United Engineering Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 23, 1967

163 N.L.R.B. 81 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

F. J. BUCKNER CORP. 81
(d) Post at its plant in Kings County, New York, New
York, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."7
Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional
Director for Region 29, after being signed by a duly
authorized representative of Respondent, shall be posted
by it immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained
by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees are
customarily displayed. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 29, in
writing, within 20 (lays from the receipt of this Decision,
what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
Note: We will notify the above-named employee if
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States
of his right to full reinstatement upon application in
accordance with the Selective Service Act and the
Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended,
after discharge from the Armed Forces.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, 16 Court Street,
Fourth Floor, Brooklyn, New York 11201, Telephone
596-5386.
' In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the
Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for
the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the
notice . In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by
a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall
be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order."
" In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the
Board, this provision shall be modified to read : "Notify said
Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this
Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO A1.1. EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board , and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , we hereby notify our
employees that:
WE WILL NOT discourage employees from engaging
in activity having for its purpose the submission,
presentation , and processing of grievances pursuant
to the terms of a collective - bargaining agreement, by
discharging or in any other manner discriminating
against any of our employees in regard to their tenure
of employment or any term or condition of
employment.
WE WILL . NOT threaten to discharge employees who
refuse to settle grievances arising under the terms of a
collective-bargaining agreement in a manner not in
accordance with the provisions of said agreement.
WE Wll.l. NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of
the Act, except to the extent that such rights may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a
labor organization as a condition of employment as
authorized in Section 8 (a)(3) of the Act.
WE WtW , offer Frederick Douglas Paige immediate
and full reinstatement to his former position or one
substantially equivalent thereto, without prejudice to
his seniority and other rights and privileges , and make
him whole for any loss of pay It(- may have suffered by
reason of the discrimination by us against him, with
interest at the rate of6 percent per annum.
RO'rAX METALS, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
F. J. Buckner Corporation , d/b/a United
Engineering Company and Oil , Chemical,
and Atomic Workers International Union,
Local 1-128 , AFL-CIO, Long Beach Local
No. 1-128 , OCAWIU, AFL-CIO. Case
21-CA-9621.
February 23, 1967
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND ZAGORIA
On August 10, 1966, Trial Examiner E. Don
Wilson issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in
and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision.
Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the
Decision and a supporting brief, and the General
Counsel filed an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and
the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
' We find without merit the Respondent's contention that
Escobedo v. Illinois, 387 U.S. 478, is applicable in this proceeding.
See Crown Imports Co., Inc., 163 NLRB 24.
The Respondent contends that the complaint should be
dismissed because of the General Counsel's alleged failure to
return documents belonging to the Respondent . As it has not been
established what, if any, papers were not returned , or how the
Respondent was prejudiced , we find no merit in this contention.
163 NLRB No. 7
82 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Relations Board adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, as
modified below, and hereby orders that the
Respondent, F.J. Buckner Corporation, d/b/a United
Engineering Company, Compton, California, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take
the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's
Recommended Order, as herein modified.
Add the following as paragraph 2(b), the present
paragraph 2(b) and those subsequent thereto being
consecutively relettered:
"(b) Notify the above-named employee, if
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United
States, of his right to full reinstatement, upon
application, in accordance with the Selective
Service Act and the Universal Military Training and
Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the
Armed Forces."
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
E. DON WILSON, Trial Examiner : Pursuant to due
notice, a hearing in this manner was held before me on
February 10 and 11 , 1966 . The parties fully participated.
Upon a charge filed by Oil, Chemical , and Atomic
Workers International Union , Local 1-128, AFL-CIO,
Long Beach Local No. 1-128 , OCAWIU, AFL-CIO,
herein the Union , on September 15, 1965, the General
Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board , herein the
Board , issued a complaint dated November 23, 1965,
alleging that F .J. Buckner Corporation d/b/a United
Engineering Company,' herein Respondent , violated
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended , herein the Act.
General Counsel 's and Respondent 's briefs have been
received and considered.
Upon the entire record in the case and from my
observation of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent, maintaining a principal office in Compton,
California, is engaged in the business of performing
maintenance services for oil and chemical companies.
During 1964, Respondent performed services valued in
excess of $50,000 for Richfield Oil Corporation, a
Delaware corporation, which in turn annually purchases
goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from sources
outside California, where it is located. It is an employer
engaged in commerce and in a business affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
Name as amended at hearing.
z G.C. Exh. 4.
All dates herein are 1965 unless otherwise specified
4 Szczesniak testified credibly that after March 3, he did not
file verbal "grievances " but merely , on about five occasions,
sought information from Loy, orally, so that Szczesntak could
determine whether a grievance should be filed in writing . There is
no unequivocal waiver by the Union in the March 3 contract of
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
At all material times, the Union has been a labor
organization within the meaning of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Issues
Was Szczesniak discharged , at least partly , because he
engaged in union and concerted activities protected by the
Act?
Did the settling of his grievance deprive the Board of
jurisdiction?
B. The Facts
Szczesniak was employed by Respondent as a laborer
and mechanic's helper from May 1956 until March 20,
1965. In an affidavit of F.J. Buckner, Respondent's
president , which Buckner testified contained the truth,
Buckner said Szczesniak 's work had "always been
satisfactory except when he was away from his work
station soliciting grievances ."2 During his employment,
Szczesniak held a number of positions with the Union,
including unit chairman , chairman of the negotiating
committee , member of the negotiation committee,
member of the policy board , and steward . Respondent had
about 200 employees . Szczesniak was discharged on
March 20 , 1965,3 by Leonard L. Loy, timekeeper and
manager of Respondent 's operation . Buckner directed Loy
to discharge Szczesniak on this date. Buckner testified he
had more than one reason for discharging Szczesniak. The
reasons Buckner testified he had for discharging
Szczesniak were excessive absenteeism without
permission , filing "verbal" grievances in violation of a
March 3 contract which required that grievances be in
writing,4 and soliciting grievances from employees at their
homes and on the job. During the negotiations between the
Union and Respondent which culminated in the March 3
contract, Buckner told Szczesniak he was fed up with
Szczesniak's solicitations of grievances and "intended to
put a stop to it." Buckner understood that Szczesniak was
soliciting grievances in February and March . Buckner
described what he meant by "soliciting grievances." He
said such phrase meant that Szczesniak "was calling on
employees at their homes and soliciting grievances on the
job where grievances actually did not exist ." Obviously
Buckner was concerned not only with Szczesniak's
solicitation of grievances at employees ' homes on
Szczesniak 's own time but also with the possible lack of
merit of such solicited grievances . "This was one of the
reasons [Buckner] discharged Mr. Szczesniak."
Szczesniak's solicitation of grievances "was a contributory
factor" to his discharge . The manner in which Szczesniak
solicited grievances weighted the decision to discharge
him. Szczesniak 's going out "and seeking out grievances
from employees" entered into the decision to terminate
Szczesniak ' s protected right orally to seek information from
management as to possible violations of the contract for the
purpose of determining whether to file a written grievance.
However, even should I be incorrect in finding that one of the
reasons for discharging Szczesntak was his protected oral
attempts to elicit information from management so as to
determine whether there was a basis for a grievance, his
discharge was still unlawful for reasons which will subsequently
be developed in the body of this Decision.
F. J. BUCKNER CORP. 83
him. It is plain that Buckner discharged Szczesniak not
only because he solicited grievances at employee's homes
but also because he filed grievances which lacked merit.
So, Buckner, in his affidavit, said, "After repeated
warning by ourselves and union officials, Szczesniak
persisted in filing a multitude of unwarranted grievances
which were solicited from employees on the job and at
their homes in direct violation of our agreement (Article
VII) none of which were legitimate and all of which were
withdrawn by the workers committee without action."5 So,
also, Buckner stated that Szczesniak had been trying to
promote grievances and had been filing grievances
"without ascertaining fully the circumstances of each
case." In describing reasons for the termination of
Szczesniak. Buckner complained that no grievance filed
by Szczesniak had been found to possess merit. Buckner
considered that Szczesniak was harassing Respondent by
soliciting and filing grievances. Loy's complaint about
Szczesniak's solicitation was that Szczesniak "persuaded"
men to file grievances. Loy admitted Szczesniak "never
forced men to file grievances." In his affidavit, Loy
referred to "continuing turmoil." Based upon the entire
record, I find Loy was referring to the condition arising out
of Szczesniak's stewardship. The "turmoil," according to
Manager Loy, consisted of Szczesniak's solicitation of
grievances "and talking strike (just the very fact that
Szczesniak was talking strike)." I find that Loy, in the
affidavit he testified was true, testified in effect that
another reason for the discharge of Szczesniak was his
"talking strike."
A grievance was filed concerning Szczesniak's
discharge. On April 2, two members of the three-man
negotiating committee 6 met with Loy at the second step of
the grievance procedure. Szczesniak had no notice of
meeting. Szczesniak was not present and was not
represented. The chairman of the committee, otherwise
known as the workmen's committee, never saw
Szczesniak's grievance. The two committeemen agreed
with Respondent through Loy that it had good and
sufficient reason to terminate Szczesniak. Subsequently
the Union's representative unsuccessfully sought
arbitration with Respondent.
C. Concluding Findings
Motivating reasons for Szczesniak's discharge included
excessive absenteeism without permission and the filing of
verbal grievances by Szczesniak.7 However, it is
manifestly clear that motivating reasons for the discharge
of Szczesniak included solicitation of grievances by
Szczesniak on his own time at employees' homes and on
the job. As an employee and shop steward, Szczesniak had
the right, under Section 7 of the Act, to inquire of fellow
employees on his and their own time, if they knew of any
violations of the contract or had any grievances, even if
such conduct be described as "soliciting grievances."
Szczesniak's attempts on his own and employees' time to
implement the contract were but an extension of the
concerted activities giving rise to the contract.
Szczesniak's solicitation of grievances was part of the
manner in which he performed his duties as a union shop
steward. By discharging Szczesniak for soliciting
grievances at the homes of employees, Respondent
interfered with, restrained, and coerced Szczesniak in his
exercise of rights guaranteed to him by Section 7 of the
Act.' Respondent attempts to justify its discharge of
Szczesniak for soliciting grievances at employees homes
by contending that article VII of the contract prohibited
Szczesniak from engaging in such activity.9 I do not agree.
There is nowhere in the contract a clear and unequivocal
waiver of a steward's protected right to solicit grievances
at the homes of employees or off the job. Nothing in article
VII or any other part of the contract curtails Szczesniak's
statutory right to inquire of fellow employees on his and
their own time if they knew of any violations of the
contract or had any grievances. Szczesniak had the right to
persuade employees to file grievances. Certainly, article
VII does not require that Szczesniak engaged in such
inquiry or persuasion only when requested by an
employee. It does not deal with these matters. I do find
that Respondent had the right to prohibit solicitations of
grievances on working time. 10
It is evident that Buckner directed the discharge of
Szczesniak because he considered grievances filed by
Szczesniak to be lacking in merit and unwarranted.
Buckner further found fault with Szczesniak because he
filed grievances "without ascertaining fully the
circumstances of each case."' I find Szczesniak had the
protected right as an employee and steward, under Section
7 of the Act, to file grievances which were lacking in
meritiz and without "ascertaining fully" the
circumstances of each case. There is no substantial
evidence that Szczesniak acted frivolously in filing any
grievance.
Another reason for the discharge of Szczesniak was that
he had been "talking strike." Szczesniak as an employee
and steward had the right, protected by Section 7 of the
Act, to talk strike. It was unlawful for Respondent to
discharge him for this reason.
I conclude that Respondent was unlawfully motivated in
discharging Szczesniak. Szczesniak's activities in
soliciting grievances, filing grievances which may have
lacked merit, talking strike, and orally requesting
information from management so as to determine whether
a grievance should be filed were all protected union or
concerted activities. By discharging Szczesniak because
of these activities Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act. Where unlawful motivation is shown, the
5 Loy, in his affidavit, said some of Szczesniak' s grievances
"were settled in favor of the union "
0 Employees
r As previously noted, I find Si-zesniak, after March 3, did not
file verbal grievances but rather engaged in the protected activity,
on his own time, of orally requesting Loy to furnish information
about employees ' working conditions and status so that
Szczesniak could determine whether a written grievance should
be filed. A discharge for such activity is violative of Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act
' See Market Basket, 144 NLRB 1462
u Article VII reads in pertinent part as follows: "The Union, by
written notice to the Company, may designate from among the
employees two (2) Stewards and a Chief Steward at each job site.
These Stewards , when requested by an employee may assist said
employee in discussing with supervision any question pertaining
to working conditions including the processing of a
grievance ...
10 See Market Basket, supra
" I have already found that one of the reasons for Szczesniak's
discharge was that he orally and unsuccessfully sought
information from Loy so as to determine whether a grievance
should be filed.
12 Note that Loy testified in his affidavit that some of
Szczesmak 's grievances were resolved in favor of the Union.
295-269 0-69-7
84 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
coexistence of what might otherwise constitute good cause
for discharge is not a defense.13
The so-called settlement of Szczesniak's grievance by
the workmen's committee at the second step does not
deprive the Board of jurisdiction. The committeemen did
not see the grievance and Szczesniak participated in the
grievance settlement in no manner. There has been no
arbitration.'"
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The operations of Respondent, described in section I,
above, occurring in connection with the unfair labor
practices described in section III, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and
desist therefrom and from any other invasions of its
employees' rights under Section 7 of the Act, and take
certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
Affirmatively, I shall recommend that Respondent
reinstate Szczesniak and reimburse him for losses he has
incurred under the formulas approved by the Board in
F.W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing &
Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716, and that it post appropriate
notices.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon
the entire record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of the Act.
2. By discriminatorily discharging Szczesniak, as found
above, Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act.
3. The unfair labor practices affect commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law, it is recommended that Respondent, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against any
employee because of his activity in behalf of the Union, or
in support of the Union or any other labor organization, or
because he has engaged in concerted activities protected
by Section 7 of the Act.
(b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under
Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Make Szczesniak whole in the manner described in
the portion of this Decision entitled "The Remedy" for any
loss of earnings suffered by reason of the discrimination
against him and offer him immediate and full
reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent
position without prejudice to his seniority or other rights
and privileges previously enjoyed.
(b) Preserve and make available to the Board or its
agents, upon request, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records,
timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
under the terms hereof.
(c) Post at its plant in Compton, California, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix." 15 Copies of such
notice to be furnished by the Regional Director for
Region 21, after being duly signed by an authorized
representative of Respondent, shall be posted immediately
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for a period
of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 21, in
writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision,
what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.16
" See Spitzer Motcr Sales , Inc , 102 NLRB 437, 447, fn. 29;
N L.R B . v Great Eastern Color Lithographic Corp., 309 F.2d 352
i C.A. 2).
14 See Pontiac Motors, 132 NLRB 413, 415.
15 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the
Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for
the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the
notice . In the further event that the Board 's Order is enforced by
a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall
be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order."
16 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the
Board , this provision shall be modified to read : "Notify said
Regional Director , in writing , within 10 days from the date of this
Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our
employees that:
WE WILL reinstate Stanley E. Szczesniak to his old
job and pay him for all back wages lost as a result of
his discharge on March 20, 1965.
WE WILL NOT discharge or discriminate against our
employees or interfere with, restrain, or coerce them
because of their union or protected concerted
activities.
F. J. BUCKNER CORPORATION
D/B/A UNITED ENGINEERING
COMPANY
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
OPERATING ENGINEERS, LOCAL 450 85
Note: We will notify Szczesniak if presently serving in
the Armed Forces of the United States of his right to full
reinstatement upon application in accordance with the
Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training
and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the
Armed Forces.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, Eastern
Columbia Building, 849 South Broadway, Los Angeles,
California 90014, Telephone 688-5229.
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board
makes the following findings:
1. BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER
Sea-Land Service, Inc., is a Delaware corporation
licensed to do business in the State of Texas, with
facilities in Houston, Texas. It is engaged in
operating containerized vessels in interstate and
foreign commerce. During the past 12 months it
received revenue in excess of $50,000 for services
performed in such commerce. The parties
stipulated, and we find, that the Employer is
engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act and it will effectuate
the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction herein.
International Union of Operating Engineers,
Local 450 and Sea-Land Service, Inc. Case
23-CD-105
February 23, 1967
DECISION AND DETERMINATION OF
DISPUTE
BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN , AND ZAGORIA
This is a proceeding pursuant to Section 10(k) of
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
following a charge filed by Sea-Land Service, Inc.,
herein referred to as the Employer , alleging that the
International Union of Operating Engineers,
Local 450 , herein referred to as the Operating
Engineers or the Respondent , had violated Section
8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(D) of the Act. The charge alleges, in
substance , that the Operating Engineers had
threatened to induce or encourage individuals
employed by the Employer and induced and
encouraged individuals employed by other persons
in industries affecting commerce to strike or refuse
in the course of their employment to perform any
services , with an object of forcing or requiring the
Employer to assign the work of operating the newly
completed dock -mounted or shore-based crane to
employees who are represented by International
Longshoremen 's Association , Local 1231,
AFL-CIO, and International Longshoremen's
Association , Local 1271, AFL-CIO, herein referred
to jointly as the ILA.
A hearing was held before Hearing Officer
William H . Helms on May 9, 1966 . All parties
appeared at the hearing and were afforded full
opportunity to be heard , to examine and cross-
examine witnesses , and to adduce evidence bearing
on the issues . The rulings of the Hearing Officer
made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error
and are hereby affirmed . The Employer and the
Operating Engineers filed briefs which have been
duly considered by the Board.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
Act, the Board has delegated its powers in
connection with this case to a three - member panel.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
The parties stipulated and we find that the
Operating Engineers and the ILA are labor
organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
III. THE DISPUTE
A. The Work in Issue
The work in dispute here is the operation of the
newly completed dock-mounted crane which has
been leased to the Employer by the Port of Houston.
B. Background
The Employer has been engaged in coastwise
cargo shipping operations since before December
1957. Until early 1958, it operated two types of ships
carrying containerized cargo, one of these having
cranes mounted on the ships for the loading and
unloading of the containers, the other relying on a
mobile land-based gantry crane for loading and
unloading. At that time the shipboard cranes were
operated by employees who were represented by the
ILA, and the operator of the land-based crane was a
member of the Operating Engineers. The Employer
discontinued the use of the land-based crane for
loading and unloading its vessels in 1958. In 1959 the
gantry crane was sold to the Port of Houston, and the
employee who had been operating the crane was
discharged. Thereafter, the Employer used only the
ship-mounted cranes operated by ILA members,
with the exception of two occasions when it rented a
gantry crane from the Port of Houston.
The Employer acquired a new land-based crane in
April 1966. Prior to completion of the erection of this
crane, the business agent of the Operating
Engineers requested that an Operating Engineer
member be employed by the Employer to operate
the land-based crane. The Southwest operations
manager of the Employer refused the request on the
basis of the Employer's contract with the ILA. The
Operating Engineers' business agent then informed
the Employer that the Operating Engineers would
163 NLRB No.18