United Parcel Service

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 28, 1993

311 N.L.R.B. 974 (N.L.R.B. 1993)

974
311 NLRB No. 97
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 The name of the Charging Party has been changed to reflect the
new official name of the International Union.
2 All dates are in 1989 unless otherwise indicated.
3 The judge found that the badge held by Teas was what might
be called an ‘‘honorary badge’’ and that Teas in fact held no paid
position with the County Sheriff’s Department. There was no excep-
tion to this finding.
4 The judge inadvertently stated that the next workday was Mon-
day, December 12, rather than December 11.
United Parcel Service, Inc. and Teamsters Local
Union 413, affiliated with the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL–CIO.1 Case 9–
CA–27597
May 28, 1993
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
DEVANEY AND OVIATT
On March 18, 1992, Administrative Law Judge
Donald R. Holley issued the attached decision. The
Respondent, the General Counsel, the Charging Party,
and the Intervenor filed exceptions and supporting
briefs. The Respondent, the Charging Party, and the
Intervenor filed answering briefs.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated
its authority in this proceeding to a three-member
panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has de-
cided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and con-
clusions, as modified below, and to adopt the rec-
ommended Order.
The judge found that the Respondent did not unlaw-
fully discharge employee Jeffrey Pierce, because his
conduct lost any protection it might otherwise be enti-
tled to under the Act. We agree but only for the rea-
sons set forth below.
On November 21, 1989,2 Pierce, a driver with the
Respondent, was involved in an altercation with John
Napoli concerning Pierce’s parking his truck in front
of Napoli’s restaurant while making deliveries at a
nearby apartment complex. Another confrontation oc-
curred between Pierce and Napoli the next day. Napoli
contacted the Respondent, which resulted in Pierce’s
receiving a warning letter on December 4 stating that
he had been rude and discourteous to Napoli. Although
such warnings are not grievable under the parties’ col-
lective-bargaining agreement, Pierce discussed the mat-
ter with his union steward. The steward indicated to
Pierce that the Respondent’s center manager, Bill
Henry, who talked to Napoli on the phone regarding
the incident, had solicited Napoli’s complaint.
Pierce decided to investigate the matter further. He
then talked to Union Secretary-Treasurer Charles Teas
and expressed a desire to confront Napoli. At Pierce’s
request, a union delegation comprised of Pierce, Teas,
Union Vice President Vernon Bell, and Union Steward
George Welling visited Napoli at another of his res-
taurants. Teas, Welling, and Pierce entered the store.
Pierce told Napoli he was there as a private citizen,
and asked Napoli if he would speak to Pierce. Napoli
refused. Teas then displayed a special deputy badge,
whereupon Napoli agreed to talk with ‘‘the officer,’’
but said that Pierce and Welling were to go outside.3
Teas questioned Napoli as to whether Napoli had
threatened Pierce and, if so, why. According to Teas’
testimony, Napoli admitted to Teas that he had threat-
ened Pierce. After a brief discussion with Napoli, Teas
left the store and Pierce and Welling returned.
Napoli questioned Welling concerning his affili-
ations with the Union and the Respondent. Then Pierce
told Napoli he was considering pursuing legal action
against Napoli. Napoli at some point told Pierce that
he had not wanted to lodge a formal complaint against
Pierce, but that Henry attempted to solicit him to do
so. Pierce said that if Napoli would put this in a sworn
statement Pierce would not sue him. Napoli agreed to
prepare a statement to that effect but never did so.
The next workday4 Napoli telephoned Henry to re-
late what had occurred. Subsequently, Napoli provided
the Respondent with a written statement concerning
the December 9 visit, stating, in pertinent part, that one
of the persons was ‘‘allege[dly] . . . a plain clothes
police officer’’ who ‘‘flashed his badge and wanted to
ask questions.’’ Napoli went on to state that he asked
the others to leave whereupon the officer asked several
questions.
It is clearly established under Board law that con-
duct can be so egregious or offensive as to be beyond
the Act’s protection. See, e.g., Transpac Fiber Optics,
305 NLRB 974 (1991); Calliope Designs, 303 NLRB
65 (1991); Paper Board Cores, 292 NLRB 995 (1989).
In this regard, the Board has held that the manner in
which an employee exercises a statutory right can be
so extreme as to lose the Act’s protection. Carolina
Freight Carriers, 295 NLRB 1080 (1989); Washington
Adventist Hospital, 291 NLRB 95 (1988); W. G. Diehl
Distributing Co., 283 NLRB 524 (1987). Assuming, as
the dissent finds, that Pierce was engaged in protected
activity when he visited Napoli to investigate his com-
plaint, we find that the manner in which he conducted
himself stripped his action of the protection of the Act.
Pierce requested that Teas accompany him to ques-
tion Napoli. During the December 9 confrontation,
when Napoli initially refused to speak with Pierce,
Teas showed Napoli his badge. At that point Napoli
agreed to speak only with Teas, clearly because he was
under the misapprehension that Teas was a law en-
forcement official. Thus, it is clear that Teas’ imper-
sonation of a law enforcement ‘‘officer’’ gave rise to
false, intimidating, and coercive circumstances that
975UNITED PARCEL SERVICE
5 The judge relied on Lear-Siegler Management Service, 306
NLRB 393 (1992), to find Pierce’s conduct during the incident was
unprotected. We find that case to be factually distinguishable and
therefore do not rely on it for our holding. In Lear-Siegler, the
Board tolled the backpay of an unlawfully discharged employee after
he threatened a witness in a Board proceeding with respect to the
discharge that he would report the witness to law enforcement au-
thorities for a parole violation in order to induce the witness to tes-
tify in a certain way. The Board further denied the employee rein-
statement based on the discriminatee’s additional threat of ‘‘specific
consequences to [the witness’] well-being’’ by the discriminatee who
had a ‘‘reputation in the workplace as a violent and disruptive per-
son.’’ Lear-Siegler at 394.
Lear-Siegler thus involved the strictly remedial issue of whether
the particular postdischarge misconduct affected the awarding of the
Board’s traditional remedies to an employee found to have been un-
lawfully discharged. The case at issue, in contrast, involves the le-
gality of the discharge itself and, specifically, whether an employee’s
conduct was sufficiently egregious as to lose the protection of the
Act. Further, the threat in Lear-Siegler found by the Board to war-
rant the tolling of backpay involved ‘‘the integrity of the Board’s ju-
dicial process.’’ Id. On that basis, the Board fashioned a remedy that
struck a balance between the ‘‘competing and equally important in-
terests of protecting the Board’s judicial processes and remedying
unfair labor practices.’’ Id. The threat found to warrant the denial
of reinstatement essentially involved a threat of physical or bodily
harm. No such threats are present here.
subsequently permitted Pierce to pursue his own inter-
rogation of Napoli about Napoli’s complaints con-
cerning him. For absent Teas’ flashing his badge and
causing Napoli mistakenly to believe he was a ‘‘law
officer,’’ Napoli would surely have maintained his re-
fusal to even talk with Pierce or Teas.
Contrary to our dissenting colleague, irrespective of
whether Pierce had prior knowledge of Teas’ planned
impersonation, it is plain that Pierce willingly acqui-
esced in Teas’ conduct and took advantage of it by
using Teas’ interrogation of Napoli as a backdrop for
his own threat of further legal action against Napoli,
unless Napoli furnished an affidavit implicating man-
agement in the solicitation of Napoli’s complaint
against Pierce. In this regard it is significant that, on
December 12, when Manager Henry asked Pierce to
identify the police officer who accompanied him on
December 9, Pierce did not suggest that he had been
taken by surprise when Teas flashed the ‘‘deputy’’
badge. Instead, Pierce refused to identify the indi-
vidual, stating ‘‘I will not reveal that information.’’
Then, when Henry chastised Pierce for harassing
Napoli and urged him to refrain from similar future in-
cidents, Pierce refused and insisted, ‘‘That’s my per-
sonal business.’’
We find that the false, intimidating, and coercive
circumstances under which Pierce conducted his inves-
tigation at Napoli’s place of business on December 9
were sufficiently egregious to cause Pierce to lose any
protection he would otherwise be entitled to under the
Act for his investigative activity. We accordingly con-
clude that the Respondent’s discharge of Pierce for en-
gaging in that conduct, and also for threatening to con-
tinue his individual pursuit of Napoli, did not violate
Section 8(a)(3) and (1).5
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, United Parcel Service, Inc.,
Obetz, Ohio, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall take the action set forth in the Order.
MEMBER DEVANEY, dissenting in part.
Contrary to my colleagues, I would find that the Re-
spondent violated the Act when it discharged Pierce
for his investigation of the circumstances surrounding
the issuance of his warning letter.
As an initial matter, I find that Pierce’s investigation
constitutes protected concerted and union activity. It is
firmly established that an employee is engaged in con-
certed activity under the Act when asserting a right
grounded in a collective-bargaining agreement. See,
e.g., Carolina Freight Carriers, 295 NLRB 1080
(1989); Howard Electric, 285 NLRB 911 (1987), enfd.
873 F.2d 1287 (9th Cir. 1989). These cases rely on the
Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. City Disposal
Systems, 465 U.S. 822 (1984), in which the Court en-
dorsed the Board’s longstanding Interboro doctrine,
157 NLRB 1295 (1966), enfd. 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir.
1967), to the same effect.
Thus, even if Pierce had been acting alone or simply
as an individual, as the Respondent asserts, he would
clearly be engaged in concerted activity because he
was investigating his discipline in order to determine
if it was grievable on the basis of discriminatory moti-
vation. In fact, although the judge noted that under the
parties’ agreement warning letters are not subject to
the grievance procedure, Pierce, as a result of his in-
vestigation, filed a grievance over the letter under the
parties’ contract on December 11 alleging that the dis-
cipline was ‘‘unfair, without just cause, and discrimi-
natory.’’ Whether this grievance was in actuality sub-
ject to the parties’ grievance procedure is irrelevant be-
cause Pierce was acting under an honest and reason-
able belief that the Employer was acting contrary to
his contractual rights. Transpac Fiber Optics, 305
NLRB 974 (1991).
Further, the Respondent’s argument that Pierce was
acting as an individual based on his statement to
Napoli that he was there as a private citizen is taken
out of context and plainly misconstrues Pierce’s intent.
The record clearly establishes that Pierce was not in
any manner disassociating himself from the Union or
his fellow employees. Rather, being sensitive to a pos-
sible claim that he was on company time representing
the Respondent, he sought to assure Napoli that this
was not the case.
976 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 I agree with the majority that Lear-Siegler, 306 NLRB 394
(1992), is factually distinguishable from the present case and, con-
trary to the judge, does not support the finding of a violation here.
I further note that I did not participate on and I express no opinion
as to the Board’s decision in that case. 1 All dates herein are 1989 unless otherwise indicated.
The record demonstrates that Pierce was not acting
alone. He was accompanied by several union officials
including Welling, a fellow employee and union stew-
ard. Although Welling testified that he was unaware of
the work-related nature of Pierce’s dispute with Napoli
at the outset, Welling participated in the investigation
during which the nature of the conflict became appar-
ent. At some point, Welling discussed with Napoli the
fact that he was an employee of the Respondent as
well as a union steward. Under these circumstances, I
conclude that Pierce was engaged in concerted rather
than individual activity when he confronted Napoli to
investigate the circumstances surrounding the warning
letter. See also Dougherty Lumber Co., 299 NLRB 259
fn. 1 (1990), enfd. mem. 941 F.2d 1209 (6th Cir.
1991).
I strongly disagree with my colleague’s conclusion
that Pierce’s conduct removed itself from the protec-
tion of the Act.1 An employee’s attempt to assert and
protect rights arising from a collective-bargaining
agreement is concerted activity for which the employee
may not be discharged unless his conduct is so egre-
gious, flagrant, or offensive as to lose the Act’s protec-
tion. See, e.g., Paper Board Cores, 292 NLRB 995
(1989); Ecker Mfg. Corp., 286 NLRB 470 (1987);
W. G. Diehl Distributing Co., 283 NLRB 524 (1987).
Numerous Board cases, such as those relied on by the
majority, illustrate that a finding that an employee’s
concerted activity forfeits this statutory protection is
not to be made lightly. Thus, the Board has established
a high standard to justify removing conduct from the
Act’s protection. Contrary to the majority’s assess-
ment, the facts here simply do not warrant the draco-
nian conclusion that Pierce’s conduct was so egregious
or offensive as to lose the protection of the Act.
Pierce did nothing more than ask Teas, among oth-
ers, to accompany him to confront Napoli in order to
ascertain if the complaint against him had been solic-
ited. There is no evidence indicating that Pierce asked
Teas to represent himself as a law enforcement offi-
cial. To the contrary, it is evident that Pierce asked
Teas to accompany him as a friend and union official.
The facts surrounding Teas’ displaying his badge and
identifying himself in some way as a special deputy
are sketchy at best. However, it is beyond dispute that
Pierce did not participate in the misrepresentation. My
colleagues in effect find Pierce guilty of the sin of
omission, i.e., his failure to affirmatively step forward
and disassociate himself from Teas’ conduct. I reject
resting a determination that an employee has forfeited
his statutory protection on such flimsy reasoning. The
majority maintains, with the benefit of hindsight and
distance, that Pierce should have acted in another way
and come forward to correct any misimpression Napoli
might have had concerning Teas’ status. Even were I
to agree that the manner in which Pierce conducted
himself was not the most desirable under the cir-
cumstances, such a judgment falls far short of justi-
fying a finding that Pierce himself engaged in false, in-
timidating, or coercive conduct. In sum, I conclude
that Pierce engaged in no conduct meeting the req-
uisite standard of being so egregious or offensive as to
warrant depriving him of the Act’s protection, and that
my colleagues’ application of that standard to the facts
here is wholly unpersuasive. Accordingly, contrary to
my colleagues, I would find that the Respondent vio-
lated the Act by discharging Pierce.
Eric Taylor, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Frank G. Wobst and John M. Stephens, Esqs. (Porter,
Wright, Morris & Arthur), of Columbus, Ohio, for the Re-
spondent.
Robert Handleman, Esq., of Columbus, Ohio, for Charging
Party Jeffrey Pierce.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
DONALD R. HOLLEY, Administrative Law Judge. Upon an
original charge filed on June 11, 1990, the Regional Director
for Region 9 of the National Labor Relations Board issued
a complaint on August 1 which alleged, in substance, that
United Parcel Service, Inc. (Respondent) violated Section
8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act by refusing since
January 11, 1990, to furnish the Union with information re-
quested on December 28, 1989.1 Respondent filed a timely
answer denying it had engaged in the unfair labor practice
alleged in the complaint. Thereafter, on September 10, 1990,
the Regional Director issued an amended complaint which
realleged the matter contained in the August 1 complaint and
additionally alleged that Respondent discharged employee
Jeffrey Pierce on December 13, 1989, in violation of Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Respondent filed timely answer
denying that it had engaged in the unfair labor practices al-
leged. In both of its answers to complaint, Respondent con-
tended the subject matter of the complaints had been arbi-
trated and that the Board should defer to the arbitration
award.
This case was heard in Columbus, Ohio, on April 8 and
9, 1991. All parties appeared and were afforded full oppor-
tunity to participate. On the entire record, from my careful
consideration of the briefs filed by the parties, and from my
observation of the demeanor of the witnesses who appeared
to give testimony, I make the following
977UNITED PARCEL SERVICE
2 Henry, Thompson, and Martin are admittedly 2(11) supervisors.
3 See G.C. Exhs. 10(a)–(d).
4 Before leaving the shopping center, Pierce obtained a statement
from one Clyde McCoy, the owner of a flower shop in the center,
which confirmed Pierce’s claim that Napoli threatened to harm the
employee and his vehicle, and indicated that Pierce conducted him-
self in a gentlemanly manner. See G.C. Exh. 17.
5 Larry Barnett, an employee of Columbia Gas of Ohio, testified
he witnessed an incident wherein the owner of the pizza shop on
Hamilton Road accosted a UPS driver at approximately 10:30 a.m.
He indicated the owner of the pizza shop was irate about the driver
blocking his parking space and he indicated as much liberally with
profanities, while the driver was polite and professional in explaining
he was making a delivery and would only be there a few minutes.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a corporation with an office and place of
business in Columbus, Ohio, is engaged in the intrastate and
interstate transportation of freight. During the 12-month pe-
riod preceding issuance of the August 1, 1990 complaint, it,
in the course and conduct of its operations, derived gross
revenues in excess of $50,000 for the transportation of
freight from the State of Ohio directly to points located out-
side the State of Ohio. It is admitted, and I find, that Re-
spondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. STATUS OF LABOR ORGANIZATION
It is admitted, and I find, that Teamsters Local Union 413,
affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL–
CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Facts
Respondent is engaged, on a national and international
basis, in the delivery of mail and other packages, goods, and
materials. Its Renoldsburg center which is located in Obetz,
Ohio, a suburb of Columbus, Ohio, is the only facility in-
volved in the instant case.
At times material, Respondent personnel assigned to the
Renoldsburg center were supervised by Bill Henry, the pack-
age center manager, Nancy Thompson and Butch Martin, su-
pervisors, and George Taylor, division manager.2 Addition-
ally, the record reveals that Larry Henry is Respondent’s dis-
trict labor relations manager, with responsibility for facilities
in the Columbus, Ohio area.
The employees at the Renoldsburg center are represented
by Teamsters Local 413. During the period under discussion,
the Union and Respondent were signatory to a collective-bar-
gaining agreement which contains a grievance procedure and
provides for binding arbitration by a joint panel composed of
an equal number of employer and union representatives (Jt.
Exh. 4).
The alleged discriminatee, Jeffrey Pierce, was employed
by Respondent from September 28, 1977, to December 13,
1989. From June 1985 until his termination, Pierce was a
package car (delivery van) driver. During the latter half of
1989, Pierce’s immediate supervisor was Thompson. Bill
Henry was Thompson’s immediate superior.
On November 21, 1989, about 10:30 a.m., Pierce parked
his truck at the north end of a strip shopping center on Ham-
ilton Road in Columbus, Ohio, to make a delivery to an adja-
cent apartment complex.3 While the truck was parked in
front of a pizza shop called Napoli’s Villa, the shop was not
to open until 11 a.m., and other parking immediately in front
of the shop was not blocked. As Pierce returned to his truck
after spending 5 minutes or so making a delivery at the
apartment complex, John Napoli, the owner of the pizza
business, complained to Pierce that he was blocking his cus-
tomer parking spots. Pierce testified that Napoli, using ob-
scene language, threatened him by telling him if he parked
in that place again he would break his nose and bust the
windshield of his vehicle. Pierce explained that he had been
parking in the spot for over a year, and he was never aware
that there was a problem. After indicating to Napoli that he
had been told to park in that spot in the past, he told Napoli
he was not free to make decisions ‘‘deterring from what I’ve
been instructed to do,’’ and he provided Napoli with Re-
spondent’s telephone number indicating he could call the
Company and discuss the matter. Pierce claims Napoli ran
after his truck yelling obscenities as he left the immediate
area.4
Napoli telephoned Respondent after Pierce left the area on
November 21 and lodged a complaint against Pierce for
parking where Napoli claimed customers would have trouble
getting around him (see G.C. Exh. 7).
The following day, November 22, Pierce once again
parked in the same general area of the Hamilton Road shop-
ping center. He indicated, however, that he parked nearer the
road and further away from Napoli’s Villa. Once again,
Napoli accosted the driver, threatened to break his nose and
the windshield of his truck, and informed Pierce he intended
to call Respondent and get him fired. Pierce asked Napoli if
he owned the facility, and, when Napoli stated he leased, the
employee told him he had been led to believe the lot was
a common area and he had been told to park there in the
past by management. As Pierce drove away, Napoli chased
alongside the vehicle and invited Pierce to get out of the
truck and fight.5
After Pierce moved his truck away from the pizza shop
area, Napoli again called Respondent and conversed with
Center Manager Henry. Napoli testified that after voicing his
complaint about the place where Pierce had parked, he told
Henry he was upset with Pierce because of his attitude. He
indicated Henry apologized for any inconvenience it had
caused him and told him he would take care of the problem.
Pierce also telephoned the facility immediately after the
November 22 incident. He first reported to Supervisor Martin
that he had parked where he always parked at the Hamilton
Road shopping center and a customer had threatened him
with bodily harm and damage to his vehicle. Martin passed
the phone to Nancy Thompson, and she turned the matter
over to Henry. Pierce testified that when he started to tell
Henry about the man who threatened him with bodily injury
and damage to his vehicle, Henry asked for the man’s ad-
dress and phone numbers. When Pierce informed him he did
not know the phone number, Henry told him he would see
him when he got in.
978 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
6 The record reveals Henry telephoned Napoli after Napoli reported
the November 22 incident to him.
7 The badge held by Teas was what may be called an ‘‘honorary
badge.’’ He holds no paid position with the Fairfield County Sher-
iff’s Department.
8 Napoli’s version of the incident differed markedly from that
given by General Counsel witnesses. Thus, he claimed that Teas
simply asked him if Henry had encouraged him to file a complaint
on Pierce and Pierce told him he needed his help because UPS had
fired him. He agreed he told Pierce he would furnish a notarized
statement, but failed to indicate what it would contain. I do not cred-
it his fragmentary account of the conversation during the incident.
When Pierce returned to Respondent’s facility on Novem-
ber 22, Thompson showed him a computer form which re-
vealed Napoli had telephoned to complain about where he
had parked at the shopping center on November 21. The
form indicated Henry had spoken with Napoli to apologize
for Pierce ‘‘being rude’’ and ‘‘blocking customers.’’ Pierce
claimed he had done nothing wrong, and Thompson re-
sponded, ‘‘What can I tell you.’’
At some time on November 22, Supervisor Thompson told
Union Steward Mark Holton that he had better talk to his
boy Pierce because he had a customer complaint. She said
that Bill Henry had talked to the guy on the phone that day
and had repeatedly asked the guy if Jeff was rude and would
he file a complaint against him. She said he had asked the
guy 10–15 times was the driver rude; will you sign a com-
plaint against him.6
On November 27, Pierce filed a ‘‘Menacing Threats’’
complaint with the Division of Police, Whitehall, Ohio, doc-
umenting the threats made against him on November 21 and
22 by Napoli (G.C. Exh. 2).
On December 4, 1989, Henry handed Pierce a copy of a
letter addressed to Union Business Agent Jim Harvey. The
body of the letter (G.C. Exh. 3) states:
This letter is in regard to Jeff Pierce who has been
employed in our Obetz operation since September 28,
1977.
On November 21, 1989, Jeff was rude and discour-
teous to a customer.
Should Jeff be involved in another incident of this
nature, he will leave me no alternative than to take
more severe disciplinary action up to and including dis-
charge.
When Bill Henry gave Pierce the above-described warning
letter, Pierce stated: ‘‘That’s interesting, Bill. That guy is
going to get a lawsuit.’’
After Pierce received a copy of the above-quoted warning
letter, Union Steward Holton relayed to the employee his
November 22 conversation with Thompson. In essence, he
told him that Henry had solicited Napoli to file a rudeness
complaint against him by asking 10–15 times if he had been
rude and whether Napoli would sign a complaint. At that
point, Pierce and Holton discussed the situation. Pierce pro-
tested his innocence and indicated he intended to pursue the
matter in an attempt to get the truth out regarding the situa-
tion.
Although warning letters such as the one received on De-
cember 4 were not grievable under the terms of the bar-
gaining agreement, Pierce discussed the Napoli situation with
Union Secretary-Treasurer Charles Teas during the period
December 4 to 9, 1989. Pierce evidenced a desire to confront
Napoli, with an object of seeking to determine whether Cen-
ter Manager Henry had, in fact, solicited Napoli to sign a
rudeness complaint against him.
On December 9, 1989, a union delegation which included
Teas, Union Vice President Vernon Bell, Union Steward
George Welling, and Pierce sought to locate Napoli. After
visiting the Hamilton shopping center location, and hearing
he was at a second pizza store located in Gahanna, also a
suburb of Columbus, the four went to the latter store. Teas,
Welling, and Pierce entered the store at approximately 5 p.m.
Pierce asked Napoli if he recognized him and Napoli indi-
cated he did by asking if he was still employed by UPS, and
did UPS know he was there. Pierce responded by saying he
was there as a private citizen who felt his rights had been
violated and he would like to talk to Napoli. Napoli said he
did not have time to talk. At that point Teas displayed a spe-
cial deputy badge, and Napoli indicated he would talk with
the officer, but that Pierce and Welling were to go outside.7
Teas testified he asked Napoli if he had threatened Pierce
and, if so, why. He claims Napoli admitted telling Pierce he
would break his nose and throw rocks through the windows
of his truck. He said his reason was that Jeff had parked his
package truck in the parking lot near his store. After a brief
discussion with Napoli, Teas left the store, and Pierce and
Welling entered.
When Pierce and Welling entered the store for the second
time, Welling was wearing a Teamsters Local 413 jacket and
a baseball cap with a large steward’s badge on the front.
Napoli questioned him about who he was, whether he be-
longed to the Union and was a steward, and whether he
worked for UPS. Pierce then told Napoli he was considering
taking him to court and suing him for defamation of char-
acter. Napoli told Pierce if he did sue him, he would, in turn,
sue Pierce and UPS. At some point, Napoli told Pierce ‘‘I
did not even complain on you . . . all I wanted you to do
was move your truck . . . your Boss, Bill Henry, tried to get
me to make a formal complaint against you and I wouldn’t
do it!’’ Pierce told Napoli that if he would put what he had
just admitted to him in a notarized statement, he would not
sue him. Napoli agreed he would give Pierce a statement and
leave it at a third party’s place of business for later pickup.8
Napoli did not prepare the notarized statement Pierce had re-
quested.
On Monday, December 12, Napoli telephoned Henry to
tell him what had occurred on Saturday evening. Thereafter,
Henry, in the presence of Union Steward Donnell Gladis,
interviewed Pierce about the December 9 incident. Pierce se-
cretly taped the meeting and the transcript was placed in the
record as General Counsel’s Exhibit 5. Summarized, Henry
accused Pierce of harassing a customer and sought to obtain
a commitment from Pierce that he would not harass or sue
Napoli. Pierce indicated he felt Napoli had been untruthful
and as it was damaging his reputation with his employer, he
intended to sue him. Pierce admitted during the interview
that Welling accompanied him on December 9, together with
a police officer whom Pierce refused to identify. Larry Henry
interviewed Welling on December 19, and the employee
claimed he accompanied Pierce on December 9 because
Pierce told him he had been threatened and he needed a wit-
ness. Welling denied that he was acting in his official capac-
979UNITED PARCEL SERVICE
9 Pierce secretly recorded the meeting. See G.C. Exh. 9.
10 See Jt. Exh. 5.
11 See G.C. Exh. 11.
ity as a union steward and he denied he made any threat-
ening remarks to Napoli.
After meeting with Pierce and steward Gladis on Tuesday,
Henry and one Tom Fisher obtained the following statement
from Napoli:
This statement I hereby make to Bill Henry and Tom
Fisher of United Parcel Service is a true and accurate
statement of the event that occurred at 5:10 at 51 South
Hamilton Road, Napoli’s Villa on 12–9–89. Jeff looked
for me and then proceeded to my other store at 129
North Stygler Road and found me there at 5:20. Three
people arrived, one being Jeff Pierce, and the other al-
leging to be a plain clothes police officer and the last
one a union man. The officer flashed his badge and
wanted to ask questions. I made Jeff and the other guy
leave and proceed with the officer. He asked several
questions about Bill Henry pertaining to a customer
complaint. Did Bill try to persuade me to file a com-
plaint. Did not want to know about what was really
going on. Officer left and then Jeff and union guy came
in and started to ask questions. I was really busy and
couldn’t talk but persuaded me to talk to them. Said,
he wanted to sue me because this will cause a mark on
his record. Ask why he was so interested in me. He
wanted me to sign a notarized statement saying that I
did not file a complaint against him. I said I would and
he could pick it up Monday or Tuesday at Carmens
Sweepers. He said if I did this he would not sue me.
I said okay. I went along with him until I could talk
to Bill Henry on Monday, talked to Bill to review what
happened.
I personally feel that I was lied to by Jeff on Satur-
day and feel I may be in danger at some other time in
the future. I feel he tried to come in Saturday night on
behalf of trying to scare me. I did not fall for it. I think
he may try to hurt my business or me in the future. The
police have been notified and do not want to deal with
that matter any more.
[Dated] 12–17–89
/s/ John J. Napoli
Also Jeff did file a complaint against me on Monday
With the Whitehall Police Dept. I found out by one of
the officers.
After Henry conducted the above-described investigatory
interview with Pierce on December 12, Respondent decided
to terminate him. Consequently, on December 13, 1989, it
met with the Union to discuss its intention to discharge the
employee. Attending for Respondent were George Taylor,
the district supervisor, and Bill Henry, the center supervisor.
In addition to Pierce, Union Representative Jim Harvey and
Union Steward Mark Holton attended. Pierce was informed
during the meeting that consideration of his total work record
and the December 9 Napoli incident caused Respondent to
decide to terminate him. Specific matters mentioned in-
cluded: failure to use seat belt; violation of no-solicitation
rule; problems with methods such as no times on air stickers;
insubordination; and customer complaint about parking and
rudeness.9
Pierce filed a grievance over his discharge on the fol-
lowing day, December 14. In the grievance Pierce contended
that by discharging him on December 14, 1989, the Com-
pany violated the collective-bargaining agreement and Sec-
tion 8(a)(1), (3), (4), and (5) of the Act.10
Pierce’s termination grievance was assigned the number
4636. It was initially scheduled to be heard by the UPS-
Teamsters Union Joint Grievance Committee on December
20, 1989. Prior to the hearing, the Union presented Larry
Henry, the Company’s spokesman, with documents which
Henry contended he needed to review. The arbitration panel,
which consisted of two Respondent representatives and two
union representatives, put Pierce’s discharge grievance on
hold until the next session, which was to be held on January
15, 1990.
By letter dated December 26, 1989, Pierce requested that
Larry Henry and/or Respondent furnish him with the fol-
lowing documents:11
I am herewith requesting copies of the below listed
documents. They are necessary for my January termi-
nation Panel and pending Grievances:
—6/26/89 DOT Physical documents including Physi-
cians Examination Report
—11/27/89 Employee Injury/Illness Report for
11/2/89 OJS stress induced headache
—Letter to UPS District Complaint against Willie
Jennings for OJS Complaint
—6/6/89 OJS SAFETY RIDE EVALUATION
WITH C. OTIMAN
—7/3/89 OJS H. McCOY
—7/5/89 OJS H. McCOY
—7/6/89 OJS H. McCOY
—7/27/89 OJS R. COLLIER
—7/29/89 OJS R. COLLIER
—9/19/89 OJS W. JENNINGS
—11/2/89 OJS B. HENRY
—11/27/89 OJS R. COLLIER
—11/28/89 OJS R. COLLIER
—11/29/89 OJS R. COLLIER.
I need copies of all evaluation writeups including the
21 methods per stop evaluations. Further, I need copies
back to 3/20/89 of my delivery records, pickup logs,
misload cards, and the computer operation report, for
the 3/20–12/20 nine month period.
By letter dated December 28, 1989, the Union requested
that Respondent furnish the following (G.C. Exh. 12):
Local 413 is hereby requesting all pertinent informa-
tion leading to the discharge of Jeffrey S. Pierce. I refer
you to your letter of discharge, dated December 14,
1989, to Mr. Pierce, in which you state that his dis-
charge is due to serious customer complaints and his
overall unacceptable work record. Therefor, it will be
necessary for you to provide Local 413 with all the
980 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
12 See Jt. Exh. 1, pp. 10 and 11.
13 See Jt. Exh. 1, pp. 22, 28, and 29.
14 The arbitration panel reduced the 5-day suspension to a 1-day
suspension, and it denied the license revocation grievance.
records, paper-work and documents that you use to sub-
stantiate these charges against Mr. Pierce.
Further, please include copies of all the information
and documents that Mr. Pierce requested in his letter to
me dated December 26, 1989, a copy of which is en-
closed.
By letter dated January 11, 1990, Respondent furnished
the Union with certain information stating:
Attached are copies of the itemized documents re-
quested by Mr. Pierce in connection with his January
termination Panel and pending grievances.
We are not providing the other documents requested
by Mr. Pierce at this time because we do not believe
that this information is even remotely relevant to the
cases to be heard.
By letter dated January 17, 1990, the Union again re-
quested that Respondent furnish it with the information pre-
viously requested. The request differed from the earlier re-
quest in one respect. Instead of requesting the 7/29/89 OJS
study by Supervisor H. McCoy, it requested the 7/27/89 OJS
study by McCoy (G.C. Exh. 15).
By letter dated January 26, 1990, Respondent indicated to
the Union that it had given the Union the specifically re-
quested OJS evaluations which it had on file but was not en-
closing other requested documents because ‘‘I fail to see
even a remote relevance to the case at hand.’’ The letter was
signed by Larry Henry (G.C. Exh. 16).
The record reveals the information not supplied included:
Pierce’s delivery records, pickup logs, misload cards, and
computer operation reports for the period March 20 to De-
cember 20, 1989.
Larry Henry indicated during his testimony that, while
driver delivery records are kept by Respondent for a year,
providing them would be a time-consuming task as the driv-
er’s daily timecards would have to be inspected to identify
the units delivered each day, and then the individual unit
documents would have to be pulled from the files. He testi-
fied that driver pickup logs are usually discarded on the
Monday following the date of pickups after they have been
audited to assure that proper pickups were made. He indi-
cated misload cards are usually kept only until mistakes are
corrected. Henry indicated computer operation reports, which
show driver’s name, time he started to work, time he left the
building, how much time for lunch, time returned to build-
ing, aggregate total of stops, miles, pieces, number of call
tags, C.O.D. collections, and failures to collect, are retained
for at least 9 months. With respect to the computer operation
reports, Henry testified that, while one could determine a
driver’s performance by viewing the reports, the reports cov-
ering a 9-month period would probably consist of 1000
pages. Henry admitted he did not tell the Union Respondent
did not want to supply the information it considered to irrele-
vant because it did not have certain records and production
of those it did have would be a burdensome task.
Pierce’s discharge grievance was heard by the arbitration
panel on January 15, 1990. Larry Henry, Bill Henry, and
Tom Buoni attended for Respondent. Jeff Pierce, represented
and assisted by Charlie Teas, Mark Holton and Donnell
Gladis, appeared for the grievant. The proceedings lasted
several hours. Larry Henry acted as chief spokesman for Re-
spondent. While Larry Henry indicated to the panel that
Pierce’s December 9 confrontation of Napoli was the inci-
dent that had triggered the termination, he indicated overall
work performance matters considered included: the employ-
ee’s morning loading procedures; the employee’s failure to
wear a seatbelt at all times when operating his vehicle; the
employee’s alleged violation of a company no-solicitation
rule; and the employee’s actions and subsequent refusal to
work during a ride with Supervisor Bill Henry. The Union,
through the actions of Teas, Pierce, and Holton, rebutted
each of the Company’s contentions. At one point during the
proceedings, Teas observed the Company had failed to pro-
vide the Union with requested records of OJS rides, and he
caused Pierce to relate remarks made by supervisors during
specific rides by referring to notes he had made. The panel
members questioned the propriety of Pierce’s actions as the
notes had not been shown to the Company prior to the hear-
ing.12 With respect to the information requested by the
Union prior to the arbitration proceeding, Larry Henry indi-
cated the Company had refused to submit certain information
on the advice of legal counsel. When the chairman of the
panel indicated that the Union was entitled to everything it
needed to present its case, Larry Henry replied:13
With all due respect Ron, I’d like to answer that for
you. I think he requested 9 months of delivery records,
9 months of misload cards, 9 months of timecards.
They’re all enumerated there. Now I don’t believe you
saw me refer to to any of those in my presentation.
Now, I’m a reasonable man and try to do what’s rea-
sonable and I’ve always complied with the Union’s re-
quest to provide information that is relevant to a case.
The chairman was apparently satisfied with Henry’s expla-
nation as he stated: ‘‘That was my main concern as chairman
here.’’
At the conclusion of the January 15, 1990 hearing, deci-
sion on the discharge grievance was tabled until grievances
submitted by Pierce in Cases 4659 and 4660 were heard. The
two remaining grievances were heard by the arbitration panel
on February 12. One involved a 5-day suspension imposed
on Pierce as a result of his conduct during an ‘‘on job super-
vision (OJS) ride with Bill Henry on November 2, 1989.’’
The second related to a request for backpay when Pierce was
required to take time off work due to a driver’s license rev-
ocation situation.14 At the conclusion of the February 12
hearing, the arbitration panel issued its decision in Case
4636, the discharge grievance, stating:
Decision in Case No. 4636 is based on the facts rep-
resented, the claim of the Union is denied. This Com-
mittee found no violation of city, state or federal law.
Subsequent to February 12, 1990, Respondent entered a
unilateral settlement agreement wherein it agreed to rescind
a warning letter issued to Pierce pursuant to Respondent’s
no-solicitation rule. The Union requested that Pierce’s dis-
charge case be reopened as Respondent had relied on the
981UNITED PARCEL SERVICE
15 See Jt. Exh. 9.
warning letter when defending its decision to terminate
Pierce. During its July 16–17, 1990 session, the arbitration
panel considered the new evidence and thereafter declined to
reopen the discharge case.15
Issues
1. Whether the Board should defer to the arbitrator’s
award.
2. In event deferral is inappropriate, whether Respondent
terminated Pierce for engaging in union and/or protected
concerted activities.
3. Whether Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) by refus-
ing to furnish the Union with requested information.
Analysis and Conclusions
Counsel recognize in their briefs that the Board will defer
to arbitration awards when (1) the proceedings were fair and
regular; (2) all parties have agreed to be bound by the award;
(3) the award is not clearly repugnant to the Act. Spielberg
Mfg. Co., 112 NLRB 1080 (1955). In Olin Corp., 268 NLRB
573, 574 (1984), the Board held that the arbitrator must have
considered the unfair labor practice before it would defer to
an arbitration award; that the arbitrator will be deemed to
have adequately considered the unfair labor practice if (1) the
contract issue is factually parallel to the unfair labor practice
issue and (2) the arbitrator was presented generally with the
facts relevant to resolving the unfair labor practice. With re-
gard to the ‘‘clearly repugnant’’ standard, the Board stated
in Olin (at 574):
[W]e would not require an arbitrator’s award to be to-
tally consistent with Board precedent. Unless the award
is ‘‘palpably wrong,’’i.e., unless the arbitrator’s deci-
sion is not susceptible to an interpretation consistent
with the Act, we will defer.
General Counsel contends the arbitration proceedings
under discussion were not fair and regular because: (1) Re-
spondent refused to provide the Union with information rel-
evant to Pierce’s performance generally and to Respondent’s
characterization of Napoli as a customer; (2) Teas refused to
disclose his identity as the Fairfield deputy sheriff who ac-
companied Pierce to Napoli’s Villa on December 9, thus cre-
ating a conflict between the Union and the employee it rep-
resented; and (3) the arbitration panel accepted the statements
contained in Napoli’s affidavit as true.
Respondent, claiming that the party seeking to have the
Board reject deferral must bear the burden of affirmatively
demonstrating that the deferral standards have not been met,
contends General Counsel has failed to sustain his evi-
dentiary burden. I find, for the reasons set forth below, that
deferral to the arbitration panel’s decision would be inappro-
priate.
It is well established that Section 8(a)(5) of the Act im-
poses on an employer the duty to furnish a union, on request,
information relevant and necessary to carry out its obliga-
tions as the employees’ exclusive bargaining representative.
Under the standard of relevancy as applied by the Board and
the courts, it is sufficient that the union’s claim for informa-
tion he supported by a showing of ‘‘probable’’ or ‘‘poten-
tial’’ relevance. NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432
(1967); International Harvester Co., 241 NLRB 600, 603–
604 (1979). With further respect to relevancy, it has been
held that ‘‘wage and related information pertaining to em-
ployees in the bargaining unit is presumptively relevant, for,
as such data concerns the core of the employee-employee re-
lationship, a union is not required to show the precise rel-
evance of it.’’ Curtis Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61 (3d
Cir. 1965); Stephen Oderwald, Inc., 284 NLRB 277, 279
(1987).
As indicated, supra, Respondent informed the Union,
Pierce, and the arbitration panel, which heard Pierce’s dis-
charge grievance, that Pierce was terminated because of his
total work record, and because of the December 9, 1989 inci-
dent involving John Napoli. With respect to total work
record, Pierce, individually and through the Union, requested
that the Company supply on-the-job supervisor evaluations,
delivery records, pickup logs, misload cards, and computer
operation reports for the 9-month period commencing March
20, 1989. Respondent supplied the supervisor evaluations,
but failed to supply the italicized documents. It contended
such records were not relevant to the grievance.
With respect to the Napoli incident, Respondent repeatedly
referred to Napoli as a customer during the arbitration pro-
ceedings. Pierce contended Napoli’s Villa had never been a
pickup customer, and that it was not a regular delivery cus-
tomer. As he had been assigned to the route which included
the Napoli’s Villa during the 9-month period preceding his
termination, his pickup records, and his delivery records
clearly constituted relevant information as they would show
whether the pickups and deliveries were made to Napoli’s
Villa during the period under discussion. Moreover, Pierce’s
misload records would reveal his degree of efficiency or lack
of same during the same period. Finally, Respondent witness
Larry Henry affirmatively indicated, when cross-examined,
that a driver’s performance could be determined by viewing
the computer operation reports requested by the Union.
The transcription of Pierce’s discharge hearing before the
arbitration panel reveals that the chairman of the panel recog-
nized that the Union’s information request was not totally
honored by Respondent. At one point, he asked why all the
requested information had not been produced. Respondent’s
representative indicated such information was not relevant
because it was not needed by the Union to rebut the specific
evidence offered by the Company to support its discharge
decision. The chairman indirectly indicated he accepted the
company spokesman’s explanation.
In sum, the record reveals the arbitration panel refrained
from requiring Respondent to produce requested information
which was relevant to Pierce’s discharge grievance although
Respondent was required by Section 8(a)(5) of the Act to
produce the information. I find that by refusing to furnish the
Union with requested delivery records, pickup logs, misload
cards, and computer operation reports for the 9-month period
commencing March 20, 1989, Respondent failed to provide
the Union with relevant information which would enable it
to represent Pierce fully during the arbitration proceeding. In
the circumstances described, I find that deferral to the award
982 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
16 I find no merit to General Counsel’s claim that the arbitration
proceedings were unfair because Teas did not disclose the fact that
he was the special deputy who visited Napoli’s pizza store, or his
claim that use of the Napoli affidavit during those proceedings was
improper. Teas and Pierce decided that Teas’ identity should not be
disclosed initially, but Teas admitted he was the special deputy who
accompanied Pierce to the store before the panel’s final decision was
reached. With respect to the affidavit contention, the record reveals
the Union offered statements taken by Pierce from witnesses who
observed the November 21 and 22 incidents. As both parties used
statements, there was no unfairness.
of the arbitration panel would be inappropriate. NLRB v.
Designcraft Jewel Industries, 675 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1982).16
The Union and/or Concerted Activity Issues
General Counsel Contends that Pierce was engaged in both
union activity and in protected concerted activity when he
visited Napoli’s pizza store on December 9, 1989. Respond-
ent contends the employee acted as an individual, and it had
no knowledge that his activity was concerted.
I deem it unnecessary to determine whether Pierce was en-
gaged in union and/or concerted activity on December 5,
1989, because the facts surrounding the incident cause me to
conclude that his actions during the incident under discussion
were not protected by the Act.
Recently, in Lear-Siegler Management Service Corp., 306
NLRB 393 (1992), the Board considered a situation in which
an alleged discriminatee utilized threats to induce a witness
to testify in a certain way in a Board proceeding. Finding
that the alleged discriminatee was not entitled to backpay or
reinstatement after the threat was made, the Board stated:
The integrity of the Board’s judicial process depends
on witnesses telling the truth, as they see it, without
fear of reprisal or promise of reward. That integrity was
compromised when Sumlin was threatened with reprisal
if he changed his anticipated testimony. It makes no
difference that Wood may have believed that he was
seeking to ensure true testimony as he saw it. The es-
sential point is that persons should not threaten poten-
tial witnesses, even if it be in the name of ensuring
supposedly truthful testimony. Sumlin, and any other
witness in a Board proceeding, should be free to testify
to the truth, without fear of reprisal, as they see the
truth. It is then the role of the judge and the Board to
determine whether the testimony is true or false.
While the threat in Lear-Siegler was to inform the poten-
tial witness’ parole officer that he had engaged in activity
which violated the terms of his parole, and the threat made
by Pierce was to sue Napoli for defamation of character, I
conclude the Board’s remarks in Lear-Siegler dictate that I
find Pierce removed himself from the protection afforded by
Section 7 of the Act when he threatened to institute a civil
action against Napoli unless he gave him an affidavit sup-
porting his position in the ongoing dispute he was experi-
encing with Respondent. In the circumstances described, I
find that General Counsel has failed to prove that Respond-
ent terminated Jeffrey Pierce in violation of Section 8(a)(1)
and (3) of the Act as alleged.
The Alleged 8(a)(5) Violation
As indicated, supra, the information the Union requested
by its letters dated December 28, 1989, and January 17,
1990, was presumptively relevant because it pertained to the
‘‘wages and related information of unit employees.’’ More-
over, General Counsel established affirmatively during the
instant proceeding that such information had potential rel-
evance to Pierce’s discharge grievance. While Respondent
claimed during the instant proceeding that production of
Pierce’s pickup and delivery records and its computer oper-
ation reports would impose an undue burden on it, the only
reasons offered for its failure to produce the requested infor-
mation prior to trial was that it considered the requested in-
formation to be irrelevant to resolution of Pierce’s grievance.
In sum, although Respondent offered testimonial evidence
through Larry Henry, which was to the effect that some of
the records requested by the Union were not maintained by
it for 9 months, and Henry claimed that production of deliv-
ery records and computer operation reports would subject
Respondent to an unduly burdensome task, Respondent has
failed to rebut the presumption that the requested information
was relevant information needed by the Union to enable it
to effectively and fully represent Jeffrey Pierce. Accordingly,
I find that by refusing to furnish the Union with the re-
quested delivery records, pickups logs, misload cards, and
computer operation reports which it possessed for the period
commencing March 20, 1990, and ending on December 13,
1989, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act
as alleged.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By refusing to furnish the Union with requested infor-
mation which was relevant to Jeffrey Pierce’s discharge
grievance, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act.
4. Deferral to the award of the arbitration panel is not war-
ranted in the circumstances of this case.
5. Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of
the Act by discharging Jeffrey Pierce on December 13, 1989.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist
therefrom and that it take certain affirmative action to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that Respondent did not terminate Jeffrey
Pierce in violation of the Act, I find that no useful purpose
would be be served by recommending that Respondent
produce at this time the information requested by the Union’s
letters of December 28, 1989, and January 17, 1990. Instead,
I conclude a general cease-and-desist order will suffice in the
circumstances presented in this case.
983UNITED PARCEL SERVICE
17 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec-
ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
18 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.’’
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended17
ORDER
The Respondent, United Parcel Service, Inc., Obetz, Ohio,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to furnish Teamsters Local Union 413, affili-
ated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL–CIO, on
request, with information which is relevant and necessary to
permit it to carry out its obligations as the collective-bar-
gaining representative of bargaining unit employees.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights
under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Post at its Renoldsburg facility located in Obetz, Ohio,
copies of the attached notice marked ‘‘Appendix.’’18 Copies
of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 9, after being duly signed by the Respondent, shall
be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof and be
maintained for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to em-
ployees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps it has taken to com-
ply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us
to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT refuse to furnish Teamsters Local Union
413, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America,
AFL–CIO, on request, with information which is relevant
and necessary to permit it to carry out its obligations as the
collective-bargaining representative of bargaining unit em-
ployees.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights
under Section 7 of the Act.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.