescinding her

Notice of Removal in July 2007, she was issued a second Notice of Removal

in October 2007 for unacceptable conduct/conviction of a crime (felony)

resulting in her incarceration in state prison that is the subject of

a separate EEO complaint and unrelated to the instant appeal.3

In response, the agency urges the Commission to affirm its final decision.

The agency argues that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case

of discrimination because she failed to identify any similarly situated

individuals outside her protected classes that were given preferential

treatment. The agency also argues that she failed to establish pretext.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b), the agency's decision is subject to de novo

review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). See EEOC Management

Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.A. (November 9, 1999) (explaining that

the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine

the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the

previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements,

and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions

of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's

own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law").

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim, complainant must satisfy the

three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant must initially

establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that she was subjected

to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support

an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438

U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will vary depending

on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804

n. 14. The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department of Community

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail,

complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the

agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993).

Assuming arguendo that complainant established a prima facie

case of discrimination based on national origin, sex, age, and in

reprisal for prior protected EEO activity, we find that the agency

articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.

The Manager Distribution Operations (MDO) submitted an affidavit into

the record stating that he issued complainant a Notice of Indefinite

Suspension-Crime Situation due the fact that "the alleged crime involved

mail and her position as a Registry Clerk handling accountable mail."

A second Manager Distribution Operations (MDO2) similarly stated in her

affidavit that complainant was placed on indefinite suspension "based

on her felony arrest January 10, 2005." The Plant Manager submitted a

statement indicating that placing complainant on indefinite suspension

"was necessary in that keeping her at work might result in the loss of

mail or funds."

MDO stated that complainant was issued a Notice of Removal "due to

her being found guilty of a crime and her [AWOL]." MDO2 stated that

complainant was issued the Notice of Removal "based on the fact that that

the complainant was found guilty of the felony charge [of] conspiracy to

commit a crime and could serve up to [two] years in prison." MDO2 and

the Plant Manager noted that all employees who are in prison are carried

in an AWOL status during their incarceration.

Complainant now bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the

evidence that the agency's articulated reasons for its actions were a

pretext for discrimination. Upon review, we concur with the agency's

determination that complainant failed to establish pretext. The record

is devoid of any evidence that the agency's actions were motivated by

discriminatory animus. Although complainant identified two comparators on

appeal that she said were not terminated after being accused or convicted

of criminal activity, there is no evidence in the record that these

individuals were similarly situated employees. The identified comparators

were not arrested and convicted for conspiracy to commit identity theft,

and there is no evidence in the record that they were supervised by the

same management officials. We note that Article 16.6 of the collective

bargaining agreement between the agency and the Union states that "[t]he

[e]mployer may indefinitely suspend an employee in those cases where the

[e]mployer has reasonable cause to believe an employee is guilty of a

crime for which a sentence of imprisonment can be imposed." We further

note that Section 665.41 of the agency's Employee Labor Manual states

that "[e]mployees are required to be regular in attendance. Failure to

be in regular attendance may result in disciplinary action, including

removal from the [agency]."

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, based on our thorough review of the record, the Commission

determines that the agency's final decision finding no discrimination

was proper and is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

______10/08/09____________

Date

1 Complainant filed a grievance regarding the January 31, 2005 suspension,

and the parties signed a settlement agreement resolving the matter in

July 2005.

2 Complainant filed a grievance regarding the December 29, 2005 Notice of

Removal. On July 30, 2007, an arbitration decision was issued rescinding

the Notice of Removal, finding that management had placed complainant

on indefinite suspension during the relevant time period rather than in

AWOL status. The decision found that management failed to correct its

Notice of Removal to charge complainant with AWOL during her post-trial

incarceration and only charged her with AWOL for the period from January

11, 2005 through January 26, 2005. As a result, the arbitration decision

determined that complainant could only be disciplined for being AWOL

from January 11, 2005 through January 26, 2005, and the appropriate

discipline was determined to be a thirty (30) day suspension.

3 The Commission has no record of an appeal filed by complainant regarding

the second notice of removal.

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0120080654

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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0120080654