United Brotherhood of Carpenters Local Union No. 14

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 31, 1975

217 N.L.R.B. 202 (N.L.R.B. 1975)

202 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of
America, Local Union No. 14, AFL-CIO (Max M.
Kaplan Properties ) and Arthur J. Bradshaw. Case
23-CB-1495
March 31, 1975
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, KENNEDY, AND PENELLO
On June 14, 1974, Administrative Law Judge Samuel
M. Singer issued the attached Decision in this proceed-
ing. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions and a
supporting brief and the General Counsel filed a brief
in support of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the Administrative Law
Judge's rulings, only to the extent consistent here-
with.
The Administrative Law Judge found, and we agree,
that the Charging Party, Bradshaw, was a supervisor
within the meaning of the Act during the relevant
period. The record shows that Bradshaw was hired as
foreman of the Employer's "tenant finishing" carpen-
ter crew; he oversees the work of contractors perform-
ing various tasks for the Employer by scheduling and
coordinating their operations; he is on a guaranteed
monthly salary and earns 15 percent more pay than the
hourly paid carpenters; he assigns work; he is not paid
for overtime work; he has hired employees for his crew;
he selects men for layoff; he has reprimanded and fired
crewmembers; and he selects men to perform overtime.
While the record also indicates that Bradshaw per-
forms some routine tasks, as well as spending about 50
percent of his working hours performing rank-an -file
work, we find that Bradshaw possesses sufficient in-
dicia of supervisory authority to qualify him as a super-
visor within the meaning of the'Act.
We also agree with the Administrative Law Judge's
conclusion that Bradshaw was an employer representa-
tive within the intent of Section 8(b)(1)(B), notwith-
standing the fact that the record failed to establish that
Bradshaw was actually vested with authority to act for
his employer in collective bargaining or the adjustment
of grievances. This conclusion follows by virtue of our
rule that persons who are supervisors within the mean-
ing of the Act are employer representatives within the
meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(B).1
The Administrative Law Judge also rejected the Re-
spondent's contention that no violation of Section
8(b)(1)(B) resulted from its imposition of the fine in the
i Operating Engineers, Local No. 501 (AnheuserBusch , Inc.), 199 NLRB
551 (1972), Rochester Musicians Association Local 66 affiliated with the
American Federation of Musicians (Civic Music Association), 207 NLRB
647 (1973),
instant case because the fine had nothing to do with
Bradshaw's supervisory functions. We agree with this
conclusion. We recognize that a union's discipline of a
supervisor-member falls outside the proscription of
Section 8(b)(1)(B) where the offense occasioning the
discipline involves a matter purely of internal union
administration, unrelated, either directly or indirectly,
to any dispute between the union and the
employer.' This rule results in the finding of no viola-
tion where, for instance, a supervisor-member is disci-
plined for failing to pay his union dues or for disturbing
a union meeting. The facts of the instant case, however,
do not fall within this category. As found by the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge herein, "[t]he fine imposed
upon Bradshaw [working without a steward] stems
from the fact that he continued to work on a 'nonunion'
job, i.e., for an employer (Kaplan) who refused to sign
a collective agreement with the Respondent-an of-
fense involving more than a `matter of purely internal
union administration."'
On the basis of the previous findings the Administra-
tive Law Judge concluded that Respondent's fining of
Bradshaw for working without a steward violated Sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(B). We do not agree that Respondent has
violated Section 8(b)(1)(B) notwithstanding our previ-
ous discussion. This follows from our Bakery and Con-
fectionery Workers International Union ofAmerica, Lo-
cal Unions 24 and 119 (Food Employers Council, Inc.),
decision, 216 NLRB No. 150 (1975), wherein we held
that no violation would result, regardless of the union's
motivation, where a supervisor-member is disciplined
after he has engaged in more than a minimal3 amount
of rank-and-file work during a strike.4 While the re-
cord in the instant case is unclear on the exact propor-
tion of unit work performed by Bradshaw during the
relevant period, it does reveal that he customarily spent
half of his time performing bargaining unit work. This
latter fact, when coupled with the evidence that two
carpenters from his crew did not show up at work after
Bradshaw had been informed by the Respondent that
he would have to leave the job or face charges, con-
vinces us that Bradshaw continued to spend at least 50
2 This conclusion does not conflict with the spirit of our Chicago Typo-
graphical Union No 16 (Hammond Publishers, Inc) decision, 216 NLRB
No. 149 (1957). This follows, regardless of the fact that no emphasis is
placed on the nature of the work performed by the supervisor-member,
because it is not reasonably likely, in conformity with Hammond, that an
adverse effect will carry over to the supervisor's performance of-, his
8(b)(1)(B) duties where he is disciplined for violating an internal union rule
in a context unrelated to a dispute between the union and the employer
3 In Food Employers Council the disciplined supervisor-members spent at
least 50 percent of their time during the strike performing bargaining unit
work
4 That the instant case concerns what amounted to a recognitional strike
without a picket line, instead of an economic strike with a picket line is of
no consequence since, in either case, there exists an overriding employer-
union dispute.
217 NLRB No. 13
UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 14
percent of his working time performing bargaining unit
work during the relevant period,'
Therefore, since Bradshaw spent at least half his
working time performing bargaining unit work during
the period for which he was disciplined, we find that
Respondent has not violated Section 8(b)(1)(B) by dis-
ciplining Bradshaw.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations
Board hereby orders that the complaint herein be, and
it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety.
MEMBER FANNING, concurring in part:
I agree with my colleagues of the majority only inso-
far as they dismiss the complaint.
Although the Administrative Law Judge agreed with
the Respondent's position that there is no evidence in
the record that Bradshaw was vested with authority to
act for his employer in collective-bargaining or adjust-
ing of grievances, he found that Bradshaw was an em-
ployer representative within the intent of Section
8(b)(1)(B). However, I find merit in the Respondent's
exceptions. The record shows that Bradshaw did not
engage in contract negotiations for the Employer, the
Employer did not have a contract with the Respondent,
and Bradshaw did not handle grievances, not was it
shown that he had the authority to handle grievances
for the Employer.
Thus, _the record indicates that the issue herein is
squarely within the decisions issued by the Supreme
Court on June 24, 1974, in Florida Power & Light Co.
v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Lo-
cals 641, 622, 759, 820, and 1263 and N.L.R.B. v.
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
AFL-CIO, et al., 417 U.S. 790 (1974). In these cases,
the Court held that the unions did not violate Section
8(b)(1)(B) of the Act when they disciplined supervisor-
members for crossing picket lines and performing rank-
and-file work during lawful economic strikes against
the employers. In the Court's view, the disciplining of
supervisor-members can violate Section 8(b)(1)(B) only
when such disciplining may have an adverse effect on
the supervisor-members' conduct in performing the du-
ties of, and acting in the capacity of, grievance adjuster
or collective bargainers on behalf of the employer. As
to the problem of a supervisor's loyalty, the Court in-
dicated that Congress intended to reach such problem
5 Under our analysis of whether Sec. 8(b)(1)(B) has been violated it is
irrelevant whether the disciplined supervisor-member had performed rank-
and-file work, in either the same or a different proportion, before the em-
ployer-union dispute. This follows since the only relevant inquiry is what the
supervisor-member did during the employer-union dispute. Hammond Pub-
lishers, Inc., supra. Member Jenkins does not find it necessary to reach the
issues set out in this footnote
203
through Sections 2(3), 2(11), and 14(a) of the Act,
which permit the employer to refuse to hire union
members as supervisors, to discharge supervisors be-
cause of union activities or membership, and to refuse
to engage in collective bargaining with them. The
Court noted that Congress did not intend to make Sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(B) part of the solution to the problems of
supervisor-union member conflicts of loyalties. In the
case herein, the, record shows that Bradshaw has not
adjusted grievances or represented the Employer in col-
lective bargaining, and, therefore, the Supreme Court
decisions are controlling.6'
In view of the above, I find that the Respondent
Union did not violate Section 8(b)(l)(B) of the Act
when it fined Bradshaw for working without a steward
in violation of the Respondent Union's bylaws. ' Ac-
cordingly, as the Administrative Law Judge's ground
for finding the 8(b)(1)(B) violation has become untena-
ble, I join my colleagues in dismissing the complaint in
its entirety.
MEMBER KENNEDY, dissenting:
I disagree with my colleagues' dismissal of the com-
plaint. In my view, Respondent's imposition of a
$1,500 fine on Supervisor Bradshaw for "working
without a steward" violated Section 8(b)(1)(B).
Employer Kaplan has no collective-bargaining
agreement with any labor organization. Beginning in
July 1973, Respondent Carpenters sought to acquire a
contract from Kaplan. Although Kaplan agreed to pay
union wages and to acquire its carpenters from union
sources, Respondent was unable to secure an executed
contract.
On August 6, Respondent 's business agent notified
Supervisor Bradshaw that because Kaplan "wouldn't
sign the contract" Bradshaw would have to leave the
job or face union charges. When Bradshaw thereafter
continued to perform his regular duties, he was fined
for violating section 13 of Respondent's bylaws which
provide in pertinent part that "A foreman who is found
running a job without a Steward shall be fined $5.00.
Each day so worked shall constitute a separate of-
fense." Although two union carpenters refused to work
after August 6,' there is no evidence to indicate that
the content of Bradshaw's job functions-including
the amount of time devoted to supervisory respon-
sibilities-was in any manner altered thereby.
In my judgment, this case is not controlled by the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Florida Power &
Light Co. v. I.B.E. W, Local 641, 417 U.S. 790 (1974).
In Florida Power, the Court 'determined that union
discipline of supervisor-members for crossing picket
6 International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No . 9, AFL-CIO
(Shelton Pipeline & Construction, Inc.), 213 NLRB No 92 (1974).
7 There is no evidence that a picket line was established
204 - DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
lines and performing rank-and-file struck work did not
violate Section 8(b)(1)(B). The Court reasoned that
supervisors are not engaged in collective bargaining or
the adjustment of grievances "when they [cross] union
picket lines during an economic strike to engage in
rank-and-file struck work.i8
In contrast, Bradshaw was fined for "working with-
out a steward." Thus the conduct which prompted
Bradshaw's discipline amounted to nothing more than
the mere continuation' of his normal responsibilities,
including his 8(b)(1)(B) duties, albeit in the absence of
a union steward.' In my judgment, when a union fine
is levied against a supervisor who is doing nothing more
than performing his normal responsibilities, it is rea-
sonable to conclude that the fine will have an "adverse
carryover effect" on the future performance of his
8(b)(1)(B) duties. Such an effect, we determined in
Hammond Publishers, Inc., 216 NLRB No. 149 (1975),
makes the fine violative of Section 8(b)(1)(B). Accord-
ingly, I dissent from my colleagues' dismissal of the
complaint.
8 417 U S 790, 805.
9 Although it is true that Bradshaw's normal job functions include work
which might arguably be categorized as "rank-and-file" work, I think this
case is distinguishable from Food Employers Council, Inc., 216 NLRB No
150 (1975) Unlike the supervisors there, Bradshaw's job content did not
change during the period for which he was fined. In Food Employers Coun-
cil, Inc., the proportion of rank-and-file work performed by at least some of
the bakery managers increased during the strike
DECISION
SAMUEL M. SINGER, Administrative Law Judge: This pro-
ceeding was heard before me in San Antonio, Texas, on April
25, pursuant to a charge filed on March 21 and complaint
issued on March 27, 1974. Essentially, the complaint alleges
that Respondent Union restrained and coerced Max M. Kap-
lan Properties (Kaplan), in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(B) of
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended , by fining
Charging Party (a supervisor and union member) for working
for an employer with whom the Union has no collective-
bargaining agreement.
All parties appeared and were afforded full opportunity to
be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to
introduce evidence. Briefs were filed by General Counsel and
Respondent. Upon the entire record, and my observation of
the testimonial demeanor of the witnesses , I make the follow-
ing:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. JURISDICTION
Kaplan, the employer here involved, is a sole proprietor-
ship managing and operating office buildings in several cities
in Texas, including the One Park Ten office building in San
Antonio here involved. During the past representative year,
it derived gross revenues exceeding $100,000 of which more
than $25,000 was in the form of rental from enterprises,
including Xerox Corporation, whose purchases in interstate
commerce exceed $50,000. I find, as Respondent admitted at
the hearing, that at all material times Kaplan has been and
is an employer engaged in commerce and in operations affect-
ing commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Respondent Union (Local 14) is a labor organization
/ within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Issues
1. Whether or not Charging Party Bradshaw is a supervisor
within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act.
2. Whether an internal Union fine levied against Bradshaw
is in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act.
B. Bradshaw's Union Status
Arthur J. Bradshaw has worked out of jurisdictional areas
of several Carpenters locals since joining Carpenters in 1969.
He would "clear" his card out of one local into another as he
moved from job to job. In July 1972, he "cleared into" Local
14 (Respondent) and has since worked in its jurisdictional
area as foreman and construction worker.
C. Bradshaw's Status as Supervisor
Bradshaw was hired by Kaplan in July 1973 as foreman or
supervisor of its "tenant finishing" carpenter crew at the One
Ten office complex in San Antonio. The crew-all Kaplan
employees-readies offices for tenant occupancy, mostly
by erecting partitions and walls. Its size varies con-
siderably-from 1 to 10 carpenters, depending on the
workload.' Bradshaw also "oversees" the work of contrac-
tors, such as electricians, painters, and carpet layers, used by
Kaplan for major jobs-scheduling and coordinating their
operations. In addition, he does some "paper work," includ-
ing keeping employee timesheets.
Building Manager Hudec, Bradshaw's superior, testified
that 50 percent of Bradshaw's time is spent working "with his
own hands" along with the "tenant finishing" crew. Unlike
the crew, he is on a "guaranteed" monthly salary. His earn-
ings average 15 percent more than those of Kaplan's hourly
paid carpenters and he is not paid for overtime work. Brad-
shaw's fringe benefits (e.g., hospitalization insurance and va-
cations) are the same as the employees'.
The record establishes that Bradshaw has hired employees
for the finishing crew. When additional men are needed, he
obtains Hudec's "permission" to hire and then proceeds to
take applications which he refers to Hudec for routine ap-
proval. As the workload diminishes, Bradshaw selects the
men to be laid off. He has reprimanded and fired crewmem-
bers for poor performance-in "most cases" without consult-
ing Hudec. He sets the crew's work hours and makes job
assignments, although, according to Bradshaw, the men usu-
i When Bradshaw was hired in July 1973, the crew consisted of four and
at the time of the hearing of only one carpenter.
UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 14
ally "know what has to be done and they just go ahead with
their own initiative and do it ." When Hudec determines that
overtime work is needed , Bradshaw selects the men to per-
form . As to wages, Hudec testified -that Kaplan pays its car-
penters and helpers (apprentices) the prevailing area or union
scale as "a very -routine matter," adding, however, that it is
he (Hudec) who "either approve [s] or disapprove [s]" requests
for wage raises. There is no evidence that Bradshaw possesses
authority to handle employee grievances; Hudec testified that
he was not aware of any complaints lodged by employees
during Bradshaw 's 9-month tenure , except for "the ever pre-
sent request for a raise."
D. Alleged Restraint and Coercion
1. The Union 's unsuccessful attempt to secure a collective
agreement covering the Kaplan employees
Kaplan has no collective agreement with any union. In
mid-July,' shortly after Kaplan hired Bradshaw, the latter
(who was then working on clearance from Respondent, su-
pra, sec. B), discussed with Union Business Agent Gooden
the possibility of unionizing the job . Agreeing that this would
be a "good idea," Gooden approached Building Manager
Hudec. In the four meetings then held by them , Gooden
attempted to get Hudec to sign a collective agreement cover-
ing the Kaplan crew . Hudec refused, offering , however, to
continue paying his crew the union wage scale as well as to
secure his carpenters through the union hall. In two of the
four sessions (including the last in August or early Septem-
ber), Gooden threatened "to pull ]the Union] carpenters" off
the job unless Kaplan signed a collective agreement.
2. Bradshaw's decision to continue on the nonunion
Kaplan job
On August 6, Business Agent Gooden went to the jobsite
and told Bradshaw that because Kaplan "wouldn 't sign the
contract," he (Bradshaw) would have to leave the job or face
union charges. Bradshaw said he would later indicate his
"choice." The next morning (August 7), Bradshaw "cleared
out" of Local 14 by retrieving his book from the union office.
Although Bradshaw testified that he regarded this action as
a "resignation," General Counsel concedes , and I find, that
it did not constitute such under the Union 's prescribed proce-
dure for withdrawing or resigning membership (Resp. Exh.
2, p. 27).3 Bradshaw remained on the job on August 7 and
still works for Kaplan . Two union carpenters working in his
2 All dates are 1973, unless otherwise indicated
3 Bradshaw explained his reasons for "resigning " as follows-
well, at this particular time I was working at One Park Ten for Max
M Kaplan Properties, and there was not a contract signed between the
Union and Max Kaplan Properties , so I had a choice to either stay with
the union or stay with Max Kaplan , and after long and hard thought,
I could see my future better with Max Kaplan than I could with the
union, and this is why I made this decision.
Bradshaw went on to say that he knew it was "standard procedure" to
fine a member working on a nonunion job
205
crew on August 6 did not return to work on and after August
7.
3. The fine levied against Bradshaw
On August 7, Business Agent Gooden filed charges against
Bradshaw , but Bradshaw did not appear at the "trial " before
a three-man union committee .4 The committee found him
"guilty" of working without a union steward on the job.5
On November 7, the Union notified Bradshaw that he was
fined $ 1,500. Bradshaw subsequently appealed to Union Fi-
nancial Secretary Adamson to withdraw the fine, but the
latter stated that there was "no way" of doing this.
E. Conclusions
As noted (supra, sec. A), the issues here are whether: (1)
Bradshaw qualifies as a supervisor under the Act; and (2) the
fine levied against him is violative of Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the
Act.
1. The supervisory issue
As found (supra, sec. C), Bradshaw , as foreman of Ka-
plan's "tenant finishing" crew , possesses and exercises the
right to hire, lay off, reprimand, and fire crewmembers. He
also sets the crew 's working hours, makes job assignments,
and selects employees for overtime work. It is clear that
Bradshaw is a supervisor possessing the indicia of such status
as enumerated in Section 2(11) of the Act. I so find. To be
sure, as Respondent points out (br. pp. 2-3), Bradshaw per-
forms a good deal of "production" or rank-and-file work and
some of his duties are essentially routine . However, the fact
that he is not a high managerial employee is immaterial. All
that is necessary is that he meet "at least one of the supervi-
sory characteristics set out in Section 2(11)." N.L.R.B. v.
Alamo Express, Inc., 430 F.2d 1032, 1035 (C.A. 5).
2. The alleged 8(b)(1)(B) violation
Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act forbids a union to "restrain
or coerce . . . an employer in the selection of his representa-
tives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjust-
ment of grievances." Respondent 's basic contentions are: (a)
there is no evidence that Bradshaw had the authority to
handle grievances or bargain collectively on behalf of
Kaplan-the contrary being indicated by the fact that it was
his superior (Building Manager Hudec) who conducted the
abortive bargaining negotiations for the Union; and (b) the
fine against Bradshaw concerned only a matter of internal
union discipline, not "in any way related to Kaplan's selec-
tion of his bargaining representative or to the adjustment of
any employee grievances."
4 Bradshaw did not receive the letter requesting him to appear ; he admit-
ted moving from his home (to which the letter was mailed) without notifying
the Union of his new address.
5 Local 14 's bylaws and trade rules , sec. 13, provides in pertinent part: "A
Foreman who is found running a job without a Steward shall be fined $5 00.
Each day so worked shall constitute a separate offense " A second charge
preferred against Bradshaw-that he had been working "with his own
tools"-was dropped and dismissed.
206
Although I agree with Respondent 's position that the re-
cord does not establish that Bradshaw was vested with au-
thority to act for his employer in collective bargaining or
adjusting grievances , I am nonetheless constrained to con-
clude that he was an employer representative within the in-
tent of Section 8(b)(1)(B) under the Board 's current broad
interpretation and application of that section . The Board still
is of the view that-
All persons who are "supervisors" within the meaning
of Section' 2(11) of the Act are employers' "representa-
tives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the
adjustment of grievances " within the purview of Section
8(b)(1)(B) of the Act.'
Underlying this Board view is the so-called reservoir doctrine
that even if supervisors are not actual grievance representa-
tives, "their status and roles [made them] such natural and
potential representatives of the [employer] for the handling
and settlement of grievances because of their day -to-day
supervision and contacts with the employees in matters that
spawn grievances , that the [employer] should be entitled to
rely on them , and therefore to select them , as its representa-
tives in handling and settling grievances whenever the occa-
sion might arise. " (Emphasis supplied .) Toledo Locals Nos.
15-P and 272 of the Lithographers and Photo-Engravers Inter-
national Union (The Toledo Blade Co., Inc.), 175 NLRB
1072, 1079 (1969), enfd. 437 F.2d 55 (C.A. 6, 1971). See also
Detroit Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Union No. 13 (The
Detroit Free Press), 192 NLRB 196, 110 (1971); Cf. Interna-
tional Association of Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos
Workers, Local 127 (Cork Insulating Company of Wisconsin,
Inc.), 189 NLRB 854 (1971).
Accordingly , I am constrained to conclude that Bradshaw,
a statutory supervisor , is also an employer representative
within Section 9(b)(1)(B) as construed by the Board.
I must also reject Respondent 's contention that no
8(b)(1)(B) violation can be found because the fine imposed on
Bradshaw had nothing to do with his supervisory functions.
As the Board stated in Times Publishing Company, supra,
1122, and reiterated in Anheuser Busch, supra, 199 NLRB
551:
In order to constitute coercion within the proscription of
Section 8(b)(1)(B), it is not essential that the union disci-
6 Operating Engineers, Local No. 501 (Anheuser Busch, Inc.), 199 NLRB
551 (1972) See also cases cited infra. But see Erie Newspaper Guild, Local
187f Times Publishing Company] v. N.L.R.B., 489 F.2d 416 (C.A 3, 1973),
reversing 196 NLRB 1121 (1972), International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, AFL-CIO, and Local 134 [Illinois Bell Telephone Co.], 487 F.2d
1143 (C.A.D C, 1973), reversing 192 NLRB 85 (1971) and 193 NLRB 30
(1971),.cert granted 417 U.S 790 (1974) For the most recent Board case
on the subject , see Wisconsin River Valley District Council (Skippy Enter-
prises, Inc), 211 NLRB 222 (1974).
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
plinary action be related to the offending member's per-
formance of supervisory functions, it being sufficient
that the discipline somehow concern the relationship
between the employer on the one hand and the union or
the employees on the other, as distinguished from mat-
ters of purely internal union administration.
The fine imposed on Bradshaw stems from the fact that he
continued to work on a "nonunion " job; i.e., for an employer
(Kaplan) who refused to sign a collective agreement with
Respondent-an offense involving more than a "matter of
purely internal union administration ." To be sure , the-spe-
cific charge of which Bradshaw was found guilty was "work-
ing on ajob without a union steward." But this is the equiva-
lent of saying that he was fined because he worked on a
nonunion job. See International Union of Operating Engi-
neers, Local Union No. 450, AFL-CIO (Schneider Construc-
tion Co.), 209 NLRB 463 (1975).
Accordingly, I find and conclude that Respondent 's impo-
sition of a fine against Bradshaw constituted restraint and
coercion of an employer representative within the meaning of
Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. At all material times, Arthur J . Bradshaw has been a
supervisor within the meaning of Section 2(11) and employer
representative within the meaning of Section 8(b) (1)(B) of
the Act.
2. By firing Bradshaw for not working on a nonunion job
or a job without a union steward Respondent restrained and
coerced Bradshaw 's employer (Kaplan) in the selection of his
representative for the purpose of collective bargaining and the
adjustment of grievances, in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(B) of
the Act.
3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Respondent having been found to have engaged in unfair
labor practices in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act,
should be required to cease and desist therefrom and to take,
certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies
of the Act, including the rescission of its action in fining
Bradshaw , expunging all records thereof in its files, and post-
ing appropriate notices. Since it appears that Bradshaw did
not pay the fine, reimbursement order is unnecessary.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
I