United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIODownload PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsAug 7, 1979243 N.L.R.B. 1157 (N.L.R.B. 1979) Copy Citation UNITEDI) STtLII.WORKRS () AMERI('A. A. ()1 United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO: United Steelworkers of America, Local No. 196, AFI.- CIO; United Steelworkers of America, Local No. 6850, AFL-CIO; United Steelworkers of America, Local No. 7508, AFL-CIO; International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 428, AFL-CIO; Construction, Production and Maintenance Labor- ers', Local No. 383, AFL-CIO; and Construction, Production and Maintenance Laborers', Local No. 479, AFL-CIO (Duval Corporation and Duval Sier- rita Corporation) and International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local No. 310. Case 28 CB 900 August 7, 1979 SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS JENKINS. MURPHY, AND TRtUiSI)ALE On November 4, 1976, the National Labor Rela- tions Board issued its Decision and Order in this pro- ceeding' in which it reversed the Administrative Law Judge's findings that various Respondent Unions had violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. Thereafter, the Charging Party petitioned the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia for review of the Board's Order. On August 1, 1978, a panel majority of the court ruled that the Board's Order was not supported by substantial evidence and the court remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. 2 On November 29, 1978, the Board accepted the court's remand and notified the parties that they could then file statements of position with regard to the issues raised by the remand. Subsequently, the Charging Party and Respondent filed statements of position. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the entire case in light of the court's decision and the statements of position on remand and we now enter the following findings. In the Board's original Decision, we reversed the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that Respon- 1226 NLRB 772. 2 587 F.2d 1176. The Administrative Law Judge had also dismissed com- plaint allegations against United Steelworkers of America. Local No. 196, AFL-CIO., and Production and Maintenance Laborers' Local No. 383. AFL-CIO. See 226 NLRB at 785. These dismissals were also upheld by the Board and not disturbed by the court of appeals' decision. Accordingl.), the designation "Respondents" in this Decision does not refer to these io unions. dents had violated Section 8(b)( )(A) of the Act by accepting a collective-bargaining agreement before the Charging Party had had an opportunity toratift it. We also reversed her finding that Respondents had further violated Section 8(b) I )(A) of the Act by ne- gotiating a strike-settlement agreement which b its terms made the Charging Party's members subject to disciplinary action or conduct which they could not know at the time they engaged therein was in viola- tion of the executed collective-bargaining agreement. Lastly, we reversed the Administrative Law Judge's finding that Respondents had violated Section 8bh)(2) when three of Charging Party's members were disci- plined for violating the terms of the collective-bar- gaining agreement. We therefore dismissed the com- plaint in its entiret. In its decision, the court reversed our first 8(b)( I )A) dismissal regarding the contract-ratifica- tion procedure. The court held that Respondents "did in fact deny the Teamsters the opportunity to ratify the collective-hargaining contract. and that in so doing those unions discriminated against the Team- sters 'in matters affecting their employment' [in viola- tion of Section 8(b)(I)(A)]."3 We have accepted that finding as the law of the case. With respect to our dismissal of the 8(bh(1)(A) allegation involving the strike-settlement agreement, the court found that con- clusion was "unsupported by substantial evidence."' The court instructed the Board upon remand to re- consider our conclusion on this issue. Upon reconsid- eration in light of the court's opinion, which as noted above we deem to be the law of the case, we now find a violation of Section 8(b)( I)(A) in Respondent's ac- tions involving the strike-settlement agreement. I. As pertinent here. the record reveals that the Charging Party and Respondents are jointly certified and bargain jointly with the Employer. Notwith- standing this joint certification. there had been dissen- sion between Respondents and Charging Party for years preceding the 1974 negotiations at issue. The 1974 negotiations began in August to replace the con- tract which was to expire on September 30, 1974.5 It is important that, at the outset of negotiations, the Employer told Respondents and the Charging Party of its understanding that negotiations would continue on a joint basis and that, once the spokesman for the unions informed the Employer that a contract had been reached, then a new agreement existed. The unions agreed to this. The spokesman for the unions was James Smith, a Steelworkers member. Joint negotiations continued through October 1. but then recessed so that the Charging Party's mem- Id at 1184. 4Id at 1185. All dates are 1974 unless noted otherwlse. 243 NLRB No. 162 II 7 I)E('ISIONS () NATIONA. ABO()R REI.Al'IONS BOAR) bership could vote that night on extending the old contract. Its membership voted instead to reject the contract's extension and to strike. Charging Party so apprised Respondents and set up picket lines. Later the same evening, however, negotiations with the other Unions, including the Charging Party, recom- menced, and the Employer increased its wage offer. On October 2, Respondents held ratification meetings to consider the new proposal and it was accepted. Smith, the spokesman for the joint negotiating com- mittee, told the Charging Party's representative there was a contract and that, accordingly, its strike was illegal. He also told the Employer there was a con- tract. It is clear that under the terms of the parties' bargaining arrangement, described above, a contract had, in fact, come into existence. On October 3, the Charging Party's representatives were told repeatedly that the strike was illegal, as a contract was then in effect. They replied that their membership had not voted on the contract yet but would do so that evening. That night the Charging Party's membership ratified the contract and took down the picket lines. Negotiations toward a strike-settlement agreement had begun on the afternoon of October 3. The Charg- ing Party's representative neither participated in these negotiations nor executed the strike-settlement agree- ment. In fact, they were not even made aware of the meeting at which agreement on the strike settlement was reached. The agreement provided, inter alia. that any employee who had continued to picket after 9:30 p.m., on October 2. in violation of the new contract's no-strike clause, would be subject to discharge or dis- cipline. The record reveals that, when the agreement was reached, Smith and the other bargaining officials of the joint representative were aware that the Charg- ing Party's members had continued to picket after the agreed-upon deadline. Indeed, the Administrative Law Judge, discrediting Smith's testimony to the con- trary, found that the provision on discipline was pro- posed not by the Employer's representatives but by Smith. Based on the above, and in light of the court's opinion, we now find that by proposing and entering into the strike-settlement agreement which subjected the Charging Party's members to discharge or disci- pline for action undertaken at a time when they could not be expected to know that a new contract contain- ing a no-strike clause had been concluded, Respon- dents violated Section 8(b)( )(A) of the Act. Respon- dents, as joint representatives of the unit involved herein, owed a duty of fair representation to all their constituency, including those employees who were members of the Charging Party. In accordance with the obligation imposed by this duty Respondents were required not to engage knowingly in any activity that could jeopardize the employment status of any unit member. It is apparent that by the above con- duct Respondents breached their duty by. "deliber- ately and unfairly subjectling] Teamsters employees to an unreasonable risk of discharge for unknowing conduct. "6 2. With respect to the 8(b)(2) allegation, the record shows that on October 4 the Employer discharged two employees represented by the Charging Party and disciplined a third for picketing on October 2 and 3 in violation of the no-strike clause. The Administra- tive Law Judge found that Respondents' 8(b)(1)(A) violation with respect to the strike settlement agree- ment had directly contributed to the workers' disci- pline and thereby that Respondents had violated Sec- tion 8(b)(2) of the Act. As noted, the Board in its original Decision dismissed this complaint allegation. Although the court expressed no view on the merits of the 8(b)(2) allegation, it did state that if the Board concluded that Respondents had violated Section 8(b)(I)(A) of the Act regarding the strike-settlement agreement on remand- the Board should consider whether that breach per e constitutes a violation of §8(b)(2) or whether more evidence of an attempt to cause discharge is necessary. If the Board finds a viola- tion of §8(b)(2), it should consider whether that violation was causally related to the disciplining of the three Teamsters employees, giving appro- priate weight to the ALJ's findings of union and employer hostility towards them. In this connec- tion the Board should also consider the relevance of the General Counsel's determination that Du- val, in firing the workers, did not discriminate against them in regard to tenure of employment in violation of §8(a)(3).7 With the court's instruction in mind, we conclude that Respondents violated Section 8(b)(2) of the Act in this proceeding. The reasons for our so concluding are largely those reasons relied on to find the 8(b)(1)(A) violation with respect to the strike-settle- ment agreement noted above. As the Administrative Law Judge found: The failure to notify the Teamsters of the sched. uled strike settlement negotiations, coupled with the proposals made and accepted by Smith which operated to the detriment of Teamsters employees, particularly in the circumstances of Respondents' animus toward Charging Party, in- dicates something far beyond mere negligence. Actually, Respondents' conduct had the effect of 6587 F.2d at 1185. 7 ld. at 1185. I 1 58 UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA. AFL CIO inviting company reprisals against the picketing employees.8 Indeed, as the Administrative Law Judge further ob- served: [B]ut for this breach of the ... duty of fair repre- sentation, Broome, Garrett, and Ortiz [the em- ployees who were disciplined] would not have been in the posture of engaging in activity in vio- lation of the no-strike clause which subjected them to the penalties of the strike settlement agreement.9 Accordingly, we find that Respondents violated Sec- tion 8(b)(2) of the Act in this proceeding and we also find that the violation "was causally related to the disciplining"10 which the employees received. While the court also remarked that there was "considerable evidence of employer hostility [emphasis supplied]"'' to the disciplined employees we conclude that the 8(b)(2) violation is made out because Respondent's conduct clearly had the intended "effect of inviting company reprisals against the picketing employees."' 2 If, as it did, the Employer took up that invitation, an 8(b)(2) violation is established. Lastly, our conclusion that Respondents violated Section 8(b)(2) of the Act, is in no way diminished by the General Counsel's failure to allege an 8(a)(3) vio- lation against the Employer in the discipline. Under Section 3(d) of the Act, the issuance of a complaint is exclusively the province of the General Counsel. In this case, he decided not to issue a complaint against the Employer. We conclude that this does not prevent us from finding an 8(b)(2) violation in the proceeding brought before us for consideration. ORDER'3 Pursuant to the provisions of Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order, the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge as modified herein and hereby orders that the Respondent, United Steelworkers of America, AFL- CIO; United Steelworkers of America, Local No. 6850, AFL-CIO: United Steelworkers of America Local No. 7508, AFL-CIO; International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 428, AFL-CIO; and ' 226 NLRB at 786. 9 Id at 787. 1' 587 F.2d at 1185. Id at 1180. 2 226 NLRB at 786 (emphasis supplied). i~ We have set out the Administrative Law Judge's recommended Order and notice in full. In addition, we have provided in the Order and notice a paragraph indicating that Respondents have no objection to the reinstate- ment of James Broome and Vertis R. Garrett. Construction, Production and Maintenance Laborers, Local No. 479, AFL CIO; Pima and Mojave Coun- ties, Arizona, their officers, agents, and representa- tives, shall: I. Cease and desist from: (a) Attempting to cause or causing Duval Corpo- ration and Duval Sierrita Corporation to discriminate against employees because they are members, or sup- porters, of Teamsters Local No. 310 in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. (b) Restraining or coercing unit employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act by failing to represent them in a fair and impar- tial manner. (c) In any other manner restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Jointly and severally make Ignacio Ortiz whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered as a result of his suspension on October 18. 1974. in the manner set forth in the section of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision entitled "The Remned." (b) Jointly and severally make James Broome and Vertis R. Garrett whole individually for an3 loss of earnings they may have suffered as a result of their discharge on October 4, 1974, with interest in the manner set forth in the section of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision entitled "The RemedN." (c) Notify Duval Corporation and Duval Sierrita Corporation, in writing, with a copy to Jamles Broome and Vertis R. Garrett, that it has no objec- tion to the hiring or employment of James Broome and Vertis R. Garrett. and recommend that theN be unconditionally reinstated to their former jobs. or, it they no longer exist, to a substantially equivalent po- sition, without loss of benefits or seniority. (d) Post at its business office, meeting halls, or other places where it customarily posts notices copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."l4 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 28, shall, after being duly signed by authorized representatives of Respondents, be posted by said Respondents immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by them for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees and members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondents to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 4 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of.1 a nited States Court of Appeals. the words n the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judg- ment of the United States Court (of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board'" 1 59 DECISIONS OF- NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (e) Sign and mail to the Regional Director for Re- gion 28 sufficient copies of said notice on forms pro- vided by him, for posting at the premises of Duval Corporation and Duval Sierrita Corporation, if said employers are willing. (f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 28, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order. what steps Respondents have taken to comply here- with. APPENDIX NOTI(E To EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF HIE NATIONAl. LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a hearing at which all sides had a chance to give evidence, the National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post this notice and we intend to carry out the Order of the Board and abide by the following: The Act gives all employees these rights: To engage in self-organization To form, join, or help unions To bargain collectively through representa- tives of their choosing To act together for collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection To refrain from any or all of these things. WE WIIL NI do anything that restrains or coerces employees with respect to these rights. More specifically: WE WILl. NOT fail or refuse during collective bargaining, or otherwise, to represent unit em- ployees in a fair and impartial manner who are members, or supporters, of Teamsters Local 310. Wi WILt. NOT attempt to cause, or cause, Du- val Corporation or Duval Sierrita Corporation to discharge or otherwise discipline or discriminate against employees who are members, or support- ers, of Teamsters Local 310 in violation of Sec- tion 8(a)(3) of the Act. WE WILL NOT in any other manner restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. WE Wi.lL jointly and severally make whole James Broome, Vertis R. Garrett, and Ignacio Ortiz, with interest, for any loss of pay they suf- fered as a result of our failing to represent unit employees in a fair and impartial manner. WI wii notify Duval Corporation and Duval Sierrita Corporation, in writing, with a copy to James Broome and Vertis R. Garrett, that we have no objection to the hiring or employment of James Broome and Vertis R. Garrett and will recommend their unconditional reinstatement to their former jobs or, if they no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions without loss of benefits or seniority. UNIlil) SIEII.WORKERS OF AMIRIfCA, AFL CIO UNITED STEIIWO()RKIRS ()F AMERICA, Lo- A('I No. 6850, AFL ('IO UlNIi II) S I WfRKIRS () ARI(A. 1.0)- (Al No. 7508, AFI. (10 INII:RNAII)NAI. UNI()N ()I OPIRAIIN; EN- (;INI I1RS, LO( Al. No. 428, AFL CIO ((CONS I RtIC I lO)N. PROU()I)' IO)N AND MAINI- NAN( I L.ABORERS. LOC()(AI. No. 429, AFL CIO 160 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation