USA Fire Protection

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Jun 21, 2010

10-CA-038074 (N.L.R.B. Jun. 21, 2010)

JD(ATL)—14—10
Clinton, TN
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ATLANTA BRANCH OFFICE
DIVISION OF JUDGES
G & L ASSOCIATED, INC. d/b/a
USA FIRE PROTECTION
And Case 10—CA—38074
ROAD SPRINKLER FITTERS LOCAL UNION
NO. 669, UNITED ASSOCIATION OF
JOURNEYMEN AND APPRENTICES OF THE
PLUMBING AND PIPEFITTING INDUSTRY OF
THE UNTIED STATES AND CANADA, AFL-CIO
Sally R. Cline, for the General Counsel.
Steve Erdely, IV, for the Respondent.
William W. Osborne, Jr., for the Charging Party.
DECISION
Statement of the Case
MICHAEL A MARCIONESE, Administrative Law Judge. I heard this case in Knoxville,
Tennessee, on January 28, 2010. Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669, United
Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the U.S.
and Canada, AFL-CIO, the Union, filed the charge on September 18, 2009.1 The complaint
issued on November 20, alleging that G & L Associated, Inc., d/b/a USA Fire Protection, the
Respondent, violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act on September 8 by withdrawing
recognition of the Union as exclusive collective bargaining representative of its journeymen
sprinkler fitters and apprentices. On December 3, the Respondent filed its answer, admitting
that it had withdrawn recognition from the Union but denying that this violated the Act. As an
affirmative defense, the Respondent asserted that the recognition was unlawful because the
Union never demonstrated that it represented a majority of the Respondent’s unit employees.
The primary issue raised by the pleadings is whether the Respondent and the Union had
a Section 8(f) or 9(a) relationship. This turns on an interpretation of the language used by the
parties in the recognition agreement and contract they signed on November 24, 2008. In
addition, counsel for the General Counsel, over the objections of the Charging Party, indicated
that the General Counsel is seeking, via this case, a re-examination and modification of certain
precedent regarding when and how construction industry employers and unions form Section
9(a) relationships and whether a challenge to initial recognition in the construction industry
should be barred if raised more than six (6) months after recognition.
On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and
after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel, the Respondent, and the Charging
Party, I make the following

1 All dates are in 2009 unless otherwise indicated.
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Findings of Fact
I. Jurisdiction
The Respondent, a corporation, is engaged in the business of installing, maintaining and
repairing fire sprinkler systems from its facility in Clinton, Tennessee. The Respondent
stipulated at the hearing that it annually purchases and receives at the Clinton facility goods
valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points located outside the State of Tennessee. The
Respondent admits and I find that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
The parties stipulated at the hearing that the Respondent is an employer in the
construction industry. The parties also stipulated that the Respondent is a member of the
National Fire Sprinkler Association (NFSA), a multi-employer association that has a collective
bargaining agreement with the Union, but that the Respondent has never authorized the
association to bargain on its behalf. Instead, the Respondent recognized the Union and signed
an independent agreement on November 24, 2008. It is undisputed that, from November 24,
2008 until it withdrew recognition on September 8, the Respondent complied with all the terms
and conditions of the collective bargaining agreement.
Counsel for the General Counsel and the Charging Party argue that, under current
Board law, these facts are sufficient to establish a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act because
the collective bargaining agreement was still in effect on September 8. The contract was not
scheduled to expire until March 31, 2010. Although the complaint alleges that the Respondent
and the Union had a Section 9(a) relationship, General Counsel argues that the withdrawal of
recognition mid-term of the collective bargaining agreement would be unlawful even if the
parties’ relationship was governed by Section 8(f). The Respondent has raised a number of
defenses in an attempt to absolve itself of the consequences of having initially recognized the
Union, most of which relate to its claims that the recognition was illegal because the
Respondent had no employees on November 24, 2008 and because the Union never
demonstrated, or even offered to demonstrate, that it had the support of a majority of unit
employees.2 As an alternative defense, the Respondent argues that, even assuming there was
a valid Section 9(a) or 8(f) recognition, it was privileged to withdraw recognition on September 8
because it had a stable one-person unit.
With the issues thus joined, I shall review the essentially undisputed facts. The
Respondent was first incorporated in 1989 by Linda Duncan and her son Greg Duncan and
licensed as a general contractor to perform residential and light commercial construction. At
some point, the corporation became inactive. The Duncans reactivated the corporation
sometime in 2008 when they decided to get into the fire sprinkler business. In order to do so,

2 The Charging Party strenuously objected to the Respondent’s proffer of any evidence
regarding the initial recognition, relying on well-established Board law that an employer can not
attack the legality of recognition that occurred more than six months before an unfair labor
practice charge was filed. See Machinists Local 1424 v. NLRB (Bryan Mfg. Co.), 366 U.S. 731
(1961). The General Counsel did not object to this evidence based on its desire to raise before
the Board whether that precedent should continue to apply in the construction industry.
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the Respondent acquired the name USA Fire Protection and applied for the specialty license
required by the State of Tennessee to perform such work. Documents in the record show that
the Respondent obtained such a license on December 1, 2008.
Because neither Linda nor Greg Duncan had any experience in the fire sprinkler
business, they hired a gentleman by the name of Dale Young to help them get started. Linda
Duncan testified that he was a “working partner”, paid an annual salary of $80,000. There is no
dispute that Young was a member of the Union and a journeyman sprinkler fitter. General
Counsel has alleged and the Respondent has admitted that Young was a statutory supervisor
and agent of the Respondent. The Charging Party objected to this, claiming that he was a unit
employee. The fringe benefit contribution reports filed by the Respondent in December 2008
and January 2009 identify Young as a journeyman unit employee. Respondent’s payroll records
for that period also show that Young was paid under the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement. Young left the Respondent’s employ in mid-January in a dispute over the terms of
his compensation as a “working partner”. Linda Duncan testified that, contrary to what the fund
reports showed, Young did not work as a sprinkler fitter in the field. He hired the Respondent’s
first employee, Brandon Scoggins, and supervised his work. According to Linda Duncan, Young
also worked in a sales capacity, soliciting work for the Respondent. He bought a vehicle and
material, found warehouse space, and otherwise assisted the Duncan’s in starting their
business.
On November 24, 2008, Linda and Greg Duncan met with the Union’s Business Agent,
Mark Davis, at the Respondent’s facility. Young was also present. Linda Duncan testified that
the meeting lasted 30-45 minutes while Davis testified it lasted 3-4 hours. In any event, there is
no dispute that Davis presented the Duncans with several documents to sign to become a union
contractor.3 One of the documents Linda Duncan signed as the Respondent’s president is
entitled, “Agreement”, and contains the following preamble:
WHEREAS, the said Employer is desirous of hiring and employing Journeymen
Sprinkler Fitters and Apprentices; and
WHEREAS, the Union has competent and skilled Journeymen and Apprentice
Sprinkler Fitters;
NOW, THEREFORE, it is mutually agreed as follows:
The Agreement contains three paragraphs that follow this preamble. In the first paragraph, the
Respondent and the Union agreed to be bound by the terms and conditions of the current
collective bargaining agreement between the Union and NFSA, effective April 1, 2007. The
parties adopted that agreement as their own and agreed that journeymen and apprentice
sprinkler fitters hired by the Respondent would be employed according to the contract’s terms.
In the second and third paragraphs, the parties agreed to be bound by the health and welfare,
pension, and education fund trust agreements and the employer agreed to make the
contributions required by the collective bargaining agreement to those funds. Although the
document signed by Linda Duncan states that the NFSA master agreement was attached and
made part of the Agreement, Linda Duncan claimed it was not and that she did not actually
receive a copy of the complete collective bargaining agreement until late January or early

3 Duncan admitted that the Respondent intended to become a union contractor when it
started the fire sprinkler business.
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February. This testimony is inconsistent with other documents the Respondent placed in
evidence and contradicted earlier testimony she gave about getting a copy of the collective
bargaining agreement from Young before this meeting.
In addition to the above Agreement, Linda Duncan signed a one page document entitled:
“Acknowledgement of the Representative Status of Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669,
U.A., AFL-CIO”, which states, in its entirety:
The Employer executing this document below has, on the basis of objective and
reliable information, confirmed that a clear majority of the sprinkler fitters in its
employ are members of, and are represented by Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union
No. 669, U.A., AFL-CIO, for purposes of collective bargaining.
The Employer therefore unconditionally acknowledges and confirms that Local
Union 669 is the exclusive bargaining representative of its sprinkler fitter employees
pursuant to Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act.
Linda Duncan testified, over the Charging Party’s objections, that Davis told her the purpose of
this document was to protect the Respondent in the event there was a strike in another part of
the State. She acknowledged having read the document before signing it and conceded the
document says nothing about strikes. Linda Duncan claimed she didn’t understand what all the
“numbers” meant. Counsel for the Respondent also elicited testimony from Linda Duncan, over
the Charging Party’s objections, that Davis did not show her any union authorization cards,
petitions or other documentation establishing majority support.
The uncontradicted evidence in the record shows that, on November 24, 2008, the only
individual employed in any unit capacity was Young, whom the Respondent and the General
Counsel contend was a supervisor. There is also uncontradicted testimony from Linda Duncan
that the Respondent had no sprinkler work yet and that it could not even begin to bid on such
work until it got its specialty license on December 1. Payroll records and fund reports in
evidence show that the Respondent did begin hiring sprinkler fitters in December 2008, and
paid them in accordance with the contract until early September when, according to Linda
Duncan, the last two unit employees were laid off.
On September 8, about nine months into the Respondent’s agreement with the Union,
Linda Duncan sent the following letter to the Union:
Please accept this letter as formal notification that G & L Associated, Inc. d.b.a. USA
Fire Protection has, on the basis of objective and reliable information, confirmed that
more than 50% of its employees are not members of or represented by Road
Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669, U.A., AFL-CIO, for purposes of collective
bargaining.
Therefore, G & L Associated, Inc. d.b.a. USA Fire Protection hereby formally
withdraw recognition of Local Union 669 as the exclusive representative of its
employees.
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At the hearing, Linda Duncan testified that the Respondent had laid off its last two union
employees at the time she wrote this letter. However, she admitted on cross-examination by
Charging Party’s counsel that the Respondent still had two incomplete jobs that were on hold.
Moreover, as shown by records obtained by General Counsel via subpoena, the Respondent
hired two employees to do work covered by the collective bargaining agreement within days of
sending this letter. These two employees, Charles Webb and Jeffrey Widmer, worked for the
Respondent for several months after September 8 but were not paid in accordance with the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement, nor were any fringe benefit contributions made on
their behalf. Respondent hired two more employees in January 2010, shortly before the hearing
in this case, who were also not receiving the contractual wages and benefits. Duncan admitted
that she did not contact the Union for additional labor when work became available after the last
two unit employees were laid off in September, even though she was aware that she could have
done so. In fact, Linda Duncan made a conscious decision not to employ union members after
September 8.
The Board, in John Deklewa and Sons, Inc.,4 set forth the governing principles for
collective bargaining agreements in the construction industry. The Board held, inter alia, that
there is a rebuttable presumption that a bargaining relationship between a construction industry
employer and union is governed by Section 8(f) of the Act and that the party asserting Section
9(a) status has the burden of proof. Id. at 1385, fn. 41. Accord: Central Illinois Construction, 335
NLRB 717, 721 (2001) and cases cited therein. The distinction between Section 8(f) and 9(a)
status is significant because an employer can withdraw recognition upon expiration of a Section
8(f) contract while a union enjoys a rebuttable presumption of continuing majority support after
expiration of the collective bargaining agreement which can only be overcome by a showing of
the actual loss of majority support. See Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pacific, 333 NLRB 717, 720
(2001).5
The Board, in Central Illinois Construction, supra, held that written contract language
standing alone could be sufficient to establish the existence of a Section 9(a) relationship. The
Board set forth a three part test for analyzing such language. According to the Board, the
language in question must unequivocally show (1) that the union requested recognition as the
majority or 9(a) representative of the unit; (2) that the employer granted such recognition; and
(3) that the employer’s recognition was based on the union’s showing, or offer to show,
evidence of majority support. In Nova Plumbing, Inc.,6 the Board further refined the Central
Illinois test to make clear that an explicit statement that a union requested recognition is
unnecessary. The Board further held that, once it was established that the employer had
recognized the union as a Section 9(a) representative, the union enjoyed a presumption of
majority status. Nova Plumbing, 336 NLRB supra at 636. Finally, the Board has held that, if the
contract language establishes a Section 9(a) relationship, then the principles of Bryan
Manufacturing, supra, and its progeny apply and an employer may not challenge the legality of
the initial recognition outside the six-month Section 10(b) period. Casale Indus., Inc., 311 NLRB

4 282 NLRB 1375 (1987), enfd. 843 F.2d 770 (3rd Cit. 1988), cert denied 488 U.S. 889
(1989).
5 Of course it is axiomatic that, regardless of whether a contract is governed by Section 8(f)
or 9(a), an employer may not withdraw recognition or repudiate the agreement during its term.
John C. Deklewa and Sons, 282 NLRB supra at 1385-1386.
6 336 NLRB 633 (2001), enf. denied 330 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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951, 953 (1993). Accord: Triple A Fire Protection, Inc., 312 NLRB 1088, 1089 (1993), enfd. 136
F.3d 727 (11th Cir. 1998); Central Illinois Construction, 335 NLRB supra at 720, fn. 14.
More recently, the Board re-visited the parties’ rights and obligations under Section 8(f)
and 9(a) and summarized the law in this area. Madison Industries, 349 NLRB 1306 (2007).
While reiterating its holdings in Central Illinois Construction, supra, and other cases cited above,
the Board held,
…[I]n determining whether the presumption of an 8(f) status has been rebutted, the
Board first considers whether the agreement, examined in its entirety, ‘conclusively
notifies the parties that a 9(a) relationship is intended.’ [ ] Where it does so, the
presumption of 8(f) status has been rebutted. [ ] Where the parties agreement does
not do so, the Board considers any relevant extrinsic evidence bearing on the
parties’ intent as to the nature of their relationship. [ ]
349 NLRB at 1308 [citations omitted]. See also Allied Mechanical Services, 351 NLRB 79, 81-
82 (2007).
Applying this precedent to the facts here, I find that the language of the one page
“Acknowledgement of Representative Status..”, signed by Linda Duncan on November 24,
2008, satisfies the three-part test of Central Illinois Construction, supra. The fact that it does not
explicitly state that the Union is demanding recognition as the 9(a) representative of the unit is
not fatal for, as the Board recognized in Central Illinois, such a demand is fairly implied by the
language granting such recognition. Moreover, notwithstanding the evidence to the contrary, the
language of the agreement explicitly states that the Respondent’s recognition of the Union was
based on a showing of majority support. However, I also note that the Board in Central Illinois
and subsequent cases indicated that it is not enough to read such language in isolation. Rather,
the agreement must be examined “in its entirety.” Id., 335 NLRB supra at 720, fn 15; Madison
Industries, 349 NLRB at 1308.
In the present case, the Respondent relies upon the preamble to the separate
“Agreement”, signed contemporaneously, pursuant to which the Respondent adopted the NFSA
contract as its own. That language, looking to the future, seems to suggest the parties intended
to establish a pre-hire agreement. Because of this “ambiguity”, the Respondent would argue
that the extrinsic evidence it offered regarding the circumstances surrounding the signing of the
agreement should be considered to determine the nature of the relationship. I agree.7
Having found that the parties’ agreement, in its entirety, did not conclusively establish
that the parties intended to establish a Section 9(a) relationship, I shall consider the extrinsic
evidence offered by the Respondent. This evidence, which is essentially undisputed, shows that

7 I note that the NFSA agreement adopted by the Respondent also contains a union security
clause requiring employees to join the Union 7 days after hiring. Such language is indicative of a
Section 8(f) rather than 9(a) agreement. At least one Board member indicated that such a
provision, while not dispositive, would suggest an intent to create an 8(f) relationship. See
Madison Industries, supra, at 1309, fn. 11.
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the Respondent was in the process of starting its business when it recognized the Union, that it
did not yet have a license to perform work covered by the agreement and in fact had no work,
and that the only “employee”, other than the corporate officers, was a statutory supervisor.
Considering the language of the parties agreement8 in its entirety and the extrinsic evidence, I
find that the parties intended to, and in fact did, establish a Section 8(f) collective bargaining
relationship.
As previously noted, the fact that the parties had a Section 8(f) relationship does not
relieve the Respondent of liability for an unfair labor practice. The Respondent withdrew
recognition while the collective bargaining agreement was still in effect. Under the principles
announced in Deklewa, an untimely withdrawal of recognition violates Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
The Respondent argues that it could withdraw recognition on September 8 either because it had
no employees or because the unit had consisted of no more than one employee on a consistent
basis. Stack Electric, 290 NLRB 575, 577 (1988). See also McDaniel Electric, 313 NLRB 126
(1993). The evidence offered by the Respondent to establish the existence of a stable one-man
unit is not persuasive and is contradicted by the fringe benefit reports it submitted to the Union
and its own payroll records. These documents show that, from the time the Respondent began
performing work as a fire sprinkler contractor until September 8, it usually employed at least one
journeyman and one apprentice. On a number of occasions, the Respondent employed two
journeymen. Rarely did the Respondent have only one unit employee on its payroll. Moreover,
within a week of repudiating the collective bargaining agreement, the Respondent hired two
employees who were employed consistently for several months after the Respondent withdrew
recognition. Accordingly, I find that the evidence does not establish the existence of a stable
one person unit that would permit withdrawal of recognition on September 8.9
Having considered the evidence and the arguments of the parties, I find that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by withdrawing recognition from the
Union and repudiating its Section 8(f) collective bargaining agreement on September 8, 2009. I
find it unnecessary to address the General Counsel’s argument that the Board should re-visit
precedent and modify the principals established in Central Illinois Construction, supra, and
Casale Industries, supra. Under the facts of this case, it makes no difference whether the
Respondent and the Union had a Section 9(a) or 8(f) relationship because its withdrawal of
recognition occurred mid-term of the collective bargaining agreement, conduct which is unlawful
under either relationship. This case is not the proper vehicle to address the issues raised by the
General Counsel. Moreover, as an administrative law judge, I am bound to follow existing
precedent until overruled by the Board. Los Angeles New Hospital, 244 NLRB 960, 962, fn. 4

8 Regardless of what the Charging Party may believe, the parties’ “agreement” on
November 24 consists of the “Agreement” adopting the NFSA agreement and the NFSA
collective bargaining agreement itself, as well as the “Acknowledgement of Representative
Status”.
9 The Respondent also argues that, because the Union failed to demonstrate majority status
when it sought recognition on November 24, the collective bargaining agreement was void ab
initio, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in International Ladies Garment Workers Union v.
NLRB (Bernhard-Altman), 366 U.S. 731 (1961). See also Nova Plumbing, Inc. v. NLRB, 330
F.3d 531,536-537 (D.C. CIR. 2003). Bernhard-Altman, which did not involve a construction
industry employer, is inapposite. Section 8(f) explicitly allows employers and unions in the
construction industry to enter into a collective bargaining agreement even though the union has
not demonstrated majority support.
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(1979), enfd. 640 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1981); Iowa Beef Packers, 144 NLRB 615, 616 (1963),
enfd. in part 331 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1964). Even assuming General Counsel’s arguments were
relevant to this case, I would have to defer to the Board.
Conclusions of Law
By withdrawing recognition from Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669, United
Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the U.S.
and Canada, AFL-CIO on September 8, 2009, during the term of its Section 8(f) collective
bargaining agreement with the Union, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
Remedy
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find
that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act. Specifically, I shall recommend that the Respondent be
ordered to recognize and, upon request, bargain with the Union and restore the terms and
conditions of employment that existed under the April 2007 NFSA Agreement that was adopted
by the Respondent on November 24, 2008. Because I have found that the parties relationship is
governed by Section 8(f) rather than Section 9(a), the Respondent had the right to terminate its
relationship upon expiration of that agreement on March 30, 2010. There is no evidence in the
record before me whether the Respondent in fact gave the Union timely notice of its desire to
terminate the bargaining relationship upon the contract’s expiration. I shall leave the
determination whether the Respondent is obligated under any succeeding agreement, pursuant
to the renewal provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, to the compliance stage of this
proceeding.
Because the record shows that the Respondent employed individuals in unit positions
after it withdrew recognition from the Union, I shall also recommend that it be ordered to make
employees whole for any wages and benefits lost as a result of the unlawful withdrawal of
recognition, including payment to the contractual fringe benefit funds any amounts that would be
owed for the hours performed by these unit employees. Employees shall also be entitled to
reimbursement for any medical, dental and other expenses incurred as a result of the
Respondent’s failure to make the contractual fringe benefit fund contributions on their behalf.
Kraft Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 252 NLRB 891, fn. 2 (1980). Any backpay owed the employees
shall be paid with interest as computed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173
(1987). With respect to any fringe benefit fund contributions owed, interest shall be computed in
accordance with Merryweather Optical Co., 240 NLRB 1213 (1979).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended10

10 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
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ORDER
The Respondent, G & L Associated d/b/a USA Fire Protection, Clinton, Tennessee, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Withdrawing recognition from Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669, United
Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the U.S.
and Canada, AFL-CIO (the Union) during the term of its collective bargaining agreement with
the Union.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Honor the 2007-2010 collective bargaining agreement between the Union and NFSA
until it expires, and any automatic renewal or extension of that contract, including paying
employees the contractual wage rates, making contractually required contributions to fringe
benefit funds, and complying with all other terms and conditions of employment set forth in the
collective bargaining agreement.
(b) Recognize and, upon request, bargain in good faith with the Union regarding the
terms of an agreement to succeed the 2007-2010 collective bargaining agreement, unless the
Respondent has effectively withdrawn recognition form the Union upon expiration of that
contract.
(c) Make whole all unit employees and the contractual fringe benefit funds, with interest,
for any losses they may have suffered as a result of the Respondent’s mid-contract withdrawal
of recognition of the Union in the manner prescribed in the remedy section of this decision.
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the Regional
Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the
Board or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel
records and reports, and all other records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored
in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this
Order.
(e)Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in Clinton, Tennessee,
copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”11 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 10, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these

11 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in
the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
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proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice
to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time since
September 8, 2009.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C., June 21, 2010.

____________________
Michael A. Marcionese
Administrative Law Judge
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this Notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
WE WILL NOT withdraw recognition from Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669, United
Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the U.S.
and Canada, AFL-CIO (the Union) during the term of our collective bargaining agreement with
the Union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL honor our collective bargaining agreement with the Union until it expires, and any
automatic renewal or extension of that contract, including paying you the contractual wage
rates, making contractually required contributions to fringe benefit funds on your behalf, and
complying with all other terms and conditions of employment set forth in the collective
bargaining agreement.
WE WILL, to the extent required under Section 8(f) of the Act, recognize and, upon request,
bargain in good faith with the Union regarding the terms of an agreement to succeed the 2007-
2010 collective bargaining agreement.
WE WILL make you and the contractual fringe benefit funds whole, with interest, for any losses
suffered as a result of our unlawful mid-contract withdrawal of recognition of the Union.
G & L ASSOCIATED d/b/a
USA FIRE PROTECTION
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
233 Peachtree Street NE, Harris Tower, Suite 1000
Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1531
Hours: 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.
404-331-2896.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST
NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, 404-331-2877.