UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 1, 2020

14768258 - (R) (P.T.A.B. May. 1, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/768,258 08/17/2015 Stephen K Kramer 71154US02(15-102) 1078
52237 7590 05/01/2020
Bachman & LaPointe, P.C.
900 Chapel St., Suite 1201
New Haven, CT 06510
EXAMINER
DUGER, JASON H
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3741
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/01/2020 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
__________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
__________

Ex parte STEPHEN K. KRAMER
__________

Appeal 2019-004448
Application 14/768,258
Technology Center 3700
__________

Before MICHAEL L. HOELTER, ANNETTE R. REIMERS, and
LISA M. GUIJT, Administrative Patent Judges.

REIMERS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON REHEARING

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 filed a request for rehearing (“Req. Reh’g”) under 37
C.F.R. § 41.52 of our decision (“Decision”) dated February 3, 2020. In that
Decision, we affirmed (1) the Examiner’s rejection of claims 23 and 25

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as United
Technologies Corporation. Appeal Brief (“Appeal. Br.”) 2, filed Oct. 18,
2018.
Appeal 2019-004448
Application 14/768,258

2
under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a),2 (2) the Examiner’s rejection of claims 19 and 21–
25 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b),3 and (3) the Examiner’s rejection of claims 9,
11, 16, 17, and 19–23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.

ANALYSIS
The request for rehearing must state with particularity the points
believed to have been misapprehended or overlooked by the
Board. Arguments not raised, and Evidence not previously relied
upon, pursuant to §§ 41.37, 41.41, or 41.47 are not permitted in
the request for rehearing except as permitted by paragraphs (a)(2)
through (a)(4) of this section.
37 C.F.R. § 41.52(a)(1). A Rehearing is not an opportunity to rehash
arguments originally made in the Brief, neither is it an opportunity to
express merely disagreement with a decision.
Appellant contends that “the teachings of Juhasz and the scope of
Appellant’s independent claims (especially independent claim 17) have been
misapprehended.” Req. Reh’g 2. Appellant argues that “the self-purging of
the fuel injector as recited in Appellant’s method claim 17 is necessarily
performed at engine shut down.” Id.
As an initial matter, as correctly pointed out in the Decision,
independent claim 9 does not require purging fuel. Dec. 9; see also Appeal
Br. 15 (Claims App.). Further, independent claim 17 does not require
purging the fuel injector “at engine shut down.” Appeal Br. 15 (Claims

2 The request for rehearing does not contend that the Board overlooked
anything in connection to the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). See Req.
Reh’g passim.
3 The request for rehearing does not contend that the Board overlooked
anything in connection to the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). See Req.
Reh’g passim.
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Application 14/768,258

3
App.). Stated differently, independent claim 17 merely recites “selectively
releasing air from [] the accumulator to purge the fuel injector.” Appeal Br.
15 (Claims App.). There is no recitation in claim 17 of “engine shut down”
let alone a method step directed to purging the fuel injector “at engine shut
down.” Id. “[L]imitations are not to be read into the claims from the
specification.” In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). See
also In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1348 (CCPA 1982) (“[A]ppellant’s
arguments fail from the outset because . . . they are not based on limitations
appearing in the claims.”). Moreover, the Decision points out that “Davies
discloses purging fuel.” Dec. 9 (citing Ans. 21, which cites Davies 2:65–
72); id. (“Notably, Davies discloses ‘residual fuel was expelled after engine
shutdown.’” (citing Davies 2:67)).
We note Appellant stating that “Appellant was not arguing that Davies
could not use locations other than the compressor as a pressure source.”
Req. Reh’g 2. Thus, Appellant acknowledges that Davies discloses using
locations other than the compressor as a pressure source. See id.; see also
Dec. 10–11 (“Davies discloses that locations other than the compressor may
be used as a pressure source.” (citing Ans. 18–19)); Davies 2:54–58. In this
regard, we note that a diffuser is a “location” that is “other than the
compressor.”
Appellant contends that “the Board has overlooked the distinction
between the conventional usage of the diffuser to mix air with fuel and the
utilization thereof as a ‘pressure source.’” Req. Reh’g 5. In particular,
Appellant contends that “the secondary reference Juhasz simply does not
utilize the bleed air from the diffuser to pressurize anything. That is, Juhasz
just dumps the bleed air into the turbine section []such that there is no
Appeal 2019-004448
Application 14/768,258

4
suggestion to use the diffuser of Juhasz as a pressure source.” Req. Reh’g 2.
According to Appellant, “[t]he entire goal of Juhasz is to trim the profile 48
by bleeding air (relieving pressure) from the diffuser so as to minimally
reduce cycle efficiency.” Id.; see also id. (“[P]ressure is just relieved from
the diffuser of Juhasz.”); id. at 4 (“Juhasz releases pressure from the diffuser
to the turbine.”); id. at 5 (“Juhasz does not utilize the diffuser as a pressure
source in any way but simply selectively bleeds pressure from the diffuser to
trim the profile 46, 48, 58, 60 within the diffuser itself.”).
Appellant’s statements above concede that by trimming the profile 48
by bleeding air from the diffuser, Juhasz discloses “relieving/releasing
pressure” from the diffuser. See Req. Reh’g 2, 4–5. From these statements,
as Appellant acknowledges that air and pressure can be relieved from the
diffuser, it stands to reason that Juhasz’s diffuser can be an air or a pressure
source. A skilled artisan would understand that if a component releases air
and pressure, that component can operate as an air or a pressure source. As
noted by the Court in KSR, “[a] person of ordinary skill is also a person of
ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” KSR Int’l v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
398, 421 (2007); Dec. 11.
Additionally, Appellant’s contention that “[a] pressuring is contrary to
bleeding air to the diffuser with operates at a lower pressure” is
unpersuasive. Req. Reh’g 4. First, to the extent Appellant is arguing that
adding pressure to the diffuser is different from bleeding air or releasing
pressure from the diffuser, we agree. However, the Examiner does not rely
on Juhasz for adding pressure to the diffuser. Second, to the extent
Appellant is arguing that Juhasz’s diffuser cannot be a pressure source
because it operates at a lower pressure, this argument is also unpersuasive.
Appeal 2019-004448
Application 14/768,258

5
It is unclear what other component is being compared to in regard to “a
lower pressure.” Moreover, Juhasz’s diffuser must operate at a higher
pressure than that of the turbine (or the manifold) because, as Appellant
recognizes, “Juhasz releases pressure from the diffuser to the turbine.” Req.
Reh’g 4 (emphases added). If Juhasz’s diffuser operates at a lower pressure
than that of the turbine, air would not be able to flow from the diffuser 16 to
the manifold 38, as disclosed by Juhasz, i.e., instead, air would flow from
the manifold 38 to the diffuser 16. See Juhasz 3:20–21.
Appellant’s request for rehearing has been granted to the extent that
we have reconsidered our Decision in light of the arguments in Appellant’s
request for rehearing, but is denied with respect to modifying the Decision.

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Outcome of Decision on Rehearing:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Denied Granted
23, 25 112(a) Written
Description
23, 25
19, 21–25 112(b) Indefiniteness 19, 21–25
9, 11, 16, 17,
19
103 Davies, Juhasz 9, 11, 16,
17, 19

20 103 Davies, Juhasz,
Taylor
20
21–23 103 Davies, Juhasz,
Gameiro
21–23
Overall
Outcome
9, 11, 16,
17, 19–25

Appeal 2019-004448
Application 14/768,258

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Final Outcome of Appeal after Rehearing:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
23, 25 112(a) Written
Description
23, 25
19, 21–25 112(b) Indefiniteness 19, 21–25
9, 11, 16, 17,
19
103 Davies, Juhasz 9, 11, 16,
17, 19

20 103 Davies, Juhasz,
Taylor
20
21–23 103 Davies, Juhasz,
Gameiro
21–23
Overall
Outcome
9, 11, 16,
17, 19–25

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

DENIED