Valerie Dylan, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Southeast Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJan 12, 2004
05A40135 (E.E.O.C. Jan. 12, 2004)

05A40135

01-12-2004

Valerie Dylan, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Southeast Area), Agency.


Valerie Dylan v. United States Postal Service

05A40135

January 12, 2004

.

Valerie Dylan,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service

(Southeast Area),

Agency.

Request No. 05A40135

Appeal No. 01A34129

Agency No. 4-H-320-0002-02

DENIAL OF REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION

On November 3, 2003, Valerie Dylan (complainant) timely initiated

a request to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or

Commission) to reconsider the decision in Valerie Dylan v. United

States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01A34129 (September 30, 2003).

EEOC Regulations provide that the Commission may, in its discretion,

reconsider any previous Commission decision where the requesting party

demonstrates that: (1) the appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous

interpretation of material fact or law; or (2) the appellate decision

will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations

of the agency. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(b).

In her complaint, the complainant alleged that she had been subjected

to unlawful discrimination, in the form of retaliation for engaging in

protected equal employment opportunity (EEO) activity, when (1) she

was denied a transfer due to an unfair evaluation; (2) she was told

that her medical documentation was not acceptable; (3) she received

a note in her post office box stating that if box information was not

updated, it would be closed; and (4) she was continuously harassed by her

supervisor and postmaster. After an investigation into the complaint,

the agency issued a final decision finding no discrimination. On appeal,

the Commission affirmed the agency's final decision, noting that the

preponderance of the evidence did not support the complainant's claims.

In the instant request for reconsideration, the complainant restates her

allegations, but fails to demonstrate that the Commission's previous

decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact

or law, or that it will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency. We note that in claims such as

claims (1) through (3) above, which allege disparate treatment based upon

retaliation for participation in the EEO process, and where there is an

absence of direct evidence of such retaliation, the allocation of burdens

and order of presentation of proof is a three-step process. Hochstadt

v. Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318,

324 (D. Mass. 1976) (extending application of the disparate treatment

analytical framework described in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411

U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973), to claims of retaliation), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222

(1st Cir. 1976). First, complainant must establish a prima facie case of

retaliation by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise

to an inference of discrimination; i.e., that a prohibited consideration

was a factor in the adverse employment action. Kimble v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01983020 (Aug. 22, 2001). Next, the agency

must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.

Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).

If the agency is successful in meeting its burden, complainant must

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the legitimate reason

proffered by the agency was a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 256.

However, the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the

agency intentionally discriminated against complainant remains at all

times with complainant. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,

530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000). In this case, even assuming the complainant

established a prima facie case of retaliation, the agency articulated

legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for its actions, and the complainant

failed to carry her burden to show that those reasons were merely pretext

for unlawful discrimination.

We further note that, as for claim (4) above, which states a claim

of hostile work environment harassment in retaliation for engaging in

protected EEO activity, in order to establish such a harassment claim,

the complainant must show that: (1) she engaged in prior EEO activity;

(2) she was subjected to unwelcome conduct related to his prior EEO

activity; (3) the harassment complained of was based on her prior EEO

activity; (4) the harassment had the purpose or effect of unreasonably

interfering with her work performance and/or creating an intimidating,

hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) there is a basis for

imputing liability to the employer. Roberts v. Department of Transp.,

EEOC Appeal No. 01970727 (Sept. 15, 2000) (citing Henson v. Dundee,

682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982)). In this case, there is no indication in

the record on appeal that the complained-of agency actions were either

based upon the complainant's prior EEO activity or related to her prior

EEO activity. Accordingly, she has not established a prima facie case

for her claim of retaliatory hostile work environment harassment, and

therefore cannot prevail on this claim.

Therefore, after a review of her request for reconsideration, the

previous decision, and the entire record, the Commission finds that the

request fails to meet the criteria of 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(b), and it

is the decision of the Commission to deny the request. The decision

in EEOC Appeal No. 01A34129 remains the Commission's final decision.

There is no further right of administrative appeal on the decision of

the Commission on this request for reconsideration.

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (P0900)

This decision of the Commission is final, and there is no further right

of administrative appeal from the Commission's decision. You have the

right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District

Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this

decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in

the complaint the person who is the official agency head or department

head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

�Agency� or �department� means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

(�Right to File A Civil Action�).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

January 12, 2004

Date