United States Gypsum Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 14, 1972

200 N.L.R.B. 305 (N.L.R.B. 1972)

UNITED STATES GYPSUM COMPANY 305
United States Gypsum Company and International
Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers,
and its Local 727 , AFL-CIO-CLC. Case
8-CA-6473
November 14, 1972
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, KENNEDY AND
PENELLO
On August 2, 1972, Administrative Law Judge'
George Turitz issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent and the
General Counsel filed exceptions and supporting
briefs, and the Respondent filed an answering brief
to the General Counsel's exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,
and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge
and to adopt his recommended Order.
issued a complaint and notice of hearing which was duly
served on Respondent. Respondent filed its answer in
which it denied all allegations of unfair labor practices. A
hearing on the complaint was held before me at Warren,
Ohio, on March 8 and 9, 1972, at which the General
Counsel, Respondent, and the Union were represented by
their respective attorneys. Respondent and the General
Counsel have submitted briefs. Upon the entire record,
and from my observation of the witnesses I make the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent, United States Gypsum Company, is a
Delaware corporation operating plants in various States of
United States, including a plant located at Warren, Ohio,
where it is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of
building materials and expanded metal products. In the
course of its operations at the Warren plant Respondent
annually ships products valued at in excess of $50,000
directly to customers located at points outside the State of
Ohio. I find that Respondent is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (the
Act).
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Respondent, United States Gyp-
sum Company, Warren, Ohio, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in said recommended Order.
i The title of "Trial Examiner" was changed to "Administrative Law
Judge" effective August 19, 1972.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
GEORGE TURITZ, Trial Examiner: Upon charges filed by
International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC (the IUE) and its Local 727
(Local 727) (both jointly referred to as the Union) on June
14, August 12 and 19, and December 7, 1971, and served,
respectively, on June 15, August 13 and 20, and December
14, 1971, upon United States Gypsum Company (Respon-
dent and, at times, the Company), the General Counsel of
the National Labor Relations Board (the Board), through
the Regional Director for Region 8, on December 14, 1971,
1 In its brief Respondent has requested me to take official notice of a
certain action brought by the Union against Respondent in the Court of
Common Pleas, Trumbull County, Ohio. The complaint in that action was
filed prior to the filing of the charge in the present proceeding. Respondent
has not stated why this evidence, assuming its relevance, was not offered at
International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC, and Local 727, International
Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers,
AFL-CIO-CLC, are labor organizations within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Introduction and Background
1. The issues
The issues litigated at the hearing were whether Respon-
dent failed to bargain in good faith in that it (a)
deliberately and for improper reasons delayed for a period
of 3 to 4 months furnishing the Union information needed
for administration of the current contract and for future
negotiations; (b) refused to meet and confer in good faith
under the contractual grievance procedure with respect to
the Johnson and Gilbert grievances; and (c) denied
Johnson union representation at a meeting concerned with
disciplining him.
2. Bargaining history
The Union was first certified in 1964, and contractual
history started in 1965. In 1969 a strike was settled by a 9-
month contract, and on March 1, 1970, the parties entered
into the contract which was in effect when the events at
the hearing Respondent's request is denied. Respondent's motion to correct
record, dated April 7, 1972, and duly served on the other parties, is hereby
granted. The corrections have been made and the motion, marked Resp
Exh 5, has been placed in the exhibit file.
200 NLRB No. 46
306 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
issue in this case occurred. It expired March 1, 1972. In late
1970 Respondent raised question as to the Union's
majority status and filed a representation petition with the
Board. An election was held and on December 29, 1970,
the Union was certified for the second time.2
B. The Delay in Furnishing Information
On January 4, 1971, the Union wrote requesting
Respondent to meet with it for a collective-bargaining
agreement for the employees covered by the certification
issued by the Board the previous week .3 The letter also
requested the names, addresses, birth and service dates,
rates of pay, job classifications , and insurance and pension
contributions of all bargaining unit employees. By letter
dated February 7, 1971, Respondent furnished the bulk of
the information requested, i.e., the names, addresses, birth
and service dates, rates of pay, and job classifications of
the unit employees .4 At some time not clearly disclosed by
the record it apparently furnished the information as to the
insurance contributions, and on June 16, 1971, following
further demand by the Union, it furnished the pension
information.
On June 25, 1971, the Union wrote to Respondent
requesting a "new seniority list" consisting of the same
items of information relating to the bargaining unit
employees which it had requested on January 4. The
Union also requested job descriptions for three specified
jobs. On July 7 Respondent wrote that it had no
descriptions for those jobs, that the information "on the
names and addresses etc." had been sent on February 7,
the information on pension contributions June 16, and
there had been no changes in the insurance program since
the Union's last receipt of information on insurance
contributions except changes of which the Union had
direct knowledge. The letter then stated:
If a recheck of your files does not reveal that you now
have adequate information for the proper representa-
tion of the employees, then, under the circumstances,
please supply specific details as to exactly what is
needed, and why this particular information is current-
ly needed in order to adequately represent the
employees, as well as why it can't be just as readily or
more readily obtained by you from sources other than
the Company.
Finally, the letter requested, "for negotiation and
representation purposes," a current copy of the IUE
constitution and the Local 727 constitution and bylaws,
plus copies of the group insurance and pension programs
offered by the IUE to its own employees. It concluded:
We need this information on the Pension and Insur-
ance programs so that we can compare these plans with
the ones currently offered under the contract.
The Union replied the next day, July 8, that the
2 See fn. 3, below.
3 It was stated at the hearing that the Regional Director's reason for
conducting an election in the middle of the 1970-72 contract term was that
the contract did not provide for Respondent' s exclusive recognition of the
Union, but left the question of representation open and was, therefore, not a
bar The original charge, filed June 14, 1971, and the first two amended
charges alleged, inter aka, Respondent's refusal "to negotiate a recognition
clause " That allegation was not included in the third amended charge, filed
December 7, 1971, and served with the complaint. The Union' s request for a
requested information was needed "on all new hires,
terminations and on all employees who may have had a
change in job classification as of February 1971." On July
19 Respondent wrote that, if the Union could show that it
could not reasonably obtain the information requested on
July 8 from other sources, it would be happy to furnish it,
but would appreciate learning why that particular informa-
tion was currently needed in order to represent the
employees. The letter closed by referring to the Company's
request for information from the Union and stating: ".. .
I want to call your attention to the fact that your Union
has a responsibility in this matter just as the Company
does. When may we expect it?"
On July 22 the Union replied that the information it
requested was needed for the purpose of properly repre-
senting the employees "for all reasons, including upcoming
negotiations." It stated, further, that it was ready to
interview the employees during working hours to get the
information. As to the Company's request for information,
it asked that the Company detail its reasons , so that they
could be evaluated. Respondent replied the next day,
"agreeing" that interviewing the employees was much more
practical and effective than asking the Company to supply
the information, but that this did not have to be done on
company time or property and could be done from the
Union's own facilities. It further stated that the Union's
constitution and bylaws were "necessary for the proper
administration of the Contract and for determining
questions of representation"; and that the information as
to the Union's pension and insurance programs was
needed in order to assist Respondent in evaluating its own
plans in preparation for future negotiations.
On July 28 the Union wrote that it had not received the
information requested since June 25 and stating that the
information was urgently needed in order to process
grievances, prepare for negotiations, and properly repre-
sent its members. The letter closed, "I expect this
information immediately or I will take the matter up [with]
the proper authorities." On August 2 Respondent wrote
back that it would begin preparation of the requested
information and that it would be submitted to the Union
promptly upon receipt of the information requested of the
Union by the Company. On August 12 the Union filed its
first amended charge, alleging, inter alia, Respondent's
refusal to provide the names, addresses, classifications, and
pay rates requested.
On October 12 Respondent sent the Union "a list of all
new hires and terminations and all other employees who
have had a change in job classifications since February 7,
1971," showing their group insurance and pension deduc-
tions, addresses, birth and service dates, rates of pay, and
job classifications .5 The list included 35 new hires, 9
changed classifications, and 30 terminations. The letter
collective-bargaining meeting did not result in any negotiations
4 The record does not disclose to what extent, if any, Respondent
furnished wage and job information relating to two other plants of
Respondent as to which, according to the Union , Respondent had raised
issue during the preelection campaign and which the January 4 letter also
requested.
5 The Union's International representative conceded that this complied
with the Union's request, so far as the material was concerned.
UNITED STATES GYPSUM COMPANY 307
closed: "In exchange, I would appreciate your sending me
copies of the I.U.E. Pension, Group Insurance and
Constitution as well as the Bylaws of Local 727." The
Union has not furnished the requested material.
In December 1971 the Union requested negotiations for
a new contract to succeed the one expiring March 1, 1972.
Daugherty, Respondent's works manager, admitted that
he could have assembled and sent the information
somewhat sooner than he did. However, he testified, the
information had already been furnished in February 1971
and, since the expiration date of the contract; March 1,
1972, was "months and months" away, and since the
Union did not comply with Respondent's request for
information, he "didn't see the urgency to jump right into
his request." He also testified that the pension information
and some of the insurance information were not readily
available at the Warren plant. He did not, he said, recall
that Rinaldi had stated that he needed the information for
handling grievances and representing the employees day to
day. As to the IUE pension and insurance plans,
Daugherty testified that he wanted them in order to be able
to make comparisons, as he did with such plans of General
Electric and other employers, and thus be better able to
evaluate Respondent's plan and to understand its relative
position. As to the IUE constitution, he testified that in
1968 the Union's certification had been changed "from the
I.U.E. and its local to the I. U. E. and its Local 727," and
he testified: "I believe I would be better qualified to know
all I can know, that was possible to know about the
relationship between the local and the international."
Rinaldi,testified that the reason for the request for an up-
to-date list was that, because of changes of classification
and new hires, he had found himself unable to determine
whether employees objecting to transfers had valid
grievances. He also stated that at no time did Respondent
claim that any of the information he requested was not
readily available. I have credited this testimony of Rinaldi.
Concluding findings as to the refusal to furnish
information
In Cowles Communications, Inc., 172 NLRB No. 204, the
Board stated:
The law is clear and well-settled that "wage and related
information pertaining to employees in the bargaining
unit should, upon request, be made available to the
bargaining agent without regard to its immediate
relationship to the negotiation or administration of the
collective-bargaining agreement." Whitin Machine
Works, 108 NLRB 1537, 1541, enfd . 217 F.2d 593 (C.A.
4); Boston Herald-Traveler Corporation v. N.L. R B., 223
F.2d 58, 63 (C.A. 1), enfg. 110 NLRB 2097; Curtis-
Wright Corporation, Wright Aeronautical Division v.
N.L.R.B., 347 F.2d 61, 68-69 (C.A. 3), enfg. 145 NLRB
152. As such information concerns the core of the
employer-employee relationship, it is presumptively
relevant and "a union is not required to show the
precise relevance of it, unless effective employer
rebuttal comes forth ... .
In N.L.R.B. v. Whitin Machine Works, 217 F.2d 593, 594
(C.A. 4), cert. denied 349 U.S. 905, enfg. 108 NLRB 1537, a
case involving incidents in the course of the negotiation of
a contract, the court stated:
Such information should not necessarily be limited to
that which would be pertinent to a particular existing
controversy. . . . In N.LR.B. v. Yawman & Erbe
Manufacturing Co., 187 F.2d 947, 949 (CA. 2), enfg. 89
NLRB 881 , which also involved incidents during the
negotiation of a contract , the court stated:
Since the employer has an affirmative statutory duty to
supply relevant wage data, his refusal to do so is not
justified by the Union 's failure initially to show the
relevance of the requested information... .
In Boston Herald-Traveler Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 223 F.2d 58,
62-63 (C.A. 1), enfg. 110 NLRB 2097, the court quoted
with approval the statement by Chairman Farmer concur-
ring in Whitin Machine Works, supra, which included the
following:
I would, therefore , hold that, short of evidence that
union requests for wage data are used as an harassing
tactic and not in good-faith effort to secure pertinent
bargaining information , the employer has a continuing
obligation to submit such data upon request to the
bargaining agent of his employees . . . . I am con-
vinced , after careful consideration of the import of the
problem on the collective bargaining process, that this
broad rule is necessary to avoid the disruptive effect of
the endless bickering and jockeying which has thereto-
fore (sic) been characteristic of union demands and
employer reaction to requests by unions for wage and
related information.... I conceive the proper rule to
be that wage and related information pertaining to
employees in the bargaining unit should , upon request,
be made available to the bargaining agent without
regard to its immediate relationship to the negotiation
or administration of the collective bargaining agree-
ment.
The majority of the Board stated, 108 NLRB at 1539, that
they agreed with this statement.
The foregoing principles are applicable not only to the
Union's function in the negotiation of a contract , but also
in its administration. See Stahl Specialty Company, 175
NLRB 129; see also Cowles Communications, Inc., supra.
Respondent complied with the Union 's January request
for employee and job data information without inquiry as
to relevancy, need, or more exact description, and it
furnished the information within about 5 weeks. The
Union's June 24 request for similar data was not complied
with for over 15 weeks, and then only after the Union,
having first threatened to resort to "the proper authorities,"
filed a charge with the Board . In the interim, in complete
disregard of the foregoing principles , Respondent com-
pelled the Union to answer a series of unnecessary
questions . It ignored the fact that what the Union
requested was a new seniority list and wrote that that
information had already been furnished . As stated by
Chairman Farmer in the opinion quoted above, an
employer's obligation to supply wage data is a continuing
one. Respondent also inquired whether the information
could not "just as readily or more readily" be obtained
from other sources, a question which I have no doubt was
asked in bad faith. Its "agreeing" with the Union that
308 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
interviewing the employees for the information outside
company time and property from the Union's own
facilities was much more practical and effective than
asking the Company to supply it was plainly with tongue in
cheek. Finally, I do not credit Daugherty's testimony that
Respondent felt that the Union's pension and insurance
programs would have been helpful to it in negotiations in
the same way as were such programs of other large
industrial employers, such as General Electric; nor do I
credit his testimony that he thought he would be better
qualified to bargain with the Union if he knew the precise
relationship between the IUE and Local 727. It will be
recalled, also, that, while Respondent later withdrew from
this position, on August 2 it made receipt of that
information a condition precedent to its furnishing the
information the Union needed.
The fact that Respondent ultimately furnished the
information requested did not remove its violation of the
Act. This is not the case of an employer protecting itself
against unreasonable requests for information. Daugherty
admitted that at least part of his delay in furnishing the
information was based on the irrelevant fact that the
Union failed to provide information to the Company; and
the entire, correspondence convinces me that Respondent,
an employer sophisticated in labor relations, raised the
various issues in order to obstruct the Union in its efforts
to represent the employees. Its actions in connection with
the Johnson grievance, discussed below, lend further
support to my conclusion that this was not just an
aberration, unlikely to be repeated, but part of a deliberate
policy to impede the Union in carrying out its functions as
bargaining representative.
I find that by delaying unreasonably the furnishing of
necessary information to'the Union and by raising issues in
connection therewith in bad faith and for the purpose of
impeding the Union in representing the employees,
Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
C., The Refusal of Union Representation
On Friday, April 16, 1971, Johnson, the Union's
financial secretary, who worked in the plant as an
electrician under Hover, the chief electrician,6 was engaged
in making adjustments on a slitting machine. Hover, his
supervisor, came over and moved as if to adjust part of the
machine. Johnson stood up, stepped back two steps, and
asked Hover if he was going to set up the machine or was
Johnson. The dimensions of the machine were approxi-
mately 15 by 30 feet, and the two men were some 15 or 20
feet apart. Hover replied, "I didn't touch anything." When
Johnson repeated his question, Hover again said, "I didn't
touch anything." He added, "You don't have to get so
damned smart about it," and walked away. Hover reported
the incident and that same day a "Contact Report" was
executed stating that it was made because of "unsatisfacto-
ry performance" in the category of "insubordination," and
specifying that the action taken was a "Final Warning."
Under "Remarks" the report stated:
Subject employee interfered with his supervisor by
threatening to walk away from a work assignment on
the edge control device of the slitter line if his
supervisor, the Chief Electrician, continued to adjust
another part of the control. Employee Johnson should
understand that this type of insubordinate conduct
cannot be tolerated as it interferes with proper
operation of the plant. Repetition of this type conduct
can result in discharge.
The report was executed by Hover, by Langewisch, the
engineering superintendent, by Church, the personnel
superintendent, and by Daugherty, the works manager.
Later that day Church encountered Johnson and said that
he would be in touch with him the following week "about
this insubordination charge."
On Monday, April 19, Johnson, finding that his timecard
had been removed from the rack, went to the personnel
office, where Church asked him to come in. Johnson said,
"Mr. Church, if there is any disciplinary action, I want a
union representative here." Church said, "No, Bob, come
on in. We just want to talk to you." Johnson complied. He
found Hover and Langewisch in the office. Langewisch
said, "Bob, I hate to do this to you, but r want you to
understand that you have to take orders from your
supervisors ." Johnson denied ever having refused an order
from his superiors, which Langewisch confirmed so far as
he was concerned. Langewisch then said, "About this
threat to leave your job-". Johnson interrupted to deny
this. Langewisch then told Johnson that Hover's procedure
of having the two of them adjust the slitter together was
correct and that he wanted Johnson to know that Hover
would continue to do that in the future. He handed the
contact report to Johnson, who said, "I deny this. This is
not the truth and I refuse it." Langewisch said, "You take
it for your file or whatever you want;" whereupon Johnson
accepted the paper and said he would file a grievance. He
then left.? Johnson testified, and I find, that, other than as
already described, he was asked no questions about the
incident.
Concluding findings as to the denial of union
representation
Johnson was summoned to the office, handed the
previously executed contact report, and warned orally of
Respondent's policy with respect to taking his foreman's
orders in general and adjusting the slitting machine in
particular. He was asked no questions, and no suggestion
was made, either expressly or by implication, that he admit
or deny the accusation, or that he give assurance that his
alleged offense would not be repeated. The allegation in
the complaint that the meeting was for the purpose of
having Johnson defend himself is not borne out by the
record. What was done there was the kind of thing foremen
do out on the factory floor every day without any question
of union representation coming into play. That Respon-
dent chose to dramatize the event by having it take place in
the personnel office in the presence of two additional
officials was insufficient to make union representation any
6 Johnson was the only employee supervised by Hover. The General 1 I do not credit Church's testimony that "Mr. Johnson agreed that the
Counsel does not contend that Respondent 's action against Johnson was insubordination wouldn't happen again in the future."
discriminatory.
UNITED STATES GYPSUM COMPANY 309
more appropriate than it would have been out on the
factory floor.8 I shall recommend dismissal of paragraph
8(C) of the complaint. See Dobbs Houses, Inc., 145 NLRB
1565, 1571.
D. The Grievances
1. Relevant provisions of the contract
Article II of the contract, entitled "Recognition," read:
Section 1. The term "employee" or "employees" as
used in this Agreement is limited to persons within this
bargaining unit who are all production and mainte-
nance employees at the Warren, Ohio plant, excluding
all office clerical employees, guards, professional
employees, the Works Manager, superintendents,
foremen, head machinist, head mechanic, and all other
supervisors as defined in the Act .9
The only express substantive limitation in the contract
on Respondent's right to discharge or otherwise discipline
employees was contained in the following clause:
ARTICLE III-NON-DISCRIMINATION
Section 1. The company will not discriminate against
any employee in a manner currently prohibited by
Federal or Ohio State Law, such as race, religion, sex,
age, or national origin, or because of his membership or
non-membership in the Union. The Union agrees that
neither the Union nor any of its members or agents will
discriminate against any employee in any manner
currently prohibited by Federal or Ohio State Law,
such as race, religion, sex, age, or national origin, or
engage in any union activity on the Company's time.
Article XVI, entitled "GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE,"
read in relevant part as follows:
Section 1. In the course of day-to-day operations and
contact, any employee will discuss with his foreman or
supervisor any matter which he feels requires explana-
tion. If, as a result of such discussion, an employee
decides that he has a grievance, he shall utilize the
following procedure in handling of this grievance.
Section 2. For the purpose of this contract, a grievance
is defined as a difference arising between the Company
and an individual employee or a number of specific
individual employees or the Union as to the interpreta-
tion or application of any of the terms of this
Agreement including discharge, disciplinary suspension
or disciplinary lay-off.
Section 3. An aggrieved employee shall invoke the
Grievance Procedure by placing an explanation of his
grievance in writing, setting out the detail of his
grievance, including Article and clause references, and
deliver this grievance to his foreman or supervisor... .
Section 4. The grievance shall then be handled in the
following steps:
Step 1. Within 5 calendar days from his receipt of
the written grievance, the aggrieved employee
and his foreman will discuss the grievance and if
the employee wishes, he may bring in a represent-
1 do not pass upon a case where, although no questions were asked, the
circumstances were such as to imply that an employer expected that the
employee would defend or explain his actions.
9 The unit in the Board's certification, 152 NLRB 624, 628, is the same as
ative of the Union to assist him or act for him. If
the grievance is not settled to the satisfaction of
the aggrieved employee, then he may invoke Step
2 by writing his department superintendent citing
those areas in the foreman's reply which he feels
are erroneous and contrary to the meaning and
intent of the contract.
Step 2. The aggrieved employee and his depart-
ment superintendent will discuss the grievance
within five (5) days from the time Step 2 is
invoked, and if the employee wishes, he may
bring in a representative of the Union to assist
him or act for him. The department superintend-
ent's answer shall be given within 7 days after the
matter is discussed with him. If the grievance is
not settled to the satisfaction of the aggrieved
employee and the Union feels that the grievance
warrants further discussion, then they may invoke
Step 3 citing those areas in the Department
Superintendent's reply which they feel are errone-
ous and contrary to the meaning and intent of the
contract.
Step 3. The Union and the Works Manager will
discuss the grievance within twelve (12) days from
the time Step 3 is involved. The Works Manager's
answer shall be given within nine (9) days after
discussion with them.
Step 4. If the grievance is not settled to the
satisfaction of the Union in Step 3, they may
invoke Step 4 by submitting a written request to
the Works Manager for a meeting with a
representative of the home office of the Compa-
ny. For the guidance of the home office repre-
sentative, the request shall state the reason why,
in the opinion of the Union, the answer in Step 3
was not in accordance with the contract. A
meeting shall be arranged within two (2) weeks
from the time Step 4 is invoked, and an
International representative, other than the one
regularly assigned to the Plant, shall be present
and represent the employee. The Company home
office representative's answer shall be given not
later than two weeks after discussion with the
Union.
Step 5. If no agreement is reached in Step 4, three
working days after receipt of the Company's
answer and before 45 calendar days after receipt
of this answer, the Union may invoke strike
action as the fifth and final step in the Grievance
Procedure, to urge a specific redress by the
Company in a current grievance which has not
been settled after discussion, review and final
decision by the parties in the fourth step of the
Grievance Procedure.
Section 7. Step 1 of this Grievance Procedure
the above except that it names six categories of employees who were
specifically included along with the rest of the production and maintenance
employees. The first certification named the IUE as representative. It was
subsequently amended to name the IUE and its Local 727.
310 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
must be invoked not later than twelve (12) days
after the event out of which the grievance arose.
The aggrieved employee or Union must invoke
each step thereafter within seven (7) days of the
Company's decision in the preceding step.
burden of proving the allegations in your grievance
when you met with Mr. Hover on April 26, I suggest
that you again review the Contact Report that
specifically describes the action in question, and then if
you have further questions, that you and Mr. Jones
may wish to discuss the matter further with Mr. Hover
at your earliest convenience.
On May 5 the Union replied that the grievance had not
been satisfactorily answered at the first-step meeting since
Hover had refused to answer any questions and that Step 2
was therefore properly invoked. It suggested a meeting on
May 10. On May 7 Respondent wrote that the suggested
May 10 meeting "would not be appropriate at this time" in
view of the record of the Step 1 meeting, the contract, and
Johnson's statement invoking Step 2, and it suggested that
the Step I meeting be reconvened. On May 13 the
reconvened Step 1 meeting suggested by Respondent was
held. Johnson submitted and read a written statement
describing the April 16 incident. Jones asked Hover for
details of Johnson's insubordination. Hover replied that he
was the supervisor in charge and Johnson had interfered
with his job. Asked in what way, Hover replied that
Johnson had taken two steps backwards. Johnson said,
"Well this isn't true . . . This is a trumped up' charge to
harass and discriminate against me because of my union
membership activities." Hover demanded that he be shown
how he had treated Johnson differently from how he
treated anyone else, upon which Jones pointed out that
Johnson was the only employee working for Hover.
Pressed for more details, Hover replied only that Johnson
had been insubordinate, had threatened to leave the job,
had taken two steps backwards; and Church said that the
insubordination charge stood. Jones said an appeal would
be taken to the next step. On May 14 Johnson again filed
an appeal to Step 2, stating:
I am appealing my grievance to step 2 of the Grievance
Procedure. The Grievance was not settled to my
satisfaction. Mr. Hover stated he did not discriminate
against me for union activity. This statement is
erroneous and contrary to the meaning and' intent of
Article III of the Contract.
On May 18 Respondent returned the appeal "for further
handling because you have not indicated how the Fore-
man's answer is in error and contrary to the Contract. In
this respect the Company calls your attention to the fact
that you claimed discrimination and not the Foreman
.... he did ask you to show how you were treated any
differently than any other employee would' be under
similar circumstances, which you did not do."
On May 21 the Union wrote to Respondent as follows:
In order to again expedite the grievance of Mr. Robert
Johnson, without any further delay in the grievance
procedure and without agreeing with your letter of May
18, 1971. The following facts are submitted as a
supplement to the grievance.
1. The grievance has not been settled to Mr. John-
son's satisfaction. Mr. Johnson, wants the warning
removed from his record, therefore he is invoking step
2, of the grievance procedure. (grievance attached)
2. In the meeting of May 13, 1971, Mr. Hover, stated
"He used profanity towards Mr. Johnson, and he
Section 9. In Steps 3 and 4 of the Grievance
Procedure it is understood that the Union
representatives may number up to five (5) people.
Section 10. In the event of the failure of either
party to comply with the time limitations herein
above provided, the grievance shall either be
deemed to have been withdrawn or affirmatively
accepted or approved, as the case may be.
Article XVIII provided that the Company would not
lock out employees and that the Union agreed that there
would be no strike, slowdown, or other interference with
production, except as provided in the Grievance Proce-
dure.
2. The Johnson grievance
On April 21 Johnson filed a grievance, as follows:
I am involking (sic) The Grievance Procedure under
Art. III Sec. 1 and Art. XVI Sec. II, in which The Co.
has Errored in accussing Me of insubordination and
inserted a written Reprimand in my Personal file. I
request this Reprimand be Remove from my Record.
On April 26 a Step 1 meeting was held, with Respondent
represented by Church, the personnel superintendent, and
Hover. Johnson was accompanied by Howard Jones, the
Union's chief steward. Jones asked how Johnson had been
insubordinate. Hover replied that he had threatened "to
leave the job." Asked how the threat had been made,
Hover replied that Johnson had taken two steps back-
wards. He admitted that Johnson had made no verbal
threat, but otherwise refused Jones' request for details
concerning the incident. Church interposed, "This has
nothing to do with witnesses," adding that Respondent was
accepting Hover's account. He stated that he would listen
to what evidence the Union had to support its claim and
asked Jones whether he had any witnesses. Jones replied
that a witness might be brought in later. Jones said, "We
don't feel that Johnson was insubordinate, we feel he is
being discriminated against and we want this removed
from his record." The grievance was denied.
On April 27 Johnson filed with Respondent an appeal to
Step 2, which included the following explanation:
I am Appealing My Grievance to Step II, of the
Grievance Procedure, under Art. III, Sec. I and Art.
XVI, Sec. II, in which The Co. has failed to Show Just
cause in inserting a Reprimand in my Record And has
Refused To Discuss in Detail The Reason's why I
Received This Reprimand.
On April 30 Respondent returned the document to
Johnson with the following letter:
We are returning the enclosed form to you for further
handling since it is not a proper invocation of the
second step of the Grievance Procedure.
If you did not, in fact, understand that you have the
UNITED STATES GYPSUM COMPANY 311
would do it again." We are not aware of any other
supervisor cussing employees in their direction of the
work force. This is a clear case of discrimination and is
contrary to the meaning and intent of Article III, of the
contract.
3. Mr. Hover, also stated "Mr. Johnson, threatened to
walk off the job by taking two steps backwards." This
is ridiculous and in error. Mr. Johnson, never threat-
ened to walk off the job. Mr. Hover, answer is in error
and again contrary to the meaning and intent of Article
III, of the contract.
We expect the step 2, grievance meeting to be held no
later than Wednesday, May 26, 1971, in accordance
with our labor agreement.
On May 25 Respondent replied that since the content of
the Union's letter was "not relevant with respect to the
proper invocation of Step 2" and Johnson had not yet
properly invoked Step 2, a meeting would not be
appropriate. On May 27 Johnson submitted to Respondent
his third appeal to Step 2, stating, "The following facts are
submitted as the areas in the foreman's reply which I claim
are erroneous and contrary to the meaning and intent of
the contract." The appeal then repeated the substance of
the Union's May 21 letter.
On June 2 Respondent rejected Johnson's invocation of
Step 2, stating that the facts in his appeal were "not
relevant to the claimed discrimination as set out in Article
III," 10 and that Johnson had failed to show error in the
foreman's decision that the "contact" for insubordination
had not been in violation of the contract. In conclusion,
Respondent stated that "in an attempt to clear up this
case" it was willing to meet with Johnson and his union
representative at a stated time, but informally, promising
to have Hover present. The parties did meet on June 7.
Langewisch, Respondent's Step 2 representative, an-
nounced that the meeting was informal, since Step 2 had
not been properly invoked. He said that, according to
Hover, Johnson had threatened to leave the job, and that
that constituted insubordination. Johnson replied that he
had not made such a threat, and again said that this "was a
trumped up charge trying to harass and discriminate
against me because of my union membership and activi-
ties." Langewisch replied to the effect that Johnson had to
take orders from Hover, his superior, and Respondent
refused to remove the reprimand.
Meanwhile, on June 3 the Union wrote to Respondent
that since both parties were "requiring strict adherence to
the contract," and Respondent had failed to hold a
grievance meeting within 5 days after Step 2 had been
invoked, as required by the contract, it was invoking
section 10 of the grievance procedure, which provided that
in those circumstances the grievance be answered in the
affirmative, accepted, or approved.
On June 8 Respondent wrote as follows:
I have reviewed the procedural details of the Johnson
grievance and do not find Section 10 of Article XVI
applicable under the current circumstances.
On June 10 the Union requested Respondent to detail the
"current circumstances" referred to, and on June 14 it filed
the original charge herein, alleging that Respondent had
refused to bargain collectively in that, inter a/ia, it had
refused to process Johnson's grievance.
On June 16 Respondent wrote to the Union as follows:
The current circumstances referred to in my letter of
June 8, 1971, involve the fact that Mr. Johnson did not
contractually invoke either Step One or Step Two
within the time periods required and Company did not
waive any of its rights under the Contract. The
Company met informally with the Grievant and his
Union Representative to assure itself that all the facts
were known and that the employee had an adequate
hearing despite the contractual defects... .
At the hearing Daugherty testified that Johnson had not
filed his Step I appeal "properly and timely" in that the
contract provided that before he did so he was required to
"discuss the grievance informally with his supervisor," i.e.,
Hover. He testified that nevertheless the grievance had
been carried on to Step 1, and Respondent's answer given
at the meeting of April 26. He testified, further, that
Johnson had failed to meet the requirement in the second
sentence of section 7 of the grievance procedure that Step 2
be filed within 7 days of that answer; that Johnson's appeal
to Step 2 from the Company's April 26 decision was dated
May 14, and that his April 27 appeal failed to state "the
reason . . . for the invoking of step two."
Johnson testified that he did not file a Step 3 appeal
because Respondent's refusal to hold a Step 2 meeting
made that impossible.
3. The Gilbert grievance
On August 19, 1971, Gilbert, a truckdriver who had been
discharged by Respondent the previous day, filed a
grievance. Meetings were held for Steps 1 and 2 at which
the Union was represented by McMillan, secretary of
Local 727. On September 13 a Step 3 meeting was held at
which the Union was represented by McMillan, Jones, the
chief steward, Rinaldi, the Union's International represent-
ative assigned to represent the employees at Respondent's
Warren plant, and Patrick Kearney. Rinaldi introduced
Kearney as a qualified International representative who
would be assisting him in the area. After a short discussion
of Gilbert's allegation of discrimination, the meeting was
recessed to give the Union the opportunity to bring in
evidence. The meeting was reconvened on September 28,
with the Union represented by Kearney, Jones, and
McMillan. After some discussion it was again recessed, to
reconvene on October 19, when Gilbert attended, along
with the same three union representatives. The grievance
was again denied.
Gilbert appealed, and a Step 4 grievance meeting was set
up for November 10. Jones, McMillan, and Kearney
appeared for the Union. Respondent was represented by
Hallberg, an official from its home office, Daugherty, the
works manager, Church, personnel superintendent, Coop-
er, plant operations manager, and Karafa, Gilbert's
foreman. Hallberg had not participated in any of the
previous meetings. Daugherty said that Rinaldi had
10 In its brief Respondent argued that the irrelevancy of the content of
the Union's May 25 communication lay in the fact that the contract required
Johnson, not the Union, to file the Step two request.
312 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
introduced Kearney "as the international representative
assigned to our plant" and his assistant, that Kearney had
handled Step 3 meetings on the grievance and therefore did
not meet the contractual requirement that the Union be
represented at a Step 4 meeting by "an International
representative other than the one regularly assigned to the
Plant." The Union insisted that Kearney was qualified and
that it was ready to proceed with the meeting. After about
an hour and a half of repetitious discussion Daugherty
said, "I heard that record before and we have work to do,"
and Respondent's representatives rose to leave. Kearney
called out, "Mr. Daugherty, are you walking out?"
Daugherty replied from the doorway, "You can call it what
you want," and the company representative left.
Twenty minutes or less later Daugherty telephoned the
union hall, where the union representatives had repaired,
and suggested that the meeting reconvene and proceed
with the grievance. Kearney returned, accompanied by
Rinaldi. He delivered to Respondent a letter signed by
Rinaldi and reading as follows:
This is to inform you that I am the regular staff man
assigned to service the local, which represents the
employees at your plant. This will be my assignment
unless you are notified differently.
Mr. Patrick Kearney will handle the grievance of Mr.
Gilbert at the 4th step of the grievance procedure, in
accordance with our contract.
Mr. Kearney is an international representative not
normally assigned to represent the employees at your
plant.
Rinaldi orally informed Respondent's representatives to
the same effect.
Daugherty stated that Kearney had been involved in the
third step of the grievance and that the fourth step had to
be handled by some one not previously involved. Kearney
asked if Respondent would meet with Rinaldi. Daugherty
refused, saying that he, too, had been involved in the third
step, and he suggested the names of three other individuals
who in the past had been International representatives.11
Kearney insisted that he himself was qualified, whereupon
Respondent suggested that they get on with the meeting,
that the Union could call it what it liked, but that
Respondent would have to consider it an informal meeting.
Kearney replied, "We are to meet only if you agree this is a
formal fourth step meeting." The company representatives
finally left.
Rinaldi testified that only one International representa-
tive was assigned to the plant and that he was the one
regularly so assigned. He also testified that the importance
of establishing the meeting as a formal fourth-step meeting
lay in the fact that without a formal meeting the Union
could not proceed to the fifth step of the grievance
procedure, which was a strike.
The clause in question, which was introduced into the
contract in 1969, was proposed and drafted by Respon-
dent.
11 At the time of the meeting two of the individuals suggested were no
longer connected with the I.U.E. and the third was no longer an
International representative. The record does not show that these facts were
known to Respondent.
Concluding findings as to the grievances
Before appraising Respondent's conduct it is necessary
to examine what was really at issue between the parties in
the processing of the two grievances . Respondent has
emphasized at the hearing and in its brief that it afforded
Johnson and Gilbert full opportunity to present facts,
arguments, and anything else they wished. However, so
long as this was done at informal meetings Respondent
could make any decision it wished, even arbitrary ones, in
full confidence that the Union had no recourse. The reason
was that the Union had surrendered the employees' right to
strike without getting the return benefit, so frequently
granted, of an arbitration clause . See Textile Workers v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, where the Court said "Plainly
the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro
quo for an agreement not to strike." In lieu of arbitration
Respondent had specifically agreed that Step 5 of the
grievance procedure was a strike. Whether or not it was
probable that the Union would resort to a strike over
Johnson or Gilbert's grievance, formal meetings would
have had the tendency to increase the likelihood that
Respondent would decide those grievances, and others, as
well, with the awareness that wrong or arbitrary decisions
could ultimately result in strike action. Respondent's
refusal of formal meetings was, thus, not a mere matter of
technicality. What must be decided is whether that refusal
was violative of Respondent's duty to confer in good faith
with respect to grievances.
Respondent's principal justification for refusing to
process Johnson's appeals to Step 2 was that he had failed
to demonstrate how the contract had been violated-in
other words, to demonstrate that his discipline was
discriminatory under the Act. The Union did undertake in
the contract to point out at each step of the grievance
procedure how Respondent's action or decision contra-
vened the contract. Respondent in effect contends that the
Union, by those restrictions, waived the employer's
obligation under the Act to discuss grievances and
questions of contract interpretation to the extent that
appealing grievants failed to demonstrate that the contract
had been actually violated. However, waivers of the
employees' statutory rights must be clear, and I find no
such waiver in this instance. The purpose of those
provisions of the contract was to relieve Respondent of the
obligation to apply the contractual grievance procedure to
appeals which failed to indicate that the grievances were
based on alleged violations of the contract.12 An employ-
er's refusal to consider a grievance is violative of the Act
even though it is eventually found that the grievance
lacked merit. See California Portland Cement Company, 103
NLRB 1375, 1377. I do not read the contract grievance
procedure as constituting a waiver by the Union of
Respondent's duty to hear and consider a grievance or
appeal which failed to contain actual proof of violation of
the contract, or even the equivalent of a bill of particulars;
nor do I read it as requiring that appeals have the accuracy
of a pleading or the convincing quality of a legal brief. At
12 The contract provided, in effect , that discipline which might be
considered undeserved, unfair, excessive, or otherwise unjust , but not
violative of the Act or some other statute forbidding discrimination , was not
subject to the contractual grievance procedure.
UNITED STATES GYPSUM COMPANY 313
most the Union waived Respondent's duty to consider
grievances or appeals which did not reasonably apprise
Respondent that Johnson, for example, claimed that he
had been discriminated against for union activities, a plain
violation of article III of the contract.
Johnson was an officer of the Union and the correspond-
ence of the parties must be read in the light of the fact that
this was known to all Respondent's officials; there was no
need to state this in the grievance or the appeals. His
original grievance invoked article III of the contract,
prohibiting discrimination for union activities, and at the
first Step I meeting Jones said, "We don't feel Johnson was
insubordinate, we feel he is being discriminated against
... " Johnson's April 27 appeal also invoked article III,
and at the reconvened Step I meeting on May 13 he said,
referring to the charge that he had interfered with Hover's
job, "This is a trumped up charge to harass and
discriminate against me because of my union membership
and activities." In his May 14 appeal Johnson alleged that
Hover's denial that he discriminated against Johnson for
union activity was erroneous and contrary to the meaning
and intent of article III. In his May 27 appeal Johnson said
that Hover's statement that he had threatened to walk off
the job by taking two steps backwards was ridiculous and
in error and "contrary to the meaning and intent of Article
III of the contract." On June 27 Johnson told Langewisch
that he had not threatened to leave the job and that "this
was a trumped up charge trying to harass and discriminate
against me because of my union membership and activi-
ties." I am convinced that Respondent understood from
these various statements that Johnson claimed that Hover
charged him with threatening to leave the job on obviously
erroneous, in fact, ridiculous, grounds-taking two steps
backwards-and that he made such a charge because of
Johnson's well-known union activities. I find that this was
a sufficient compliance with the contractual grievance
procedure and that Respondent's refusal to hold a Step 2
meeting of Johnson's grievance was not justified by the
contract.
In its letters of June 10 and 16 Respondent relied on still
another strategem to confound the Union's efforts to
utilize the formal grievance procedure. It made the belated
claim that the formal Step 1 meetings, which had been held
with its consent, even at its own suggestion, were merely
informal meetings after all. Daugherty testified that this
was on the basis of the fact that Johnson had failed, before
filing his grievance, to comply with the contractual
requirement-Section 1 of the grievance procedure-to
discuss his grievance informally with Hover. Assuming,
arguendo, the unlikely proposition that that contractual
provision was a condition precedent to the filing of a
grievance, especially where the matter at issue was a
dispute between Hover and Johnson, it is plain that
Respondent waived it and proceeded to hold the Step I
meetings. Indeed, at the hearing Daugherty changed his
stance and testified that "in spite of this defect" the
grievance had been "processed."
Respondent's failure to meet with the Union in compli-
ance with the grievance procedure was more than a mere
contract violation. Respondent was refusing to comply
with its statutory duty, set forth in Section 8(d) of the Act,
"to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with
respect to . . . any question arising" under an agreement.
The contract is relevant only to the extent that Respondent
has claimed that it contained a partial waiver by the Union
of the statutory safeguards . See N. L.R.B. v . C & C Plywood
Corp., 385 U.S. 421, 428 . Moreover, Respondent was not
seeking, in good faith , to take advantage of the contractual
provisions protecting it from having to deal with grievances
not based on alleged violation of the contract; it was
generally willing to spend time to meet with the Union so
long as the meetings were informal . What Respondent was
trying to accomplish in refusing to meet formally was to
frustrate the Union's efforts to advance grievances so as to
place it in a position , if it so decided , to invoke Step 5 of
the grievance procedure. Plainly, its object was to render
nugatory, to the extent it could, an important concession it
had made to the Union on the basis of which"the Union
had agreed to a no-strike clause without arbitration.
I find that Respondent's refusal to meet formally on the
Johnson grievance was in bad faith and that Respondent
by such refusal violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
Gilbert's grievance was advanced to Step 4 but Respon-
dent refused to hold a formal Step 4 meeting with either
Kearney or Rinaldi as the Union's representative. It had
itself drafted the clause requiring that the union represent-
ative be an International representative "other than the
one regularly assigned to the Plant." Rinaldi and Kearney
could not both be "the one" regularly assigned, but
Respondent rejected both. While I am of the opinion that
Respondent was wrong as a matter of contract interpreta-
tion, since the clause limits the employees ' statutory rights
and the language was Respondent's own, I recognize that
its position was an arguable one which an employer could
take in good faith. That does not mean , however, that
Respondent took it in good faith . Here, again, the question
was not one of wasting time-Respondent was willing to
hold the meeting . But Respondent was determined to
prevent the Union , if at all possible , from reaching the
position where it could advance the grievance to Step 5.
Respondent's bad faith in connection with the Union's
request for information and the Johnson grievance
establish its disposition to frustrate the Union in its
function as bargaining representative. I find that it was
similarly motivated in refusing to meet formally with either
Kearney or Rinaldi, and that such refusal to meet was in
bad faith. I further find that Respondent thereby violated
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
I find that the activities of Respondent set forth in the
section III, occurring in connection with its operations
described in section I, have a close , intimate, and
substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of
commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
As I have found that the Respondent has engaged in
314 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
certain unfair labor practices, I recommend that the Board
issue the recommended Order set forth below requiring
Respondent to cease and desist from said unfair labor
practices, and to take certain affirmative action which will
effectuate the policies of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and of
the entire record of this case I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent, United States Gypsum Company, is
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
2. Respondent is, and at all times material has been, an
employer with the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act.
3. International Union of Electrical Radio and Ma-
chme Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC, and its Local 727 are
labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
4. All production and maintenance employees of
Respondent at its Warren, Ohio, plant, excluding all office
clerical employees, guards, professional employees, the
works manager, superintendents, foremen, head machinist,
head mechanic, and all other supervisors as defined in the
Act, constitute a unit appropriate for collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
5. At all times material the IUE and its Local 727 were,
and now are, the exclusive representative of the employees
in the appropriate unit for the purpose of collective
bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, and other conditions of employment, within
the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
6. By delaying unreasonably the furnishing of necessary
information to the Union and by raising issues in
connection therewith in bad faith, and by failing to process
grievances in good faith, Respondent has failed to bargain
collectively as provided in Section 8(d) of the Act, and has
engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
7. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of
the Act Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
8. The unfair labor practices described above are unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: 13
ORDER
Respondent , United States Gypsum Company, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to furnish International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC, or its
Local 727, the name, address , birth date, service date, rate
of pay, job classification , insurance contribution , pension
contribution , and all other wage information of each
employee in the bargaining unit within a reasonable time
after being requested to do so by said organization. The
appropriate bargaining unit is:
All production and maintenance employees of Respon-
dent at the Warren, Ohio, plant, excluding all office
clerical employees, guards, professional employees, the
works manager, superintendents, foremen, head ma-
chinist, head mechanic, and all other supervisors, as
defined in the Act.
(b) Negotiating with the employees' bargaining repre-
sentative in bad faith concerning grievances, or refusing to
process grievances formally to further steps in the
grievance procedure set forth in the applicable contract.
(c) In any other manner failing to bargain in good faith
with the IUE and its Local 727.
(d) In any like or related matter interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) With reasonable promptness upon request, furnish
the IUE and its Local 727 all wage and related information
pertaining to employees in the bargaining unit.
(b) Upon request, process grievances in good faith and
advance them to further steps in the grievance procedure
when appropriate.
(c) Post at its offices and plant in Warren, Ohio, copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 14 Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 8, shall, after being signed by a representative of
Respondent, be posted immediately upon receipt thereof
and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter,
in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken to ensure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify said Regional Director for Region 8, in
writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision,
what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.15
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed
insofar as it alleges unfair labor practices not found herein.
13 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec
102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, automatically become the findings,
conclusions, decision, and order of the Board, and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes. .
14 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board," shall read, "Posted Pursuant
to the Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board."
15 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board
after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read-
"Notify said Regional Director for Region 8, in writing , within 20 days from
the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply
herewith."
UNITED STATES GYPSUM COMPANY 315
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT refuse to furnish the Union within a
reasonable time after request the name, address, birth
date, service date, rate of pay, job classification,
insurance contribution, pension contribution, and all
other wage information, of each employee in the
bargaining unit.
WE WILL NOT negotiate in bad faith concerning
grievances, or refuse to process grievances formally to
further steps in the grievance procedure as provided in
the contract.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner fail to bargain in
good faith with the Union with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment of the
employees in the appropriate unit. The appropriate
bargaining unit is:
All production and maintenance employees of
the Company at its Warren, Ohio, plant, exclud-
ing all office clerical employees, guards, profes-
sional employees, the works manager, superin-
tendents, foremen, head machinist, head mechan-
ic, and all other supervisors, as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with , restrain , or coerce employees in the exercise of
their rights to self-organization , to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,
or to refrain from any or all such activities , except
insofar as these rights might be affected by a contract
with a labor organization, if validly made in conformity
with Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended.
Dated - By
UNITED STATES GYPsuM
COMPANY
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. Any questions concern-
ing this notice or compliance with its provisions may be
directed to the Board's Office, 1695 Federal Office
Building, 1240 East Ninth Street , Cleveland, Ohio 44199,
Telephone 216-522-3715.