United Parcel Service

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 30, 2001

333 N.L.R.B. 1202 (N.L.R.B. 2001)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1202
United Parcel Service, Inc. and Andre Kazanjian.
Cases 27–CA–16064, 27–CA–16140, and 27–CA–
1654–1
April 30, 2001
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS LIEBMAN, HURTGEN, AND
WALSH
On August 11, 2000, Administrative Law Judge Albert
A. Metz issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions, a supporting brief, and a reply brief.
The General Counsel filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, United Parcel Service, Inc.,
Commerce City, Colorado, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the
Order.

William J. Daly, Esq., for the General Counsel.
John M. Husband, Esq. and Erika A. Fedge, Esq., for the Re-
spondent.
James Fattor, Esq., for the Charging Party.
DECISION1
ALBERT A. METZ, Administrative Law Judge. The issues
presented are whether certain of Respondent’s actions involv-
ing its employee, Andre Kazanjian, violate Section 8(a)(1), (3),
and (4) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act).2 On the
entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the
witnesses, and after consideration of the parties’ briefs, I make
the following

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
In adopting the judge’s findings, Member Hurtgen finds it unneces-
sary to pass on the 8(a)(4) allegation, inasmuch as the discharge is
effectively cured by the 8(a)(3) remedy.
1 This case was heard at Denver, Colorado, on February 9–11 and
14, 2000.
2 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3), and (4).
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION AND LABOR ORGANIZATION
The Respondent admits that it is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act and that Teamsters Local Union 435 (the Union) is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
II. BACKGROUND
The Respondent is in the business of the interstate
transportation and delivery of parcels. The Respondent operates
a terminal at Commerce City, Colorado, which is the location
involved in this case. The Union represents some of the Com-
merce City employees. Their collective-bargaining agreement
contains a grievance procedure for resolving disputes.
Andre Kazanjian started working at the Commerce City fa-
cility on February 8, 1995. Kazanjian has performed union
steward functions since 1997. Kazanjian was zealous in the
pursuit of his steward duties, including the filing of approxi-
mately 200–250 grievances against Respondent as well as nu-
merous unfair labor practice charges.
The Respondent terminated Kazanjian on two occasions. His
discharges and the surrounding events are the issues in dispute
in this case. The Government alleges that Kazanjian was co-
erced and terminated because of his protected activities includ-
ing his filing of unfair labor practice charges against the Re-
spondent. The Respondent denies that any actions it took
against Kazanjian were unlawful, but rather were the result of
his own misconduct.
III. SUPERVISOR COOPER’S CONFRONTATION WITH
KAZANJIAN
The Government alleges that in early September 1998 Re-
spondent’s division manager, John Cooper, harassed and co-
erced Kazanjian because he had filed a grievance under the
collective-bargaining contract.
On September 14, 1998, Kazanjian filed a grievance relating
to the suspension and discharge of employee Fred Hall. The
grievance named Division Manager John Cooper because his
name appeared on disciplinary letters that were issued to Hall.
Cooper’s signature appeared on Hall’s termination letter, but it
was customary that a secretary would actually sign his name.
The grievance implied that Cooper had targeted Hall for termi-
nation as a means of reducing the Twilight Sort shift’s OSHA
reportable injury rate. Cooper was irritated at having his integ-
rity questioned by such an assertion. Cooper had been on spe-
cial assignment during the period of time relevant to the griev-
ance and did not personally participate in the decisions regard-
ing the grievant.
A short time after the Hall grievance was filed, Cooper ap-
proached Kazanjian and questioned why he had been named in
the grievance. Kazanjian noted that Cooper was agitated about
being named. Kazanjian told Cooper that he would not talk
about the grievance because the matter was scheduled for a
local hearing. According to Kazanjian, Cooper insisted that
they discuss the grievance. Kazanjian testified that because of
Cooper’s angry demeanor he stated that he wanted another
union steward present. Cooper repeated his displeasure about
333 NLRB No. 146
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE 1203
being named in the grievance and insisted the matter be dis-
cussed at that time. Kazanjian reiterated that he could not dis-
cuss the grievance without a steward because he now consid-
ered Cooper’s confrontation with him to be an investigatory
interview. Cooper consented that Kazanjian could have a stew-
ard present.
There is some dispute about what happened next. According
to Kazanjian, he and Cooper started to get a steward when
Cooper suddenly ordered him to return to where Cooper was
standing. Kazanjian said that he was going to get a steward.
Cooper then said Kazanjian was refusing to work as directed.
Kazanjian returned to Cooper. Cooper then again said that they
would get a steward and both men went to another location in
the facility and contacted steward, Byron Moore.
According to Cooper, Kazanjian said that he was going to
get a steward and that he was going to file charges against
Cooper. Kazanjian then walked away from Cooper. Cooper
then directed Kazanjian to stop three separate times. The final
time he told Kazanjian he was giving him a direct order to stop.
Kazanjian finally responded by returning to where Cooper
stood. Copper then said that he would get a steward for Kazan-
jian and they both went and got Moore. Based on the demeanor
of the witnesses, I find that Cooper’s portrayal of events is the
more accurate recitation of what was said and done relative to
Kazanjian walking away from Cooper.3
Cooper, Kazanjian, and Moore went to an office where Coo-
per stated that Kazanjian had failed to work as directed. Kazan-
jian denied that he had failed to work as directed. Moore told
Kazanjian that he should work as directed and Kazanjian reiter-
ated that he had worked as directed. Cooper stated that he
thought that his name appeared on the grievance was unfair and
that the allegation of the grievance was a lie. Kazanjian said
that he had evidence to support the allegation. Kazanjian ex-
plained that Cooper’s name appeared in the grievance because
his name had appeared on the disciplinary letters issued to Fred
Hall. Cooper asked what evidence Kazanjian had to support the
allegation. Kazanjian said that the evidence would be presented
at the local hearing. Kazanjian invited Cooper to attend that
hearing. The meeting then ended. Kazanjian was not disci-
plined for any alleged failure to work as directed. On Septem-
ber 23, 1998, Kazanjian filed an unfair labor practice charge
regarding his encounter with Cooper. Kazanjian and Cooper
both testified that it was not uncommon for stewards and man-
agement to informally discuss grievances.
The test of whether an employer’s remarks or actions vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1)’s prohibition against interference, re-
straint, or coercion is not whether it succeeds or fails, but,
rather, the objective standard of whether it tends to interfere
with the free exercise of employee rights under the Act. Field-

3 As set forth below, Kazanjian is credited in other regards. NLRB v.
Universal Camera Corp., 179 F.2d 749, 754 (2d Cir. 1950) (“Nothing
is more common in all kinds of judicial decisions than to believe some
and not all [of what a witness says].”); Champion Papers, Inc. v. NLRB,
393 F.2d 388, 394 (6th Cir. 1968) (“A fact finder—jury, judge or ad-
ministrative agency—is not barred from finding elements both of truth
and untruth in a witness’ testimony.”); NLRB v. Pat Izzi Trucking Co.,
395 F.2d 241, 244 (1st Cir. 1968) (“That part of a witness’ testimony is
not believable does not of itself destroy the rest.”).
crest Cannon, Inc., 318 NLRB 470, 490 (1995). The filing of a
grievance is protected activity within the meaning of Section 7
of the Act. NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, 465 U.S. 822, 836
(1984)..
I find that Cooper’s insistence upon discussing the grievance
was not unlawful. Cooper wanted an explanation of why he was
named in the grievance. Cooper admitted that he was “irritated”
and “a little upset” because he had been named in the griev-
ance. I find that Kazanjian precipitously walked away from
Cooper when he went to get a steward and Cooper had to three
times order Kazanjian to return to him. The two men then got a
steward, discussed the matter, including Cooper’s assertion that
Kazanjian had not worked as directed when he had walked
away from Cooper and initially failed to respond to his direc-
tion to return. Kazanjian was not disciplined for anything he did
on this occasion and the matter ended there. I find that on bal-
ance Cooper’s actions in wanting to discuss the grievance and
his insistence that Kazanjian not walk away from him during
their discussion was not of such a character as to have a reason-
able tendency to interfere with the free exercise of employee
rights under the Act. I find that the Respondent did not violate
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by Cooper’s actions on this occasion.
IV. EVENTS OF NOVEMBER 16, 1998
A. Kazanjian’s Confrontation with Rooney
On November 16, 1998, Kazanjian and Supervisor Rich
Rooney had a confrontation that led to Kazanjian’s first dis-
charge. The Government alleges that in this encounter Rooney
struck Kazanjian because he had threatened to file an unfair
labor practice charge against Rooney. The Respondent denies
any such motivation existed and contends that Rooney merely
shoved Kazanjian away from him when Kazanjian spit on him.
Kazanjian, in addition to his normal duties, frequently per-
formed Saturday air delivery work for the Respondent. He had
a practice of checking his recorded hours for such work. On
November 16, 1998, as Kazanjian was leaving work for the day
he went to the Commerce City Center office to check his hours.
Kazanjian asked Lee Johnston, a part-time supervisor, to see his
driving records for the previous Saturday. Johnston said there
would be a short delay because he was printing some docu-
ments from the computer at that time. As Kazanjian waited for
his records he was looking down the hallway. Supervisors Keri
Alderman and Steve Sparks walked by and Sparks asked Ka-
zanjian what he was doing. Kazanjian said that he had made a
phone call and was getting some information. Alderman asked
Kazanjian if he was still on the clock. Kazanjian was upset by
this question and asked Alderman why she was harassing him.
He told her that he was going to file a NLRB charge against
her. He then returned to the interior of the office and sat down
to wait for his driving records.
Kazanjian’s failure to answer Alderman’s question was
shortly related to Supervisor Rich Rooney, who was in an of-
fice next door. Rooney then went to the City Center office,
opened the door, and asked Kazanjian if he was on the clock.
Kazanjian testified that he said he was not on the clock and that
he thought that Rooney was harassing him. He told Rooney that
he was going to file a NLRB charge against him. Kazanjian
testified that Rooney then came at him where he was seated and
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1204
angrily shouted, “You’re going to file a charge against me in
my own building?” Kazanjian stated he felt threatened by
Rooney’s actions and stood up. Rooney then moved closer and
placed his chest against Kazanjian’s chest. As they stood facing
each other, Rooney and Kazanjian continued to exchange
words. Kazanjian recalled Rooney repeated the question about
Kazanjian filing charges against him in his own building. Ka-
zanjian states he then attempted to move past Rooney in an
effort to leave the office. Kazanjian testified that at this point
Rooney placed both hands on Kazanjian’s chest and pushed
him into the opened door. Rooney then stated that Kazanjian
had spit in his face. Kazanjian denied he spit in Rooney’s face
and said that he was going to file an assault charge with the
police. Kazanjian then exited the office. Kazanjian testified that
he never spit at Rooney at any time during the incident. Kazan-
jian testified that when he exited the office he observed Super-
visor Chris Swanson, standing in the hallway near the Com-
merce City Center office next to a solid wall that permitted no
view into that office.
Rooney testified that he asked Kazanjian if he was on or off
the clock. At this point, Kazanjian said he was going to file a
NLRB charge. Rooney testified that he said he did not care.
Kazanjian then started “screaming and hollering” at him and
jumped out of his chair. Kazanjian spit in his face as he came at
Rooney. Rooney said he pushed Kazanjian away from him, out
the door. Rooney recalled that as Kazanjian left the office he
said again that he was going to file charges and get the police.
Rooney denied that he made any move towards Kazanjian and
testified that he remained in the doorway to the office. Rooney
testified that he had contact with Kazanjian before November
16 and that Kazanjian had always been friendly toward him.
Employee Michael Johansson observed the encounter be-
tween Rooney and Kazanjian through a sliding glass window in
an adjacent office. Johansson testified that he saw Rooney and
Kazanjian exchanging words and he saw Rooney push Kazan-
jian into the door. After observing the confrontation, Johansson
hurriedly came out of his office and went to the door of the
Commerce City Center office. Johansson testified that as he left
his office he noticed Supervisor Chris Swanson standing in the
hallway by a solid wall that did not have a clear view into the
Commerce City Center office. Johansson testified that he did
not see Kazanjian spit on Rooney.
After Kazanjian and Rooney exited the office, Rooney
walked past Johansson in the hallway. Johansson did not ob-
serve any spit on Rooney’s face nor was Rooney wiping his
face. A few seconds later, Rooney approached Johansson and
told him that Kazanjian had spit on him and that was why he
had pushed Kazanjian. Rooney asked Johansson if he would
not shove someone if they had spit in his face. Johansson saw
no spit on Rooney’s face but Rooney was wiping his face with
his hand.
Chris Swanson testified that he was in the window of the
Commerce City Center office and observed Kazanjian stand up
aggressively, slam his chair, and charge at Rooney. Swanson
testified that as Kazanjian charged at Rooney, he spit in his
face, and then barged by Rooney, who was holding the door
open.
Supervisor Lee Johnston was in the City Center office during
the encounter between Rooney and Kazanjian. He recalled that
Rooney asked Kazanjian if he was on the clock. Kazanjian then
said that he was going to file harassment charges against
Rooney. Rooney said that he was only asking if Kazanjian was
on the clock. Kazanjian then jumped out of his chair and got
chest to chest with Rooney and they briefly argued. Rooney
then pushed Kazanjian away from him toward the door and said
something like, “[D]on’t ever spit in my face again.” Johnston
testified that he could only see Rooney from the side and did
not see Kazanjian spit in his face. Johnston also did not ob-
serve any spit on Rooney’s face and he did not see Rooney
wipe his face
I found the witnesses to the sudden confrontation between
Kazanjian and Rooney all testified to the best of their recollec-
tions as to what they observed. None of them testified that they
heard Rooney say words to the effect he was angry with Kazan-
jian about his going to file charges against him. I found Johns-
ton, the only other person in the room, to be particularly credi-
ble and forthright about what he observed. As he related,
Rooney reacted calmly to Kazanjian’s threat to file charges and
again stated that he was only inquiring if Kazanjian was on the
clock. I also find that, as Johnston related, it was Kazanjian that
jumped out of his chair and approached Rooney in a distraught
manner. I find that Kazanjian did not deliberately spit in
Rooney’s face. Based, however, on Rooney’s instantaneous
reaction at the time, and his demeanor while testifying, I find
that Kazanjian did inadvertently spray Rooney’s face with spit-
tle as the two engaged in a chest-to-chest heated argument. In a
natural reaction to such an incident, I find that Rooney shoved
Kazanjian away from him.
In sum, I find that Kazanjian, offended by what he thought
was an unreasonable question from a supervisor, charged at
Rooney and engaged him in an excited argument. I do not find
that Rooney’s conduct was a result of Kazanjian’s threat to file
a charge against him. I do not find that Rooney’s actions rea-
sonably had a tendency to threaten, coerce, or restrain employ-
ees for engaging in protected activity. I conclude that the Re-
spondent did not violate the Act by anything that happened
between Rooney and Kazanjian on November 16, 1998.
B. Kazanjian’s First Termination
Twilight Sort Manager Kelly Schmaltz testified that she
learned of the encounter between Rooney and Kazanjian im-
mediately after the incident. Schmaltz credibly testified that she
at once went and talked to some of the witnesses. She then
telephoned Cooper and reported what she had learned. Cooper
then spoke to Rooney and Swanson and got their versions of
what had occurred. Finally, Schmaltz got back on the phone
and Cooper told her to gather all the facts from both sides and
that she needed to make a decision based on what she heard.
She told the witnesses she had spoken to at that point to write
down what they observed while the incident was still fresh in
their minds. Kazanjian returned to the Commerce City Center
office about this time with Steward Jim Osborne. They met
with Schmaltz, Safety Supervisor Larry Wells, and Supervisors
James Gilchrest and Chris Swanson. Kazanjian at first refused
to tell Schmaltz what had happened between he and Rooney.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE 1205
Finally, after urging from Osborne, Kazanjian related to
Schmaltz that he had been waiting for his driving records and
that Rooney had assaulted him. He denied that he had spit in
Rooney’s face. After hearing from Kazanjian, Schmaltz made
the decision to terminate him and informed him of her decision.
Kazanjian then left the Respondent’s facility and went to a
police station where he filed a report that Rooney had assaulted
him. I credit Schmaltz’ testimony that it was her independent
decision to terminate Kazanjian based on her investigation.
On November 24, 1998, Twilight Hub Division Manager
John Cooper issued a letter to Kazanjian confirming that he was
terminated effective November 16 because he had spit on a
management official. Kazanjian filed a grievance concerning
his termination. The central region committee (a joint manage-
ment-labor committee) ultimately heard the grievance. The
committee issued a two-sentence decision that ordered Kazan-
jian’s termination reduced to a suspension and that he be rein-
stated without backpay. Kazanjian was reinstated on February
1, 1999. A Commerce City, Colorado jury heard Kazanjian’s
criminal assault charge against Rooney. Rooney was acquitted
of the charge.
C. Analysis of the November 16 Discharge
The Respondent initially argues that this unfair labor practice
proceeding rehashes Kazanjian’s two terminations and, to that
extent, should be dismissed because the contractual dispute
proceedings have already made determinations regarding his
similar grievances. I reject the Respondent’s argument that I
should defer to the panels’ decisions regarding Kazanjian’s two
discharges. Kazanjian’s discharges are alleged in the complaint
to have been, in part, motivated by his filing of unfair labor
practice charges under the Act. The Board does not defer al-
leged violations of Section 8(a)(4) to private dispute resolution.
Equitable Gas Co., 303 NLRB 925, 927 (1991); International
Harvester Co., 271 NLRB 647 (1984); and Filmation Associ-
ates, 227 NLRB 1721 (1977). I find that Kazanjian’s unfair
labor practice charges relating to his two discharges are not
deferrable under the Act.
The General Counsel has the initial burden of establishing
that union or other protected activity was a motivating factor in
Respondent’s action alleged to constitute discrimination in
violation of Section 8(a)(3). The elements commonly required
to support such a showing of discriminatory motivation are
union activity, employer knowledge, timing, and employer
animus. Once such unlawful motivation is shown, the burden of
persuasion shifts to the Respondent to prove its affirmative
defense that the alleged discriminatory conduct would have
taken place even in the absence of the protected activity. Wright
Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir.
1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982); approved in NLRB v.
Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983); Elec-
tromedics, Inc., 299 NLRB. 928, 937 (1990), enfd. 947 F.2d
953 (10th Cir. 1991); and Presbyterian/St. Luke’s Medical
Center v. NLRB, 723 F.2d 1468, 1478–1479 (10th Cir. 1983).
The test applies regardless of whether the case involves pretex-
tual reasons or dual motivation. Frank Black Mechanical Ser-
vices, 271 NLRB 1302 fn. 2 (1984). “A finding of pretext nec-
essarily means that the reasons advanced by the employer either
did not exist or were not in fact relied upon, thereby leaving
intact the inference of wrongful motive established by the Gen-
eral Counsel.” Limestone Apparel Corp., 255 NLRB 722
(1981), enfd. sub nom. 705 F.2d 799 (6th Cir. 1982). The
Wright Line standard is also used in assessing alleged violations
of Section 8(a)(4) of the Act. Gary Enterprises, 300 NLRB
1111 (1990).
The General Counsel has shown by its case that the Respon-
dent had admitted knowledge of Kazanjian’s union and pro-
tected activities. Kazanjian’s first discharge followed shortly
after his statement that he was going to file charges against
Rooney with the Board. The credited evidence also shows that
Rooney did not take umbrage at Kazanjian’s statement and that
it was Kazanjian who jumped out of his chair, confronted
Rooney and accidentally spit on him. Based on her understand-
ing that Kazanjian had spit on Rooney, Schmaltz made her
decision to terminate Kazanjian’s employment. I find that the
Government has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence
that Kazanjian’s November 16 discharge was based on his ac-
tivities protected under the Act. I find that the Respondent did
not violate the Act when it discharged Kazanjian on November
16. Wright Line, supra.
V. KAZANJIAN’S SECOND DISCHARGE—MARCH 22,
1999
Kazanjian was reinstated to work on February 1, 1999, at
which time he resumed his duties as steward. Kazanjian worked
for the Respondent until March 22, 1998, when he was again
terminated. The Government alleges the second termination
was the result of his protected concerted activities, including
the filing of unfair labor practice charges. The Respondent
denies these allegations and asserts that Kazanjian was fired
because he refused to follow repeated orders to leave the Re-
spondent’s premises after he was off work.
On February 10 Kazanjian attended a grievance meeting
with new division managers, Al Falco and Ben Stewart, and
Supervisor Schmaltz. During this meeting Kazanjian brought to
Falco’s attention problems regarding supervisors wearing
nametags and the posting of seniority lists.
On February 11 Falco and Stewart were at Kazanjian’s time-
clock when he reported for work. Falco asked Kazanjian what
time he started work. Kazanjian said that he did not know his
start time because his name was not listed on the start time list.
The start time list shows the employee’s name, start time and
work area. Kazanjian’s name had not been on the start time list
since he returned to work on February 1, 1999.
Falco asked Kazanjian what work area he was assigned. Ka-
zanjian replied that he wanted a union steward. Kazanjian then
took out a card that listed employees’ Weingarten rights to
representation by a union representative during an investigatory
interview.
Steward Byron Moore was nearby and came over to where
the men were standing. Kazanjian then filled out a grievance
form alleging that he was being harassed. Kazanjian offered the
grievance to Falco and Stewart, but neither would accept the
form.
Kazanjian and Moore then walked to Kazanjian’s work area
followed by Falco and Stewart. Falco asked Kazanjian how he
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1206
knew where his work area was. Kazanjian said that this was
where he had been recently working. Falco then spoke to Su-
pervisor Ron Yeager and told him to get Labor Relations Man-
ager Dan Flores. Flores came to the work area and Falco told
him that Kazanjian did not know what his start time was so he
was probably late. Flores responded that he guessed that they
would have to write Kazanjian up for being late.
Falco then questioned Kazanjian about a bag he was carry-
ing. The bag contained copies of the collective-bargaining
agreement, grievance forms, a pad of paper, and some informa-
tion sheets. Kazanjian had routinely carried the bag at work
since first becoming a steward. Kazanjian told Falco the bag
belonged to him. Falco told Kazanjian that employees could not
bring bags into the building. Kazanjian replied that stewards
were allowed to bring bags into the building. Kazanjian told
Flores that he would have to file a grievance over the matter.
After the bag was discussed, Kazanjian started work unload-
ing “irreg” packages from the conveyor belt. (Irregs are pack-
ages that are oversized, weigh in excess of 70 pounds, or have
sharp edges that could damage the belt.) Falco observed Kazan-
jian at work and then told him he had lowered a package incor-
rectly. Kazanjian asked what he had done that was in error.
Falco said he could not say, as he was not an expert. Kazanjian
then took off his gloves and offered them to Falco. He asked
Falco to show him what he had done wrong if he was not able
to tell him. Again, Falco said that he was not an expert. Falco
then directed Yeager to get Safety Supervisor Larry Wells.
Wells came to the work area and demonstrated safe lifting and
lowering techniques. Kazanjian testified that Wells did not
demonstrate any techniques that Kazanjian did not already
know and utilize. Wells had Kazanjian’s employee record and
entered a notation that Kazanjian had requested retraining in
safety. Kazanjian protested that he had not requested retraining
and he stated that he knew how to lift and lower properly.
Gary Watson, a union steward and part-time employee, testi-
fied that he regularly carried a tote bag with steward materials.
He recalled that a couple of years ago his supervisor advised
him that he could not bring tote bags into the facility. He com-
plained to the Labor Manager Danny Flores about the situation.
Flores told him that it was okay as a steward to have such a bag
in light of the necessity of stewards having union paperwork
they need available. No one has prohibited him from bringing
in his tote bag since that time. Flores testified that at one time a
grievance panel decision sustained a company rule prohibiting
part-time employees, including union stewards, from bringing
bags into the facility. Neither the rule nor the panel decision
was introduced into evidence. Flores did not deny that Kazan-
jian and Watson had been permitted to carry bags into their
work areas before February 11, and, with regard to Watson,
after February 11. Based on demeanor, and the record as a
whole, I credit Kazanjian and Watson that they routinely car-
ried bags without a problem prior to Kazanjian being re-
proached on February 11.
On February 24, Kazanjian asked his supervisor, Rachel
Groppel, if he could write grievances on the clock after his
shift. Groppel told Kazanjian to clock out and to report his
time the next day. Kazanjian stated her instructions were con-
trary to past practice and that he should be permitted to remain
on the clock. Groppel continued to deny his request to stay on
the clock to write grievances. Schmaltz came up to Kazanjian
later and asked him who had given him permission to write
grievances. Kazanjian explained that Groppel had given him
permission to write grievances. Schmaltz asked Kazanjian if he
was on the clock and he explained that Groppel had refused to
permit him to remain on the clock, Schmaltz then told Kazan-
jian to leave the building. Kazanjian suggested that he could
clock in again, but Schmaltz rejected his suggestion. Kazanjian
requested that Steward Gary Watson be called to discuss the
matter. Watson arrived shortly thereafter and Schmaltz stated
that Kazanjian could not write grievances because he was not
on the clock and that he had to leave the building. Kazanjian
again offered to clock in, but Schmaltz again refused. Watson
told Kazanjian not to argue about the matter and to leave. Ka-
zanjian acquiesced and left the facility.
Kazanjian testified that on March 4 he and Byron Moore had
clocked out and were leaving work for the day. Falco followed
them as they exited the building. Kazanjian and Moore encoun-
tered Jose Sanchez, a union steward, who was reporting for the
next shift. Sanchez had not yet punched in for his shift. As the
employees stopped to talk, Falco told them they could not talk
to each other. Kazanjian and Moore then left the building.
Falco testified that he did leave work that evening behind Ka-
zanjian but said nothing to him. Based on demeanor and Kazan-
jian’s detailed testimony of what occurred on this occasion, I
credit Kazanjian as to what occurred on this occasion.
On March 15, an employee asked Kazanjian to represent him
in a matter. Kazanjian asked Groppel for permission to repre-
sent the employee. Groppel refused to give him permission.
Shortly thereafter, Groppel and Falco came up to Kazanjian.
Falco said that he had gotten complaints that Kazanjian had
been soliciting grievances. Kazanjian asked from whom he had
received these complaints, but Falco refused to say. Falco said
that Kazanjian could not solicit grievances and that if he did not
have irregs to pull off the belt he had to go into the trucks and
start unloading. Falco said that if Kazanjian did not work as
directed he would be terminated. Kazanjian then commenced
unloading trucks although this was not part of his regular work
assignments. None of the other six to eight employees assigned
to irregs on that night were ordered to unload trucks.
On approximately March 16, Kazanjian and employee Ron
Kalkhorst were in the facility waiting outside of an office in
order to talk to Stewards Byron Moore and Sam Herrera, and
Union Business Agent Alan Frisbee. Moore, Herrera, and Fris-
bee were in a meeting with management. The meeting con-
cluded and Falco approached Kazanjian and asked if he was on
the clock. Kazanjian said that he was not and that he was there
to see his business agent and a steward. Falco told Kazanjian to
leave the building. Kazanjian did not challenge Falco’s order
and began to leave. Kalkhorst started to argue with Falco about
the matter, but Kazanjian told him not to press the point and
Kazanjian left the building.
On approximately March 17, Kazanjian attended a safety
committee meeting. During the meeting, he exchanged phone
numbers with Christine Epperson, a fellow employee who was
also a member of the committee. At the conclusion of the meet-
ing, Schmaltz told Kazanjian to remain in the room while the
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE 1207
other employees left. Schmaltz, Falco, Larry Wells, and Bob
Stanley, safety supervisor, remained in the room with Kazan-
jian. Schmaltz asked Kazanjian if he had distributed union lit-
erature during the meeting. Kazanjian said he had not. Schmaltz
asked him what he had given Epperson. Kazanjian said that he
had exchanged telephone numbers with her. Kazanjian then
returned to work.
On March 22, employee Angie Caputo came to Kazanjian in
his work area and said she was looking for Byron Moore so he
could represent her in a dispute with her supervisor. Kazanjian
and Caputo asked Groppel and Yeager about Moore’s where-
abouts. They did know Moore’s location. Kazanjian then asked
Caputo if she wanted him to represent her and she said she did.
Kazanjian asked Groppel and Yeager if he could have permis-
sion to leave his work area to represent Caputo. They refused
his request. Kazanjian asked if Caputo could stay in his work
area until the sort was done. Groppel and Yeager agreed that
she could stay.
After Kazanjian finished his shift, he and Caputo met with
Supervisors Greg Lopez and Chris Gallegos to discuss her
complaints. When they finished discussing Caputo’s situation,
Kazanjian returned to his work area to punch out. He noticed
that someone had already punched him out. Caputo then ap-
proached Kazanjian and asked him to write grievances for her
regarding the matters that they had discussed earlier with man-
agement. Kazanjian said he would write the grievances for her
the next day.
Kazanjian then got some food and went to the breakroom.
Kazanjian testified that one reason he went to the breakroom
was to write some grievances that had to be submitted that
night in order to be timely. It was also his intention to double
shift. (The Respondent has a policy of open double shifting on
the midnight shift. This policy permitted any employee, who
desired, to voluntarily work on the midnight shift. An em-
ployee who was double shifting could begin his double shift at
any time during the midnight shift.)
When he arrived at the breakroom, Kazanjian spoke briefly
with another employee, Steve Buckles. He told Buckles that he
had to write some grievances and was then going to double
shift. Kazanjian then began writing grievances. Supervisor
Jason Adams observed Kazanjian in the breakroom and re-
ported his presence there to Schmaltz. Schmaltz then reported
this information to Falco.
Falco asked Manager Rick Suder to accompany him to the
breakroom where they found Kazanjian. Falco asked Kazanjian
what he was doing. Kazanjian said that he was writing griev-
ances. Kazanjian testified that Falco then said he was fired for
failing to follow instructions to leave the building when he had
completed his work. Falco then asked Kazanjian if he was on
the clock and Kazanjian said that he was not. Falco asked if
anyone knew that he was in the breakroom. Kazanjian said no,
but he told Falco that employees were permitted to be in the
breakroom. Falco asked how Kazanjian knew that and Kazan-
jian said that he had heard about a PCM to that effect. (A
PCM—precommencement of work message—is a directive
given to employees by their supervisor.) Falco asked who had
given the PCM and Kazanjian responded that he did not know.
(Kazanjian testified that a few days earlier another employee,
Jonathan Lindenberg, had told him about a PCM that said em-
ployees could not remain in the building after their shift unless
they were double shifting or in a breakroom. Lindenberg had
complained about the restriction and his supervisor had told
him it was because of Kazanjian.) Kazanjian admitted that he
never told Falco or Suder that the reason he was still on the
premises was to double shift.
Kazanjian testified he then requested a union steward and
Falco instructed Suder to get a steward. Kazanjian specifically
asked for Steward Gary Watson. Suder left to find a steward
and Kazanjian attempted to give Falco a Weingarten card.
Falco did not accept the card. Kazanjian then requested that
Falco sign the grievances that he had been preparing. Falco said
that he would not accept the grievances because Kazanjian no
longer worked there.
Suder returned to the breakroom with Steward Christy
Anderson. Kazanjian said that he had requested Gary Watson.
Falco then instructed Suder to get Watson. After Suder left the
room, Falco told Anderson that Kazanjian had been terminated
for failing to follow an instruction and he had been told that
when he finished his work he had to leave the building. Kazan-
jian told Anderson that he had been writing grievances and that
Falco was harassing him because he had been writing griev-
ances. He showed Anderson the grievances and told her that
they had to be filed before midnight or they would be untimely.
Kazanjian again attempted to present the grievances to Falco
and again Falco refused to accept them. Anderson did not tes-
tify at the hearing.
Watson soon arrived and Anderson left to return to work.
Falco told Watson that Kazanjian had been terminated. Watson
and Kazanjian left the room to discuss the situation. Kazanjian
explained to Watson his version of what had occurred. As they
were talking a security guard came to escort Kazanjian out of
the facility. As they were leaving, Falco stated that Kazanjian
was not to be in the building.
Falco testified that he and Suder went to the cafeteria and
found Kazanjian. He asked Kazanjian what he was doing. Ka-
zanjian was writing on some grievances and offered them to
Falco and said, “[H]ere, sign these.” Falco asked if anyone
knew he was in the cafeteria and Kazanjian replied, “[N]o, sign
these.” Falco then asked Kazanjian if he was on the clock and
Kazanjian said he was not. Falco told him he needed to leave
the building if he was off the clock. Falco testified that Kazan-
jian replied that it was his right to be there. Falco testified that
he then repeated that Kazanjian needed to leave the building.
Kazanjian said, “[N]o, I was told in a PCM that I could be
here.” Falco inquired who gave the PCM and Kazanjian said he
did not remember. Again, Falco told Kazanjian he needed to
leave the building, but he continued to write without response.
Falco then told Suder to get a shop steward.
Suder shortly returned and said that Steward Christie Ander-
son was on her way to the breakroom. Kazanjian spoke up and
said he did not want Anderson, but wanted Steward Gary Wat-
son. Suder was then instructed to attempt to find Watson.
Anderson then arrived and Suder introduced her to Falco. They
went to the table where Kazanjian was sitting and Falco said in
front of everyone there that he was terminating Kazanjian for
failing to follow instructions, “he’s been told numerous times
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1208
that he must leave the building and he’s refusing to leave the
building.” Watson appeared about this time and Falco told him,
“I’ve asked Andre to leave the building numerous times, he’s
refusing to follow instructions, I’m terminating Andre for fail-
ing to follow instructions.” Falco testified that during his tenure
at this facility the policy was that anyone who was done with
work needed to leave the facility.
Watson testified that Falco stated he had terminated Kazan-
jian but did not say anything about having ordered Kazanjian to
leave the building or that Kazanjian had refused to leave the
building. Watson also testified that he was unaware of any pol-
icy that required employees to leave the facility after punching
out from their shift. Watson testified that he had never been
made aware of any company policy requiring stewards to notify
management before they perform grievance work off the clock.
He also testified that he had performed steward investigations
and the processing of grievances while off the clock, that he
had not informed management of those activities, and that he
had never been disciplined for such activity.
Suder testified at the hearing and corroborated Falco’s testi-
mony concerning the events that occurred in the breakroom on
the night of March 22. Suder was not present in the room when
Anderson, Falco, and Kazanjian were there as he left momen-
tarily to attempt to locate Watson.
On March 26, Falco prepared a termination concerning Ka-
zanjian. The letter stated that Kazanjian was discharged for
blatantly failing to follow instructions given him by manage-
ment. Kazanjian filed a grievance regarding his second dis-
charge. On April 14, 1999, the joint panel heard the grievance.
The panel, after meeting in executive session, denied the griev-
ance.
VI. ANALYSIS OF KAZANJIAN’S MARCH 22, 1999
DISCHARGE
The Government has highlighted Kazanjian’s post-February
encounters with management as indicative that his March ter-
mination was motivated by his protected activities. The Re-
spondent asserts that Kazanjian’s discharge was solely the re-
sult of his repeated refusal to leave the facility as directed by
Falco.
The record shows that Kazanjian remained an active steward
upon his February return to work. It also establishes that he was
subjected to concentrated attention by management starting
with the February 11 incident where he was questioned about
his start time and work area, threatened with being charged for
being late, questioned about his possession of a bag, and trained
for proper lifting. With regard to his bag, Kazanjian had rou-
tinely carried it with his steward supplies since the time he had
first become a steward. Other stewards likewise carried such
bags. Kazanjian was singled out for carrying his bag. Watson
continued to carry his bag without retribution. The matter of
Kazanjian having to be trained on February 11 in proper lifting
and lowering is questionable. Falco was unable to tell Kazan-
jian what he was doing wrong and called on help from a safety
advisor to provide the training. Kazanjian credibly testified that
he was following proper procedures and did not require such
training. In sum, I find that on February 11 Falco singled out
Kazanjian for attention.
On March 4, Kazanjian and Moore were leaving the facility
when they stopped to speak with Steward Jose Sanchez. All the
men were off the clock and in a nonwork area, yet Falco told
them that they could not talk to each other.
On March 15, Kazanjian was again scrutinized by Falco. Ka-
zanjian testified that he requested permission from Groppel to
represent an employee. Shortly thereafter, Falco and Groppel
accused him of soliciting grievances. Falco told Kazanjian that
he could not solicit grievances and that if he had no irregs to
pull he had to unload trucks. Falco also threatened Kazanjian
that if he did not work as directed he would be terminated. Ka-
zanjian was required to unload trucks although this was not part
of his regular work duties. Falco did not deny Kazanjian’s tes-
timony and Groppel did not testify. I credit Kazanjian as to
what occurred on March 15. I further find that Falco was har-
assing Kazanjian because of his protected activities.
On March 17, Kazanjian exchanged phone numbers with an-
other employee during a safety committee meeting so they
could later discuss an impending safety committee election.
Schmaltz, in the presence of Falco, interrogated Kazanjian after
the meeting as to whether he had passed out union literature
during the meeting. Neither Schmaltz nor Falco denied that this
encounter happened. I credit Kazanjian as to what happened on
this occasion. I find that the Respondent considered Kazanjian
to be a major source of concern because of his enthusiastic
pursuit of his union duties. I further find that this concern led to
Kazanjian being the target of particular scrutiny by Falco.
Falco and Suder state that on March 22 Kazanjian was or-
dered three times to leave the building and he refused. Kazan-
jian denies he was ever ordered to leave on this occasion or that
he refused to leave the building after being ordered to do so.
Kazanjian had been ordered to leave the facility on other occa-
sions. In each instance he complied. Falco admitted that he
never ordered Kazanjian to leave the building while either
Christie Anderson or Watson was present in the breakroom.
Watson testified that Falco merely said that Kazanjian was
being terminated and nothing was mentioned about his refusing
to leave the building. Based on the demeanor of Kazanjian,
Falco, and Suder and the record as a whole, I credit Kazanjian’s
version of what was said when he was discharged on March 22.
The Respondent argues that it was justified in ordering Ka-
zanjian to leave the facility based on various rules and policies.
The collective-bargaining agreement requires that a steward
obtain permission before doing steward duties.
Article 4 of the collective-bargaining agreement provides, in
relevant part:

Upon notification to his or her supervisor, a steward shall be
afforded the right to leave his/her work area for a reasonable
period of time to investigate, present and process grievances
and to represent a fellow employee concerning grievances or
discipline so long as such activity does not interrupt the Em-
ployer’s operation.
. . . .
Where mutually agreed to by the Local Union and Employer,
stewards may investigate off the property or other than during
their regular schedule . . . . [Jt. Exh. 1, pp.10—11.]

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE 1209
The record and a reasonable interpretation of this article lead
to the conclusion that its scope is limited. The record shows
that stewards needed to obtain permission from a supervisor to
do union business when the steward was working or to receive
pay for off the clock union activity. Such was not the case with
Kazanjian on the night of March 22 as he was off the clock, in a
nonwork area, and not seeking to be paid for the activity. I find
that article 4 of the collective-bargaining agreement is not a
justification for Kazanjian’s discharge.
There is no evidence that the Respondent maintained any
rule or policy that required a steward to receive permission to
perform union activity while on the premises and off the clock.
Kazanjian testified that he was not aware of any requirement
that he request permission from Respondent before writing
grievances off the clock. Bryan Grant has served as a steward
since September 1998. He testified that when he was appointed
to that position, his supervisor, Keri Alderman, and Schmaltz,
both told him that he was to investigate grievances only before
work, after work, or during break periods. Grant has followed
those instructions and never requested permission of supervi-
sion to perform these functions while off the clock. He has also
never been disciplined for performing steward functions while
off the clock and without permission. Gary Watson testified
that he also had performed grievance work while off the clock
without having notified management and had never been disci-
plined.
Respondent additionally argues that Kazanjian was ordered
to leave the facility on March 22 because he was in violation of
a policy that prohibited employees from being in the building
when off the clock. Respondent contends that it maintained a
no-solicitation rule that provides, in part:

No employee shall enter or remain in the building and other
work areas for any purpose except to report for, be present
during, or conclude his or her shift. [R. Exh. 1.]

Kazanjian and fellow employees Watson, Bryan Grant, and
Steve Buckles denied that they had ever seen this rule. The
Respondent’s witnesses testified that the rule was in effect at all
material times. I credit the employees’ testimony and find that
this rule was not published to employees at the facility at the
relevant times.
The Respondent also argues that there was another policy
that was in effect at the time Kazanjian was discharged on
March 22. This policy provides in pertinent part:

All employees must exit the building after they have clocked
out. Employees working a double shift may remain in the
breakroom until the next shift begins. [GC Exh. 8.]

General Counsel’s Exhibit 8, the PCM in question, shows
that it was reviewed with the twilight shift (Kazanjian’s work
area) on March 31, 1999—9 days after Kazanjian’s discharge.
Kazanjian, Buckles, Grant, and Watson testified that they were
not aware of any rule or policy that required employees to leave
the building after clocking out from their shift. Grant, Watson,
and Kazanjian specifically denied that they had ever seen any
of the PCM documents allegedly used by Respondent to dis-
seminate its policy to employees. I find that the record does not
support the conclusion that this PCM was broadly issued to
employees prior to Kazanjian’s discharge. I also find that Ka-
zanjian had not been advised of the PCM before he was termi-
nated.
The Respondent presented testimony that Kazanjian knew of
the policy because he was in attendance at a March 10 griev-
ance meeting where the matter was discussed. Schmaltz and
Falco testified that a grievance settlement was reached at this
meeting that provided the Respondent would issue PCMs to
employees notifying them of a requirement that they leave the
building after clocking out. Kazanjian confirmed he was at this
meeting but denied that there was any discussion regarding
employees not being in the building when they were not on the
clock. He also denied that there was any discussion or agree-
ment regarding the issuance of PCMs concerning employees
leaving the building after the end of their work shift.
Falco testified that the grievance was settled and withdrawn
on that basis and that it “[d]idn’t go any further past this par-
ticular day.” Falco’s notes from this meeting do not make any
reference to any discussion of PCMs or any agreement to re-
solve the grievance through the issuance of PCMs. Likewise,
the grievance which was allegedly settled and withdrawn on
March 10 on the basis of such a PCM being issued does not
mention anything about a resolution of the grievance or an
agreement to issue PCMs. A later version of the same grievance
document shows that discussion of this grievance was post-
poned by the parties and eventually resolved on June 11, 1999,
by an agreement that Respondent would abide by articles 37
and 21 of the collective-bargaining agreement. (GC Exh. 9.) I
find that the record does not support the conclusion that any
PCM policy on the subject of requiring employees to leave the
facility after completing work was agreed to or generally issued
to employees prior to Kazanjian’s discharge.
Supervisor William Whitney testified that employees who
reported to work but were off the clock would use the break-
room. As noted, other stewards testified to performing union
work off the clock without interference from the Respondent.
Grant testified that he remained in the building on a daily basis
off the clock after his shift to socialize with other employees
and supervisors. He testified he engaged in these conversations
in both work areas and the breakrooms and has never been
disciplined for this activity. Kazanjian and Grant testified with-
out contradiction that they were unaware of any employee ex-
cept Kazanjian who had ever been disciplined for being in the
building while off the clock. The Respondent offered no evi-
dence showing any such discipline regarding any employee
other than Kazanjian.
In sum, I find that the Government has shown by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that Kazanjian, well known to the Re-
spondent for his unrelenting union activity and the filing of
unfair labor practice charges, was closely watched by manage-
ment after he was reinstated in February 1999. The credited
evidence shows that in March Kazanjian was singled out for
discharge because he was in the facilities’ breakroom filling out
grievances after he was off the clock. The credit evidence does
not establish that alleged policies prohibiting off the clock em-
ployees had been published to employees at the time of Kazan-
jian’s discharge. Moreover, even assuming their existence and a
direct order from Falco to leave the premises, I find that the
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1210
evidence shows that the Respondent has disparately enforced
such rules against Kazanjian. The record supports the conclu-
sion that Kazanjian was disparately selected for discharge be-
cause of his protected activities. I find that the Respondent has
failed to prove that Kazanjian would have been discharged,
regardless of his activities protected under the Act. I find that
Kazanjian was discharged on March 22, 1999, in violation of
Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. United Parcel Service, Inc., is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
2. The Teamsters Local Union 435 is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the
Act by discharging Andre Kazanjian on March 22, 1999.
4. The foregoing unfair labor practices constitute unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. Respondent has not violated the Act except as specified.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law, and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended4
ORDER
The Respondent, United Parcel Service, Inc., Commerce
City, Colorado, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Discharging Andre Kazanjian, or any other employee,
because they engage in union or other protected concerted ac-
tivity, including filing charges under the Act.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer Andre
Kazanjian full reinstatement to his former job or, if that job no
longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without
prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or privileges previ-
ously enjoyed.
(b) Make Andre Kazanjian whole for any loss of earnings
and other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination
against him, computed on a quarterly basis, less any net interim
earnings, as prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289
(1950), plus interest as computed in New Horizons for the Re-
tarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
(c) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from
its files any reference to the March 22, 1999 unlawful discharge
of Andre Kazanjian, and within 3 days thereafter, notify him in
writing that this has been done and that the discharge will not
be used against him in any way.

4 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommend
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make available
to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards, per-
sonnel records and reports, and all other records, including an
electronic copy of the records if stored in electronic form, nec-
essary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of
this Order. Bryant & Stratton Business Institute, 327 NLRB
1135 (1999).
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in Commerce City, Colorado, copies of the attached no-
tice marked “Appendix.”5 Copies of the notice, on forms pro-
vided by the Regional Director for Region 27, after being
signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be
posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and main-
tained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including
all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material. In the event that, during the pendency of these pro-
ceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the
facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall
duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to
all current employees and former employees employed by the
Respondent at any time since March 22, 1999. Excel Container,
Inc., 325 NLRB 17 (1997).
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed
insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the
National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide
by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.

To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected con-
certed activities.

WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate against
Andre Kazanjian, or any other employee because they engage
5 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE 1211
in union or other protected concerted activity, including filing
charges under the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Or-
der, offer Andre Kazanjian full reinstatement to his former job
or, if his job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent posi-
tion, without prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or
privileges previously enjoyed.
WE WILL make Andre Kazanjian whole for any loss of
earnings and other benefits resulting from his discharge, less
any net interim earnings, plus interest.
WE WILL within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Or-
der, remove from our files any reference to the March 22, 1999
unlawful discharge of Andre Kazanjian, and WE WILL, within
3 days thereafter, notify him in writing that this has been done
and that his discharge will not be used against him in any way.

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.