United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 31, 1960

126 N.L.R.B. 1367 (N.L.R.B. 1960)

UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA , AFL-CIO 1367
United Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO, and Laurel Hill
Refinery Workers Union , Local No. 4355 , United Steelworkers
of America , AFL-CIO, and its agent, Jack W. Clark and
Phelps Dodge Refining Corporation . Case No. 92-CC-518.
March 31, 1960
DECISION AND ORDER
On December 30, 1959, Trial Examiner Henry S. Salim issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondents had engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair
labor practices and recommending that they cease and desist there-
from and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of
the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respond-
ents and the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Intermediate
Report and supporting briefs.' Phelps Dodge Refining Corporation,
the Charging Party herein, filed a brief in support of the Intermediate
Report.
The Board 2 has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.'
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the In-
termediate Report,4 the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record
in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner.5
ORDER
Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
1 The Respondent also requested oral argument This request is hereby denied as the
record, including the exceptions and briefs , adequately presents the issues and positions
of the parties.
'Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, the
Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three -member panel
(Chairman Leedom and Members Bean and Fanning].
8 The General Counsel contends that the Trial Examiner erred ( 1) in striking certain
testimony regarding picketing by the Respondents at point D on August 18, 1959, and
(2) in rejecting the General Counsel's offer to prove that the Respondents also picketed
at point D on August 19, 1959. We agree with the General Counsel that the Trial
Examiner 's ruling in each instance was unduly restrictive and therefore erroneous.
However, in view of the Board's decision herein , we find that the Trial Examiner's error
was not prejudicial
4 The Trial Examiner inadvertently stated that the two individuals with Superintendent
Coleman when , on August 3, he drove past Respondents ' pickets stationed at point E were
employees . In this regard the Trial Examiner apparently relied on the testimony of
William R. Cooke , works engineer for Phelps Dodge, who testified that Coleman had two
of his employees with him. Coleman , however , testified that the two men were foremen.
In these circumstances , we do not rely on this incident in finding the violation herein.
E We agree with the Trial Examiner that on the issues in the instant case General
Electric Company , Appliance and Television Receiver Division, 123 NLRB 1547, and not
Ryan Construction Corporation , 85 NLRB 417, is controlling . Moreover , the Ryan case
has been overruled to the extent that it is inconsistent with the General Electric case.
See Local No 36 , International Chemical Workers Union, AFL-CIO ( Virginia- Carolina
Chemical Corporation ), 126 NLRB 905.
126 NLRB No. 168.
1368 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Relations Board hereby orders that Respondent Laurel Hill Refinery
Workers Union, Local No. 4355, United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO, and its agent, Jack W. Clark, and Respondent United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, their officers, representatives,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Picketing the gate or the approaches thereto at Phelps Dodge
Refining Corporation's Maspeth, New York, plant, reserved exclu-
sively for the employees of the contractors named herein.
(b) In any like or related manner engaging in, or inducing or
encouraging the employees of A. Munder and Son, Inc., Lipsett, Inc.,
M. W. Kellogg Co., Mineola Steel Fabricators, Inc., T. F. Contracting
Co., Inc., or of any other employer except Phelps Dodge Refining
Corporation, to engage in a strike or a concerted refusal in the course
of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or other-
wise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities,
or to perform any services, where an object thereof is to force or re-
quire A. Munder and Sons, Inc., Lipsett, Inc., M. W. Kellogg Co.,
Mineola Steel Fabricators, Inc., T. F. Contracting Co., Inc., or any
other employer or person, to cease doing business with Phelps Dodge
Refining Corporation at its Maspeth, New York, plant.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds
will effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Post in conspicuous places at Respondent Local's business
offices and meeting halls and all other places where notices or com-
munications to its members are customarily posted, copies of the
notice attached hereto marked "Appendix." 6 Copies of said notice,
to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Second Region,
shall, after being duly signed by representatives of the Respondent
Unions and by the Respondent Clark, be posted by them immediately
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by them for a period of 60
consecutive days thereafter. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Re-
spondents to insure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or cov-
ered by any other material.
(b) Furnish to the said Regional Director signed copies of the
aforementioned notice for posting by Phelps Dodge Corporation and
A. Munder and Sons, Inc., Lipsett, Inc., M. W. Kellogg Co., Mineola
Steel Fabricators, Inc., T. F. Contracting Co., Inc., they being will-
ing, at places where they customarily post notices to their employees.
(c) Notify the Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from
the date of this Order, what steps have been taken to comply herewith.
6In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of
Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the
words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order."
'UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO 1369
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA,
AFL-CIO, AND LAUREL HILL REFINERY WORKERS UNION, LOCAL
No. 4355, UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National
Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify you that :
WE WILL NOT engage in, or induce or encourage the employees
of A. Munder and Sons, Inc., Lipsett, Inc., M. W. Kellogg Co.,
Mineola Steel Fabricators, Inc., T. F. Contracting Co., Inc., or of
any other employer except Phelps Dodge Refining Corporation,
to engage in a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their
employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise
handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities,
or to perform any services, where an object thereof is to force
or require A. Munder and Sons, Inc., Lipsett, Inc., M. W. Kel-
logg Co., Mineola Steel Fabricators, Inc., T. F. Contracting Co.,
Inc. or any other employer or person to cease doing business with
Phelps Dodge Refining Corporation.
WE WILL NOT picket the gate or the approaches thereto at
Phelps Dodge Refining Corporation reserved exclusively for the
employees of the contractors named in the preceding paragraph.
LOCAL No. 4355, LAUREL HILL
REFINERY WORKERS UNION,
Labor Organization.
Dated---------------- By-------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
JACK W. CLARK, AGENT LOCAL No. 4355,
LAUREL HILL REFINERY WORKERS UNION,
Individual.
Dated---------------- By-------------------------------------
(JACK W. CLARK)
UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO,
Labor Organization.
Dated---------------- By-------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case was heard in New York City on October 5, 6, and 7, 1959, on complaint
of the General Counsel and the answer of the Respondents. All parties were
1370 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
represented at the hearing and accorded full participation. At the conclusion of the
General Counsel's case-in-chief, the Respondents rested and offered no testimony.'
Ruling was reserved upon the motion of the Respondents to dismiss the proceeding
and is hereby ruled upon in accordance with the findings and conclusions made herein.
ISSUE
Respondent Union was seeking to negotiate a new collective-bargaining agreement
with Phelps Dodge, the Charging Party, covering the employees the Union repre-
sented at the Laurel Hill Smelter and Refinery. When these negotiations failed to
produce an agreement, the Union called a strike against the Company. A few days
before the strike, the Company, Phelps Dodge, constructed a special gate, with
a sign posted on it, reading, "Contractors Only" restricted to the exclusive use of
employees of various contractors participating in a construction project for the
Company which had been underway for several months prior to the strike. The
Union had no dispute with these contractors. When the strike commenced, the
Union, in addition to picketing the regular gates through which the Company's
employees entered or left the plant premises, picketed the special gate reserved for
the exclusive use of the contractors and their employees, as well as the vehicles which
transported them and necessary equipment and supplies. The signs carried by the
pickets at all gates read: "On Strike, Phelps Dodge Local No. 4355, United Steel-
workers of America, AFL-CIO. Don't scab." Another sign read the same except
that it substituted the words "keep away" for the words "Don't scab." The picketing
was effective as all the independent contractors' employees refused to cross the picket
line so that they were unable to proceed with the construction project and there has
been no production at the Company's plant up until the time of the hearing. The
salient issue in this proceeding is whether the Union's picketing at the gate set aside
for the exclusive use of the various independent contractors, who were unconnected
with the Phelps Dodge dispute, violated Section 8(b)(4)(A) of the Act?
'Upon the entire record in this case, upon consideration of the arguments and
motions of counsel, including the excellent briefs filed by counsel for the Respondent
and counsel for the Charging Party and citations of cases alleged to be dispositive of
the issue in this proceeding,3 the Trial Examiner makes the following:
1In a suit at law, this is equivalent to a motion for a directed verdict and for purposes
of the motion the movant "admits every fact in evidence which tends to sustain the
[other side's] case and every inference reasonably deducible therefrom " Hellweg v.
C & P Tel. Co , 110 F. 2d 546 (C.A, D C.)
z The relevant provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat.
136, 29 U.S.C, Sees. 151 et seq.), are as follows•
Sec 8 (b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents-
a x s s r a
(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to
engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use,
manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles,
materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is •
(A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join any labor or
employer organization or any employer or other person to cease using, selling,
handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer,
processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person ; . .
The representative of the General Counsel failed to file a brief. As a result, the
Trial Examiner does not have the benefit of a formalized statement based upon the
transcribed record giving his analysis of the facts, applicable law, and the specific
reasons for the contentions made This is particularly necessary in this proceeding
which involves a novel question of law, as these "separate-gate-for-contractors" cases
have introduced a new facet of interpretation in construing Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the
Act as there is comparatively little law on this aspect of so-called secondary boycott
situations. Moreover, it is strange. indeed, for one to investigate the case, interview
witnesses, prepare for hearing, present the case, argue it and fight for it before and
during the hearing, but when the issue reaches climax on the battlefield of decision, and
after the evidence is in and the hearing is at an end, to fold one's tent of advocacy by
neglecting to file a brief and silently steal away leaving the Trial Examiner to surmise,
in some 'instances, what are the theories upon which the case is being tried, as well as
the specific contentions. This is provokingly irksome in those situations where litigants
not only fall to advance legal theories and evaluations of the facts at the hearing and
also neglect to file briefs after the hearing, but wait until the Trial Examiner finds
UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO 1371
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER
Phelps Dodge Refining Corporation, a New York corporation, and the Charging
Party herein, has plants in Maspeth, New York, called the Laurel Hill plant, the
one involved in this proceeding, and another in Texas, both of which are engaged
in the smelting and refining of copper ores and in the sale and distribution of copper
products. During the year 1958, Phelps Dodge manufactured, sold, and distributed
at these two plants copper products in an amount valued in excess of $1,000,000,
of which products valued in excess of $1,000,000 were shipped from said plants in
interstate commerce directly to States of the United States other than the States in
which these plants are located. It is found, therefore, that Phelps Dodge is engaged
in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
It is admitted and found that Respondent International and Respondent Local
each are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
A. Background
In April 1959, Phelps Dodge Refining Corporation, hereinafter referred to as
"the Company," embarked on a $1,800,000 construction project at its Laurel Hill
Copper Smelter and Refinery located at Maspeth, New York, to provide a new gas-
handling and dust-collecting system that would bring the plant into compliance with
the requirements of the New York City Board of Air Pollution Control. -Contracts
were made with various contractors for work on the project under the supervision
of an independent engineering firm. These contractors included, among others,
T. F. Contracting Co., Inc., A. Munder and Sons, Inc., M. W. Kellogg Co., Lipsett,
Inc., and Mineola Steel Fabricators, Inc., all of whom had started on construction
of this project before August 3, 1959, the date the Respondent Unions went on strike.
Three days before the strike, on July 31, negotiations for a new contract broke
off between the Company and the Respondent Unions. Respondent Local represents
the plant's approximately 1,000 production workers, all of whom went on strike 4
It is agreed that this was a lawful strike. There has been no production by the
Company since that time.
In anticipation of the possibility of a breakdown in negotiations, the Company,
about a week before the strike, had an opening cut in the chain link fence at the
plant's extreme southeast corner and installed a gate, bearing a sign, facing out,
reading: "CONTRACTORS ONLY." This is marked "F" on General Counsel's
Exhibit No. 2 which is a map of the plant including the gates and its environs
attached to this report as an appendix, to which reference will be made hereinafter
in describing the relevant physical surroundings necessary to understand and
determine the issues in this proceeding. The contractors were notified that in the
adversely to them in his Intermediate Report and then, for the first time, propound their
factual concepts and legal theories to the Board in their bill of exceptions and brief
filed with the Board. If they had argued these contentions in their briefs the Trial
Examiner would have been, at least, afforded the opportunity to discuss these contentions
in his Intermediate Report, which, in turn, as a matter of sound administrative law
principles, would facilitate both Board and judicial review. The representative of the
General Counsel did argue orally at the hearing, but this is necessarily inadequate because
only after the turbulence of the hearing room has subsided, and the spoken word has been
transferred to the written transcript, can the testimony elicited during the heat of hear-
ing be accurately recalled, dispassionately reviewed and intelligently argued. Such steps
are conducive to establishing a well-laid foundation which is the necessary keystone upon
which the structure of argument can be erected and the pinnacle of advocacy sturdily
built. As was recently stated by Member Fanning (address before the New Orleans
Chapter of the Federal Bar Association, October 19, 1959) :
. .. the briefs of counsel play nearly as large a part in putting flesh on a statute as
the decisions of the judges. Careful and incisive analysis by counsel is the founda-
tion of sound decisions The more intricate the statute, the more important such
analysis is to just decisions.
4 Twenty-five employees who are represented by the International Union of Operating
Engineers and who maintain the distribution of power and related services, remained at
work, as did approximately 60 of the plant's clerical employees and supervisory personnel
who continued to use the main gate to enter and leave the plant.
1372 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
event of a strike they were to use the contractors' gate only and that those company
maintenance, clerical, and supervisory employees who were not on strike would not
be permitted to use the contractors' gate.
On July 31, during the last negotiation meeting preceding the strike, Howard
Barkell , vice president of Phelps Dodge, notified the Respondent Unions that a gate
had been constructed in the fence at the southeast corner of the plant premises; 5
that this gate was to be used as a means of ingress and egress by the contractors,
their employees, and suppliers exclusively,6 and that company employees would not
be permitted to use it.
When the strike began on August 3, 1959, company supervisors, who had been
instructed that no company employees ( including supervisors) were to be admitted
through the contractors' gate, were stationed as guards inside the gate, around the
clock, to prevent anyone using the contractors' gate other than contractors and their
employees who had already been working on the construction project for 3 to 4
months prior to the strike. Nonstriking employees have never used the contractors'
gate since the strike began. They entered and left the plant premises through the
main gate which is marked "A" on the map attached hereto.
The contractors' gate can be reached by automobile, which was the exclusive
means of transportation used by the contractors and their employees, by traveling
the following route: Through the junction of 49th Street and 56th Street, across the
Long Island Railroad tracks at Haberman's Crossing which is marked "D" on the
above-referred-to map; then down 49th Street and into a roadway a short distance
south of 57th Avenue (point E); then down the roadway and over graded land to
point F, the contractors' gate. It is conceded that in order to get to the contractors'
gate, it is necessary to pass points E and F.
Point D is approximately 950 feet from the company property line at its nearest
point. In other words, the projected distance from the northeasternmost part of
the Phelps Dodge property line north to 56th Road and thence east along 56th Road
to point D is approximately 950 feet. The distance from point D to point E and
thence to point F is approximately 1,550 feet.
On or about August 3, the Respondents established picket lines at Haberman's
Crossing, which is located at the intersection of 56th Road and 49th Street (D);
and on 49th Street, south of D at a point where people and vehicles would turn onto
a graded roadway (E) until they reached the contractors' gate (F) where there were
also pickets?
The signs carried by the pickets read: "On Strike, Phelps Dodge Local No. 4355,
United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, Don't Scab." Some of the signs read
"Keep Away" instead of "Don't Scab." The Respondent Unions picketed the con-
tractors' gate and points D and E from August 3 to the morning of August 11 .8
1. The testimony
While driving south on 49th Street with two of his employees about 8 a.m. on
August 3, Coleman, field superintendent of T. F. Contracting Co., turned right at
point E in order to enter the contractors' gate at point F. As he drove past Re-
spondents' pickets stationed at E, they ran after Coleman's automobile but he
apparently outdistanced them. William R. Cooke, works engineer for Phelps
Dodge, who was in the vicinity where this occurred and witnessed it, testified that
a Phelps Dodge employee named Zarate, one of the pickets, who is also a shop
steward for the Union, came over to him and said: "You got one through. Who
was it and what was his name?" Cooke did not answer and walked away.
John J. Licastro, personnel office manager of Phelps Dodge, testified that on the
morning of August 3 he saw a company employee, John DelGado, take a 2-by-8-foot
board which had nails hammered in it and protruding through the board and place
it with the nail points facing upward on the roadway leading to the contractors'
gate. Licastro testified that the nail-embedded board covered a "major portion of
the road" with a 1,1/z-foot clearance on each side so that it was "impossible"
5 Representing the Union were Angelo Botton and George Hobaugh, subdistrict directors
of the International Union ; Jack Clark, president of the Local Union, and Sam Rothbard,
counsel for the Respondents.
6 Phelps Dodge purchasing department notified all its suppliers to stop deliveries to
the plant.
IIt was agreed that the picketing at points A, C, and G (General Counsel's Exhibit
No. 2) was lawful . The=issue in this proceeding involves the picketing at points D,
E, and F.
8 See footnote 12.
55..
MAIN
DR
J 1 in.=1,60 ft.
General Counsel's Exhibit No. 2
1374 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
for a car seeking to pass through the contractors' gate to do so without driving
across the nail-embedded board.
John R. Smith, a Phelps Dodge foreman, testified that on August 3, about 8 a.m.,
he saw an automobile driven by an employee (not a supervisor) of A. Munder and
Son, one of the contractors on the smoke-elimination project, turn right from
56th Road into 49th Street at point D, stopped by a picket who said: "You can't go
in; they're on strike" whereupon the Munder employee said: "I am not going to
work. I'm only going to pick up [my] tools." 9
At approximately 8 a.m. on August 10, an automobile driven by Coleman, field
superintendent for T. F. Contracting Co., who was accompanied by two non-
supervisory employees, McCoy and Valentine, was prevented from entering the
contractors' gate because of an automobile and card table placed in front of the
gate in a way that made access impossible. On both the automobile and card table
were signs reading:
On Strike
Phelps-Dodge Refinery Workers
Local 4355
Don't Scab
Manning the picket line at this time and place were four striking employees, mem-
bers of the Respondent Unions, two of whom were named DeGennero and White-
head. When Coleman asked the pickets to move the automobile and card table
from the entranceway to the contractors' gate, so that he could drive in through the
gate, DeGennero replied that he was not the driver of the car, whereupon he
walked away from the vicinity of the contractors' gate.
Shortly afterward, another group of pickets arrived at the contractors' gate,
headed by Joseph Stanisci, recording secretary of the Local Union; Chester Pietrzac,
member of the grievance and negotiating committees; Purvis Peaks, and Sal Casale,
all of whom are employees of the Company. Stanisci walked over to the auto-
mobile stopped in front of the entranceway to the contractors' gate by the auto-
mobile and card table and in which were sitting Coleman and the two employees
and he asked them "if they were Valley Stream" to which Coleman replied, "No." 10
Stanisci then asked Coleman, "Aren't you going to honor our picket line?" Coleman
answered that he had checked with his union and "As far as [their union ] was con-
cerned it was all right for us to go to work. . . To this Stanisci replied that "he
expected they would observe the picket line" and then asked the two employees of
the T. F. Contracting Co., who were in the auto with Coleman to what local they
belonged. Coleman answered for them, giving Stanisci the men's local union num-
ber. The conversation ended when Stanisci said to the occupants of the car "that he
wasn't going to stop anybody from coming in [to the plant], but they expected that
the men would observe the picket line."
Franklin W. Richardson, works manager of Phelps Dodge Laurel Hill plant, then
walked over to where Stanisci was standing and asked him if "They would clear the ac-
cess to the contractors' gate [and] if they weren' t going to then we would leave.. .
Stanisci didn't answer me [Richardson], but he went over and talked to a group of
pickets cluttered around the card table. We waited a few minutes and no one made
a move to clear the [auto and card table from in front of the] gate, so I directed
Mr. Coleman and our people to leave. We then left."
On the morning of August 11 about 8 o'clock, four or five pickets, all striking
company employees, were again at the contractors' gate walking back and forth
with the same signs they had carried on the previous days. Two automobiles, the
lead car of which was driven by Jensen, superintendent of M. W. Kellogg Company,
one of the contractors working on the construction project, drove up to the en-
tranceway of the contractors' gate where they were stopped by Morano, chairman
of Respondents' grievance and negotiating committees. Morano walked around to
the side of the car driven by Jensen, and in the hearing of the employees sitting in
Jensen 's car, spoke with Jensen." Shortly thereafter, John Bilotti , vice president
of Respondent Local, joined the pickets grouped around Jensen's car and asked
9In addition to guards who were stationed at the contractors' gate, supervisory per-
sonnel of Phelps Dodge were in the area of the contractors' gate in order to direct
contractors, their employees, and their suppliers how to reach the recently installed
contractors' gate.
1o Valley Stream was formerly the name of the T. F Contracting Co.
11 Ford Radio & Mica Corporation, 115 NLRB 1046, 1047; cf. Dallas General Drivers,
etc., Local No. 745, AFL-CIO ( Associated Wholesale Grocery of Dallas, Inc.), 118
NLRB 1251, 1255.
UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO 1375
Jensen and the other men in Jensen's car if they were union men, to which they
all replied they were. When Bilotti mentioned the picket line, Jensen stated that
they were there to go to work on the construction project as he had been informed
that a court order had been issued enjoining picketing at the contractors' gate but
as long as there was picketing there, he would not cross the picket line. The con-
tractors' gate picket line was disbanded about 10:30 a.m. that same morning,
whereupon Jensen and the Kellogg employees entered the plant premises and began
work on the smoke-elimination construction project.12
2. Contentions
The General Counsel contends that the case at bar is similar in all respects to
the General Electric Company case 13 where the Board held that a union violated
Section 8(b) (4) (A) by picketing an employer's plant gate that was used exclusively
by employees of independent contractors who had construction contracts with the
employer. Such picketing, held the Board, was not part of "traditional" primary
strike action protected by the Act since its object in picketing at the contractors'
gate "was to enmesh these employees of the neutral employers in its dispute with
the company" with the object of inducing employees of the neutral contractors to
cease work in order to force these contractors to stop doing business with the Com-
pany with whom the Union had its dispute.
Essentially, the Respondents' argument resolves itself down to the proposition
that the Board erred in holding as it did in the General Electric case, and that it is
hopeful that the courts will not follow the Board's decision. Respondents' counsel
also asserts that its conduct was lawful primary picketing because it occurred at the
premises of the employer with whom it had a labor dispute and consequently the
Union had a right to induce employees of secondary employers to refuse to work.
Moreover, argue Respondents, the General Electric decision is contrary to the
Board's holding in the Ryan Construction Corporation case,14 which held picketing,
under the same circumstances as occurred in the instant case, to be lawful.
3. Discussion and conclusions
The salient question to be decided is whether it was a violation within the mean,
ing of Section 8(b) (4) (A) 15 for the Respondent labor organizations to picket the
contractors' gate which resulted in employees of the contractors refusing to cross
the picket line, or whether such activity was not only lawful primary activity but
it also comes within the protective coverage of Section 13.15 This question and
the conclusions reached herein require some understanding of the various interpreta-
tions that the Board and the courts have placed upon Section 8(b) (4) (A) with
respect to what picketing is permissible and which is impermissible.
In essence, Section 8(b) (4) (A) generally makes it unlawful for a labor union
to apply pressure to the employees of an employer in order to urge said employees
to refuse to perform work for the "object" of compelling their employer to cease
doing business with the struck employer. To warrant an unfair labor practice finding
under this section, two factors must combine: (1) the alleged activities must have
as an object the forcing or requiring any employer to cease doing business with any
person; and (2) the activities must constitute inducement and encouragement of
employees in the course of their employment.17
13 A temporary restraining order had been issued the day before, on August 10, by the
U S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York enjoining Respondents from
picketing at Haberman's Crossing (D), "the contractors' gate or any approach thereto."
It appears, however, that the Unions' pickets were not notified by their attorney until
approximately 10.30 a.m. on August 11 that the Federal court had issued such an
order on the day before, whereupon picketing was discontinued and the pickets left.
13 Local 761, International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO
(General Electric Company, Appliance and Television Receiver Division), 123 NLRB 1547
14 United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, et at (Ryan Construction
Corporation), 85 NLRB 417.
is Footnote 2, supra.
19 Section 13 of the Act provides.
Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so
as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or
to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right
17 Wadsworth Building Company, Inc., et al , 81 NLRB 802, 805.
1376 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Although Section 8(b) (4) (A) defines the prohibited activity without using the
term "secondary boycott," 18 the legislative history of this section makes it abundantly
clear that secondary boycotts are an unfair labor practice.19 Senator Taft in dis-
cussing this section stated:
This provision makes it unlawful to resort to a secondary boycott to injure the
business of a third person who is wholly unconcerned in the disagreement be-
tween an employer and his employees.20
In Moore Dry Dock Co., 92 NLRB 547, the Board said: "Section 8(b) (4) (A) is
aimed at secondary boycotts and secondary strike activities." The concept of the
secondary boycott which the Act proscribes was stated by Judge Learned Hand as
follows:
The gravamen of a secondary boycott is that its sanctions bear, not upon the
employer who alone is a party to the dispute, but upon some third party who
has no concern in it. Its aim is to compel him to stop business with the em-
ployer in the hope that this will induce the employer to give in to his employees'
demands 21
The Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, recently said: 22
... the Taft-Hartley Act was, to a marked degree, the result of conflict and
compromise between strong contending forces and deeply held views on the role
of organized labor in the free economic life of the Nation and the appropriate
balance to be struck between the uncontrolled power of management and labor
to further their respective interests. This is relevant in that it counsels wariness
in finding by construction a broad policy against secondary boycotts as such
when, from the words of the statute itself, it is clear that those interested in just
such a condemnation were unable to secure its embodiment in enacted law.
. Of course § 8(b) (4) (A) . was designed to protect the public interest,
but not in the sense that the public was to be shielded from secondary boycotts
no matter how brought about. Congress' purpose was more narrowly con-
ceived. It aimed to restrict the area of industrial conflict insofar as this could
be achieved by prohibiting the most obvious, widespread, and, as Congress
evidently judged, dangerous practice of unions to widen that conflict: the
coercion of neutral employers, themselves not concerned with a primary labor
dispute, through the inducement of their employees to engage in strikes or
concerted refusals to handle goods. In the light of the purpose of the statute
as thus defined the cases now before the Court must be judged.
It would appear, therefore, that the basic purpose of Section 8(b) (4) (A) in
condemning secondary boycotts and secondary strike activities is to prohibit unions
from involving neutral employers in a labor dispute in order to help the union
achieve certain specified objectives, while at the same time recognizing the right
of a labor organization to continue to pursue traditional primary strike activity
directed against the employer with whom it is involved in a direct labor dispute.
Giving effect to these dual congressional objectives is, indeed, in many situations,
most difficult of accomplishment. Congress in interpreting Section 8(b)(4)(A)
has made mutual concessions to these dual objectives by recognizing that in order
to reconcile what appears to be inconsistent purposes an adjustment must be made to
accommodate "the dual congressional objectives of preserving the right of labor
organizations to bring pressure to bear on offending employers in primary labor
disputes and of shielding unoffending employers and others from pressures in
controversies not their own." 23
is See Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters etc., AFL, et al. (Sand Door &
Plywood Co.) v. N.L.R.B., 357 U.S. 93, 98.
19 93 Congressional Record 3953, 4155, 4156, 4323, 7683, 7969. For additional material
on congressional intent, see H. Con. Rept. No. 510 on H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st sess.,
pp. 43, 44 and N.L.R.B. v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, et al.
(Gould c& Preisner), 341 U.S. 675, 686; Douds v. Metropolitan Federation of Architects,
etc., Local 631 (Project Engineering Company), 75 F. Supp. 672, 675, 676 (D.C., N.Y.).
2093 Congressional Record 4323
n International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 501, et al. v. N.L.R.B., 181
F. 2d 34, 37 (C.A. 2).
22Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters etc., AFL, et al. (Sand Door
Plywood Co.) v. N.LR.B., 357 U.S. 93 at 99-101.
23 N.L R B. v Denver Building & Construction Trades Council , et al. (Gould & Preisner),
341 U.S. 675, 692. -
UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO 1377
In a case which did not involve a contractor's gate situation, the Supreme Court
held that a union's picketing the premises of an employer who is primarily involved
in the labor dispute and which reaches individual employees of neutral employers
does not come within the proscription of 8(b)(4)(A).24 Picketing of the struck
employer's premises has the incidental effect of inconveniencing those who do
business with the struck employer but these effects are an inevitable concomitant
of a labor organization's basic right to strike.25 An example of the incidental effects
of primary strike activity is the Interborough News case.26 It was held there that
striking employees whose picketing of their employer's premises resulted in employees
of a secondary employer not making deliveries to their struck employer, did not
violate Section 8(b)(4)(A) because the inducement invited action "only" at the
premises of the primary employer whose employees were on strike.
As indicated above, no serious problem arose where all of the employees of the
struck primary employer perform their day's work at his premises. Difficult prob-
lems of interpretation do arise, however, where some of the primary employer's
employees work at a common situs with employees of neutral employers. In such
situations, the usual incidence of picketing at a common site, even though the
picketing clearly discloses that it is directed solely against the primary employer,
is the refusal of the employees of the neutral employer to cross the picket line,
thereby resulting in a complete or partial shutdown of the activities conducted
at the common site. Moreover, when employees of the primary employer share a
work situs with unionized employees of neutral employers, the likelihood is greatly
increased that when the common site is picketed, the "natural and probable conse-
quence" of the picketing will be to cause the union employees of the neutral employer
to refuse to cross the picket line.27 As was said in Printing Specialties and Paper
Converters Union, Local 388, AFL (Sealright Pacific Ltd.) v. Le Baron, 171 F. 2d
331, 334 (C.A. 9), "the reluctance of workers to cross a picket line is notorious."
Accord, Dallas General Drivers, etc. Local No. 745, AFL-CIO (Associated Whole-
sale Grocery of Dallas, Inc.), 118 NLRB 1251, 1253.
The Supreme Court in the Denver Building Council case,28 decided in 1951,
held that where a labor organization picketed a site occupied jointly by a general
contractor and his subcontractors, with the object of forcing the general contractor
to terminate his contract with a subcontractor who employed nonunion craftsmen,
this was a violation of Section 8(b)(4)(A). The Court did not discuss the legal
incidence of the general contractor and his subcontractor performing their respective
services at a common site but confined its rationale to the unlawfulness of the union's
object in picketing the common situs for the proscribed purpose of forcing the general
contractor to terminate his contract with the subcontractor who employed nonunion
labor.
It has been said 29 that where the place of business of the employer party to the
dispute is stationary, and geographically removed from the premises of any other
employer, the controlling criterion is whether the pressures are geographically
confined to the situs of the dispute. But if the pressures are extended to a place of
business of a neutral employer, they are secondary and unlawful. These arise in the
so-called "common situs" cases exemplified (1) by a neutral employer's engaging
in business operations on a primary employer's premises; and (2) where the primary
employer's business operations are ambulatory and take place temporarily at a
neutral's premises.
In 1951, the Board in situations involving picketing at a common site, and in
order to achieve a practical compromise between the dual congressional objectives,
established criteria for determining when concerted union action is permissible
primary action as distinguished from proscribed secondary action with a view to
minimizing the effect of such picketing activity at premises jointly occupied by the
neutral employer and the primary employer.
21 International Rice Milling Co., Inc., et al. v. N.L.R.B., 341 U.S. 665; N.L.R.B. V.
Service Trade Chauffeurs, Salesmen & Helpers Local 145, etc. (Howland Dry Goods),
191 F. 2d 65 (C.A. 2).
25 The Pure Oil Co., 84 NLRB 315.
29 90 NLRB 2135.
m N L R B. v. Business Machine and Office Appliance Mechanics Conference Board,
Local 459, et al., CIO (Royal Typewriter Co ), 228 F. 2d 553, 560 (CA. 2) ; cf. Radio
Officers' Union etc., AFL (A. H. Bull Steamship Company) v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 17, 42-46.
29 341 US. 675.
20 Koretz, Secondary Strikes and Boycotts, 59 Columbia Law Review 125, 129-130 (1959).
1378 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
This was the situation in the Moore Dry Dock case, 92 NLRB 547, where a ship,
owned by a foreign corporation, having no office, pier, or other place of business
in the United States, was undergoing repairs at Moore Dry Dock. The owners of
the ship became involved in a dispute with a labor organization whereupon the union
picketed Moore Dry Dock. The Board there established four tests for determining
the propriety of such picketing and in applying these tests to the facts in the case
determined that the picketing was primary action because the drydock of the neutral
employer (Moore) harbored the situs of the dispute between the shipowner and the
union and therefore was permissive. The tests promulgated by the Board are:
1. The picketing must be strictly limited to times when the situs of the dispute is
located on the secondary employer's premises.
2. At the time of the picketing, the primary employer is engaged in its normal
business at the situs.
3. The picketing is limited to places reasonably close to the location of the sites.
4. The picketing discloses clearly that the dispute is with the primary employer.
However, the Board later held in the Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc.
case,30 that the Moore Dry Dock doctrine, supra, is inapplicable where the primary
employer has a permanent place of business in the vicinity at which the union can
adequately publicize its labor dispute.31
It would appear, therefore, in determining what is permissible primary conduct
and what is impermissible secondary conduct, that the fundamental question to be
decided with respect to the type of situation presented by the case at bar is where,
under the facts peculiar to this case, shall the emphasis be placed: protecting neu-
trals or furthering fully adequate picketing. Which competing claim shall be deemed
paramount leads one to conjecture that perhaps abstract justice is a divine, not a
human attribute. That abstract justice is sometimes difficult to achieve where there
are competing rights is recognized by a well-settled principle of law that rights are
not absolute, but qualified, and that where conflicts between rights arise, a deter-
mination must be made as to which should give way, and which should be deemed
paramount in order to achieve the greater good.32 Circuit Judge Frank stated the
problem to be one of reconciling "the competing claims of unions to strike and of
bystanders to be free of harm from so-called `secondary boycotts."' 33 The Board
has stated it thus:
In developing and applying [the Moore Dry Dock] standards, the controlling
consideration has been to require that the picketing be so conducted as to mini-
mize its impact on neutral employees insofar as this can be done without sub-
stantial impairment of the effectiveness of the picketing in reaching the primary
employees. 34
In determining, therefore, what was the object of the picketing, the following
considerations should be taken into account. Congress in enacting Section
8(b) (4) (A) did not intend to outlaw the primary strike when conducted for
legitimate goals 35 as the curtailment of this right may not only violate the first
30107 NLRB 299, affd sub nom Brewery and Beverage Drivers and Workers, Local
Union No 67, et al., AFL v. N.L R.B., 220 F 2d 380 (C.A., D.C ).
31 In two cases, recently decided by the courts, the alternative premises theory of
Washington Coca-Cola was criticized as forcing the give-and-take reality of labor rela-
tions into a straitjacket whereby mechanically rigid rules would be applied rather than
determining the legality of the union's secondary activities upon a study of all the facts
in each case rather than holding any one factor to be controlling or conclusive Campbell
Coal Company, 110 NLRB 2192, enforcement denied, 229 F 2d 514 (CA, DC), cert
denied 351 U S. 972 (order on remand 116 NLRB 1020) ; Otis Massey Company, Ltd.,
109 NLRB 275, enforcement denied 225 F. 2d 205 (C.A 5), cert. denied, 350 U S. 914
See also, Douds v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc, Local 976, et at., 139
F. Supp. 702, 716 (D C., S N.Y.) ; John F. Le Bus v General Truck Drivers, etc., AFL-CIO
(Genuine Parts Co ), 141 F. Supp. 673 (D C, E. La.).
s' See N L R.B. v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, et at (Gould d
Preisner), 341 U S 675 at 692; Jones d Laughlin Steel Corp v N.L R B., 301 U.S 1, 43,
44; N L.R.B. v. Cities Service Oil Company, 122 F. 2d 149, 152 (C.A. 2) ; Art Metals
Construction Company v. NL.R.B., 110 F. 2d 148, 150 (CA. 2) ; NL.R.B. v. Albert
Leonard, et at., d/b/a Davis Furniture Co., et al, 205 F. 2d 355, 357, 358; and Monolith
Portland Cement Company, 94 NLRB 1358, 1366.
a' N.LR.B. v. Service Trades Chauffeurs, etc., Local 145 (Howland Dry Goods), 191
F. 2d 65, 67 (C.A. 2).
'4 Retail Fruit Dealers' Association of San Francisco , Inc. (Crystal Palace Market),
116 NLRB 856, 859.
=international Rice Milling Co., Inc., et at . v. N.L.R.B., 341 U. S. 665.
UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO 1379
amendment to the Constitution but also Section 13 of the Act and thus deprive
unions of a powerful weapon to publicize freely its disputes which Congress meant
to preserve. However, a labor organization's right to publicize freely its dispute
where it enmeshes a neutral employer is not absolute but conditioned on the legality
of its objective.36 It is "the objective of the union's secondary activities . . and
not the quality of the means employed to accomplish that objective, which was the
dominant factor motivating Congress in enacting [Section 8(b)(4)]."37 For
example, if its purpose is to create a work stoppage of neutral employees at the
common situs of the primary employer, by picketing a gate set aside for the
exclusive use of the neutral employer and his employees in order to force that
neutral employer to cease doing business with the primary employer, as in the
General Electric case, then it would come within the proscription of Section
8(b) (4) (A) of the Act under the principles enunciated by the Board in that case.38
It would appear, therefore, although the General Electric decision does not so state
it expressly, that the Board, in applying its general policy 39 of balancing the reason-
able necessity of the union's picketing the premises of the employer with whom it had
its dispute against the harm to the neutral contractors resulting from such picketing,
that, on balance, the Board concluded that the equities preponderate, in a contracors'
gate situation, in favor of the neutral secondary employer with whom the union
had no dispute. It would seem, too, that the Board, in arriving at this determination
in the General Electric case, concluded that the union had ample opportunity, by
picketing at the other entrances to the plant's premises, to further its legitimate
primary objectives without extending its picket line to the contractors' gate. Based
upon these principles, it is concluded, for the reasons hereinafter indicated, that the
involvement of the contractors' employees in the dispute between the Respondent
Unions and Phelps Dodge by picketing not only the regular gates through which the
Company's employees and others doing business with Phelps Dodge passed, but in
addition, by extending their picketing to a gate set apart for the exclusive use of
contractors engaged in work at the Company's plant, and the disruption of the neutral
employers' operations was a principal object of the picketing and not merely an
unavoidable byproduct of legitimate primary picketing.
It would seem, therefore, the Board determined in the General Electric case,
that in weighing the competing and conflicting interests of the union, namely, the
right of the union, on the one hand, to publicize its dispute with the primary em-
ployer and the right of the neutral employer, on the other hand, to be protected
from a dispute between the union and the primary employer in which the neutral
employer was wholly unconcerned that the neutral employer's rights are paramount,
as the union's right to publicize its dispute is curtailed only to the extent that it
cannot picket that part of the primary employer's premises which has been reserved
exclusively for ingress and egress by the neutral employer and his employees.
The Respondents' contention that the General Electric case can be distinguished
from the instant situation in that in General Electric the contractors' gate had been
in existence for over 4 years while in the case at bar the contractors' gate was built
a few days before the strike, is not a substantive distinction. It is a distinction
without a difference because the controlling factor in this proceeding is the Respond-
ents' knowledge, prior to the strike, that such a gate had been constructed and
opened under extensive safeguards to insure its exclusive use by contractors and their
employees.
In deciding the General Electric case, the Board cited Associated General Con-
tractors of America, 120 NLRB 400, enfd. 262 F. 2d 931 (C.A., D.C.). In that
case, as in the instant case, the contractors' gate was not set up until the beginning
of the primary dispute. The distinction urged by Respondents here was similarly
urged also by the respondent in Local No. 36, International Chemical Workers Union,
AFL-CIO, (Virginia-Carolina Chemical Corporation), 126 NLRB 905, in which
Trial Examiner Ralph Winkler rejected this contention and held the picketing in
violation of Section 8(b) (4) (A) where the contractors' gate was built and opened
after the union struck and began picketing.
In the case at bar, as in the General Electric case, there was picketing of a con-
tractors' gate reserved for the exclusive use of contractors' personnel and through
which employees of the primary employer were forbidden to enter. Here, as in the
General Electric case, the picketing Union knew when it was picketing the con-
tractors' gate that it was reserved for contractors and their employees. Here, as in
30 Section 8(b) (4) (A).
37 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 601 , et at. (Samuel Langer) v.
N.L R.B., 341 U. S. 694, 704.
88 123 NLRB 1547.
89 See the Board's statement in drystai Palace Market, supra.
554461-60-vol. 126-89
A
1380 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the General Electric case, the picketing was accompanied by oral inducements di-
rected toward the contractors' employees. Here, as in the General Electric case,
the picketing was "effective." Here, as in the General Electric case, the object
of Respondents in picketing at the contractors' gate was to "enmesh" the employees
of the neutral employers in its dispute with the Company.
Finally, Respondents contend that the General Electric case is in direct conflict
with the Ryan Construction Corporation case 40 A study of that case reveals no
substantive factual difference with the facts in the case at bar.41 The majority opin-
ion in the Ryan case states: ". . . although only Ryan employees and suppliers
[the neutral employer] had in fact used the Ryan gate [contractors' gate] before
picketing started, Bucyrus employees [primary employer] could always also have
entered this gate in order to reach their job location." 42 The dissenting opinion,
however, states: "Apparently, no Bucyrus employee or supplier shared, or even
attempted to share this gate before or after the picketing started." [Emphasis sup-
plied.] 43 The Trial Examiner, in an even stronger recital of this crucial fact,
stated: "A large slough, impassable in bad weather, separated the construction site
from the plant and the main gate. In order to have access to the construction site,
Ryan cut a hole in the fence in front of the site, some 500 feet from the main gate
and beyond the slough. In this hole, Ryan installed a gate, 23 feet wide, supplied by
Bucyrus. . . . Ryan and Bucyrus agreed that Ryan employees and suppliers would
use only the new gate (called the Ryan gate) and that Bucyrus employees would
continue to use the main gate." [Emphasis supplied.] 44 However, even though
there is no substantive factual difference between the Ryan and General Electric
cases, since the General Electric case was decided by the Board 11 years subsequent
to Ryan, the General Electric decision is controlling insofar as the case at bar is
concerned.
It is found, therefore, that the effective picketing by the Respondents of the
contractors' gate, knowing it was reserved for the exclusive use of the contractors and
their employees, with the object to "enmesh" the employees of these neutral em-
ployers in its dispute with the Company, was an unfair labor practice.
Accordingly, in view of the foregoing, and upon the record as a whole, it is
concluded and found that the Respondents violated Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the Act
by inducing and encouraging the employees of independent contractors to engage in
a concerted refusal to work with an object of forcing the independent contractors
to cease doing business with Phelps Dodge Refining Corporation.45
III. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent Local 4355 set forth above, occurring in connection
with Phelps Dodge operations described above, have a close, intimate, and sub-
stantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend
to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow
thereof.
40 85 NLRB 417.
41 See Roanoke Building & Construction Trades Council, 117 NLRB 977 at p. 978, foot-
note 2 , where the Board said • "We note, however, . . . that the Trial Examiner errone-
ously stated that 'the Board' overruled Ryan Construction Corporation, 85 NLRB 417
and Crump Incorporated, 112 NLRB 311, in Retail Fruit Dealers Association (Crystal
Palace Market), 110 NLRB 856. Only the main opinion of the two Board Members ex-
pressed disagreement with those decisions, to the extent inconsistent."
42 Id. at p. 419.
43 Id, at p. 419.
44 Id. at p. 425.
45 See Cuneo v. International Chemical Workers Union , Local 4 34, 44 LRRM 2800 (D.C.,
N.J.), in which the court issued a temporary injunction restraining a union, which was en-
gaged in a dispute with an employer over a contract covering employees, from picketing at
a gate set aside by the employer for the exclusive use of employees of the company doing
construction work at the employer's plant, and from appealing to company's employees
not to cross the picket line, and thereby forcing the company and other persons to cease
doing business with the employer. The court found there was reasonable cause to believe
that the union violated the secondary boycott provisions of Section 8(b)(4)(A) of the
Act. The U S. District Court for the District of Kansas in Sperry v. United Packing-
house Workers of America, Local No 20 (Wilson & Company), 45 LRRM 2474 (D.C.,
Kans.), issued a temporary restraining order where the contractors' gate was built after
the strike began and the union pickets at the contractors' gate carried signs reading:
"We have no dispute with Universal Construction Company" (the neutral secondary
employer).
DETROIT ASSOCIATION OF PLUMBING CONTRACTORS 1381
IV. THE REMEDY
It shall be recommended that Respondent Local No. 4355 and Respondent In-
ternational shall cease and desist from the unfair labor practices found and that
they take certain affirmative action deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of
the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent International and Respondent Local each are labor organizations
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. Phelps Dodge Refining Corporation is engaged in commerce within Section
2(6) of the Act.
3. Respondents Local and International have violated Section 8(b) (4) (A) of
the Act by engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the mean-
ing of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
Detroit Association of Plumbing Contractors and James P.
Duffy
Mechanical Contractors Association of Detroit and James P.
Duffy
Farrington Company and James P. Duffy
Goss Mechanical Contractors Company and James P. Duffy
J. W. Partlan Company and James P. Duffy
Stanley Carter Company and James P. Duffy
Donald Miller Company and James P. Duffy
Johnson Service Company and James P. Duffy
United Engineers and Constructors, Inc. and James P. Duffy.
Cases Nos. 7-CA 1709, 7-CA-1710, 7-CA 1784, 7-CA-1786, 7-CA-
1786, 7-CA-1787, 7-CA-1788, 7-CA-179$, and 7-CA-1791. March
11,1960
DECISION AND ORDER
On August 17, 1959, Trial Examiner John Fischer issued his Inter-
mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondents had not engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in
the consolidated complaint and recommending that said complaint be
dismissed as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached
hereto. Thereafter the Charging Party and Intervenors 1 filed ex-
ceptions to the Intermediate Report and supporting briefs.
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions, the briefs, and the entire record in
i United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipeftting
Industry, AFL-CIO, and Its Local 636, and Metal Trades Department , AFL-CIO.
,126 NLRB No. 1,65.