U.S. Postal Service

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 14, 1979

242 N.L.R.B. 228 (N.L.R.B. 1979)

DI)8((ISI()NS (O NAIIONAL I.ABOR RKI:.AIIONS BOARD
United States Postal Service and Branch No. 98, Na-
tional Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO.
Case 25-CA-9881-P
May 14. 1979
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING ANI) M[IMBE.RS JNKINS
AND PNFI.IO
On November 13, 1978. Administrative Law Judge
Hutton S. Brandon issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed
exceptions and a supporting brief, and the Respon-
dent filed an answering brief to the General Counsel's
exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief',
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Or-
der of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby or-
ders that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dismissed
in its entirety.
MEMBER PENELLO concurring in the result:
I regret that innumerable staff hours and tens of
thousands of dollars of the Board's scarce resources
'Chairman Fanning and Member Jenkins agree with the Administratise
Law Judge's finding that the record fails to establish a violation of Sec.
8(a)(l). as alleged in the complaint. They do not agree. however, with his
further conclusion that even if such a violation were proved by a preponder-
ance of the evidence no remedial order would b required because the viola-
tion would be isolated and de mimi..
Chairman Fanning and Member Jenkins note that they were not on the
panel that decided American Federation of Muicians, Locwal 76, A FL (10
(Jimmv Wakelv Show). 202 NLRB 620 11973). and that they have not en-
dorsed the principles enunciated therein. See Gra Lile. In 209 NLRB 88
(1974). Furthermore. Sec. 3(d) of the Act vests the General Counsel with
exclusive authority to issue complaints, Accordingly, the C(hairman and
Member Jenkins find it inappropriate to "second-guess" his exercise of such
authority. Moreover. the importance of the rights involved may be viewed by
the one seeking to exercise them with a perspective different from that in
which they appear from Washington.
In addition. regarding Member Penello's reference to an address delivered
by Chairman Fanning on February 18. 1979. the Chairman notes that al-
though the shortage of administrative law judges and the resultant backlog
of cases to be heard is a grave concern to the Board. he does not believe that
the failure of the Board to protect employees' statutory rights. which individ-
ual Board Members might consider relatively unimportanl. is the proper
solution to this problem
were totally and utterly wasted in the formal process-
ing of this meaningless case. In sum, the General
C(ounsel has litigated to Board Decision the "issue" of
whether Respondent violated the Act by ordering an
employee and a steward back to work after the stew-
ard admittedly informed Respondent that his presen-
tation of the employee's grievance was finished.2 This
was a paradigm case not tbr Federal intervention hut
for the application of the sound principles of Amenri-
canl f'ederation oJ Mlu.sicians, Local 76. AFL--C10
(Jimmvlr Wakel Show), 202 NLRB 620, 621 (1973):
[T]he General Counsel should use the power
granted to him in Section 3(d) to refuse to pros-
ccute violations of minor or isolated character
that do not warrant exercise of the Board's reme-
dial powers.
. . . But with the eer-expanding caseload, it is
more important than ever that the Board be per-
mnitted to husband its limited resources and ap-
ply them where they have maximum impact in
effectuating the Act. Otherwise, time, energy,
and manpower are dissipated in seeking to rec-
tity situations of no real moment while, backed
up behind them, significant violations remain
unremedied.
'his view has received the endorsement of the judi-
ciary.3 Thus, the [istrict of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals stated in Jolns-Manille. supra at 428. in
relation to my dissent in the underlying Board deci-
sion:
The Board has latitude not to burden itself
and the courts with "infinitesimally small ab-
7The Ilicts of this cae reveal that Respondent and the Union have had a
collective-hargaining relationship Ior a number of'years Although the work-
load was unusualkl heavy one April morning in 1978. Respondent granted
permission to all employee to discuss a grievance with his steward. There-
after, the emplosee and the stewaird presented the grievance to Respondent.
Alter a griev;ance torm was illed out. Respondent asked. "Is that about it?"
The steward admittedly replied. "Yeah. I think so." 'I he employee and the
steward were then directed to return to work, hut the steward protested that
he had more documents to present. After several refusals, Respondent finally
stated that they would he disciplined if they did not return to work. At that
poinl. the employees and the steward returned to their assigned chores. No
discipline w;as actually imposed upon the employee or the steward and the
grievance in question was processed in accordance with the contract. Never-
theless, the General Counsel issued a complaint alleging that Respondent
violated Sec 8(a)( I by threatening its employees with "disciplinary action
because its employees filed grievances." The Administrative Law Judge rec-
ommended that the complaint he dismissed. concluding that the record did
not support a finding of a violation and that, even if an unfair labor practice
had been comnmitted, a remedial order was not warranted because the inci-
dent was of ';a de lliin l nature. "'Under the circumstances. why the General
Counsel filed his Icomplainti and . ..persists in this litigation is difficult to
understand." S`: I RB. Columbia Tpogrphual nion io l(1, Interna-
tionl Tpogruphi( al Union o Norih America. .4 FL (10 I The Evening Slur
ei.spaper Co. lnd the lWavshilngton Dails Sevs/. 470 F.2d 1274. 1275
(D.C Cir. 1972).
See Truck Drivers. Oil Drivers, Filling S(on nd Plalorm Worker L-
ia/l o 705, IBT Johns-Manvilh (orporoation v. R B.. 509 '.2d 425
(D.C (Cir. 1974: The Evening Sr Nevspper Co. spra Dallus Muilers
Lnion, L.o(al No 143 and Inernmirional VUailers Lnion Don Jones Compnyv,
In- / s : 1. R. B. 445 F.2d 730 D[).C. Cii. 19711.
242 NLRB No. 39
228
UNITED STATES POSTAL. SERVICE
stract grievances. ". . . But where to draw the line
on matters trivial in their import is primarily a
task for the Board and not for the court.
This is not the first time that I have felt compelled
to raise my voice to protest this Agency's apparent
obsession with trivial issues, and I fear that it will not
be the last. See my concurring opinions in United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO (Bucvrus-Erie
Company), 238 NLRB 177 (1978), and Peerless Food
Products, Inc., 236 NLRB 161 (1978), and note my
remarks in Bureau of National A/lairs. Inc.. 235
NLRB 8. fn. 2 (1978). At the present time, it is im-
perative that the Board clear its docket of these
meaningless cases and turn its attention and resources
toward remedying substantial or significant violations
of the Act. The Board is currently staggering under a
load approaching 60,000 cases this fiscal year. We are
faced with a severe backlog of 1,700 cases awaiting
hearing before an administrative law judge, resulting
in a delay of many months between complaint and
hearing.4
De minimis lon curat lex. The law is not concerned
with trifles. It is time for this institution to take that
maxim to heart. The Agency can no longer afford to
do otherwise.
4 In a recent address delivered on Fehruary I 179. before the Executive
Board of the Food and Beverage Trades Department., AFI. CO,. Chairman
Fanning, in reviewing the mounting caseload. stated that "our Al Js are
literally being swamped with cases." and concluded that the Agenct "is on
the threshold of a crisis." With cases of this kind being lihtigated, it ill not
take long for us to pass over hat threshold
I have closely examined m colleagues' response in In I and find t to he
wilthoul any foundation hatsoever Contrary to the iew expressed therein,
I am not attempting to invade the General Counsel's "final authority' under
Sec. 3(d) with respect to the issuance of complaints. Rather, I am discharging
the responsibility committed to the Board by Sec. I(c) of fashioning rem-
edies that "ill effectuate the policies of this Act This responsihility of
tailoring the remedy to the conduct involved cannot. as the majorily implies,
be delegated to a participant in a particular proceeding, be it the General
Counsel, the respondent, or the employee Where the quantum of miscon-
duct necessary to sustain a siolation is so lacking that no purpose of the Act
would be served by the issuance of a remedial order, the Board should
exercise its discretion under Sec 10(c) to withhold one. een if under some
theory the conduct could he construed as being in technical conlravention of
the statute And, if the Board refuses it gran a remedy ill such cases. it
tillows that it is pointless for the General Counsel to continue to issue com-
plaints under similar circumstances. Chairman Fanning's charge that this
approach results in a failure to protect employee rights is baseless. I hase
never advocated withholding a remedial order in a) proceeding in which an
adverse effect on employees was present. To the contrary, my single-minded
purpose has been and is to conserve the Board's limited funds and personnel
so that they can he employed promptly and effectilelb In those vers cases
where indication of the rights guaranteed in Sec. 7 is necessary
DECISION
SrATEMENT OF TE CASE
HUtTON S. BRAND)ON, Administrative Law Judge: This
case was heard at Muncie, Indiana. on August 14. 1978.'
The charge was filed by Branch No. 98. National Associ-
I All dates are In 1978, unless otherwise stated,
ation of Letter Carriers. AFL CIO, herein called the
Union, on May 15. and the complaint herein was issued on
June 23. The sole issue presented by the complaint is
whether the United States Postal Service, herein called Re-
spondent, violated Section 8(a)(I) of the National Labor
Relations Act, herein called the Act, by threatening its em-
ployees. on or about April 29. "with unspecified disciplin-
ary action because its employees filed grievances, attempted
to process grievances, and engaged in other protected con-
certed activity."
Upon the entire record, including my observation of the
demeanor of' the witnesses, and after due consideration of
the briefs filed by the General Counsel and Respondent, I
make the following:
FINI)INiS o ( Fr
1. JURISI)I( II()N
At all times material, the Board has had jurisdiction over
this matter by virtue of Section 1209 of the Postal Reorga-
nization Act. herein called the PRA.
11. lIll I ABOR )RiANIZAI'IO)N IN.t) f\ l)
The complaint alleges. Respondent's answer admits, and
I find, that the lUnion is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act and the PRA.
111. A.L (it) 'NI-AIR ABO()R PRA( (E F
The U nion has represented certain employees of Respon-
dent at its Muncie. Indiana. post office for a number of
years. The Ulnion and Respondent were at all relevant
times2 parties to a collective-bargaining agreement contain-
ing a grievance procedure providing for the filing and pro-
cessing of grievances concerning employee complaints and
concerns. Under the grievance procedure, article XV. an
employee must discuss his grievance at step I with his im-
mediate supervisor and may be accompanied with his union
steward if he so desires when doing so. A union steward can
perfoirm unioi business on Respondent's time if he requests
and is given permission according to article XVII of the
collective-bargaining agreement. Whether or not the em-
ployee is accompanied by a steward, the immediate super-
visor to whom a grievance is submitted is required to render
his decision on the grievance with reasons therefor within 5
days.
In practice employees who wish to discuss grievances
with a steward obtain permission from their supervisors.
who fill out a lfrm 7020, "Authorized Absence From
Workroom Floor," indicating the time the employee leaves
the unit and returns to the unit and the reason for the ab-
sence. The same form is used in granting an absence to a
steward.
Pursuant to the above procedure, employee and letter
carrier Byron Pomeroy sought permission from his supervi-
sor. Omer Sells. foreman of delivery and collections, at 8:03
I The collective-hargaining agreement was effective from Jul) 21. 1975.
through Jul) 20. 1978. Jt. Eh. 7.
229
I)l('ISIONS O() NAT IONAL I.ABOR RELATIONS BOARI)
a.m. on April 29 ftr the purpose of conflrring with his
union steward, (eorge L. Powell. Such permission was
granted and Sells filled out the appropriate form 7020.)
Pomeroy proceeded to consult with Powell over the filing of
a grievance at the first step regarding Pomeroy's contention
that his route needed to he reinspected inasmuch he felt he
could not deliver his route in the time allotted.4
Pomeros and Powell proceeded to Sells' desk and indi-
cated their desire to file a grie ance. Sells proceeded to fill
out a grievance trm reflecting the tilme filed.' the name of
the grievant, the stesward, the nature of the grievance (re-
questing reinspection) the postal manual sections violated,
and utnion position (carrier feels route is out of adjustment).
Ulnion Stewa;rd well testified that after he explained thlat
Pomero; wanited a route reinspection, Sells replied that if
they had to give him a route inspection on request they
would ha e to grant all carriers a route inspection if re-
quested. Powell agreed, it the carriers had sutlicient evi-
dence showing hat the ' were overburdened. At that. Rus-
sell IFeatherston, Respondent's director of customer service,
and Sells' ininiediate superior. ho Powell testificd was sit-
ting at the other side )of the douhle desk at hich Sells WIas
seated, comrnll ntedl . ()h. horse sit. Supervisioin 4ill de-
cide i ad wlhen a carrier gets it route inspection." Sells
completed the grievance forml and, still according i to Powell,
asked "Is that ahbout it'?"' IPoweil then admiittedly responded,
"Yeah, I think so." Featherston then declared the discus-
sion over and directed Powell and Ponieros to return to
work. Powell protested that lie hadIn't concluded his discus-
sions with Sells hut eatherston then issued t direct order
to him to return to work. Powell at this point clainied lie
had some documents that Poimeroy had given him showing
late leavings and overtime pertinent to the grievance which
he wanted to present. Again Featherston directed them to
return to work and again Powell claimed he wasn't finished.
Featherston again declared the discussioIn over and stated
that if they did not return to work thev would he subject to
disciplinary action. Powell hesitated and started to put
down in note form just the date that he had filed the griev-
ance but Featherston persisted in ordering him hack to
work, so he and Pomeroy thereupon returned to ork.
Their respective 702) fornis initialed h Sells show they
returned to their unit at 8: 15 a.m.
Pomero's testimony generally supports Powell's except
that he added that Featherston had made several deroga-
tory comments during presentation of the grievance to Sells
and stated that Respondent only had to inspect a route
once ever 2 years. Pomeroy was unclear in his recollection
ias to whether Powell had told Featherston he still had
documents or information to "get" or "present.", In any
event, Pomeroy's testimony suggests that in the discussion
'J. I.xh p 5
4This was noi a new coniennion hb PmeroNs Ile had initlally raised it n
earl), November 1977. although it does not appear an) grievance was filed on
the matter at thai time. Neserlhcless, Respondent undertook ,on November
9, 1977. an "ltice couln" i)l' Pomeroy's mail to see it he was meeting stan-
dards and if it reflected an 8-hour day. he "countl" reflected he did nt hve
more thaln an 8-hlur daN According it) the uncontradicled testimony t
Sells. iPomeroeN continued to press his contentln aftler the "count" end dis-
cussed it with Powvell ;nd Sells sme 10 to I times including two occasions
during the week prior to, April 29
5 8:07 am.
6 Poiimeros said P'owell said one or the ,other. I is undisputed that Povwell
did have some documentation Pomero had given him.
with Sells the documentation was referred to, for Powell
had stated that Pomeroy had kept records and Sells re-
sponded that he was sure Pomeroy did hut that these rec-
ords did not justify' an inspection.
That Featherston threatened Powell and Pomeroy with
disciplinary action ift' they did not return to work, notwith-
standing Powell's protests that he was not finished with the
grievance, is supported bv four other witnesses of' the Gen-
eral Counsel. emploees Robert Middendorft; William
Smith. Jarmes D)ay. and Floyd Jones. Indeed. Sells and
Featherston admit that Featherston ordered Powell and
Pomeroy hack to work and threatened disciplinary action if
the didn't. lHowever, it was their testimony that the griev-
ance discussion had been completed.
According to Sells, he took the grievance filling in the
grievance form based on the information given him hbs
Potwell, initialed and attached the 7020 frms to the griev-
ance. and put it in his desk drawer. He then proceeded to
direct his attention to the work schedule for the day. a Sat-
urday. Powell and Pomleroy had stepped aw'ly from his
desk and were not talking to him when eatherston. who
had been hack and forth at the other desk during the griev-
ance meeting. told the two to g bhack to vwslrk. While Sells
testified that Povell had not told him he had further evi-
dence to present, Poowell did tell Featherston that he wasn't
through with the discussion.
F:eatherston's testimony has it that he asked Sells ift' the
discussion was over and Sells said it was. ea therston then
directed Powell and Promeroy back to work, and Powell
said he wasn't through taking notes down for Pomeroy.
Featherston directed them back to work a second time, and
this time Powell said he wasn't through with his discussion
with Pouneroy. Featherston ordered Powell and Pomeroy
back to work a third time, and this time Powell said he
wasn't through with the grievance meeting. This time
leatherston threatened Powell and Pomeroy with disciplin-
ary action i they did not return to work. He denied that
this threat was in any wa\v based upon their having filed a
grievancie.
According to PIowell. later in the day on April 29 he
stopped hb Sells' desk anlt stated that they should have step
I grievancie meetings in an office or ofl' the workroom floor
because ofl' the interruptionis and added thati what happened
that da was all uncalled for. Sells responded that he knew
that, that he wouldn't have had "that" happen but he
couldn't say anything because "he," obviously referring to
Featherston. was his boss. Sells denied making such state-
ment to Powell.
It is undisputed that Powell made no further effort to
"document" Pomeroy's grievance in the first step. Sells de-
nied the grievance in the first step on May 1 .
A. (otltiOl. osf l t'e Partie'
Based on his version oft the evidence as presented through
employee witnesses, the (ieneral Counsel contends that
It was not customary lir superlssrs toI render an immediate decision
upon filing of the grievance Powell appealed Sells' denial to he second step
level where he did produce some documentation and the grievance was again
denied. At he time of the hearing herein it was pending at he next level
which was it level beyond the local polsl office
230
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
Featherston ordered Powell and Pomeroy back to work and
threatened disciplinary action because they presented a
grievance: Featherston did not want to "bother" with a
grievance and used his supervisory authority to stop the
processing of the grievance. While acknowledging that in
the past Respondent had on occasion not been able to dis-
cuss grievances when initially filed and had postponed dis-
cussions on such matters until a time mutually agreed upon
with the Union, the General Counsel points out that such
was not the case here, for Featherston never expressed to
Powell that the grievance processing was stopped because
of the heavy work load the morning the grievance was
filed.s
Even based on the testimony of Featherston and Sells,
the General Counsel points out that Powell and Pomeroy
were ordered back to work under penalty of discipline even
though Powell admittedly contended that he was not
"through" with the grievance discussion. According to the
General Counsel, "A clearer violation [of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act] could not be envisioned." No case authority was
cited, however.
Respondent argues in its brief that the evidence does not
establish that disciplinary action was threatened because
the grievance was filed. Moreover, the grievance was in fact
presented and some discussion held, and according to Re-
spondent's view of the evidence as related through Feather-
ston and Sells, the grievance discussion was in fact com-
pleted before Powell and Pomeroy were ordered back to
work. Finally, Respondent argues, Powell and Pomeroy
were never in fact disciplined, and the situation after Powell
and Pomeroy went back to work became "dead" and moot.
Thus, the case presents a de tninimni. issue even assuming
the existence of a technical violation of Section 8(a)( 1).
B. Conclusion
Although the facts as related by the employee witnesses
and Respondent's differ in several respects, I find it unnec-
essary to make credibility resolutions with respect to such
differences for the undisputed fact remains that Respon-
dent, through Featherston, ordered a union steward, Pow-
ell, and grievant, Pomeroy, back to work under threat of
disciplinary action at a time when Powell was insisting that
his presentation of the grievance or the grievance discussion
was not completed. That fact lends some support to the
complaint allegation that the disciplinary action was caused
by the filing of the grievance. Such allegation also receives
some support from the testimony of Powell and Pomeroy to
the effect that Featherston made derogatory remarks re-
garding the merit of the grievance. Nevertheless, even Pow-
ell's testimony makes it clear that neither Featherston nor
Sells prevented the filing of the grievance. Nor did either
prevent Powell from relating information regarding the
contractual or postal manual provisions relied upon as a
basis for the grievance. Finally, even under Powell's testi-
mony, when Sells asked him if "that was about it" Powell
responded that he thought soy. It was only at this point that
8 The unusually heavy work load the morning of April 29 was established
in the testimony of Featherston and Sells and was not disputed by the Gen-
eral Counsel.
' Moreover, from Pomeroy's testimony it appears that Powell offered
documentary matenal to Sells, who rejected it. claiming it would not justifs
an inspection.
Featherston ordered Powell and Pomeroy back to wor,,
and he only threatened disciplinary action after the initi;.l
two orders were not immediately' complied with.
"The Board has held that the filing of grievances purs,-
ant to a contractual grievance procedure is protected by
Section 7 of the Act, and that discipline of an employee
therefor tends to interfere with. restrain, and coerce em-
ployees in violation of Section 8(a)( 1) .... " Mrs. Bairdv
Bakeries, Inc., 189 NLRB 606 (1971). It follows that a
threat of disciplinary action for filing a grievance would
also violate Section 8(a)( I ) of the Act. See, e.g., .4 1'(O (or-
poration, ,4 VC O Electronics Division. 199 N LR B 505 ( 1972).
In the instant case, while Featherston might well have
been advised to exercise a bit more patience. diplomacy.
and discretion in issuing his orders to Powell and Pomeroy,
I am not satisfied by a preponderance of evidence that ci-
ther his order or his threat of disciplinary action was based
on the fact that Powell and Pomeroy filed their grievance.
The grievance was filed and processed. and although Powell
may have desired more time for discussion before being
ordered back to work by Featherston, it is evident that
Powell did not seek further discussions with Sells during the
day on the grievance. nor was he actually precluded from
doing so. Under these circumstances. I find that Resp,n-
dent. through Featherston, did not violate Section 8(a}( I ) of
the Act.
Even if I were to conclude that Respondent did commit a
violation of Section 8(a)( I I would find no remedial oriler
necessary in this case, for I would find this one inciden to
he of an isolated and de m, nisli.u nature. In this regard the
case is substantially similar to one considered bh the Board
in Sqtuare D Copn'. 204 NL RB 154 (1973). In that case a
supervisor was found to have told a union steward in a
grievance meeting regarding a grievance filed on "wallk-
space obstructions" that the grievance amounted to nitpick-
ing and that the t'nion should file no more grievances on
the matter. The steward, however, continued to file griev-
ances on that matter as well as others, and no one suffered
disciplinary action therefrom. The Board. reversing the Ad-
ministrative [.aw Judge's inding of a violation on these
facts, stated at page 154:
In the circumstances described. we do not find that
Moberls's [the supervisor's] remarks to W'alton [the
steward] on the single. isolated occasion noted above
rises to the level of an 8(a)( 1 ) violation. But even were
we to assume that such remarks may have been in
technical contravention of the Act, we do not believe
that they were sufficient to justif, either the finding of
an unfair labor practice or the issuance of a remedial
order.'
In so concluding, we are not, of course, unmindful of
our (oll/ver resolve to encourage collective bargaining
by requiring parties to adjust their differences through
their own agreed-upon methods. But we reject out dis-
senting colleague's charge that our disposition o the
case "permit[sJ Respondent to discourage use of the
grievance-arbitration machinery." Viewed, as they
must be, in the total context of the parties' bargaining
See 4mter'an f.edelratlrt ,l Wliuianm, Lc al 'h. 4 ( 10 (./lmm,
lWit/t. Sho,a, 202 NI RB h62) i973)
( lve, n leJ I'rt. 4 (;I,/! nrtI I4''ctor S. ,' (, I192 N RB
837 (I971)
231
DIECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
relationship. Moberly's remarks do not evidence a re-
jection by Respondent of the principles of collective
bargaining or indicate a repudiation of the terms of its
agreement with the Union. For sure. they do not ap-
pear to have had an inhibiting effect on the subsequent
filing of' grievances.
The same may be said here. The record here, Joint Exhibit
5, shows that Powell had filed a substantial number of
grievances prior to April 29 and that he continued to file
grievances thereafter and prior to the hearing herein. There
was no evidence of any disciplinary action ever having been
taken against him or Pomeroy for ever having filed any
grievance. The one grievance which precipitated the instant
case was still pending at the time of the hearing and ma or
may not be ultimately found meritorious. I therefore con-
clude that the complaint herein should be dismissed in its
entirety."'
JO See also Wichita Eagle & Beacon Publishing (C,. ln. 206 N.RB 55
(1973): Philor Lumber (Compan,. 229 NLRB 210 (1977).
CON('I.SI()NIS )1: LW
I. The Board has jurisdiction over this matter by virtue
of Section 1209 of the PRA.
2. The tUnion is a labor organization within the meaning
of the Act.
3. Respondent has not engaged in an3 conduct violative
of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of' fact and conclusions of'
law and upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of' the Act. I hereby issue the following recommended:
()ORD)ER
Ihe conlplaint is hereby dismissed in its entirety.
I In the event no excceptlrls are iled ia, provided h Se. 10246 of the
Rules and Regulatins ol the National .i abor Relallons Board. the tindings.
conclusions, andti recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations. be adopied hb the Board and become its
findings. conclusions. and Order, and all objectiolns thereto shall he deemed
wai\ed for all purposes.
232