Universal Fuels

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 14, 1984

270 N.L.R.B. 538 (N.L.R.B. 1984)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Universal Fuels, Inc. and American Federation of
Government Employees, AFL-CIO. Case 5-
CA- 14272
14 May 1984
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
ZIMMERMAN AND HUNTER
On 24 February 1983 Administrative Law Judge
Stanley N. Ohlbaum issued the attached decision.
The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting
brief, and the General Counsel and the Charging
Party filed answering briefs.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, and
conclusions' and to adopt the recommended
Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge and orders that the Respondent, Universal
Fuels, Inc., Patuxent River, Maryland, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the Order.
In view of the fact that we agree with the judge that the Union did
not have a conflict of interest disqualifying it from representing the Re-
spondent's employees, we find it unnecessary to rely on his finding that
the Respondent did not raise the issue in a timely manner.
Member Hunter agrees that the Union's representation of Government
employees in other units, standing alone, is insufficient to establish a con-
flict of interest which precludes the Union from fairly representing the
employees of the Respondent, a private sector employer. Member Hunter
notes that the record evidence is insufficient to establish that the Union
represents Government employees who perform the same work as that
performed by the Respondent's employees. Member Hunter notes that
the parties have stipulated that refueling services at the Naval Air Station
have been performed by private contractors since at least 1966. In these
circumstances, Member Hunter agrees with his colleagues that the evi-
dence of conflict of interest here is insufficient to disqualify the Union
from representing the Respondent's employees.
DECISION
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT; ISSUE
STANLEY N. OHLBAUM, Administrative Law Judge.
This proceeding' under the National Labor Relations
Act was litigated before me in Washington, D.C., with
all parties represented by counsel throughout and afford-
ed full opportunity to present evidence and contentions,
I Complaint issued by Board Regional Director for Region 5 on May
26 growing out of charge filed by Charging Party Union on April 19,
1982.
270 NLRB No. 97
as well as to file posttrial briefs received, after unop
posed application by the Charging Party for time exten-
sion, by November 3, 1982. Record and briefs have been
carefully considered.
The complaint alleges violation by Respondent of Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. The basic issue is whether
Respondent Employer is, as it asserts, relieved of its stat-
utory obligation to bargain with Charging Party Union
(the Board-certified exclusive collective-bargaining rep-
resentative of an appropriate unit of Respondent's em-
ployees) because of an alleged "conflict of interest" on
the part of the Union.
Upon the entire record,2 I make the following
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
I. JURISDICTION
At all material times, Respondent, an Alabama corpo-
ration with an office and place of business in Lexington
Park, Maryland, has engaged in aircraft fuel transporta-
tion for the United States Navy at the Patuxent River,
Maryland Naval Air Station. In the course and conduct
of that business in the representative 12-month period
ending March 16, 1981, Respondent performed aircraft
fuel transport services valued in excess of $50,000 for the
United States Navy at its said Patuxent River facility;
and, during the same period, in its said business oper-
ations, Respondent purchased and received supplies
worth over $2000, directly in interstate commerce from
places outside Maryland.
I find that (as admitted in the answer) Respondent has
at all material times been and is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and
(7), and Charging Party Union a labor organization as
defined in Section 2(5), of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A.
Essentially only questions of law are presented, the
case having been submitted on stipulation (Jt. Exh. I)
and record colloquy, with documentary evidence re-
ceived in part subject to cross-motions (upon which
ruling was reserved) to strike them3 from the record as
2 Hearing transcript as corrected by my September 30. 1982 order ion
notice is incorporated into the record. As shown below, there was no tes-
timony in the case.
' G.C. Exhs. 2 and 3 were received without objection, with the ac-
companying stipulation that they were passed at Charging Party Union's
1980 national convention; but Respondent questions their sweight G.C
Exhs. 1, 4, and 5 were received without objection. R. Exhs 2-8-Ident,
objected to by the General Counsel and the Charging Party as irrelevant,
are received as indicated in the above paragraph in the text of this deci-
sion. The Charging Party's September I, 1982 motion to revoke Re-
spondent's subpoena duces tecum B-257278 anld subpoena and testifican-
dum and duces tecum B-257279 on Kenneth Blaylock as president of the
Charging Party Union was, by reason of the stipulatioin of the parties IJt
Exh. 1), rendered academic and was accordingly withdrawn. without
prejudice to the Charging Party's contention that the subpoenaed docu-
ments are irrelevant.
In view of the disposition of this proceeding, under considerations ex-
plicated infra, the materials called for by the General Counsel's subpoe-
nas duces tecum B-277981, B-277977, B-277980, and B 27782, to the
Confinued
538
UNIVERSAL FUELS
irrelevant, and offers of proof likewise objected to,4 and
upon the basis thereof cross-moving for summary judg-
ment. All objections to identified exhibits are overruled.
The parties' offers of proof are resolved by this decision.
It is undisputed that Respondent has refused, and con-
tinues to refuse, to recognize or bargain with its unit em-
ployees's elected and Board-certified bargaining repre-
sentative, the Charging Party herein. Respondent rests its
refusal to recognize or bargain with the Union solely on
its assertion that the Union has a "conflict of interest"
disqualifying it from such representation (answer, par.
VII; Tr. 16), that alleged "conflict of interest" being
solely the Union's "position on the subject of contracting
out."6 Respondent does not claim that the Union
"own[s] a competitor or any other types of confict of in-
terest." 7
For its part, Charging Party Union as well as the Gen-
eral Counsel concedes that the Charging Party has taken
the position that "where work is performed by employ-
ees of the Federal government, that work should not be
contracted out," 9 at any rate "when it is not cost effec-
tive."1 0 The foregoing is within the frame of reference
extent not already supplied, are deemed unnecessary here, and according-
ly Respondent's petition (R. Exh. I-ldent.) to revoke those subpoenas is
dismissed as academic, as are the subpoenas themselves.
4 The General Counsel and the Charging Party offered to prove, over
Respondent's objection, that (1) Charging Party Union currently effec-
tively represents employees of contractors with the U.S. Government,
without "ulterior motive": (2) Charging Party Union undertook to repre-
sent Respondent's unit employees, at the request of those employees,
properly to represent them without ulterior motive; (3) Charging Party
Union has no national policy of putting Government contractors, whose
employees it represents, out of business: (4) many private employees as
well as many Federal employees represented by Charging Party Union
have become employees of Government contractors; (5) Respondent was
or should have been aware of the alleged "conflict of interest" it now
asserts, at the time of the Board representation proceeding (i.e., Case 5-
RC- 11445) culminating in the election (April 30, 1981) and Board certifi-
cation (May 8, 1981) of Charging Party Union as Respondent's unit em-
ployees' bargaining representative, antedating the instant proceeding.
Respondent in turn offered to prove, over the General Counsel's and
Charging Party's objection, that Charging Party Union represents U.S.
Government employees performing some aircraft refueling services at Pa-
tuxent River Naval Air Station.
As indicated in the above paragraph in the text of this decision, the
necessary issues raised by these offers of proof are resolved by this deci-
sion.
L.e., all full and regular part-time employees employed by Respond-
ent at the Naval Air Station at Patuxent River, Maryland, excluding all
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. Respondent's brief states
that, after the Board's certification of the Union, a first (and only) negoti-
ating meeting was held with the Union in Charlotte, North Carolina, on
February 22, 1982; and that it was not until after the Union there present-
ed Respondent with and Respondent received its contract proposals and
Respondent indicated it would "study the proposals and forward the
Union a written counter-proposal," (ibid), that Respondent discontinued
all further bargaining.
Statement Mr. Mitchell, Respondent's counsel, Tr. 17:
The only kind of conflict of interest that we raise has been the
AFGE's [i.e., Charging Party Union'sl position, that the govern-
ment, and in particular the Department of Defense and the military,
should not contract out service jobs at military bases, which are the
exact type jobs this company performs.
? Id.
8 Id. at 17
9 Id. at II and 18.
iO Id at 11, 16-17
of the Union's actual and conventional representation of
Government contractors' employees. '
The parties' stipulation establishes that Charging Party
Union currently represents approximately 1800 employ-
ees in the private sector, as well as U.S. Government
employees performing aircraft refueling services; that the
only private sector aircraft refueling service employees
represented by Charging Party Union are those of Re-
spondent at Patuxent River Naval Air Station; that Re-
spondent, a private contractor which has provided air-
craft refueling services at Patuxent River Naval Air Sta-
tion since May 1, 1978, does so under contract with the
U.S. Department of Defense; and that refueling services
at Patuxent River Naval Air Station have been per-
formed by private contractors since at least 1966.'2
The parties' positions as developed in their stipulation
and trial transcript colloquy, illumined by documentary
evidencet and briefs, sufficiently present the issues so as
to be ripe for decision without need for testimony.
B.
Analytically, Respondent Employer's asserted justifica-
tion for its admitted refusal to recognize or bargain with
the Board-certified elected bargaining representative of
its employees has three distinct aspects: (1) protection of
or concern for its employees, (2) protection of itself, and
(3) timeliness. These will be severally addressed.
1. Employer's purported desire to protect its
employees from the supposed folly of their choice
of this particular union as their bargaining
representative
In this regard, it must be recognized at the outset that,
under the Act's statutory scheme, the choice of bargain-
ing representative of employees is theirs and not that of
their employer. If the choice is improvident, it may be
corrected by them in various ways, such as their with-
drawal from the union or their substitution of another or
none. But this is a matter for them rather than their em-
ployer. As the Supreme Court instructed in Brooks v.
NLRB, 384 U.S. 96 at 103 (1954):
If the employees are dissatisfied with their chosen
union, they may submit their own grievance to the
" Id. at 20-21.
12 Jt. Exh. I.
i3 This shows that the Charging Party's officials have indeed ex-
pressed themselves-as could any person or union in exercise of First
Amendment constitutional rights-in general opposition to "contracting
out" under certain circumstances (many if not most other unions are, as is
well known, similarly opposed to "contracting out" by private employers
of their members), within the formal union policy (G.C. Exh. 2) "princi-
ple that public work which has traditionally been performed by public
employees should continue to be performed by public employees, and
that public work which has traditionally been performed by private em-
ployees should continue to be performed by private employees" It will
be recalled that it is established by the parties' stipulation here (Jt. Exh. I,
par. 7), that the services in question at Patuxent Naval Air Station have
been privately performed since at least 1966.
The Union's constitution (G.C. Exh. 4, art. Ill, sec. Ila]) admits to
membership not only employees of the United States Government but
also "all other persons providing their personal services indirectly to the
United States Government"--clearly including Respondent's unit em-
ployees here who elected to have it represent them.
539
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Board .... The underlying purpose of this statute
[i.e., the Act] is industrial peace. To allow employ-
ers to rely on employees' rights in refusing to bar-
gain with the formally designated union is not con-
ducive to that end, it is inimical to it.' 4
And, as also indicated by the U.S. Court of Appeals in
NLRB v. Signal Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 471 (Ist Cir. 1965),
cert. denied 382 U.S. 985 (1966):
The right of employees to be represented by offi-
cials of their own choice doubtless must outweigh
any principle of persona non grata. 1
We according readily surmount, as a tenable justifica-
tion for Respondent's refusal to bargain with its employ-
ees' elected bargaining representative, any concern,
actual or pretended, by Respondent for its employees
over the supposed folly of their choice, or Respondent's
supposedly superior wisdom in these matters.
2. Employer's desire to protect itself from what it
fears may be the adverse economic impact upon it
of bargaining with this particular union
As to this, our point of departure is the fact that the
Act itself, as explicitly set forth in its underlying legisla-
tive "Findings and Policies" (Act, Sec. 1), recognizes the
"inequality of bargaining power" of employees vis-a-vis
employers and is purposed to ameliorate that imbalance
through the instrumentality of collective bargaining. Im-
plicit, as well as explicit, therein is recognition of the in-
herent or basic economic tension between employers and
employees. It is, therefore, well to remember that the
basic frame of reference is not an economic vacuum in
which the collective-bargaining representative of em-
ployees, on the one hand, and the employer, on the other
hand, bear a bland and tensionless relationship to each
other. On the contrary, their interests are to a large
extent adversarial.
This would be true of any bargaining representative
which Respondent's unit employees here may have se-
lected to represent them, save possibly a "bargaining rep-
resentative" of their employer's designation, choice,
sponsorship, or support (sometimes denominated a
"sweetheart union" and unlawful under the Act). Re-
spondent's seemingly basic concern here that Charging
Party Union "could through unreasonable demands make
it unprofitable for UFI [i.e., Respondent Employer] to
continue providing refueling services to the military" (R.
Exh. 2) is not only conjectural but applicable as well to
any other union with whom it may be required to deal.
The same is true for its alleged apprehension that this
Union may "create labor unrest . . . or even cause a
work stoppage" (id.).
14 To the same effect, see Chief Justice (then Circuit Judge) Burger in
Local 57 ILGWLU v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295, 308 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert.
denied 387 U.S. 942 (1967); North Shore University Hospital, 259 NLRB
852 (1981); Sierra Vista Hospital, 241 NLRB 631 (1979).
1" To the same effect, see NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 33 (1937); Newspapers, Inc., 210 NLRB 8, 10 (1974), enfd. 515
F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1975); Canton Sign Co., 174 NLRB 906, 909 (1969),
and case cited, enf. denied on other grounds 457 F.2d 832 (6th Cir. 1972);
NLRB v. Harris-Woodson Co., 179 F.2d 720, 723 (4th Cir. 1950).
Respondent's argument that this particular Union has a
definite financial stake to force Respondent out of busi-
ness (id.) is also without merit, since (1) it is likewise
speculative, (2) there is no reason to assume any other
union's bargaining demands would be more favorable to
Respondent or that any other union would not force Re-
spondent to the wall if they were not met or reasonably
compromised-even were this to be the test or a proper
subject of inquiry, which of course it is not, (3) there is
no inherent conflict of interest between Charging Party
Union's representation of employees directly employed
by the Government and employees working for employ-
ers carrying out contracts with or for the Government,
nor has any such conflict been persuasively established
on the record,16 (4) there is no reason for assuming that,
in the eventuality conjectured by Respondent, that if it
should come about that it were forced out of business be-
cause it could not meet what it fears may be Charging
Party Union's contract demands, its work would be
awarded to Government employees represented by that
union, and (5) it is conceded by Respondent (supra fn. 6
and accompanying text) that no competitive business re-
lationship between itself and Charging Party Union exists
here.
The rare instances in which the Board has regarded a
union as unqualified or disqualified from representing
certain unit employees have been limited to situations in
which (I) the bargaining representative is in business
competition with the employer,1 7 (2) the bargaining rep-
resentative is affiliated with a business competitor of the
employer,'l (3) the bargaining representative is affiliated
directly with the employer,' 9 or (4) the employer's su-
pervisors play an active role in the bargaining represent-
ative;20 or in which the proposed bargaining representa-
tive was on appropriate objection excluded by the Board
in the preliminary stages of a representation petition,
without being allowed to stand for election.21
It is clear that the instant case falls into none of these
categories. to extend their closely delimited scope to a
case, such as that here, would declare open season for
sweeping, postelection, postcertification inquires at yet
more Board hearings (with attendant appeals) at the
Le See fn. 13, supra; Ojai Valley Community Hospital, 254 NLRB 1354
(1981); Gino Morena Enterprises, 181 NLRB 808 (1970). In any event,
such a possibility is at best speculative and conjectural.
II St. John's Hospital, 264 NLRB 990 (1982) (bargaining representative
of employer's nurses also owns and operates a nurses' registry; petition
for election and certification dismissed); Visiting Nurses Assn., 254 NLRB
49 (1981), id. Bausch d Lomb Optical Co., 108 NLRB 1555 (1954) (com-
peting union business established after certification).
i" R & M Kaufmann v. NLRB, 471 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied 411 U.S. 906 (1973) (employer had raised contention in underlying
petition for election proceeding in opposing union candidacy for certifica-
tion); Bambury Fashions, 179 NLRB 447 (1969) (petition for election and
certification dismissed); Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 108 NLRB 1555
(1954), see observation supra fn. 17.
19 Teamsters Local 249, 139 NLRB 605 (1962), petition for election and
certification dismissed on objection of another union as intervenor.
20 Nassau d Suffolk Contractors' Assn., 118 NLRB 174, 187 (1957), Sec.
8(a)(2) context. But cf. North Shore University Hospital, 259 NLRB 852
(1981), motion to revoke certification and cases cited; Sierra Vista Hospi-
tal, 241 NLRB 631 (1979), motion to revoke certification.
21 St. John's Hospital, 264 NLRB 990 (1982), and see observations sub
other cases cited supra fns. 17-20.
540
UNIVERSAL FUELS
behest of every employer into the supposed bargaining
objectives and tenacity of every union before recogniz-
ing or bargaining with it, notwithstanding the Act's com-
mand, the Board-conducted election, and the Board's
formal certification.
What Respondent's concern, in this aspect, amounts to
is its desire to be rescued from what it fears may be the
hard bargain Charging Party Union may drive. This,
however, is not a matter for the Board's cognizance. It is
rather, a potential problem, should it arise, to be faced
by Respondent-as it is by other employers-in its nego-
tiations with the bargaining representative, within the
frame of reference of the ultimate saving proviso of the
Act that Respondent is not constrained "to agree to a
proposal or [to make] a concession."
For these reasons, it is determined that Respondent is
not excused from recognizing and bargaining with the
Board-certified Union here based on its assertions of con-
flicting interest and fear of the possibility of economical-
ly costly outcome from its point of view.
3. Timeliness
It is to be noted that Respondent failed to raise its cur-
rent contention that the Charging Party is disqualified by
reason of "conflict of interest" from representing Re-
spondent's unit employees, at the Board representation
case (5-RC-11445) antedating the instant proceeding. 2 2
Assuredly the contention could have been, and it would
seem certainly should have been more properly raised
there, by way of preliminary objection, as in St. John's
Hospital, 264 NLRB 990 (1982), and other cases cited
supra.
It is hornbook law that an issue which was not but
could have been litigated in an earlier related case en-
compassing the issue is laid to rest by the outcome of the
earlier case. As recently reiterated in NLRB v. Southeast
Assn. for Retarded Citizens, 666 F.2d 428 at 432 (9th Cir.
1982), quoting from Fall River Savings Bank v. NLRB,
649 F.2d 50, 58-59 (lst Cir. 1981):
Under the Board's longstanding rule of practice, see
29 C.F.R. "sec. 102.67(f), which the courts have re-
peatedly endorsed, a party to an unfair labor prac-
tice proceeding may not raise an issue which was or
could have been litigated in the prior representation
proceeding, in the absence of newly discovered or
previously unavailable evidence or special circum-
stances."2 3
For this additional reason, it is determined that the
issue of the Charging Party's alleged disqualification to
act as Respondent's employees' bargaining representa-
tive, not having been raised by Respondent in the earlier
representation proceeding, may not now be raised to jus-
tify Respondent's refusal to bargain with the duly elected
and formally Board-certified bargaining representative.
22 Nor has Respondent at any time sought to reopen that proceeding
or to vacate the Board certification of the Charging Party as its unit em-
ployees' bargaining representative.
23 See also Pittsburgh Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146. 162 (1941).
C.
It is accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, deter-
mined that Respondent's refusal to recognize and bargain
with Charging Party Union, as Respondent's unit em-
ployees' duly elected and Board-certified bargaining rep-
resentative, was and is without justification and in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
On the foregoing findings and the entire record, I state
the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Jurisdiction is properly asserted here.
B. By failing and refusing to bargain collectively with
American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-
CIO, as the duly elected and Board-certified exclusive
bargaining representative of the following appropriate
collective-bargaining unit of Respondent's employees,
Respondent has failed and refused and continues to fail
and refuse to bargain collectively as required by Section
8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act thereby vio-
lating said Section 8(a)(5), and has, further, interfered
with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise
of their rights under Section 7 of the Act, and continues
so to do, in violation of Section 8(aX1) of the Act.
All full and regular part time employees employed
by Respondent at the Naval Air Station at Patuxent
River, Maryland, excluding all guards and supervi-
sors as defined in the Act.
C. Said unfair labor practices and each of them, viola-
tive of the Act as aforesaid, have affected, affect, and
unless permanently restrained and enjoined will continue
to affect, commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Respondent should be ordered to cease and desist from
continuing to violate the Act in the respects found, and
to bargain collectively in good faith with the Charging
Party as its unit employees' Board-certified exclusive
bargaining representative, as of the date of its certifica-
tion by the Board (May 8, 1981).24 In order to avoid in-
justice to the unit employees and the Charging Party,
and to avoid rewarding Respondent for its violation in
flouting the Board's certification, and in accordance with
Board policy and precedents the certification period
should be extended for a period of I year from the time
when, on timely demand, Respondent commences to bar-
gain with the Union in good faith in compliance with the
Order herein. Finally, Respondent should be required to
post the usual Notice to Employees.
24 Cf. Trading Port, 219 NLRB 298, 300-301 (1975); NLRB v. Eagle
Material Handling, 558 F.2d 160, 163-164, 168 (2d Cir. 1977); Ann Lee
Sportswear v. NLRB, 543 F.2d 739, 744 (10th Cir. 1976).
2a King Radio Corp., 177 NLRB 1051, 1080 (1968), enfd. 416 F.2d 569
(10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 1007 (1970); B. Brown Associates,
224 NLRB 929, 940 (1976); Burnett Construction Co., 149 NLRB 1419,
1421 (1964), enfd. 350 F.2d 57 (10th Cir. 1965); Larnar Hotel, 140 NLRB
226, 228 (1962), enfd. 328 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied 379 U.S.
817 (1964); Mar-Jac Poultry Co., 136 NLRB 785, 787 (1962).
541
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
On the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law and or the entire record, I issue the following2 6
ORDER
The Respondent, Universal Fuels, Inc., Patuxent
River, Maryland, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall
i. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing to bargain collectively in good
faith, as of May 8, 1981, with American Federation of
Government Employees, AFL-CIO, as the Board-certi-
fied exclusive bargaining representative of the following
appropriate unit of Respondent's employees, and failing
to embody in a signed contract any understanding
reached:
All full and regular part time employees employed
by Respondent at the Naval Air Station at Patuxent
River, Maryland, excluding all guards and supervi-
sors as defined in the Act.
(b) In any like or related manner failing or refusing to
bargain or interfering with, restraining, or coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of their right to self-organization;
to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing; to engage in concerted activities for the
purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection; or to refrain from any or all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, recognize and bargain collectively in
good faith with American Federation of Government
Employees, AFL-CIO, as of May 8, 1981, as the exclu-
sive bargaining representative of Respondent's employees
in the aforementioned appropriate collective-bargaining
unit, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of em-
ployment, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment, and embody in a signed agreement any under-
standing reached. Said bargaining representative's cerfifi-
cation with regard to said unit is extended for a period of
I year from the date when Respondent commences to
bargain in good faith.
(b) Post at its premises in Lexington Park, Maryland
(or any current relocation thereof) copies of the attached
notice marked "Appendix." 27 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 5,
after being signed by the Respondent's authorized repre-
sentative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately
s6 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions. and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
*7 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of
Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board."
upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other materi-
al.
(c) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps Respondent
has taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which we had full opportunity to
present our evidence and arguments, the National Labor
Relations Board has determined that we have violated
the National Labor Relations Act, because of our failure
and refusal to recognize and bargain collectively with
American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-
CIO, as the exclusive bargaining representative of our
employees in the bargaining unit set forth below; and we
have been ordered to post this notice and do what it
says.
WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to recognize and bargain
collectively in good faith with American Federation of
Government Employees, AFL-CIO, as of May 8, 1981,
the date of its certification by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board as the exclusive bargaining representative of
the following appropriate collective-bargaining unit of
our employees, with respect to said employees' rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and
conditions of employment, or to embody in a signed con-
tract any understanding reached:
All full and regular part time employees employed
by us at the Naval Air Station at Patuxent River,
Maryland, excluding all guards and supervisors as
defined the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner fail to rec-
ognize or bargain with the above Union, nor will we
thereby or in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their
rights under the National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL, on request, recognize and bargain collec-
tively, as of May 8, 1981, with the above Union as the
exclusive bargaining representative of our employees in
the above collective-bargaining unit, with respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other
terms and conditions of employment, and WE WILL
embody in a signed contract any understanding reached.
UNIVERSAL FUELS, INC.
542