United States Postal Service

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 12, 2017

365 NLRB No. 92 (N.L.R.B. 2017)

365 NLRB No. 92
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
United States Postal Service and Branch 256, National
Association of Letter Carriers (NALC), AFL–
CIO. Cases 07–CA–145159 and 07–CA–159684
June 12, 2017
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MISCIMARRA AND MEMBERS PEARCE
AND MCFERRAN
On December 2, 2016, Administrative Law Judge
Christine E. Dibble issued the attached decision. The
Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, to
which the General Counsel filed an answering brief and
the Respondent filed a reply brief. The General Counsel
filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief, to which
the Respondent filed an answering brief and the General
Counsel filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions,1
cross-exceptions, and briefs and has decided to affirm the
judge’s rulings, findings,2 and conclusions and to adopt
the recommended Order as modified and set forth in full
below.3

1 There are no exceptions to the judge’s finding that the Respondent
unlawfully delayed in responding to the Union’s request for the names
and work locations of light-duty status employees.
2 In adopting the judge’s finding that the Respondent violated Sec.
8(a)(5) and (1) as alleged, we do not rely on the judge’s citations to
Alcan Rolled Products, 358 NLRB 37 (2012), and Postal Service, 359
NLRB 1052 (2013), decisions that issued at a time when the Board
lacked a quorum. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S.Ct. 2550 (2014).
In adopting the judge’s finding that the Respondent violated Sec.
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by unreasonably delaying furnishing infor-
mation about light-duty employees’ work restrictions, we do not rely on
the judge’s suggestion that the Respondent “waived” its right to bargain
over how to protect employees’ confidential medical information.
Instead, we find that the Respondent failed to adhere to the process for
handling requests for employee medical information set forth in its
negotiated agreement with the Union. See, e.g., River Oak Center for
Children, 345 NLRB 1335, 1336 (2005), enfd. mem. 273 Fed.Appx.
677 (9th Cir. 2008).
3 On exception, the General Counsel contends that the judge erred
by declining to recommend a broad cease-and-desist order and by fail-
ing to extend the order to apply to “any other labor organization.”
Contrary to the General Counsel’s contentions, we find that the judge’s
recommended remedial Order, including district-wide notice posting, is
necessary and sufficient “‘to dissipate fully the coercive effects of the
unfair labor practices found.’” Federated Logistics & Operations, 340
NLRB 255, 256 (2003) (quoting Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc., 318 NLRB
470, 473 (1995)), enfd. 400 F.3d 920 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order to conform to the
Board’s standard remedial language, and we shall substitute a new
notice to conform to the Order as modified.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, United States Postal Service, in the Flint
installation and the facilities it encompasses and the De-
troit District, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns
shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Branch 256,
National Association of Letter Carriers (NALC), AFL–
CIO (the Union) by failing and refusing to furnish and/or
by unreasonably delaying in furnishing it with requested
information that is relevant and necessary to the Union’s
performance of its function as the collective-bargaining
representative of the Respondent’s unit employees.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) To the extent it has not already done so, furnish to
the Union in a timely manner the information requested
by the Union on October 22, 2014, and July 25, 2015.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its facilities within the Detroit District, including the
Flint installation and the facilities it encompasses, copies
of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”4 Copies of
the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 7, after being signed by the Respondent’s
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Re-
spondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. In addition to physi-
cal posting of paper notices, notices shall be distributed
electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or
internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Re-
spondent customarily communicates with its employees
by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 7 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. June 12, 2017

4 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
______________________________________
Philip A. Miscimarra, Chairman
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce, Member
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the
Union by failing and refusing and/or by unreasonably
delaying in furnishing it with requested information that
is relevant and necessary to the Union’s performance of
its functions as the collective-bargaining representative
of our unit employees.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL furnish to the Union in a timely manner the
information it requested on October 22, 2014, and July
25, 2015, to the extent we have not already provided it.
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/07–CA–145159 or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the
decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Re-
lations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C.
20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
Jennifer Y. Brazeal, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Roderick D. Eves, Esq., for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
CHRISTINE E. DIBBLE, Administrative Law Judge.1 This case
was tried in Detroit, Michigan, on April 18 and 19, 2016.2
Branch 25, National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL–CIO
(Charging Union) filed charges in Cases 07–CA–145159 and
07–CA–159684 on January 26, 2015, and September 8, 2015,
respectively. (GC Exhs. 1(a) to 1(aa).)3 The General Counsel
issued the complaint and notice of hearing for case 07–CA–
145159 on May 20; and issued the complaint and notice of
hearing for case 07–CA–159684 on December 31.4 The United
States Postal Service (Respondent) filed timely answers to both
complaints denying all material allegations.
The consolidated complaint alleges that (1) from about Oc-
tober 22, 2014, to about November 14, 2014, Respondent un-
reasonably delayed in furnishing the Charging Union “with the
following information for ‘all Flint installation employees with
light-duty status’ including their: names, location, restrictions
(written request to Postmaster), date restrictions began; and all
information concerning reasonable accommodation hearings for
each”; (2) from about October 22, 2014, to about February 11,
Respondent unreasonably delayed in informing the Charging
Union that the requested information, with respect to Joelle
Hindbaugh does not exist; (3) from about October 22, 2014, to
about February 20, Respondent unreasonable delayed in fur-
nishing the Charging Union with the requested information as

1 At the start of the trial, the counsel for the General Counsel made a
motion to consolidate cases 07–CA–145159 and 07–CA–159684.
Respondent supported the motion to consolidate. I granted the General
Counsel’s motion.
2 All dates are in 2015, unless otherwise indicated.
3 Abbreviations used in this decision are as follows: “Tr.” for tran-
script; “GC Exh.” for General Counsel’s exhibit; “R. Exh.” for Re-
spondent’s exhibit; “CU Exh.” for Charging Union’s exhibit; “ALJ
Exh.” for administrative law judge’s exhibit; “Jt. Exh.” for joint exhib-
it; “GC Br.” for General Counsel’s brief; “R. Br.” for Respondent’s
brief; and “CP Br.” for Charging Union’s brief. My findings and con-
clusions are based on my review and consideration of the entire record.
4 On May 26 and 28, the General Counsel issued errata to the com-
plaints and notices of hearings to correct language in the prayer for
relief. See GC Exhs. 1(f), 1(h). In addition, on October 19, the Charg-
ing Union filed the first amendment to Case 07–CA–159684. (GC Exh.
1(p).)
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE 3
to light-duty employees other than Joelle Hindbaugh; (4) from
about July 25 to about September 2, Respondent unreasonably
delayed in furnishing the Charging Union with requested the
test scores, seniority dates, and seniority numbers as described
in paragraph 7 of complaint 07–CA–159684; and (5) since
about July 25, Respondent has failed and refused to furnish the
Charging Union with underlying documentation used to estab-
lish the modified/changed “seniority dates and ranks” as de-
scribed in paragraph 7 of complaint 07–CA–159684.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed
by the General Counsel and Respondent, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent provides postal service for the United States and
operates facilities throughout the nation, including the State of
Michigan. Respondent admits and I find that Section 1209 of
the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § 101, et seq. (PRA)
gives the National Labor Relations Board (the Board/NLRB)
jurisdiction over the Respondent in this matter.
At all material times the Charging Union and National Asso-
ciation of Letter Carriers (NALC), AFL–CIO (National Union)
have been labor organizations within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Overview of Respondent’s Operation
Respondent processes and delivers mail nationwide, and is
organized into seven distinct Regions: Northeast, Eastern, Great
Lakes, Capital Metro, Southern, Western, and Pacific. Each
Region is divided into Districts; and the Districts consist of
postal locations that are grouped into an installation. Installa-
tions are comprised of a number of postal facilities within a
certain city. The Great Lakes Region, which is involved in this
case, has seven Districts: Detroit, Lakeland, Greater Michigan,
Greater Indiana, Gateway, Central Illinois, and Chicago. The
District and postal facility at issue are: the Detroit District and
the Flint installation. The Flint installation is comprised of sev-
eral postal stations: Northeast Station (cities Flint and Burton);
Southeast Station (cities Burton and Grand Blanc); Cody Sta-
tion (Flint City); Northside Station (Flint City); Northwest An-
nex (Flushing City, Flint City, Mundy Township); Southwest
Annex (Flint Township); and Main Office (downtown Flint).
(Tr. 69–70.)
David Williams (Williams) is Respondent’s chief operating
officer and executive vice president. Great Lakes area manag-
er, Jacqueline Krage Strako (Strako) reports directly to Wil-
liams.5 At all material times, Lee Thompson (Thompson) was
the Detroit district manager. Since August 2013, Andrea Porter
has been the Detroit request for information (RFI) coordinator.

5 I have taken judicial notice of Respondent’s administrative struc-
ture as set forth on its website. See http://about.usps.com/who-we-
are/leadership/hq-org-photos?v=51416. F.R.E. 201(b); Doron Precision
Systems, Inc. v. FAAC, Inc., 423 F.Supp. 2d 173, 179 fn.8 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (“a court may take judicial notice of information publicly an-
nounced on a party’s website, as long as the website’s authenticity is
not in dispute and it’s capable of accurate and ready determination.”)
Wanda Rodgers (Rodgers) has held the position of human re-
source services (HRS) local services for the Detroit District.
During the relevant period, Ron Hippensteel (Hippensteel)
was the postmaster and installation head of the Flint installa-
tion. Since January 2000, Cheryl Trenkle (Trenkle) has been
the “confidential secretary” to the postmaster. During all perti-
nent times, the following individuals held positions of: Michael
Steiner (Steiner) officer-in-charge, Flint/station manager
Northwest Annex; Shari Demo (Demo) manager of customer
services; Darryl Kittell (Kittell) supervisor of customer ser-
vices; Risson Ingalls (Ingalls) station manager/manager of cus-
tomer service, Flint Northwest;6 and Joelle Hindbaugh (Hind-
baugh) acting supervisor, Flint.7
The following constituted a unit appropriate for the purposes
of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of
the Act:
All full-time and regular part-time city letter carriers em-
ployed by Respondent at various facilities throughout the
United States, but excluding professional employees, employ-
ees engaged in personnel work in other than a purely non-
confidential clerical capacity, postal inspection service em-
ployees, employees in the supplemental work force, rural let-
ter carriers, mail handlers, maintenance employees, special
delivery messengers, motor vehicle employees, postal clerks,
managerial employees, supervisory personnel, and security
guards as defined in Public Law 9-375, 1201(2).
(GC Exhs. 1(d), 1(s).) During the period at issue, the Charging
Union represented between 250–300 employees at Flint and the
cities attached to the Flint installation. For approximately 9
years, Paul Gillie (Gillie) has been the president for Branch 256
and the union steward, which has been designated by the na-
tional union (NALC) to represent those employees. Patricia
Skinner (Skinner) is a member of Branch 256 and served as its
union steward in 2014 and 2015.
B. Collective-Bargaining Agreement and Requests
for Information
NALC entered into a nationwide collective-bargaining
agreement (CBA) with Respondent that was effective from
January 10, 2013, through May 20, 2016. Article 31 of the
CBA governs requests for information (RFI). It reads in rele-
vant part:
Requests for information relating to purely local matters
should be submitted by the local Union representative to the
installation head or designee. All other requests for infor-
mation shall be directed by the National President of the Un-
ion to the Vice President, Labor Relations. Nothing herein
shall waive any rights the Union may have to obtain infor-
mation under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.

6 Ingalls, also known as “Sean,” officially assumed the position of
station manager/manager of customer service Flint Northwest on Feb-
ruary 7, 2015. Beginning in November 2014, he had responsibilities
for and split his time working out of the Flint Northwest and Waterford
postal facilities. In June 2016, Ingalls’ responsibility for and work in
the Waterford postal facility ended.
7 Respondent also refers to its acting supervisors as “204-B” super-
visors.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
(Jt. Exh. 1, p. 108.) The NALC and Respondent are also parties
to the Joint Contract Administration Manual (JCAM). It also
addresses the parties’ rights and obligations regarding union
RFIs. It reads in relevant part:
To obtain employer information the union need only give a
reasonable description of what it needs and make a reasonable
claim that the information is needed to enforce or administer
the contract. The union must have a reason for seeking the in-
formation—it cannot conduct a “fishing expedition” into
Postal Service records.
Settlements and arbitration awards have addressed the union's
entitlement to information in certain specific areas. For exam-
ple, the union has a right to any and all information which the
employer has relied upon to support its position in a grievance
(Step 4, HIC-3U-C 6106, November 5, 1982, M-00316). Note
that the union also has an obligation to provide the Postal Ser-
vice with information it relies upon in a grievance (Article
15). The union is also entitled to medical records necessary to
investigate or process a grievance, even without an employ-
ee's authorization, as provided for in Handbook AS-353,
Guide to Privacy, the Freedom of Information Act, and Rec-
ords Management and by Articles 17 and 31 of the National
Agreement. If requests for copies are part of the information
request, then USPS must provide the copies (Step 4, H7N-
5K-C 23406, May 21, 1992, M-01094). A national prearbitra-
tion settlement established that if the union provides the Postal
Service with a list of officers and stewards, the Postal Service
must indicate which (if any) applied for a supervisory position
within the previous two years (National Prearbitration Settle-
ment, H4C-3W-C 27068, February 13, 1990, M-01150).
When the union is provided with information, for example
medical records, it is subject to the same rules of confidenti-
ality as the Postal Service.
(Jt. Ehx. 2, p. 31–2, 31–3). Respondent’s Detroit District main-
tains the Detroit RFI office, which is tasked with overseeing the
flow of RFIs. As the Detroit RFI coordinator, Porter monitors,
log-in, and processes RFIs. The RFIs are sent to her office over
a dedicated facsimile line; and once she receives the RFI, Porter
date stamps the document and forwards it to the local manage-
ment official who is responsible for providing the requested
information.
C. Union’s RFI: October 22, 2014
Skinner represented an employee, Dave Jones (Jones), who
was having health issues and required light duty.8 As a result
of his request to Respondent for light duty, Jones was sent for a
reasonable accommodation hearing.9 Consequently, on Octo-
ber 22, 2014, Skinner hand-delivered a RFI form to Kittel, re-

8 Light duty is a term used by Respondent to describe modified job
duties provided to employees who are experiencing health issues that
prevent them from performing their normal duties without assistance.
9 Respondent reasonable accommodation hearing consists of a panel
of management officials who, through questioning of employees and
review of documents, determine whether an employee meets the eligi-
bility requirements for a job modification during the pendency of their
illness or injury.
questing:
All Flint installation employees with light duty statis (sic)
1- Names
2 Location
3 Restrictions (written request to Postmaster)
4 Date restrictions began
5 all information concerning reasonable accommoda-
tion hearing for each
(GC Exh. 4.) The RFI form was addressed to Hippensteel, Steiner,
and Kittel. Kittel signed for receipt of the RFI on October 22,
2014. Although a piece of the requested information was located at
the Northwest Flint facility, the bulk of the requested information
was scattered among various postal facilities. Accordingly, in an
attempt to procure the information, Kittel contacted other local post
offices but only one of the stations’ postmasters returned his call.
The postmaster declined to provide Kittel with the requested in-
formation. Consequently, he forwarded the RFI form to Trenkle10
and wrote on it,
Cheryl,
Do you have any of this information on hand? Tried offices
w/little or no luck
Thanks D
(GC Exh. 4.) About a week after she delivered the RFI, Skin-
ner approached Kittel for an update on the status of the request.
Kittel informed her of his unsuccessful efforts to procure the
information from other postmasters and showed her the note
that he had written to Trenkle requesting her assistance. (Id.)
Upon receipt of the RFI with Kittell’s handwritten note,
Trenkle obtained the information in response to items #1 and
#2 of the RFI. However, she did not provide information on
items #3 through #5 of the RFI because the “labor relations
office” informed her that the union would have to get medical
releases from the affected employees due to the confidential
nature of the information. By letter dated November 14, 2014,
Demo, on behalf of Hippensteel, addressed a letter to Skinner,
responding to the union’s October 22, 2014 RFI. In the letter
Demo explained the information for items #1 and #2 of the
RFI. However, she did not provide items #3 through #5 of the
RFI. Demo wrote,
In order to release this confidential information contained
within an employe medical documentation, you will need to
have each employee sign the attached medical release and re-
turn to me.
(GC Exh. 5.) Kittel received Demo’s November 14, 2014 letter
as an attachment in an email chain that included him. At some

10 Trenkle testified that on November 6, 2014, Kittell forwarded her
the RFI. However, Skinner’s testimony is that Kittell told her that he
had sent the RFI to Trenkle late October 2014 and showed her a copy
of his note to Trenkle. (GC Exh. 4.) Kittell did not testify to the date he
forwarded the RFI to Trenkle. Regardless, the evidence is clear that
Trenkle received the RFI by early November because she was able to
obtain the information in response to items 1 and 2 of the RFI; and draft
the November 14, 2014 letter for Demo to send to Skinner. (GC Exh.
5.)
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE 5
point, Kittel hand delivered the November 14, 2014 letter to
Skinner. She complained to him that the union was entitled to
the information without being required to procure the medical
releases. Kittel responded that “there’s nothing I can do about
it. You would have to file another grievance because there’s
nothing I can do at my level.”11 (Tr. 62.)
On November 23, 2014, Skinner filed a grievance because of
Respondent’s failure to provide the information requested in
the October 22, 2014 RFI at items #3 through #5. (GC Exh. 6.)
On January 5, Respondent’s Dispute Resolution Team (DRT)12
issued a step B decision upholding the grievance and instruct-
ing Respondent that “[m]anagement shall immediately supply
the requested information.” (GC Exh. 7.)
Trenkle received the step B decision on January 8, and for-
warded a copy to Ingalls via interoffice mail. Ingalls testified
that he first saw the step B decision on about January 30. (Tr.
203.) Trenkle also provided a copy of the grievance file and
step B decision to the “postmaster for review.” (Tr. 161.) It
should also be noted that on January 30, Gillie, because of Re-
spondent’s failure to provide all the documents sought in the
October 22, 2014 information request, submitted another RFI
repeating the request for the same documents sought in the
October 22, 2014 RFI. He hand delivered that RFI to Supervi-
sor Dennis Delmage.
Within a “couple of days” of receiving the step B decision,
Ingalls asked for Trenkle’s assistance in gathering documents
responsive to items #3 and #4 of the October 22 RFI. By Feb-
ruary 5, she had gathered the remaining information responsive
to the October 22, 2014 RFI, and provided it to Ingalls for his
review and possible redaction.
On about February 4, Trenkle also submitted a request, by
facsimilie, to the Detroit District RFI Office for the reasonable
accommodation information on Joelle Hindbaugh at item #5 of
the October 22, 2014 RFI. She documented for the Detroit
District RFI Office the unsuccessful efforts she had taken to
date to acquire the information. On about February 10, Porter
sent Trenkle an email stating that there was no information
responsive to the October 22, 2014 RFI item #5 regarding
Hindbaugh. Consequently, on February 11, Trenkle notified
Gillie by email that there was no record of the DRAC13 results
for Hindbaugh. On or about February 20, Respondent provided
to Gillie the information responsive to the October 22, 2014
RFI items #3 through #5. Gillie forwarded the information to
Skinner.

11 Kittell initially testified that he had not discussed the November
14, 2014 letter with Skinner. However, he immediately contradicted
himself by admitting to telling her, in connection with the letter, that
Skinner would have to file a grievance to get the requested information
because he was unable to assist her at his level. Also, Skinner and
Kittell use slightly different wording to describe Kittell’s response to
her complaint about management’s November 14, 2014 letter. I find
that the dissimilarity is insignificant and does not require me to resolve
it in order to rule on the merits of the cases.
12 The Dispute Resolution Team is comprised of labor and manage-
ment members who work together to adjudicate grievances.
13 I could find no indication in the record that the term “DRAC” was
defined by either party.
D. Union’s RFI: July 25, 2015
At some point, the Charging Union received seniority lists
from Respondent which caused Gillie to question their accura-
cy. Consequently, on May 27, Gillie submitted a RFI to Kittel
asking for the city carrier assistant (CCA) test scores and exams
for 10 employees, the employees’ official pay records for two
pay periods, and PS Form 50s for calendar year 2015 for the
same employees.14 On May 28, Kittel forwarded the RFI to
Trenkle seeking her assistance. By email dated May 29, Tren-
kle contacted Respondent’s Law Department—NLRB Unit for
guidance on whether “postal exam scores” could be provided to
the union in response its RFI. (R. Exh. 4.) By email dated May
29, Tonya Kennish (Kennish), from the law department, in-
formed her that certain protocols must be followed when the
union is seeking exam scores. The protocol is listed as follows:
(1) ask the union if it is willing to obtain the employees’ con-
sent; (2) if the union is unwilling to obtain employees’ consent,
offer to make the exam scores available for review but not
copy; and (3) if the union insists on obtaining the test scores,
request that the union sign a nondisclosure agreement (NDA)
restricting the disclosure of the scores only to those union offi-
cials who are investigating or processing the grievance.
By letter dated May 29, Porter responded to Gillie about the
May 27 RFI by attaching “the requested PS Form 50s along
with a request for an [e]xtension.” (GC Exh. 13.) In response
to the request for the test scores, Porter wrote
. . . the Postal Service requests that the Union obtain written
consent from each employee whose test score they are re-
questing, prior to the information being released. If you be-
lieve that this request imposes an undue burden on the union,
I invite you to explain why it is overly burdensome and to
bargain with the Postal Service over some alternative safe-
guard to its confidentiality interests.
(GC Exh. 13.) On receipt of Porter’s response, the Charging
Union did not seek releases from the affected employees.
However, Gillie continued to agitate for the information; and
on about July 8, he emailed Hippensteel for an update on the
status of the May 27 RFI noting in part,
The attached information request is six weeks old. The USPS
requested an extension to July 9, 2015, to which I did not ob-
ject.
At this time I am requesting that the USPS exercise Option #2
and Option #3, detailed below. I noted the union is not un-
willing to obtain releases but that is nnecessary and I do not
have immediate access to the personnel to obtain said re-
lease(s). Also, should any employee decline to sign a release,
it would not
(R. Exh. 4.) Hippensteel forwarded the email to Trenkle who
arranged for Gillie to come to the office to review the employee
test scores and seniority information. On July 10,15 Gillie came

14 The May 27 RFI is not the subject of this complaint but rather is
included as background information.
15 Gillie acknowledged that at some point in July he partially com-
pleted the PS Form 6105, and informed management that he would
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
to the Flint main post office to review the information, along
with Hippensteel and Trenkle. He had been provided a list of
employees which included their seniority dates. Gillie used this
list to compare it with the employees’ applications and test
scores he was given for review. During the course of this re-
view, Gillie voiced a concern that the employees were inaccu-
rately ranked. Consequently, he made notations on the roster to
reflect his assessment of the correct ranking of the employees
based on their test scores. (GC Exh. 14.) Hippensteel told him
that his corrections would be sent to his “district counterparts”
for review. It took Gillie approximately an hour to look at the
named employees’ applications16 which included their test
scores. (R. Exh. 6.)17
By letter dated July 23, Porter provided Gillie with a routing
slip containing a list of employees with modified seniority
dates. It read in part,
Here are the corrected seniority dates and rankings in score
order however due to HRSSC processing days webcoins will
not reflect these changes until 7/30/2015.
(GC Exh. 15.) Despite Respondent’s corrections to the seniori-
ty list, Gillie continued to doubt the accuracy of the employee
rankings because 8 of the employees on the July 10 list were
not on the Respondent’s July 23 “corrected” list. Consequent-
ly, on July 27, Gillie hand delivered a RFI to Kittel dated July
25, seeking: (1) any and all information used to determine the
‘Sen Date Craft’ and ‘Sen #’ for all employees with a ‘Sen Date
Craft’ for 2015 listed on Exhibit 1, attached; and (2) any and all
information used to establish the modified/changed ‘seniority
dates and ranks’ for the employees listed on Exhibit 2, attached.
(GC Exh. 17.) Gillie made the request because he wanted an
explanation for the discrepancies between the July 10 and July
23 seniority lists and the information Respondent relied on in
creating the lists. Among other concerns, Gillie had also ex-

fully complete it after he received the documents in response to the
RFI. (Tr. 120–121.)
16 Gillie denied that he was able to review the employees’ entire ap-
plications. He claimed that he saw only the cover page to the employ-
ees’ employment packet with their exam score. (Tr. 122.) Respondent,
however, rebuts his testimony on this point. Respondent noted that the
employee applications included the employees’ test scores and their
claim of veterans’ preference. According to Trenkle, she placed the
applications for all of the requested employees in front of Gillie for him
to review. She showed him where to locate the test scores within the
application but did not in any way restrict or limit Gillie’s ability to
review the entire application packets. I credit Trenkle’s testimony on
this point and find that Gillie did or was able to review the entire appli-
cation packet for each employee. In fact, Gillie testified that Hippen-
steel informed him he could come to the Fling main post office to re-
view the “employees’ application records” and when he arrived, he
reviewed the applications with Trenkle. Gillie’s later retraction on this
point does not ring true.
17 Respondent made a motion to have GC Exh. 22 placed under seal
because p. 2 of the exhibit contains “confidential information in the
nature of test scores that are indicative of employees’ basic competen-
cy.” (Respondent’s Motion to Place Under Seal General Counsel’s
Exhibit 22) The General Counsel did not file a response. Based on my
review of Respondent’s motion, Board decisions, and weighing the
parties’ competing interest, I will grant, in part, Respondent’s motion.
I, therefore, order that p. 2 of GC Exh. 22 be placed under seal.
pressed skepticism that employee Richard Henry’s (Henry)
veterans’ preference points had been properly scored. Kittel
informed Gillie that he would forward the RFI to the appropri-
ate postal officials.
By email dated August 14, Trenkle forwarded Gillie an up-
dated seniority list from Respondent’s local services. She also
relayed to him the comments made by Rogers in local services
on the possible reasons for Henry’s score. (GC Exh. 18.) Tren-
kle emailed Gillie,
I just talked to Wanda Rogers in Local Services: With regard
to Richard Henry . . . she said he could have applied for any
number of another positions around that time during the ap-
plication process and opted to re-take the test and gotten a
higher score which wipes out the lower score.”
(GC Exh. 18.) Gillie responded in part,
I submitted a request to D. Kittell a couple weeks ago, re-
questing information used to establish the (then) updated rela-
tive standing list. The records are at my office. Since I am
working for National today, they are not within my reach at
this time.
(Id.) Trenkle informed him that she had forwarded his request
to the Detroit District ROI because it was not available locally.
By letter dated August 21, Respondent asked the Charging
Union for an extension of time to respond to the July 25, RFI.18
There is no evidence that the Charging Union responded to the
request.
By letter dated September 2, Porter informed Gillie that
“[p]er Exhibit 1—The wrong column was entered on
WEBCOINS report (SEN DATE CRAFT) see corrected list for
item #1; and [p]er Exhibit 2—Information was established to
make corrections by verifying the Hiring register.” (GC Exh.
20) Consequently, Gillie responded to Porter that he continued
to have question about the rankings of the employees. Gillie
testified that he felt the response was only partially responsive
to the July 25 RFI because: (1) there was no explanation about
how Respondent compiled the July 10 and 23 lists; (2) Re-
spondent failed to supply supporting documentation for em-
ployees rankings on the July 10 and 23 seniority lists; and (3)
the seniority list on September 2 continued to reflect an inaccu-
rate ranking of the employees. (Tr. 111–112.)
Based on his concerns, on September 4, Gillie sent Porter a
letter detailing his issues with the rankings of the employees.
In the letter he noted that regarding item #1 of the July 25 RFI,
the seniority lists continued to reflect inaccurate rankings of the
employees; and with respect to item #2 of the July 25, RFI
Respondent had not provided the underlying documentation
that it used to “establish the modified/changed ‘seniority dates
and ranks’ for the employees listed on Exhibit 2” of the RFI.
(GC Exh. 21.) Porter followed-up with a clarification to her
September 2 letter to Gillie. By letter dated September 29,
Porter informed Gillie that corrections were made to the rank-
ings based on a review of the employees’ PS Form 61, test

18 The parties agreed that Respondent’s request for extension of time
to respond to the July 25, RFI was incorrectly dated as “August 14,
2015,” on the extension of time form at GC Exh. 19.
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE 7
scores, and “Hiring Lists.” (R. Exh. 13.) However, Porter did
not include copies of the PS Form 61 and test scores. Accord-
ing to Porter, the test scores would be released once he signed
an attached Form 6105 or a Non-Disclosure Agreement. (Id.)
Respondent scheduled a meeting with Gillie to be held on
October 13, for him to sign the PS Form 6105 and provide him
with the test scores. On October 13, Gillie met with Detroit
District Human Resources Manager Lee Ward (Ward), Rogers,
and Porter. During the meeting Gillie was given a PS Form
6105 which he signed. He then received employee test scores
and a chart demonstrating each employee’s seniority date and
rank. (GC Exh. 22.) Gillie continued to be dissatisfied with the
information provided because: (1) the test scores Respondent
provided in response to the May 27 RFI did not include several
of the employees listed in item 2 of the July 25 RFI; and alt-
hough he received information responsive to item 1 of the July
25 RFI, Respondent still did not provide him with the underly-
ing documentation it used to come to the conclusion that the
rankings shown to him at the October 13 were correct. Gillie
also still had concerns about the ranking of Henry, which he
discussed at length with management in the meeting. When
discussing Henry’s score, Rogers went to the computer in the
room and accessed his records. She noted to Gillie that Hen-
ry’s score was actually higher than that shown on the document
she had given to Gillie. By the end of the meeting, Gillie
agreed with Porter and Roger that, with the exception of Henry,
the rankings were correct.
In summary, the Charging Union agrees that it ultimately re-
ceived the information requested for item #1 of the July 25 RFI.
However, it continues to insist that Respondent has failed and
refused to provide the information requested in item #2 of the
July 25 RFI.
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standards
Section 8(a) (5) of the Act mandates that an employer must
provide a union with relevant information that is necessary for
the proper performance of its duties as the exclusive bargaining
representative. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co. 351 U.S. 149, 153
(1956); Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 303 (1979).
“. . . [T]he duty to bargain unquestionably extends beyond the
period of contract negotiations and applies to labor-
management relations during the term of an agreement.” NLRB
v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436 (1967). Information
requests regarding bargaining unit employees’ terms and condi-
tions of employment are “presumptively relevant” and must be
provided. Whitesell Corp., 352 NLRB 1196, 1197 (2008),
adopted by a three-member Board, 355 NLRB 649 (2010),
enfd. 638 F.3d 883 (8th Cir. 2011); Southern California Gas
Co., 344 NLRB 231, 235 (2005). If the requested information
is not directly related to the bargaining unit, the information is
not presumptively relevant, and the requesting party has the
burden of establishing the relevance of the requested material.
Disneyland Park, 350 NLRB 1256, 1257 (2007); The
Earthgrains Co., 349 NLRB 389 (2007).
The standard for establishing relevancy is the liberal, “dis-
covery-type standard.” Alcan Rolled Products, 358 NLRB 37,
40 (2012), citing and quoting applicable authorities. In Leland
Stanford Junior University, 307 NLRB 75, 80 (1992), the
Board summarized its application of the principles as follows:
[T]he Board has long held that Section 8(a)(5) of the Act ob-
ligates an employer to furnish requested information which is
potentially relevant to the processing of grievances. An actual
grievance need not be pending nor must the requested infor-
mation clearly dispose of the grievance. It is sufficient if the
requested information is potentially relevant to a determina-
tion as to the merits of a grievance or an evaluation as to
whether a grievance should be pursued. United Technologies
Corp., 274 NLRB 504 (1985); TRW, Inc., 202 NLRB 729,
731.
The requested information does not have to be dispositive of
the issue for which it is sought, but only has to have some rela-
tion to it. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 301 NLRB 1104,
1104–1105 (1991). The Board has also held that a union may
make a request for information in writing or orally. Further, the
Board has found that a delay is unreasonable when the infor-
mation requested is easily and readily accessible from an em-
ployer’s files. Bundy Corp., 292 NLRB 671, 672 (1989).
B. October 22, RFI: Respondent’s unreasonable delay
I find, and Respondent admits, that all of the information
sought by the Charging Union in the October 22, RFI is neces-
sary for and relevant to the Charging Union’s performance of
its duties as the designated servicing representative of the ex-
clusive collective-bargaining representative of the unit. See
United Graphics, Inc., 281 NLRB 463, 465 (1986) (the Board
held that information presumptively relevant to the union’s role
as bargaining agent must be provided to the union as it “relates
directly to the policing of contract terms.”).
1. Unreasonable delay until November 14, 2014, in
providing information
As part of its October 22 RFI, the Charging Union requested
the names and work locations of employees on light duty status.
Respondent did not provide this information until November
14, 2014. The General Counsel alleges that Respondent violat-
ed Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act because the Charging
Union’s requests for information were relevant and necessary
to the performance of its duties as the designated servicing
representative of the exclusive collective-bargaining representa-
tive of the unit; and Respondent’s delay and, or refusal in
providing the information was unreasonable. Respondent ar-
gues that the delay was reasonable because (1) Kittel did not
have readily available access to the information so he attempted
to get it from other installation but they refused to cooperate;
and (2) Kittel enlisted the assistance of Trenkle who obtained
the information within a week or two of receiving the request.
Consequently, Respondent contends that under the “particular
circumstances” it made a diligent effort to provide the infor-
mation “with reasonable promptness.” (R. Br. 8.)
I find that Respondent’s argument is without merit. The
Board has held that in assessing the promptness of a response to
an information request, the totality of the pertinent circum-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD8
stances must be considered.19 “In evaluating the promptness of
the response, the Board will consider the complexity and extent
of information sought, its availability and the difficulty in re-
trieving the information.”20 It is clear that Respondent’s action,
given the totality of the circumstances, does not meet the defi-
nition of “reasonable promptness” as set forth in West Penn
Power Co. Neither Kittel, nor Trenkle or any other manage-
ment official testified that obtaining the names and work loca-
tions of the affected employees involved complex or volumi-
nous information. Kittel admitted that he had some of the
names and work locations of those individuals who worked at
his location, Flint Northwest facility. Presumably, the manag-
ers Kittel called to obtain the remaining information, likewise,
had easy access to the names and work locations of light duty
employees at their facilities but refused to cooperate. Another
factor to consider in assessing the promptness of the response is
the ease with which Trenkle was able to obtain the information.
Although Respondent described the actions taken to provide the
Charging Union with the names and work locations of employ-
ees on light duty, Respondent failed to explain the why it took
almost a month to obtain this simple and limited information.
Accordingly, I find that Respondent’s delay until November
14, 2014, to respond to items #1 and #2 of the Charging Un-
ion’s information request was unreasonable and therefore vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act and within the meaning
of the PRA.
2. Respondent unlawfully delayed until February 11, in in-
forming Charging Union about the status of employee Joelle
Hindbaugh and unlawfully delayed until February 20 in fur-
nishing information about the remaining light duty employees
In its November 14, 2014 response to the October 22 RFI,
Respondent refused to provide the information at items #3
through #5 of the request until the Charging Union secured
signed medical releases from each affected employee. As not-
ed earlier in this decision, the Charging Union ultimately filed a
grievance to receive the remaining information; and on January
5, the DRT upheld the grievance by requiring Respondent to
“immediately supply the requested information.” (GC Exh. 7.)
Respondent, however, did not inform the Charging Union until
February 11, that there was no record of DRAC results for
Hindbaugh. The information related to the remaining employ-
ees was not given to the Charging Union until February 20.
In its defense, Respondent argues that the delay was neces-
sary because (1) the union failed to obtain releases for the non-
disclosed confidential information, nor attempted to bargain
with Respondent over alternate means to obtain the information
that would protect employees’ confidentiality interests; (2)
Respondent did not “clearly and unmistakably waive its right to
bargain over how to protect confidential information that it
discloses to the union”; and (3) Respondent provided the re-
maining information within a reasonable period of time after
receiving the DRT Step B decision. I reject Respondent’s ar-
guments on all points.
It is well-settled law that the party asserting confidentiality

19 West Penn Power Co., 339 NLRB 585, 587 (2003), enfd. in perti-
nent part 349 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2005).
20 Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
has the burden of proof. Postal Service, 356 NLRB 483
(2011); Detroit Newspaper Agency, 317 NLRB 1071 (1995);
Northern Indiana Public Service Co., 347 NLRB, 211 (2006).
Even assuming that Respondent meets its burden, it cannot
simply refuse to furnish the information, but rather must engage
in accommodative bargaining with the Union to seek a resolu-
tion that meets the needs of both parties. In Alcan Rolled Prod-
ucts, supra at 15, the Board explained:
Confidential information is limited to a few general catego-
ries that would reveal, contrary promises or reasonable expecta-
tions, highly personal information. Detroit Newspaper Agency,
317 NLRB 1071, 1073 (1995). Such confidential information
may include “individual medical records or psychological test
results; that which would reveal substantial proprietary infor-
mation, such as trade secrets; that which could reasonably be
a timely manner and seek an accommodation from the other
party. Id. at 1072.
The disclosure of the information must be balanced against
the confidentiality and privacy interests raised by Respondent.
Detroit Edison Co., supra.
Respondent’s insistence that the Charging Union get medical
waivers prior to receiving the information about Hindbaugh and
the remaining employees is inconsistent with its own actions.
Respondent entered into the JCAM with the union which spe-
cifically notes the union “is also entitled to medical records
necessary to investigate or process a grievance, even without an
employee’s authorization . . .” (Jt. Eh. 2, p. 31–3.) Moreover,
in the step B decision, Respondent’s DRT noted management
failed to follow the appropriate protocols for determining
whether the medical information was relevant and necessary to
the union’s request and had therefore waived its right to deny it
on the basis of confidentiality. (GC Exh. 7.) Consequently, in
the step B decision the DRT instructed Respondent to immedi-
ately provide the union with the requested information without
the Charging Union first having to secure medical releases from
the affected employees. Lastly, there is nothing in the record to
explain the lengthy delay in Respondent informing the Charg-
ing Union that the requested information for Hindbaugh did not
exist. A quick review of Hindbaugh’s personnel file or other
electronic employee records should have revealed this infor-
mation.
Respondent also sets forth an unpersuasive argument for
why it has not waived its right to require medical waivers be-
fore releasing the information. According to its reading of the
JCAM preamble, article 2 of the CBA, the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), and the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission’s (EEOC) regulations and case law,
Respondent contends that these sources support a finding that:
(1) the JCAM statement does not constitute a “clear and unmis-
takable waiver” of Respondent’s right under the Act to bargain
with the union over ways to protect confidential information;
(2) the article 2 of the CBA and the Rehabilitation Act specifi-
cally prohibit unlawful discrimination against handicapped
employees; and (3) EEOC’s regulations and case law deem
medical records that contain diagnosis of a condition as confi-
dential and sharing such medical records with a union steward
without the employee’s consent is a per se violation of the Re-
habilitation Act. (R. Br. 10–11.) I find Respondent’s arguments
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE 9
without merit.
The Board requires a waiver of a party’s statutory right to be
clear and unmistakable. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460
U.S. 693 (1983); Timken Roller Bearing Co., 138 NLRB 15, 16
(1962). “A clear and unmistakable waiver may be found in the
express language and structure of the collective-bargaining
agreement or by the course of conduct of the parties. The bur-
den is on the party asserting waiver to establish that such a
waiver was intended.” Leland Stanford Junior University, su-
pra. See also, NLRB v. New York Telephone Co., 930 F.2d 1009
(2d Cir. 1991), enfg. 299 NLRB 44 (1990); United Technolo-
gies Corp., supra. Respondent’s conduct, as established by the
evidence, shows that it waived its right to bargain with the un-
ion over methods of protecting its employees’ confidential
medical information in this particular case.
While the JCAM may not contain an explicit waiver of Re-
spondent’s right to bargain with the union over how to protect
confidential information, the DRT sets forth the clear steps
Respondent has established for management to take to protect
this right and explicitly found in its step B decision that Re-
spondent failed in its effort, and thus waived its right. Second,
I am unclear what argument Respondent is attempting to make
by noting that the CBA and the Rehabilitation Act prohibit
discrimination against individuals with disabilities. Finally,
Respondent cites Lampkins v. United States Postal Service21 to
support its final argument. However, the case is inapposite to
the facts at issue. In Lampkins v. Postal Service, the union did
not request the employee’s medical records, but rather, the
employer unilaterally decided to provide the union and a super-
visor with the information while in a pre-disciplinary meeting
with the employee. More importantly, EEOC cases have no
precedential value in matters before the Board.
Even assuming Respondent had not waived its right to bar-
gain with the Charging Union over this issue, Respondent has
failed to show that it attempted to engage in accommodative
bargaining. It is undisputed that Respondent’s initial response
to the Charging Union’s information request was to send partial
information with the excuse that the employees’ privacy inter-
est required the Charging Union to secure medical waivers
before receiving the requested information. Shortly thereafter,
the Charging Union filed a grievance and ultimately separate
charges with the NLRB. During this interim period (the time
between Respondent’s refusal to fully provide the requested
information and the Charging Union filing a grievance and
charges with the NLRB), there is no evidence that Respondent
made any attempts at engaging the Charging Union in accom-
modative bargaining.
Accordingly, I find that Respondent’s delay until February
11, to respond to information pertaining to Hindbaugh and its
delay until February 20 to respond to the remaining information
were unreasonable and therefore violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act and within the meaning of the PRA.
C. July 25, RFI: Respondent’s unreasonable delay
I find, and Respondent admits, that the information sought
by the Charging Union in the July 25, RFI is necessary for and

21 EEOC Appeal No. 0720080017 (Dec. 8, 2009).
relevant to the Charging Union’s performance of its obligations
as the designated servicing representative of the unit. There-
fore, the remaining questions are: whether in balancing the
interests of the employees’ versus the Charging Union the Re-
spondent unreasonably delayed in furnishing the requested
information; and whether Respondent ultimately provided the
Charging Union with all of the requested information.
1. Respondent unlawfully delayed from July 25 to September 2
in responding to item #1 of the RFI
The General Counsel argues that Respondent’s response to
item #1 of the July 25, RFI was “unclear and unresponsive”;
and did not include a valid reason to justify its delay in provid-
ing the requested information. Respondent counters that, after
some initial confusion, it ultimately provided the union with the
correct requested information; and made a good faith effort to
explain to the Charging Union how it arrived at its response.
Moreover, Respondent asserts that Gillie was obligated to “ask
to view potential sources that would resolve” any lingering
confusion on his behalf about the information he was given. (R.
Br. 13.)
In the July 25 RFI Gillie, on behalf of the Charging Union,
sought: (1) any and all information used to determine the ‘Sen
Date Craft’ and ‘Sen #’ for all employees with a ‘Sen Date
Craft’ for 2015 listed on Exhibit 1, attached; and (2) any and all
information used to establish the modified/changed ‘seniority
dates and ranks’ for the employees listed on Exhibit 2, attached.
(GC Exh. 17.) Gillie submitted the July 25, RFI because he
doubted the accuracy of employee rankings on seniority lists
that he had received a few months earlier. However, it was not
until about August 14, 2015, when Gillie reminded Trenkle he
had yet to receive a response to the July 25 RFI that Respond-
ent acknowledged it. It was at this point that Trenkle forward-
ed the RFI to the Detroit District RFI office. Porter wrote to
the Charging Union asking for an extension of time to respond
to the RFI but the Charging Union did not reply to the request.
Consequently, it was not until September 2 that Respondent
provided Gillie with a response to item #1 of the RFI which
included a purported “corrected” seniority list; and a reply to
item 2 of the RFI that consisted of an explanation that the cor-
rection (to the seniority list) was made by verifying the
“[h]iring register.” (GC Exh. 20.)
I find that Respondent unlawfully delayed until September 2,
its response to item #1 of the July 25 RFI. While Gillie admits
that in September the Charging Union received an adequate
response to item #1 of the July 25 RFI, it was not provided until
about 6 weeks after the initial request. This delay is unreason-
able because there is no evidence that the information was not
readily available. Moreover, Respondent admits that the in-
formation was not overly complex; and noted that the only
difference between the information ultimately given to the
Charging Union; and “the information already provided to the
union before the July 25, 2015 request for information is that
Kaeja Breed’s seniority date changed from 02/16/15 to
02/03/16, moving her ahead of Teearis Stratham in seniority
rank for that date.” (R. Br. 13.) The evidence simply shows
that Respondent either misplaced or ignored the initial July 25
RFI; and after being reminded by Gillie that the request was
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD10
still pending, inputted wrong information causing an inaccurate
seniority list to be generated and sent to the Charging Union.
Incompetence on the part of Respondent is not a valid reason
for a delay in responding to the Charging Union’s relevant and
necessary request for information.
Accordingly, I find that Respondent’s delay until September
2, to respond to item #1 of the July 25 RFI was unreasonable
and therefore violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act and
within the meaning of the PRA.
2. Since July 25, 2015, Respondent has failed to respond to
item #2 of the RFI
The General Counsel alleges that Respondent never provided
the information relevant to item #2 of the July 25 RFI; and
Board law does not support Respondent’s confidentiality de-
fense. According to the General Counsel, Respondent provided
some, but not all, of the underlying entrance exam scores for
the employees on the July 23 seniority list; and “never provided
an explanation as to how the July 23 list was modified from
earlier lists.22 The General Counsel argues that the facts in the
case are “strikingly similar to Postal Service23 in which the
Board found that the entrance exam scores were not confiden-
tial, and should be provided to the union.” (GC Br. 17.) More-
over, the General Counsel contends that even assuming the test
scores were confidential, “Respondent waived its right to claim
confidentiality when it provided employee scores to the Charg-
ing Party without the Charging Party having submitted releas-
es.” (GC Br. 18.)
Respondent counters that the employees’ exam scores are
confidential. Moreover, Respondent insists: (1) it provided the
Charging Union with all of the “confidential” test scores; (2) a
good-faith effort was made to explain to the Charging Union
how it arrived at the seniority list given to the Charging Union;
(3) Gillie was obligated to “ask to view potential sources that
would resolve” any lingering confusion on his behalf about the
information he received; and (4) any delay in receiving the test
scores was due to the Charging Union’s refusal to accept any of
the 3 options offered to it for releasing the information while
protecting the employees’ privacy interests. Respondent, like
the General Counsel, cites Postal Service to support its argu-
ment that the Charging Union was not entitled to unfettered
access to the employees’ test scores.
The evidence established that on May 29, Respondent asked
the Charging Union to get the consent of the employees at issue
to release their test scores. Gillie, on behalf of the Charging
Union, did not seek releases from the employees. Instead, on

22 In its brief, the General Counsel moved, pursuant to the Board’s
Rules and Regulations Sec. 102.17, for the amendment of paragraph 10
of the complaint in Case 07–CA–159684 to allege “[s]ince about July
25, 2015, Respondent has failed and refused to completely furnish the
Charging Party with all of the underlying documentation used to estab-
lish the modified/changed ‘seniority dates and ranks’ as described
above in paragraph 7, except for the information provided to it as de-
scribed above in paragraph 7.” (GC Br. 17.) Respondent did not sub-
mit a reply. Based on a review of the General Counsel’s motion, the
Board’s Rules and Regulations Section 102.17, and the facts, I have
granted the General Counsel’s motion for the above-stated amendment
to the complaint.
23 359 NLRB 1052 (2013).
July 8, Gillie emailed Hippensteel that he felt it was unneces-
sary for the union to obtain the releases, and requested that
Respondent exercise “[o]ption #2 and [o]ption #3” of the Re-
spondent’s protocol for seeking exam scores. (R. Exh. 6.) As
noted earlier in this decision, option #2 offered to make the
exam scores available to the Charging Union for review but not
copy; and option #3 requested that if the union insisted on ob-
taining the test scores without employee releases, it sign a NDA
restricting the disclosure of the test scores only to those union
officials who are investigating or processing the grievance.
Respondent rejects the General Counsel’s contention that it
did not provide the Charging Union with the underlying infor-
mation it used to create the seniority list given to Gillie on
about September 2. Respondent notes that the information
Gille was provided before July 25 RFI, with one exception,
never changed. This, however, is irrelevant because the Charg-
ing Union was seeking all of the information Respondent used
to compile the final seniority list it gave to Gillie. I also find
that there is no evidence that Respondent ever provided Gillie
with the underlying documentation used to rank the employees
on the July 23 list. Although Porter’s letter to Gillie explains
what was used to verify the accuracy of the seniority list, Gillie
was never provided with the actual documents that Respondent
used to accomplish it. Respondent argues that Gillie was obli-
gated to “ask to view potential sources that would resolve” any
lingering confusion on his behalf about the provided infor-
mation. I, however, reject Respondent’s argument. Respond-
ent cites no Board or case law to support its argument of this
point.
Respondent also insists that any delay in providing the test
scores was due to the Charging Union’s refusal to accept any of
the options presented to it for receiving the confidential test
scores; and Board law establishes that a balancing test is re-
quired in these cases. Respondent notes that in weighing the
employees’ privacy interests versus the Charging Union’s need
for the information, it established a protocol for releasing the
test scores which comports with the Board’s decision in Postal
Service, supra, and Detroit Edison.
In Detroit Edison, the union sought employees’ aptitude test
scores to support its allegation, in a grievance case, that the
employer had violated a provision of the CBA requiring that
promotions be based on seniority “whenever reasonable quali-
fications and abilities of the employees being considered are
not significantly different.” The employer would only provide
the union the test scores with the names redacted and nonre-
dacted test scores only with an employee’s consent. In balanc-
ing the parties’ competing interests, the Court determined that
“any possible impairment of the function of the [u]nion in pro-
cessing the grievances of employees is more than justified by
the interests served in conditioning the disclosure of the test
scores upon the consent of the very employees whose grievance
is being processed.” (Id. at 318.)
The facts at issue, however, are more similar to those in
Postal Service, supra. In that case, the union sought the Exam
473 test scores to evaluate the whether employees with veterans
preference were being ranked accurately on the hiring register.
Assessing their competing interests by using the balancing test
laid out in Detroit Edison, the Board determined that although
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE 11
the employees had a confidentiality interest that deserved pro-
tection, the union had “a strong need for the test scores, and
disclosure is unlikely to negatively affect anyone’s view of the
applicants’ basic competence.” Postal Service at 5 (internal
quotations not included). The Board also disagreed with the
Postal Service’s argument that it reasonably accommodated the
union’s interest by offering to furnish the test scores if the un-
ion obtained the employees’ consent. The Board wrote,
Unlike in Detroit Edison, if one or more of the nonveteran
employees withholds his consent, the Union will be effective-
ly precluded from determining whether the Postal Service had
complied with the collective-bargaining agreement. Moreo-
ver, there is a substantial risk that one or more nonveteran
employees will withhold their consent because they stand to
suffer a reduction in seniority if the Union were to prevail on
a grievance.
The case at issue includes the same risks. Gillie likewise re-
quested the information because he believed a particular veter-
an employee, Henry, had received more points than allowed.
Consequently, if one or more of the employees on the seniority
list withholds his or her consent, the Charging Union would be
“effectively precluded” from assessing whether Respondent
carried out the terms of the CBA related to this issue. Further,
if the Charging Union were required to get the employees’
consent before Respondent released the test scores and exams,
the union’s right to enforce most provisions of the CBA and
obtain necessary and relevant information would depend on the
desires of bargaining unit employees. This is not an outcome
envisioned by the Act. The union is empowered by the Act with
enforcing Respondent’s obligations under the CBA through the
grievance process or any other legal means. To accept Re-
spondent’s argument would be to strip the Union, for all practi-
cal purpose, of its statutory duties as the exclusive bargaining
representative of unit employees and its power to enforce viola-
tions of the CBA. United Graphics, Inc., 281 NLRB 463, 465
(1986) (the Board held that information presumptively relevant
to the union’s role as bargaining agent must be provided to the
union as it “relates directly to the policing of contract terms.”).
Even assuming Respondent’s interest outweighed the Charg-
ing Union’s need for the information, Respondent was still
obligated to engage in accommodative bargaining with the
union, but the evidence shows it failed to meet its duty on this
point. It is undisputed that Respondent’s initial response to the
unions’ information request was submitted on September 2 and
consisted of a partial response. Respondent forwarded the
Charging Union its version of a “corrected” seniority list with
an explanation that the “wrong column was entered on
WEBCOINS” which caused the inaccuracies on the previous
list given to Gille. Respondent reiterated that it has not provid-
ed the “test scores” because Gillie had not completed the PS
Form 6105 and obtained the employees’ written consent. (GC
Exh. 20.) Consequently, there is no evidence that in its Sep-
tember 2 response, Respondent offered to find an alternative
means for the Charging Union to access the information. Short-
ly thereafter, the unions filed separate charges with the NLRB.
During this interim period (the time between Respondent’s
refusal to fully provide the requested information and the Un-
ions filing charges with the NLRB), there is no evidence that
Respondent made any attempts at engaging the unions in ac-
commodative bargaining.
Accordingly, I find that Respondent’s failure to provide the
information requested in item 2 of the July 25 RFI was unrea-
sonable and therefore violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act and within the meaning of the PRA.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, United States Postal Service, provides
postal service for the United States and operates various facili-
ties throughout the United States. The Board has jurisdiction
over Respondent and this matter by virtue of Section 1209 of
the PRA.
2. The National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL–CIO
and the Charging Union are labor organizations within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By its unreasonable delay in providing the necessary and
relevant information requested by the Charging Union in writ-
ing on or about October 22, 2014, the Respondent has engaged
in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act and within the meaning of the PRA.
4. By its unreasonable delay and failure/refusal in providing
the necessary and relevant information requested by the Charg-
ing Union in writing on or about July 25, 2015, the Respondent
has engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act and within the meaning of the PRA.
5. The above unfair labor practices affect commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
. The Respondent has not violated the Act except as set forth
above.
REMEDY
The General Counsel requests that I order as appropriate
remedies for the Respondent’s unreasonable delay in providing
the Charging Union with the requested information in violation
of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act: an affirmative bargaining
order; a broad cease-and-desist order; and a prohibition on Re-
spondent from violating the Act “in any other manner.” While
I find that traditional remedies are inappropriate in this matter, I
reject the General Counsel’s argument that notices should be
posted at all Respondent’s facilities within the state of Michi-
gan.
In Hickmott Foods, 242 NLRB 1357 (1987), the Board held
that a broad cease-and-desist order is warranted only when it
has been established that an employer has a proclivity to violate
the Act or has engaged in such egregious or widespread mis-
conduct as to demonstrate its general disregard for the employ-
ees’ statutory rights. The Board has also found that a broad
posting requirement was appropriate when the respondent dis-
played “a clear pattern or practice of unlawful conduct.” Postal
Service, 339 NLRB 1162, 1162 (2003). I find that the evidence
in this case is sufficient to show that in the Detroit District,
which includes the Flint installation (and the facilities it en-
compasses), Respondent has shown a proclivity to violate the
Act or engaged in such egregious misconduct as to demonstrate
a disregard for employees’ fundamental statutory rights. The
settlements, judgments, and orders cited by the General Coun-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD12
sel to support issuance of the requested remedies involve both
the Detroit District and its facilities. A notice posting through-
out the state of Michigan is not warranted because there is cred-
ible evidence that management in the Detroit District does not
have control over any area besides the Detroit District. There
was no evidence that the Detroit District was or has been in-
volved in a coordinated state-wide effort with the other areas in
Michigan to circumvent the process for responding to RFIs.
Therefore, Respondent will be ordered to post and communi-
cate by electronic post to employees the attached Appendix and
notice.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended24
ORDER
Respondent, United States Postal Service, in the Flint instal-
lation and the facilities it encompasses, and the Detroit District
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Branch 256, Na-
tional Association of Letter Carriers (NALC), AFL–CIO
(Charging Union) by failing and refusing to and, or unreasona-
bly delaying in providing the Charging Union, information
requested that is necessary and relevant to its role as the exclu-
sive representative of the employees in following unit:
All full-time and regular part-time city letter carriers em-
ployed by Respondent at various facilities throughout the
United States, but excluding professional employees, employ-
ees engaged in personnel work in other than a purely non-
confidential clerical capacity, postal inspection service em-
ployees, employees in the supplemental work force, rural let-
ter carriers, mail handlers, maintenance employees, special
delivery messengers, motor vehicle employees, postal clerks,
managerial employees, supervisory personnel, and security
guards as defined in Public Law 9-375, 1201(2).
(b) In any like or related manner, interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed to them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the purposes and policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, fur-
nish the Union with all information it has requested since on or
about October 22, 2014, and July 25, 2015.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cilities within the Detroit District, including the Flint installa-
tion (and the facilities it encompasses), copies of the attached
notice marked “Appendix.”25 Copies of the notice, on forms

24 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
25 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
provided by the Regional Director for Region 7, after being
signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be
posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive
days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to
employees and members are customarily posted. In addition to
physical posting of paper notices, the notices shall be distribut-
ed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an
internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent
customarily communicates with its employees by such means.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material. In the event that, during the pendency of these pro-
ceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the
facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall
duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to
all current employees and former employees employed by the
Respondent at any time since October 22, 2014.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated: Washington, D.C. December 2, 2016
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT do anything to prevent you from exercising the
above rights
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively and in good faith
with Branch 256, National Association of Letter Carriers
(NALC), AFL–CIO (Union) by failing and refusing to furnish
it with requested information that is relevant and necessary to
the Union’s performance of its duties as the collective-
bargaining representative of our unit employees at our Detroit
District facilities, including the Flint, Michigan installation (and
the facilities it encompasses).
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively and in good faith
with Branch 256, National Association of Letter Carriers
(NALC), AFL–CIO (Union) by an unreasonable delay in fur-
nishing it with requested information in a timely manner that is
relevant and necessary to the Union’s performance of its duties
as the collective-bargaining representative of our unit employ-
ees at our Detroit District facilities, including the Flint, Michi-
gan installation (and the facilities it encompasses).
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE 13
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner fail and refuse to
bargain collectively and in good faith with the Union as the
servicing representative of the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of our employees in the Unit at our Detroit Dis-
trict facilities, including Flint, Michigan.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to
you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL provide the Union with the underlying documenta-
tion we used to establish the modified/changed seniority dates
and ranks of Flint city carrier assistants with a seniority date
craft for 2015, as requested by the Union on about July 25,
2015.
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case 07–CA–145159 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273-1940.