United Steelworkers of America, Local 8061

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 14, 1976

226 N.L.R.B. 403 (N.L.R.B. 1976)

UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 8061 403
United Steelworkers of America , Local No. 8061,
AFL-CIO (Arrowhead Engineering Corp.) and Eve-
lyn Hinckley . Case 25-CB-2521
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
October 14, 1976
DECISION AND ORDER
By CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS FANNING
AND JENKINS
On June 22, 1976, Administrative Law Judge Ber-
nard Ries issued the attached Decision in this pro-
ceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed limit-
ed exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of .the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusion' of the Administrative Law Judge and
to adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that the Respondent, United Steelworkers of
America, Local No. 8061 , AFL-CIO, its officers,
agents, and representatives , shall take the action set
forth in said recommended Order.
i In his Decision the Administrative Law Judge in several instances inad-
vertently referred to "Section 8(a)(1)" in place of "Section 8(b)(1)(A)" of the
Act Such inadvertent misstatement is hereby corrected
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
BERNARD RIES, Administrative Law Judge: A hearing
was held in this case on May 4, 1976, at Knox, Indiana,
pursuant to a charge filed on February 10, 1976, and a
complaint issued on March 31, 1976. The complaint alleges
that on several occasions since August 11, 1975, agents of
Respondent restrained and coerced employees in the exer-
cise of their Section 7 rights and thereby violated-Section
8(b)(1)(A). A helpful brief was received from the General
Counsel on or about June 8, 1976; Respondent's brief, al-
though-received late, was timely mailed and has been con-
sidered.
Upon the entire record' and my observation of the wit-
nesses, I make the following:
Arrowhead Engineering Corporation is an Indiana cor-
poration which, at all times material, has been engaged at
its Knox, Indiana, facility in the manufacture, sale, and
distribution of precision split steel pulleys and related
products. During the year prior to issuance of the com-
plaint, a representative period, Arrowhead Engineering
Corporation purchased, transferred, and delivered to its
Knox facility goods and materials valued in excess of
$50,000 which were transported to the facility directly from
States other than the State of Indiana. The Respondent
admits, and I find, that Arrowhead Engineering Corpora-
tion is now, and has been at all times material, an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that
the Respondent is, and has been at all times material, a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act. I further find that it would effectuate the policies
of the Act to assert jurisdiction over Respondent.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
Respondent is the collective-bargaining representative of
the production and maintenance employees at Arrowhead
Engineering Corporation. Evelyn Hinckley, the Charging
Party, is an employee of Arrowhead Engineering Corpora-
tion. She is the wife of Emmett Hinckley, also an employ-
ee. In early 1974, Emmett Hinckley became vice president
of Respondent Union, and later in 1974, he became its
president.
Around July 1974, Arrowhead created the position of
toolroom crib attendant. Although Arrowhead was operat-
ing three shifts at the time, it initially put only one crib
attendant position into effect, on the day shift. Evelyn
Hinckley bid on, and was awarded, the position. Subse-
quently, at some undisclosed time, a crib attendant was
assigned to each of-the other two shifts, as discussed below.
Because Arrowhead had not negotiated the pay rate for
the crib attendant job with Respondent prior to putting it
into effect, Emmett Hinckley, then the vice president of
Respondent, and John Tubbs, then the chief steward for
Respondent,' filed a "policy grievance" in July 1974.
Hinckley testified that the grievance was customarily re-
ferred to as "Evelyn's grievance." The grievance ultimately
went to arbitration, the arbitrator ruled in favor of Respon-
dent, and, pursuant to the arbitrator's decision, Respon-
dent and Arrowhead commenced negotiations about the
appropriate pay rate for the job, probably in the summer of
1975.
1 Counsel for General Counsel has filed an unopposed motion to correct
the record The motion is granted with one exception I disagree with the
contention of General Counsel that the word "didn 't" appearing at p 116, 1.
25, should read "did."
2 The parties stipulated that Tubbs subsequently served as vice president
of Respondent from the fall of 1974-February 1975 and from June 1975-
January 1976, when he became president
226 NLRB No. 57
404 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In the interim, perhaps in early 1975, employee Marlene
Ferry was assigned to the position of crib attendant on the
third shift. Around March 1975, Arrowhead closed down
its third shift. About the same time, Marlene Ferry was
removed from the job of toolcnb attendant and assigned to
a less desirable job of operator, on the second shift. The
record is in conflict as to whether Ferry was removed from
the crib attendant job prior to or subsequent to the closing
of the third shift, but it seems probable that the two events
coincided.
On March 14, Ferry filed a grievance protesting her re-
moval from the crib attendant job; her claim was couched
in terms of her seniority, and she was evidently asserting
that, when the third shift closed down, she should have
been-assigned as a crib attendant on another shift, in pref-
erence to the employees holding that position on the other
shifts with inferior seniority. Around this time, Respon-
dent's representatives and Arrowhead were having discus-
sions about the seniority rights of employees who had been
on the third shift; the record shows that Ferry had greater
plant seniority than Evelyn Hinckley.
On March 14, at the first step of the grievance proce-
dure, instead of meeting Ferry's seniority claim head-on,
the Company replied that Ferry was "not considered capa-
ble of continuing in the toolcnb attendant position," and it
reiterated this contention at the next two steps. In April
1975, at the third step of the grievance procedure, Emmett
Hinckley, who by that time had become president of Re-
spondent, acquiesced in the Company's claim that Marlene
Ferry had been an incompetent crib attendant and "signed
off" on the Ferry grievance.
It appears from the record that John Tubbs, who became
vice president and a member of the grievance committee in
June 1975, was unhappy with Emmett Hinckley's decision
to "sign off" on the Ferry grievance. He testified that he
was "displeased" with the disposition of that grievance.
On July 2, 1975, the Company and Respondent's repre-
sentatives met to negotiate the crib attendant pay rate pur-
suant to the arbitrator's decision. Emmett Hinckley was
present at the meeting; although he was president of the
Union at that time, he was not a member of the grievance
committee. Not much progress was made at the July 2
meeting. There may have been another meeting before
Hinckley left for vacation at the end of July 1975; the rec-
ord is unclear on this. On July 28, while Emmett and Eve-
lyn Hinckley were on vacation, the grievance committee,
composed of Tubbs, the chief steward, and another mem-
ber, reached agreement with the Company about the rate
of pay for the job. The committee accepted the same rate
of pay that the Company had originally assigned to the job.
B. The Alleged Threat of August 11, 1975
The first substantive allegation of the complaint (par.
5(b)) is that Vice President John Tubbs threatened, on or
about August 11, 1975, "to cause the employer to discharge
certain employees of the employer because such employees
3 To "sign off" on a grievance is to withdraw it, or to acquiesce in the
employer's denial of the grievance
protested the Respondent's handling of grievances." This
appears to relate to certain testimony given by Emmett
Hinckley, although I am less than confident in this asser-
tion. See footnote 9, infra.
Hinckley credibly testified that, when he returned from
his vacation on August 11, and discovered that Tubbs and
the committee had signed off on "Evelyn's grievance," he
questioned Tubbs as to why he had done so. Tubbs told
him that if he did not like it he should call United Steel-
workers staff representative, Don Tobin. When Hinckley
stated that he did not see how Tubbs could have signed off
at the same pay rate that the Company had originally as-
signed to the job, Tubbs replied, "Well, I done it, and I'm
going to have Evelyn's job next." Tubbs testified to several
conversations with Hinckley about signing off_ on the poli-
cy grievance, but his version of those conversations con-
tained no reference to "having Evelyn's job." I believed
Hinckley's testimony; he appeared somewhat tentative,
perhaps from the effects of medication,4 but, albeit, an
honest w` iness. Tubbs' testimony did not breed confidence.
I do not, however, see how Tubbs' statement to Hinckley
can be construed, as the complaint alleges, to be a threat
"to cause the employer to discharge certain employees of
the employer because such employees protested the Re-
spondent's handling of grievances."
In the factual setting, "such employees" would have to
be Evelyn Hinckley. The threat to "have Evelyn's job next"
does not on its face indicate that Tubbs was displeased
with Evelyn for having "protested the Respondent's han-
dling of grievances," which, as of August 11, she had not
done. Since it appears from the record that Tubbs was dis-
pleased with Emmett Hinckley's handling of the Ferry
grievance and believed that the grievance should have been
prosecuted further, Emmett Hinckley may have under-
stood the threat to "have Evelyn's job next" as an assertion
by Tubbs that Ferry, who had the greater seniority, should
be occupying the day-shift crib attendant job, and that
Tubbs was going to attempt to see that she got the job.
In any event, the statement, "Well, I done it, and I'm
going to have Evelyn's job next," is ambiguous and, I be-
lieve, cannot be fairly read, on the given facts, as a threat
"to cause the employer to discharge certain employees of
the employer because such employees protested the Re-
spondent's handling of grievances." I will therefore recom-
mend that paragraph 5(b) of the complaint be dismissed.5
C. The Alleged Threats Directed to Evelyn Hinckley
The complaint alleges (par. 5(c)) that George Luckett,
treasurer of Respondent, on several occasions during the
period from August 11 to December 30, 1975, and John
a The record shows that Hinckley has recently had a long siege of illness
5 There is testimony by Evelyn Hinckley, discussed infra, that, in April,
Tubbs had spoken to her of his displeasure with Emmett having signed off
the Ferry-grievance, and his determination to replace Evelyn with Ferry as
crib attendant With knowledge of those conversations, Emmett might have
understood Tubbs' August ' 11 remark as part of a continuing vendetta
against Emmett for signing off the Ferry grievance, and this, conceivably,
could lay the groundwork for finding a violation. But General Counsel
failed to elicit from his witnesses, the Hmckleys, that Evelyn had told Em-
mett about the conversations with Tubbs. Since General Counsel failed to
do so, I refuse to infer that fact, even though I think it likely occurred.
UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 8061
Tubbs, on or about August I1 and in November 1975,
"threatened to cause employees of the employer to lose
their jobs because their relatives had `signed off' certain
grievances."
Evelyn Hinckley testified that, in April 1975, Tubbs
talked to her about her husband having signed off on
Ferry's grievance and told her that "he was going to get, me
out of the crib and Marlene Ferry was going to have my
job." Later that month, Tubbs, in the presence of Luckett,
told Hinckley that what her husband had done about the
Ferry grievance was "pretty rotten," and that "he was
going to get [Ferry] back in the crib, and I would be out." 6
Around August 13, after her return from vacation,
Hinckley inquired of Luckett and Tubbs, about the prog-
ress of the "policy grievance"; Tubbs said that "they had
signed off on the policy grievance because Emmett had
signed off on Marlene Ferry's grievance." That evening,
Evelyn Hinckley called Union Staff Representative, Tobin,
who is located in South Bend, to complain. The following
day, August 14, Tubbs told her that she should not have
called Tobin, that there was no longer anything she could
do about the grievance settlement, and that she "wasn't
going to be in the crib any longer; Marlene Ferry would be
in.,,
During this period, according to the testimony of Tobin,
who was substantially corroborated by Evelyn Hinckley,
she called Tobin a number of times, in September, Octo-
ber, and November, 1975, about her inability to convince
Tubbs to file certain grievances on her behalf pertaining to
overtime pay. Tobin testified that he kept referring Hinck-
ley to Tubbs, and also talked to Tubbs, telling him to be
sure to file the grievances on Hinckley's behalf. The record
shows that, on September 15 and October 7, Tubbs filed
such grievances on behalf of Evelyn Hinckley.
Hinckley testified that on one occasion in November,
after she had called Tobin about some matter, Tubbs came
to the toolcrib and warned her "not to call Don Tobin
about anything or to talk to any other union official about
anything, that I was to come directly to him." Tubbs re-
peated that she would "be taken out of the crib." 7
Tubbs denied that he had ever engaged in discussions of
the Ferry grievance with Evelyn Hinckley; denied that he
had had any conversations with Evelyn Hinckley about the
resolution of the policy grievance; but testified that, on one
occasion, Tobin called him to relay a complaint from Eve-
lyn Hinckley and that he thereafter told her that, if she
wanted a grievance written up, she should approach him
rather than bother Tobin. As indicated, Tubbs conceded at
the hearing that he was "displeased" with Emmett
Hinckley's disposition of the Ferry grievance.
Hinckley testified that, in November 1975, Treasurer
Luckett told her that "I'd better watch myself, that John
was going to get me out of the crib and to put Marlene
Ferry back in it. I was going to lose my job." In the first
part of December, Luckett again told her that Tubbs was
6,The foregoing testimony predates the 10(b) period; it was received, with-
out objection, as background material
7 Beginning August 20, except for 8 days in December, Emmett Hinckley
was on sick leave until February 1976, and Tubbs was the acting chief
executive of Respondent
405
"going to get me out of the crib, that I was going to lose my
job." Luckett denied ever telling Hinckley that Tubbs was
after her job.
I found Evelyn Hinckley to be a thoughtful witness and
honest in demeanor. Tubbs was a rather defensive witness;
some of his testimony supported that given by Hinckley
and his sweeping denials were, in the situation,.implausi-
ble. The same -is true of Luckett. I do not believe that Eve-
lyn Hinckley fabricated these conversations, and I_ credit
her.
General Counsel contends that the several statements
made to Evelyn Hinckley by Tubbs that he was going to
have her replaced by Marlene Ferry constituted unlawful
threats in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A). I fully agree with
General Counsel's argument that "a threat to have an em-
ployee discharged in retaliation for that employee's dissent
over union positions of policy" violates that section, as the
cases cited by General Counsel indicate. Local 636, United
Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America,
AFL-CIO (Arco Industries, Inc.), 213 NLRB 61 (1974); cf.
International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 406 (New
Orleans Chapter, AGC), 189 NLRB 255, 265 (1971). I fur-
ther agree with General Counsel's assertion that the direc-
tion of such a threat against Evelyn Hinckley, for the man-
ner in which her husband Emmett had conducted the
business of the Union, would equally violate Section
8(b)(1)(A)._Cf. Local Union No. 513, affiliated with Interna-
tional Union of Operating Engineers (Maxon Construction
Co.), 183 NLRB 1134, 1138 (1970); Golub Bros. Conces-
sions, 140 NLRB 120, 128 (1962).
General Counsel, to a large extent, concentrates on the
relationship between Tubbs' statements about getting Eve-
lyn Hinckley "out of the crib" and his displeasure about
Emmett Hinckley's disposition of the Ferry grievance.
That relationship has its inner complications. This is not, a
case where a union official threatens random reprisal
against a relative of an employee because of the latter's
disfavored intraunion activities in regard to a matter alien
to the relative's own status. Here, it is clear that Tubbs in
good faith believed that Emmett Hinckley had mishandled
the Ferry grievance, and it would appear that he hoped to
reverse its resolution. The inevitable consequence of such a
reversal would be to get Evelyn Hinckley "out of the crib"
and Marlene Ferry, who had greater plant seniority, back
in.
It therefore seems to be somewhat of an over-simplifica-
tion to necessarily read every reference to getting Evelyn
out and Marlene in as a threat of blind reprisal; these state-
ments, abstractly, could be construed as conclusionary
summations of the natural result of righting what Tubbs
perceived to be a wrong done to Ferry.8
However, analysis of the testimony in the setting pre-
sented discloses various grounds, alluded to by General
Counsel, for concluding that Respondent committed viola-
tions of the Act. Although my reasoning below does not
8 I sincerely doubt that Tubbs or Luckett ever conveyed the thought that
Evelyn Hinckley was going to "lose [her] job," in the sense of terminating
employment, although her testimony occasionally contains such language. I
feel certain that, when Tubbs or Luckett spoke about her "losing her job,"
they meant, and she understood, the reference to be a transfer from her
current job to another one
406 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
wholly comport with the complaint allegation, the facts
could not have been more fully litigated, as an evidentiary
matter. I believe that I have the authority to make the fol-
lowing findings based on those facts; should Respondent
disagree with my legal conclusions, it may argue the points
of disagreement to the Board, by filing exceptions hereto.
According to Evelyn Hinckley, Tubbs told her on Au-
gust 13 that the committee "had signed off on the policy
grievance because Emmett had signed off on Marlene
Ferry's grievance." This statement conveyed to Evelyn
Hinckley, in no uncertain terms, that Tubbs and'the re-
mainder of the grievance committee had yielded on a
grievance in which she had a substantial interest because of
another decision taken by her husband in the performance
of his union duties. Such a statement falls comfortably
within the confines of the precedent earlier cited. It con-
veyed the message to Evelyn Hinckley that Tubbs was per-
fectly willing, when the opportunity arose, to sacrificethe
employment rights of employees with whom he disagreed
about union policies and practices. Such a statement may
reasonably be said to have a tendency to chill employees in
the exercise of their right to stake out dissenting positions
within the union structure, and, accordingly, to restrain
and coerce them in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.
On August 14, Tubbs told Evelyn Hinckley that she
should not have called Staff Representative Tobin to com-
plain about the resolution of the policy grievance, and that
she "wasn't going to be in the crib any longer; Marlene
Ferry would be in." Although Tubbs had indicated to Eve-
lyn in their April conversations that the reason Marlene
Ferry would be in the toolroom and Hinckley would be out
was because of his determination to reverse Emmett
Hinckley's disposition of the Ferry grievance, the August
14 statement made no reference to this matter. Instead, it
appeared to attribute the threatened displacement to
Tubbs' annoyance with Hinckley's call to Tobin. In con-
tacting Tobin to complain about the settlement of the poli-
cy grievance, Evelyn Hinckley was engaging in conduct
protected by Section 7; and in announcing his displeasure
with that action'in conjunction with the gratuitous state-
ment that she "wasn't going to be in the'crib'any longer;
Marlene Ferry would be in,"Tubbs foreseeably tended to
cause Hinckley to conclude that her removal would result
not merely as a consequence of a reversal of the Ferry
grievance, but because she had engaged in protected activi-
ty. By this statement, Tubbs violated Section 8(a)(1).9 The
fact that Tubbs later filed grievances on Hinckley's behalf,
after she continued to call Tobin, does not, in ',my opinion,
nullify the lingering and potentially combustible effect of
such a threat, especially since itwas renewed in November,
as discussed hereafter.
In November, after Hinckley had called Tobin, Tubbs
again approached her, told her "not to call Don Tobin
about anything or to talk to any other union officials about
anything, that I was to come directly to him," and repeated
9 This may, indeed, be the violation referred to in par. 5(b), above, which
I have dismissed General Counsel does not explain in his brief which evi-
dence is asserted to support the separate allegations of the complaint; the
only testimony as to an occurrence on August 11, referred to in par. 5(b),
was that given by Emmett Hinckley, discussed above.
that she would be "taken out of the crib." For the reasons
given above, I find this statement also to be violative of
Section 8(a)(1).
As discussed, Treasurer Luckett told Hinckley in No-
vember that "I'd better watch myself, that John was going
to get me out of the crib and put Marlene Ferry back in it."
The admonition that Hinckley had "better watch [herself]"
is not only ominous, but plainly suggests that it was her
ongoing activity in bypassing Tubbs and directly contact-
ing Tobin, rather than simply Tubbs' desire to undo the
Ferry grievance' resolution, which prompted the remark. In
December, Luckett repeated that Tubbs "was going to, get
[her] out of the crib." In the light of the thrust of Tubbs'
prior remarks, the connotation of Luckett's November cau-
tionary statement, and the reasonable inference arising
from this record that Tubbs and Luckett worked closely in
union affairs, Luckett's December statement likely carried
the same message as his November remark. I conclude,
accordingly, that by the foregoing conduct of George
Luckett` Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1).
'D. The Alleged Threat Uttered to Lyda Beehler
Paragraph-5(d) of the complaint alleges that in February
1976 Luckett "threatened-to `blackball' employees of the
Employer because their relatives had filed-chargeswith the
Board; and because said employees had encouraged said
relatives to file charges with the Board."
Lyda Beehler testified that, in February 1976, she had a
conversation with George Luckett in which Luckett said
that he had found out that Evelyn Hinckley had "filed
charges against the Union" and that "he would see if they
could . . . blackball" Emmett. Later in the day, however,
Luckett told Beehler that he had spoken to Emmett Hinck-
ley "and found out that Emmett wasn't behind the charges
that was [sic] filed." 10 Beehler testified that the thrust of
Luckett's statement was that Luckett was going to investi-
gate whether Hinckley could be "blackballed"; that she
had not understood what Luckett had meant by the term
"blackball";` and that she told neither of the Hinckleys
about the conversation.
Luckett recalled a conversation with Beehler in which he
said that Hinckley had told him he had nothing to do with
the charge filed by his wife. Luckett did not recall speaking
to Beehler about Hinckley being "blackballed:"
Beehler was a most impressive witness. Luckett's conces-
sion makes little sense except in the context testified to by
Beehler. I credit Beehler.
General Counsel constructs his argument on the persua-
sive theory that a statement made by a union official to an
employee that the union was contemplating punitive action
against another employee whose wife had "resorted to the
Board's processes" constitutes a violation of Section
8(b)(1)(A). International Union of Operating Engineers, Lo-
cal 139 (T. J. Butters Construction), 198 NLRB 1195, 1196
(1972); cf. N.L.R.B. v. Industrial Union of Marine & Ship-
building Workers [U.S. Lines Co.], 391 U.S. 418, 424 (1968),
approving Local 138,- International Union of Operating En-
"The record shows that Evelyn Hinckley filed the underlying charge
here on February 10, 1976.
UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 8061
gineers, AFL-CIO (Charles S. Skura), 148 NLRB 679, 681
(1964). The difficulty here is that Beehler did not testify
that Luckett indicated to her the nature of the charges
filed; she testified, "Well, he said that he had found out
that Evelyn Hinckley had filed charges against the Union,"
and that, later, Luckett told her that "Emmett wasn't be-
hind the charges that was [sic] filed." Unless Board pro-
cesses were reasonably implicated in the statements made
to Beehler, there is no basis for saying that the statements
would have a tendency to deter resort to those processes.
The word "charges," standing alone, is ambiguous-
Evelyn Hinckley could have filed any manner of charge
against the Respondent. I believe, however, that Luckett's
partial concession on this subject satisfactorily clarifies
what the two were talking about. Asked if he recalled a
conversation with Beehler "with respect to charges filed
before the National Labor Relations Board," Luckett an-
swered:
Ms. Beehler and I used to talk just about everyday,
you know, about different things; and she wanted
something moved, you know, general. And I think I
did hear something that day about Evelyn signing; I
mean something came up about the Umon, against the
Union. And if I am not mistaken, I did tell her that I
talked to Emmett, and Emmett told me he had noth-
ing to do with it, a signing against the Union at that
time.
In the context of the question posed, it is obvious that
Luckett and Beehler were speaking of the charge which
initiated this proceeding. The Board applied a similar anal-
ysis in The Hanna Building Corporation, 223 NLRB 703
(1976).
I therefore agree with General Counsel that Luckett's
first remarks about possibly "blackballing" Hinckley for
filing charges constituted a violation. I think General
Counsel is correct in arguing that, even though Beehler did
not understand the word "blackball," she perceived it to be
a punitive measure, as witnessed by her recall of a word
she did not know. I further agree with General Counsel
that Luckett's later remarks did not eradicate the ones first
uttered. While the Board has held that retraction of a
threat is a valid defense, The Powers Regulator Company,
149 NLRB 1185, 1186, In. 1 (1964), I think General Coun-
sel is correct in principle in contending that a retraction of
this nature-"We will not take action because we have dis-
covered that we were wrong about the facts"-hardly
amounts to a retraction of the underlying threat. Finally,
the fact that the proposed action was only in the formative
stage is no defense; see Millwright & Machinery Erectors
Local Union No. 720, United Brotherhood of Carpenters &
Joiners of America, AFL-CIO (National Maintenance Cor-
poration), 196 NLRB 673, 675 (1972).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent, United Steelworkers of America, Local
No. 8061, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the
meaning of the Act , and it will effectuate the purposes of
the Act for the Board to exercise jurisdiction over Respon-
dent.
407
2. By the statement of Vice President Tubbs to Evelyn
Hinckley, on or about August 13, 1975, that Respondent's
agents had not faithfully prosecuted a grievance whose res-
olution affected her employment conditions because of the
manner in which Evelyn Hinckley's husband had per-
formed his duties as president of Respondent; by'the state-
ment of Vice President Tubbs to Evelyn Hinckley, on or
about August 14, 1975, that her job might be affected by
the fact that she had filed a complaint with staff represen-
tative Tobin; by similar statements by Vice President
Tubbs to Evelyn Hinckley in November 1975, and by Trea-
surer Luckett in November and December 1975, and by
Treasurer Luckett's threat, in February 1976, to "black-
ball" Emmett Hinckley because his wife had filed charges
with the Board, Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of
the Act.
THE REMEDY
I shall recommend that Respondent be ordered to cease
and desist from the unfair labor practices found, and that it
be required to post appropriate notices.
General Counsel seeks a broad order; I do not believe
the circumstances warrant that remedy. General Counsel
further asks that a copy of the notice be mailed to each
member of Respondent, citing Millwright & Machinery
Erectors Local Union No. 720, supra, 196 NLRB at 675. The
Trial Examiner there predicated the unusual remedy of
mailing on the ground that "the record indicated that only
a small percentage of members attend membership meet-
ings." No such evidence is in this record. The normal reme-
dy, which will include posting at the plant, if the Company
is willing, seems sufficient.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommend-
ed:
ORDER 11
United Steelworkers of America, Local No. 8061, AFL-
CIO, Knox, Indiana, its officers, agents, and representa-
tives shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Telling employees that their grievances were not or
will not be faithfully prosecuted because of their protected
union activities or the protected union activities of others.
(b) Telling employees that their jobs might be adversely
affected by their participation in protected union activities.
(c) Telling employees that other employees might be
"blackballed" from the Respondent because of their parti-
cipation in filing charges with the Board.
(d) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing
its members or the employees it represents in the exercise
t In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec
102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes
408 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of their rights protected by Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
deemed necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Act:
(a) Post at its business office, and at all places where
notices to members are customarily posted, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix." 12 Copies of said no-
tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 25, shall be posted by Respondent after being duly
signed by its representaive, immediately upon receipt
thereof, and shall be maintained for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by Respondent to insure that the notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Mail to the Regional Director for Region 25 signed
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix," on
forms provided by the Regional Director, for posting by
Arrowhead Engineering Corporation in places at its Knox,
Indiana, facility where notices to employees are custom-
arily posted, if it is willing to do so.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 25, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
12 In the event the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE -
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing in which all parties had an opportunity to
present evidence, the National Labor Relations Board has
found that we have violated the National Labor Relations
Act and has ordered us to post this notice.
WE WILL NOT tell employees that their grievances
were not or will not be faithfully prosecuted because
of their protected union activities or the protected
union activities of others.
WE WILL NOT tell employees that their jobs might be
adversely affected by their participation in protected
union activities.
WE WILL NOT tell employees that an employee might
be punished by union discipline for filing, or encour-
aging the filing of, charges with the National Labor
Relations Board.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain
or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights pro-
tected by Section 7 of the Act.
UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA , LOCAL No.
8061, AFL-CIO