Vacation Finder, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 23, 2021

2020005975 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 23, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/063,760 03/08/2016 Richard F. Elliott 1110.0015-CIP 2424
65770 7590 03/23/2021
Thrive IP
Jeremy Stipkala
5401 NETHERBY LANE
SUITE 1201
NORTH CHARLESTON, SC 29420
EXAMINER
CHEN, GEORGE YUNG CHIEH
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3628
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/23/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
JEREMY.STIPKALA@Thrive-IP.COM
docket@thrive-ip.com
rebecca.seaman@thrive-ip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte RICHARD F. ELLIOTT and CRAIG LUCAS
____________

Appeal 2020-005975
Application 15/063,760
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before NINA L. MEDLOCK, CYNTHIA L. MURPHY, and
KENNETH G. SCHOPFER, Administrative Patent Judges.

MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 1–6. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Our decision references Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,”
filed March 20, 2020) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed August 18, 2020),
and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed June 24, 2020) and Final Office
Action (“Final Act.,” mailed December 26, 2019). Appellant identifies
Vacation Finder, LLC as the real party in interest (Appeal Br. 3).
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CLAIMED INVENTION
The Specification states, “[t]he present disclosure is directed broadly
to an online vacation rental by owner marketplace that has access to
hundreds of properties around the world” (Spec. ¶ 5).
Claims 1, 5, and 6 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 6,
reproduced below with bracketed notations added, is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter:
6. A method for rental property verification, the
method comprising:
[(a)] providing a concierge shop belonging to a host, the
concierge shop being configured to generate and publish a first
display based on first sets of information, a second display based
on second sets of information, and a composite set of information
based on an interaction of at least one of the first sets of
information and at least one of the second sets of information;
(i) wherein the first sets of information belong to
respective property owners;
(ii) wherein the first display includes a property
associated with a rental opportunity of a selected of one of
the respective property owners, the property being verified
by a local service contract before the property can [sic]
presented on the first display; and
(iii) wherein the respective property owners, the
host, and a plurality of end users are independent of each
other, the property owners and the end users being third
parties with respect to one other;
[(b)] receiving from the end users respective queries to
the concierge shop;
[(c)] identifying at least one of the properties
corresponding to each query and presenting the second displays
to the end users; and
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[(d)] presenting the composite information selected from
the group comprising the first sets of information regarding one
of a house, a condominium, or a resort; and the second sets of
information regarding a homeowner, a resort owner, or a
condominium owner; a third set of information based on
customer criteria; and combinations thereof.
REJECTIONS
Claims 1–6 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial
exception without significantly more.
Claims 1–5 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Mulholland et al. (US 2008/0215384 A1, published Sept. 4, 2008)
(“Mulholland”) and Mueller et al. (US 2003/0225599 A1, published Dec. 4,
2003) (“Mueller”).
Claim 6 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as anticipated by
Mulholland.
ANALYSIS
Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter
Appellant argues independent claims 1, 5, and 6 as a group (Appeal
Br. 10–12). We select independent claim 6 as representative. Claims 1 and
5 stand or fall with claim 6. See 37 C.F.R. §41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor.” 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. The Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted § 101 to include
an implicit exception: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216
(2014).
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The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework
previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim
laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim
patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217.
The first step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are
directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. If the claims are not
directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an abstract idea, the inquiry
ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step where the elements
of the claims are considered “individually and ‘as an ordered combination’”
to determine whether there are additional elements that “‘transform the
nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 79, 78). This is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’ — i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
[ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. at 217–18 (alteration in original).
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (the “USPTO”) published
revised guidance on January 7, 2019, for use by USPTO personnel in
evaluating subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 2019 REVISED
PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7,
2019) (the “2019 Revised Guidance”). 2 That guidance revised the USPTO’s
examination procedure with respect to the first step of the Mayo/Alice
framework by (1) “[p]roviding groupings of subject matter that [are]

2 The MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) incorporates
the revised guidance and subsequent updates at Section 2106 (9th ed.
Rev. 10.2019, rev. June 2020).
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considered an abstract idea”; and (2) clarifying that a claim is not “directed
to” a judicial exception if the judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application of that exception. Id. at 50.
The first step, as set forth in the 2019 Revised Guidance (i.e.,
Step 2A), is, thus, a two-prong test. In Step 2A, Prong One, we look to
whether the claim recites a judicial exception, e.g., one of the following
three groupings of abstract ideas: (1) mathematical concepts; (2) certain
methods of organizing human activity, e.g., fundamental economic
principles or practices, commercial or legal interactions; and (3) mental
processes. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. If so, we next
determine, in Step 2A, Prong Two, whether the claim as a whole integrates
the recited judicial exception into a practical application, i.e., whether the
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, apply,
rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful
limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting
effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception. Id. at 54–55. Only if
the claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application do we conclude that the claim is
“directed to” the judicial exception, e.g., an abstract idea. Id.
If the claim is determined to be directed to a judicial exception under
revised Step 2A, we next evaluate the additional elements, individually and
in combination, in Step 2B, to determine whether they provide an inventive
concept, i.e., whether the additional elements or combination of elements
amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception itself; only then, is
the claim patent eligible. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
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Here, in rejecting independent claims 1, 5, and 6 under § 101, the
Examiner determined that the claims recite “a series of rules to be followed
when managing [an] interpersonal relationship (e.g.[,] between a computer
user and a condo owner/management) or a series of steps to be followed
when conducting commercial activity of renting vacation rentals,” i.e., a
method of organizing human activity and, therefore, an abstract idea (Final
Act. 2–5). The Examiner also determined that the abstract idea is not
integrated into a practical application; that the independent claims do not
include additional elements sufficient to amount to significantly more than
the abstract idea itself; and that dependent claims 2–4 are patent ineligible
for substantially the same reasons (id. at 6).
Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2A)
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner
erred in determining that claim 6 is directed to an abstract idea (Appeal
Br. 10–12). The Federal Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry
applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification,
based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject
matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d
1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a
specific improvement in relevant technology or on a process that itself
qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a
tool. See id. at 1335–36. Here, it is clear from the Specification (including
the claim language) that claim 6 focuses on an abstract idea, and not on an
improvement to technology and/or a technical field.
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The Specification is titled “METHODS OF RESERVING AND
MANAGING VACATION RENTAL PROPERTIES,” and describes, in the
Background section, that “[c]onventional vacation rental websites are
passive and lack functionality,” and that “[s]uch sites do not assure
customers of professional services or satisfaction (Spec. ¶ 2). The
Specification, thus, describes, for example, that owners of properties posted
on conventional vacation rental websites are often inaccessible such that
when guests have problems with the rental properties, the guest or renter
may have to wait days to have the issue resolved — a situation that can
result in ruined vacation time that cannot be replaced (id.).
According to the Specification, what is needed in the industry is a
website “that will provide renters with locally professionally managed rental
properties and much needed functionality,” e.g., dynamic mapping so when
a user “mouses” over a potential destination location to highlight the
destination, the destination is displayed to the user (Spec. ¶ 3). The
Specification describes that the needed website should organize potential
destination pages to permit users to navigate to a destination and upload the
destination when selected; offer users a search-and-suggest feature; offer
property owners the ability to upload rental contracts, logos, photographs,
website addresses and other information in real time; and provide property
owners and agents the ability to allow a user to view other properties listed
by the owner or agent — all while being “fast, efficient and easy to use by
consumers, rental agencies[,] and property owners alike” (id. ¶¶ 3, 4).
The claimed invention ostensibly is intended to address this need by
providing an online vacation rental by owner marketplace “using a concierge
website with has [sic] access to hundreds of properties around the world”
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(Spec. ¶ 26). All of the properties listed on the concierge website have
rental management contracts with local vacation rental companies, property
management companies, or licensed agents in proximity to the properties;
therefore, “[r]enters or guests will . . . have the full support of a local,
professional service organization to resolve any questions, problems or
maintenance issues that may come up during their stay” (id.).
Consistent with this disclosure, claim 6 recites a method for rental
property verification comprising: (1) providing a concierge shop configured
to generate and publish (a) a first display based on first sets of information
regarding available rental properties belonging to property owners, each
property being verified by a local service contract before the property is
published on the first display, (b) a second display based on second sets of
information, and (c) a composite set of information based on an interaction
between the first and second sets of information, i.e.,
providing a concierge shop belonging to a host, the
concierge shop being configured to generate and publish a first
display based on first sets of information, a second display based
on second sets of information, and a composite set of information
based on an interaction of at least one of the first sets of
information and at least one of the second sets of information;
(i) wherein the first sets of information belong to
respective property owners;
(ii) wherein the first display includes a property
associated with a rental opportunity of a selected of one of the
respective property owners, the property being verified by a local
service contract before the property can [sic] presented on the
first display; and
(iii) wherein the respective property owners, the host,
and a plurality of end users are independent of each other, the
property owners and the end users being third parties with respect
to one other
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(step (a)); (2) “receiving from the end users respective queries to the
concierge shop” (step (b)); (3) “identifying at least one of the properties
corresponding to each query and presenting the second displays to the end
users” (step (c)); and (4) presenting a display of composite information
selected from the first sets of information regarding a house, a
condominium, or a resort; the second sets of information regarding a
homeowner, a resort owner, or a condominium owner; and a third set of
information based on customer criteria, i.e.,
presenting the composite information selected from the
group comprising the first sets of information regarding one of a
house, a condominium, or a resort; and the second sets of
information regarding a homeowner, a resort owner, or a
condominium owner; a third set of information based on
customer criteria; and combinations thereof
(step (d)). The Examiner determined, and we agree, that these limitations,
when given their broadest reasonable interpretation, recite renting vacation
properties, i.e., a commercial interaction, which is one of “[c]ertain methods
of organizing human activity” and, therefore, an abstract idea. See 2019
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Appellant ostensibly does not dispute that claim 6 recites an abstract
idea. Instead, Appellant’s argument, as best understood, is that, even if
claim 6 recites an abstract idea, the claim is nonetheless patent eligible
because it includes additional elements that integrate the abstract idea into a
practical application and that, moreover, amount to significantly more than
the abstract idea itself.
The 2019 Revised Guidance references MPEP, Ninth Edition
(rev. Jan 2018) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
pac/mpep/old/mpep_E9R08-2017.htm) § 2106.05(a)–(c) and (e) in
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non-exhaustively listing considerations indicative that an additional element
or combination of elements may have integrated a recited judicial exception
into a practical application. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. In
particular, the Guidance describes that an additional element may have
integrated the judicial exception into a practical application if, inter alia, the
additional element reflects an improvement in the functioning of a computer
or an improvement to other technology or technical field. Id. At the same
time, the Guidance makes clear that merely including instructions to
implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely using a computer as a
tool to perform an abstract idea; adding insignificant extra-solution activity
to the judicial exception; or only generally linking the use of the judicial
exception to a particular technological environment or field are not sufficient
to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Id.
Appellant asserts here that the Examiner, in stating that “the claims do
not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly
more than a judicial exception,” inappropriately dismissed “unique, tangible
features that resolve technological problems created by the internet that
heretofore have plagued the vacation industry and that improve
computer/internet functionality” (Appeal Br. 11). Appellant also argues that
the Office failed to fully appreciate the previously submitted Declaration
Under 37 C.F.R. § 1.132 of Craig Lucas (“Lucas Decl.”) (id.). We disagree.
Mr. Lucas is a co-inventor of the present application. In his
declaration, Mr. Lucas states that a longstanding problem in the vacation
rental industry, which has resulted in “fraud and . . . dismal on-site service”
for vacationers, is that, until the present invention, “no one in the industry
has been able to provide rental units that have their existence verified and
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include associated local service contracts” (Lucas Decl. ¶ 8(b)). Therefore,
according to Mr. Lucas,
[i]t has been regrettably common . . . for a vacationer to reserve
a rental unit only to discover upon arrival that the rental unit does
not exist, or . . . that there is no local service provider in the event
that a repair or other service is needed during the vacation.
(Id.).
Appellant maintains, as described above, that claim 6 is patent
eligible, because it includes “features that resolve technological problems
created by the internet . . . and that improve computer/internet functionality”
(Appeal Br. 11). But, we are not persuaded that the problems Appellant
identifies, i.e., vacation rental fraud and inadequate on-site service (see, e.g.,
Spec. ¶¶ 2; see also Reply Br. 8; Lucas Decl. ¶ 8), are technological
problems, or that requiring that a local service contract be verified before a
property is published to a prospective vacationer is an improvement to
computer/internet functionality as opposed to an improvement to the abstract
idea of renting vacation properties, which is not enough for patent eligibility.
See SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(“[P]atent law does not protect such claims [i.e., claims to an asserted
advance in the realm of abstract ideas], without more, no matter how
groundbreaking the advance.”). This is particularly so, where, as here, we
find no indication in the Specification that the operations recited in claim 6
require any specialized computer hardware or other inventive computer
components, invoke any allegedly inventive programming, or that the
claimed invention is implemented using other than generic computer
components as tools operating in their normal and ordinary capacity.
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The alleged specificity of claim 6, standing alone, also is insufficient
to confer patent eligibility. Appellant argues that the claims “recite a
specific way to automate the creation of a composite web page” (Appeal
Br. 11). Yet, a specific abstract idea is still an abstract idea. Cf. Mayo,
566 U.S. at 88–89 (noting that “cases have not distinguished among different
laws of nature according to whether or not the principles they embody are
sufficiently narrow”) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (holding
narrow mathematical formula unpatentable)).
We also are not persuaded of Examiner error to the extent Appellant
maintains that claim 6 is patent eligible because the concierge shop presents
disparate information in a composite form (Appeal Br. 11), or because the
claimed composite set of information is “uniquely created with every use”
(Reply Br. 6). The Federal Circuit has held that abstract ideas include
merely collecting data, analyzing data, and displaying the results of the
collection and analysis, including when limited to particular content. See,
e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332,
1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (identifying the abstract idea of collecting, displaying,
and manipulating data); Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d
1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (characterizing collecting information,
analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by
mathematical algorithms, and presenting the results of collecting and
analyzing information, without more, as matters within the realm of abstract
ideas); see also SAP Am., 898 F.3d at 1168 (“As many cases make clear,
even if a process of collecting and analyzing information is ‘limited to
particular content’ or a particular ‘source,’ that limitation does not make the
collection and analysis other than abstract.”) (quoting Elec. Power Grp.,
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830 F.3d at 1353, 1355 (citing cases)). Identifying rental property based on
user criteria, i.e., a comparison process, also is substantially similar to other
concepts that courts have held abstract. See, e.g., Berkheimer v. HP Inc.,
881 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (concluding that parsing, comparing,
storing, and editing data are abstract ideas); SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced
Biological Labs., 555 F. App’x 950 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (comparing new and
stored information and using rules to identify options is an abstract idea).
Appellant also misapprehends the controlling precedent to the extent
Appellant maintains that claim 6 is patent eligible because the “concierge
solution provided by the claims . . . [is not] found in the prior art” (Appeal
Br. 11–12). Neither a finding of novelty nor a non-obviousness
determination automatically leads to the conclusion that the claimed subject
matter is patent eligible. “Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant
discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.” Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013). A novel and
non-obvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent
ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90; see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175, 188–89 (1981) (“The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or
even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the
subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly
patentable subject matter.”).3

3 As for Appellant’s arguments regarding Ex Parte Linden, Appeal
No. 2018-003323, 2019 WL 7407450 (PTAB Apr. 1, 2019) (Reply Br. 7
(Appellant mistakenly refers to this case as Ex Parte Hannun)), we note that
this case is non-precedential.
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We conclude, for the reasons outlined above, that claim 6 recites a
method of organizing human activity, i.e., an abstract idea, and that the
additional element recited in the claim beyond the abstract idea, i.e., “a
concierge shop,” is no more than a generic component used as a tool to
perform the recited abstract idea. As such, it does not integrate the abstract
idea into a practical application. See Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223–24
(“[W]holly generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of
‘additional featur[e]’ that provides any ‘practical assurance that the process
is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea]
itself.’” (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77)). Accordingly, we agree with the
Examiner that claim 6 is directed to an abstract idea.
Step Two of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2B)
Having determined under step one of the Mayo/Alice framework that
claim 6 is directed to an abstract idea, we next consider under Step 2B of the
2019 Revised Guidance, the second step of the Mayo/Alice framework,
whether claim 6 includes additional elements or a combination of elements
that provides an “inventive concept,” i.e., whether claim 6 includes
additional elements that amount to “significantly more” than the judicial
exception itself. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. We agree with
the Examiner that it does not.
The only claim element recited in claim 6 beyond the abstract idea is
“a concierge shop” — an element described in the Specification at a high
level of generality, and, similarly described by Appellant, as “a concierge
website” (see, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 26, 27, 33, 36; Reply Br. 6). Appellant does not
contend to have invented a new type of website. Nor does Appellant
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otherwise contend that the concierge website is other than a generic
component.
We are not persuaded, on the present record, that the Examiner erred
in rejecting independent claim 6 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 6, and claims 1 and 5, which fall
with claim 6. We also sustain the rejection of dependent claims 2–4, which
are not argued separately.
Obviousness
Independent Claim 1 and Dependent Claims 2–4
We are persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 because Mueller, on which the
Examiner relies, does not disclose or suggest an interactive concierge shop
containing data for each of a plurality of first web pages, “wherein each of
the first web pages displays at least one active link associated with a [rental]
property . . . , the property being verified by identifying sources for
registration and a local service contract being required before the property
can be activated on the first web pages,” as recited in claim 1 (Appeal
Br. 14–15).
Mueller is directed to a centralized property reservation system for
reserving a specific property, e.g., an apartment unit, in real time (Mueller
¶ 7), and discloses that information regarding available rental units, e.g.,
availability dates, unit features, digital images, may be displayed to a user
via a web interface (id. ¶¶ 55, 56).
The Examiner cites paragraph 57 of Mueller as disclosing the argued
limitation (Final Act. 9). Yet, although Mueller discloses in paragraph 57
that its system is configured to co-brand the displayed information
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(regarding available rental units) with “logos, colors, and/or styles of the
selected apartment, its property management company, and/or the referring
ILS[, i.e., the internet listing service]” (Mueller ¶ 57 (emphasis added)), we
find nothing in that paragraph that discloses or suggests that the Mueller
system is configured to display information regarding available rental units
based on their local service contract status (i.e., that a local service contract
must be verified before information regarding a rental unit property is
displayed) and, therefore, nothing that discloses or suggests “the property
being verified by identifying sources for registration and a local service
contract being required before the property can be activated on the first web
pages,” as called for in claim 1. Instead, Mueller merely discloses that
branding, i.e., “logos, colors, and/or styles of the selected apartment, its
property management company, and/or the referring ILS” may be added to
the displayed information.
In view of the foregoing, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. For the same reason, we also do not
sustain the rejection of dependent claims 2–4. Cf. In re Fritch, 972 F.2d
1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“dependent claims are nonobvious if the
independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious”).
Independent Claim 5
Claim 5 includes language substantially similar to the language of
claim 1, and stands rejected based on the same rationale applied with respect
to claim 1 (Final Act. 15). Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 for the same reasons set forth
above with respect to claim 1.
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Anticipation
In rejecting claim 6 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as anticipated by
Mulholland, the Examiner found that Mulholland discloses all of the
elements of claim 6, i.e., including “providing a concierge shop . . .
configured to generate and publish a first display,” where the first display
includes property associated with a rental opportunity that is “verified by a
local service contract before the property can [be] presented on the first
display” (Final Act. 15–17). Yet, as Appellant observes (Appeal Br. 16–17),
the Examiner expressly acknowledged in rejecting independent claims 1 and
5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 that Mulholland does not explicitly disclose an
interactive concierge shop containing data for each of a plurality of first web
pages, “wherein each of the first web pages displays at least one active link
associated with a [rental] property . . . , the property being verified by
identifying sources for registration and a local service contract being
required before the property can be activated on the first web pages,” as
called for in those claims (Final Act. 8, 14–15).
Responding to Appellant’s argument, the Examiner takes a position in
the Answer that “the property verification of the method claim is . . . outside
the scope of the claimed method steps”; that “the limitation regarding
verification is merely describing the characteristic of property”; and that “the
concierge shop is not required to perform any step regarding such
verification” (Ans. 7). But, even accepting the Examiner’s position, the
Examiner has not identified any portion of Mulholland that discloses that a
local service contract must verified before information regarding a particular
property is displayed and, therefore, nothing that discloses “the property
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being verified by a local service contract before the property can [be]
presented on the first display,” as recited in claim 6.
Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 6
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1).
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–6 101 Eligibility 1–6
1–5 103 Mulholland,
Mueller
1–5
6 102(a)(1) Mulholland 6
Overall
Outcome
1–6
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED