United Brotherhood of Carpenters

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 9, 1972

195 N.L.R.B. 799 (N.L.R.B. 1972)

UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America, Carpenters District Council of Western
Pennsylvania, AFL-CIO and Negotiating Commit-
tee for Special Representatives . Cases 6-CA-5078
and 6-CA-5312
March 9, 1972
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND KENNEDY
On September 9, 1971, Trial Examiner Lloyd Bu-
chanan issued the attached Decision in this proceeding.
Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a support-
ing brief, and General Counsel filed a brief in answer
to Respondent's exceptions and in support of the Trial
Examiner's Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding' to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the Trial
Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the Trial Examiner's
rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt his
recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended , the National Labor Relations
Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of
the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that Respondent,
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America, Carpenters District Council of Western
Pennsylvania , AFL-CIO, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, its
officers, agents , and representatives , shall take the ac-
tion set forth in the Trial Examiner's recommended
Order.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
LLOYD BUCHANAN, Trial Examiner: The complaints
herein (issued November 25, 1970, and March 12, 1971,
charges filed June 22, October 6, November 10, and Decem-
ber 17, 1970), as consolidated, allege that the Council has
violated Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended, 73 Stat. 519, by negotiating in bad faith, refusing
to supply necessary information, shifting its bargaining posi-
tion, refusing to bargain until the Union withdrew a pending
unfair labor practice charge, engaging in dilatory tactics, and
failing to entrust its negotiators with sufficient authority; Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) and (4) of the Act by discharging William Maher,
Jr., on December 15, 1970, because he engaged in protected
concerted activities and because he filed with the Board an
unfair labor practice charge against the Council and gave
testimony under the Act in Case 6-CA-5078; and Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by said acts and by informing employees
that it would not negotiate a contract with the Union until
the latter withdrew pending unfair labor practice charges
against it, that a fellow employee was discharged because of
195 NLRB No. 151
799
his union activities, that a fellow employee would not receive
reimbursement for expenses because of his union activities,
and that the Council would never execute`a contract with the
Committee, by promising employees economic benefits if they
ceased their union activities, and by threatening employees
with discharge unless they discontinued their support of the
Union.
Raising questions of commerce and jurisdiction, the Coun-
cil admits certification of the Committee as representative of
the employees in an appropriate unit, but it denies the allega-
tions of requests and refusal to bargain. Also admitting that
it laid off and has to date refused to reinstate Maher, the
Council denies the allegations of unfair labor practice in this
connection. The alleged independent violations of Section
8(a)(1) are also denied
The case was tried before me at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
on April 29 and 30 and May 4, 1971. Briefs have been filed
by the General Counsel and the Company, the time to do so
having been extended.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observa-
tion of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT (WITH REASONS THEREFOR)
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I THE COUNCIL' S BUSINESS
AND THE COMMITTEE'S STATUS AS
A LABOR ORGANIZATION
It was stipulated that the Council, with its principal offices
located in Pittsburgh, is a voluntary unincorporated associa-
tion chartered and organized in conformity with the constitu-
tion and bylaws of the International, whose headquarters are
in Washington, D.C. The Council employs special represent-
atives, business representatives, and clerical and other em-
ployees. Various employers who are under contract with the
Council employ employees represented by it Some of these
employers sell or cause to be shipped goods valued at more
than $50,000 directly to persons located outside Pennsyl-
vania. During the 12-month period immediately preceding
the issuance of the complaints, more than $250,000 of per
capita dues was remitted to the International offices by affi-
liated local unions throughout the United States. During the
same period, the Council has remitted approximately $20,000
to the International Union office in Washington for pension
fund contributions on behalf of the Council's employees.
The Regional Director's certification of the Council on
December 11, 1969, issued with the same force and effect as
if issued by the Board, included 'the finding that the Council
is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
the Act. As I stated at the trial, I would not review that
determination, the Council's right to raise the issue before the
Board being preserved. My findings herein with respect to
jurisdiction are consistent with and support the finding of
engagement in commerce.
It was admitted and I find and conclude that the Commit-
tee is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act.
II JURISDICTION
This case presents a surprising, even startling, question
with respect to jurisdictional standards and the assertion of
jurisdiction over the Respondent Council I am not aware of
any case directly in point; none has been cited involving a
council as here. Aside from any issue of jurisdiction depend-
ent on monetary considerations, it would be anomalous to
limit Board jurisdiction by such considerations where the
Respondent, as here, is a type of entity which is daily involved
with Board organizations engaged in commerce and indeed
800 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
which provides the very basis for the vast majority of Board
proceedings.
The Council, composed of delegates from its various locals,
acts for and on behalf of the locals. It negotiates with em-
ployer associations and employers whose employees are
members of its locals a District Council agreement which
covers 29 counties in western Pennsylvania.
To the extent of its powers, the Council does what the
locals might otherwise, perhaps less conveniently and with
less authoritativeness, do separately. For example, each of the
56 locals under the Council could hardly employ a special
representative for itself to perform the work which the two
special representatives here performed on their behalf jointly
while employed by the Council. Thus, in the words of the
recent though different AAA Electric, Inc., case,' the Council
does in fact "provide the labor for the job" of organizing and
negotiating to be performed by its locals: They are fully inte-
grated.
The Council effectively controls the organizational activi-
ties and the bargaining relationships of its locals. The engage-
ment of the latter (with employers engaged in interstate com-
merce) in and their effect on interstate commerce cannot be
gainsaid. No less can be said of the Council Although not a
party to the contracts which its special representatives negoti-
ate between its locals and employers engaged in interstate
commerce, the Council, as we shall see, undertakes to super-
vise the efforts and activities of its representatives in connec-
tion with negotiation and enforcement of such contracts.
As for the Council's formally declared power and authority
vis-a-vis its locals, its constitution and bylaws provide that it
"shall have legislative and executive powers on all matters
relating to the general interest and welfare of [its] Local
Unions and their members. The Council shall have the power
to establish uniform dues and initiation fees [of members of
its locals].... The Council shall have power to issue the quar-
terly work card." (A portion of the dues thus collected is
remitted to the International.) Further, the Council is sup-
ported by its locals, from which it receives funds on a per
capita basis. Such funds from the Council's construction lo-
cals constitute its General Fund and Organizing Fund, both
of which receive income from the initiation fees and particu-
larly the dues paid by the members of the locals. The special
representatives are paid directly out of the Organizing Fund,
which also receives loans occasionally from the General
Fund.
We were told also that many of the employers under con-
tract with the Council are themselves engaged in interstate
commerce.' The Council established working rules which
govern the members of its locals in the performance of their
duties subject to the terms of the collective-bargaining agree-
ments.
While, as declared at the trial, I have not examined gener-
ally the provisions of the constitution and laws of the Interna-
tional or the Council beyond those sections cited by counsel,
reference to the latter's section 32 as cited caused by attention
to be directed to section 31, in part on the same page I have
noted that the latter section provides that the Executive Com-
mittee of the Council shall function as the Strike Committee,
which maintains reporting records of local members on strike
or lockout and pays members who have complied with the
ruling of the District Council. Subject to the approval of the
District Council, the Strike Committee (an office of the Ex-
ecutive Committee) may adopt rules to conduct the strike or
190 NLRB No 23
In such situations, jurisdiction is exercised over some employers who
do not themselves meet the jurisdictional monetary standards As much can
and should be done here.
lockout (all of these being functions which would otherwise
be performed by the locals or the International), and the
business representatives have the further duty vis-a-vis mem-
bers of the locals to place them on other jobs during a strike
or lockout.
It would indeed be strange not to recognize as engaged in
commerce a council which, inter alia, is authorized to "de-
cide all disputes involving its affiliated Local Unions and their
members ... [and to] settle all disputes between employers
and members of the United Brotherhood ......
The extent of the Council's effect on and direct connection
with interstate commerce is clear as it serves through its
delegate members, even guides, its constituent local unions.
We would otherwise be declaring here as not sufficiently
engaged in commerce to warrant exercise of jurisdiction a
labor organization which repeatedly relies on Board assertion
of jurisdiction but which is, not itself directly engaged al-
though it is deeply involved in monetary business; that it is
to be dealt with only on the basis of the amount of dues which
its members or the members of its constituent locals pass
across state lines regardless of the Council's effect on and
connection with interstate commerce and organizations en-
gaged in such commerce; and that, where such "interstate
dues" are less than $50,000, the Council is to be absolved of
all responsibility under the Act; the very responsibility which
it constantly seeks to impose, as do the cases, on management
when the latter is not itself a labor organization.
Avoidance of such, an anomaly should not depend on the
number of members and the extent to which their dues are
transferred across state lines: Unlike employers which are not
labor organizations, the latter are themselves the immediate
beneficiaries of the stated policies of the Act to the extent that
it is "encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining ......
That by the very nature of its business the Council is served
by the Act more than are other employers is not surprising;
that it should be excluded by nonstatutory jurisdictional rules
from responsibility which attaches to other employers would
be surprising.
The practical reasons declared for adopting monetary stan-
dards with respect to organizations other than unions which
are engaged in commerce do not apply in the unusual situa-
tion here presented, and the standards can and should be
modified, if that be necessary, so that labor organizations
benefited by the Act will not escape the responsibilities which
the Act imposes. The question of jurisdiction dependent on
the amount of money which passes to and from the Council
across state lines may also be viewed in relation to jurisdiction
over labor unions acting as nonprofit organization employ-
ers.'
The Board has, and should assert, jurisdiction over the
Council. If this calls for a new decision by the Board, that
itself would not be so new. It would be not so much a change
as an extension.
I do not deem it necessary to detail fully the relationship
between the Council and the International Union as set forth
in the latter's constitution and laws which indicate the Coun-
cil's active and intimate relationship with the International
Union also. To the extent that they are before me, I have
examined them The relationship and its significance can be
readily covered in detail should there be further proceedings
and"that be deemed necessary. I also leave to others disquisi-
tions concerning dejure and de facto jurisdiction. The Board
has, more than once extended its jurisdiction as occasion ap-
peared to warrant: It can again should extension be called for.
' Office Employees International Unions, Local 11 v XL R B., 353 U S
313, 320
UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS 801
What has elsewhere been said of the relationship between
other International unions and their constituent locals can be
applied here: The Council "is an integral part of the Interna-
tional."'
If under these circumstances there still be concerns over
jurisdictional amounts so-called, it may be noted that the
Council services approximately 9,500 members, that the two
special representatives employed by the Council, Cough-
anour and Maher, have serviced 12 industrial locals of a total
of 56 locals affiliated with the Council, the 12 having a total
of approximately 1,000 members, and that local unions affi-
liated with the Council send more than $50,000 across state
lines to the headquarters of the International Union in Wash-
ington , D.C., for per capita taxes and initiation fees. The
jurisdiction and business of all 56 locals affiliated with the
Council are confined to Pennsylvania with the exception of
one local, whose jurisdiction covers two Ohio counties.
Whatever the direct monetary effect on interstate com-
merce of any disputes involving the various employers and
agreements entered into with them by the Council, labor
disputes which are connected with the work of the special
representatives who organize the employees and negotiate
and service such contracts must indeed have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. Jurisdiction over the opera-
tions of the Council' is warranted. While in Local #423
Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO,
and Laborers'International Union, 'per capita dues and pen-
sion fund fees in excess of $25,000 were transmitted from
Ohio to Washington and the respondent local conceded that
it was an employer engaged in commerce, as the Board found,
the facts in the instant case and the indicated effect on com-
merce require no such concession.
An analogy for assumption of jurisdiction may also be
argued on the basis of decisions in such cases as Grand Cen-
tral Liquors;' Barbers and Beauticians Local Union No. 635
(F. A. Buttrey Co.);' and Thriftown, Inc. 10 (It has already been
pointed out that the extended basis for asserting jurisdiction
over employers which are not unions should be applied to
unions as employers.)
The relationship in the instant case extends upward and
down: Up to the extent that the Council recognizes and is
governed by supervision of the International; down as the
Council and its special representatives act for and determine
various activities of its locals. The lower ranked whose affairs
this organizational hospodar handles are within the Board's
jurisdictional concern; so is the supreme authority in Wash-
ington . There is no logical, and there should be no adminis-
trative, obstacle to jurisdiction over the Council.
The delegates to the Council from the various local unions
are in the Council and serve it by virtue of their status as local
delegates. To the extent of its broad powers, the Council,
subject to the laws of the International, acts for and on behalf
of the local unions.
Laundry, Dry Cleaning and Dye House Workers' International Union
Local 26. 129 NLRB 1446. See also Chain Service Restaurant, Luncheonette
& Soda Fountain Employees, Local 11, 132 NLRB 960, 961.
More than one ground for this finding is here submitted since the issue
is novel, and with full realization that adoption of one may be declared to
make another reason unnecessary. Cf International Association ofMachin-
ists, Oakland Lodge No. 284 (Morton Salt Company), 190 NLRB No 32.
6 Cf. Trico Disposal Service, Inc., 191 NLRB No 17, where the Board
asserted jurisdiction on the basis of the company's $26,000 contract with the
U.S. Army for garbage disposal
179 NLRB No. 100.
155 NLRB 295, 296-298.
188 NLRB No. 44.
° 161 NLRB 603, 606-607.
The relationship between the Council and the Interna-
tional Union is further indicated by the provisions in the
latter's constitution which I have noted mea sponte and
which authorize formation of councils and provide that the
councils and their members are subject to the laws of the
International.
The authority and the status of the International have in
fact metastasized to both the local unions and the area coun-
cils. Whatever the modalities, the Council is an adjunct of,
intertwined with, and dependent for its existence on its con-
stituent locals and the International Union.
III THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Alleged Violation of Section 8(a)(5)
While the refusal-to-bargain issue depends on the existence
of a more than one-man unit and can be determined on the
basis of the legality of Maher's termination," the latter can
be evaluated only if we proceed in chronological order and
begin with the negotiations.
It was admitted and I find that, as certified by the Regional
Director on December 11, 1969, after a Board-conducted
election on December 3, 1969, the Committee is the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of all of the employees in
the following appropriate unit:
All special representatives of the Council working out of
its Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, office, excluding business
representatives, office clerical employees, janitors, coor-
dinators, auditors, and guards, professional employees
and supervisors as defined in the Act.
At the time of certification, there were two employees in the
unit, Special Representatives Maher and Coughanour.
1. Requests to bargain, meetings, and delay
Although the Council at the trial maintained its position
that there is a question concerning requests to bargain and
their significance, there can be no question concerning this in
the light of written requests stipulated to and various oral
requests made, and the meetings arranged pursuant to re-
quests and actually held. It was stipulated that bargaining
meetings were held on December 19, 1969, and thereafter on
February 2, February 10, March 10, April 3, and July 21. We
need not consider events at what is referred to as the brief first
meeting between the parties on December 19, which occurred
prior to the statutory period and which are not necessary to
shed light on the issues before us.
At the last four meetings the Council was represented by
two of its members, Zovko'2 and Blumling, who constituted
its negotiators. The Committee was represented by its two
special representative, Coughanour being its chairman. While
there was at first some question whether Blumling attended
the meeting of February 2, it appears that, as Coughanour
reliably testified, he did not.
The Council's alleged willingness to rehire or reinstate Maher, when
economic conditions permit, declared at the opening of the trial , suggests
that this is recognized to be a two-man unit, which will now be realized by
a reinstatement order if not earlier There is here greater reason for finding
that the diminution in staff was temporary than existed in Crispo Cake Cone
Company, Inc., 190 NLRB No. 60, where the indication of temporary
depletion of staff was argued by the General Counsel, not suggested by the
employer Certainly the Council has not sustained its "burden or proving
that this was not a temporary reduction but was one of a permanent na-
ture "
" This seems to be the correct spelling, as noted early in the trial and as
printed on the last page of the Council's constitution and bylaws.
802 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
With evidence quite clearly pointing the way to findings
and the conclusion that the Council refused to bargain collec-
tively with the Committee, we need not determine questions
concerning which opinions may reasonably differ, decision of
which will add little of substance and nothing to the remedy.
Thus, with testimony' which might be construed as indicating
dilatory tactics by the Council," such testimony could be
passed over as cumulative and at best unnecessary on the
principal issues of refusal to bargain, with no harm or intent
to slight counsel's feelings. But whether or not this be called
dilatory, Zovko's admitted statement to Coughanour on Oc-
tober 15, well after the last of our series of meetings, and a
day after the Committee had by letter requested further
negotiations, was an outright and unlawful refusal to negoti-
ate. Meeting with the Executive Board, Coughanour asked
Zovko for a meeting to continue negotiations. To this the
latter replied that Senge, the Council's secretary-treasurer,
had instructed him not to set up any further meetings because
the Committee had filed unfair labor practice charges with
the Board.
Nor need we pursue each proposal submitted, through its
counterproposal where there was such, negotiation if any,
and agreement or rejection. It will suffice to list several items,
which plainly indicate bad faith and refusal to bargain,
whether or not other instances of refusal to bargain could be
found.
2. Attitude
Whether parties negotiate in good faith can be judged by
their words and indicated attitude. During the February 2
meeting Zovko remarked that he did not feel that what the
two special representatives had done in going to the Board
and forming a committee was right. When they explained
why they had formed a committee and gone to the Board,
Zovko declared again that it was not right and that it only
caused dissension and problems in the Council. These re-
marks were neither a threat nor a refusal to bargain although,
standing alone,, they might explain acts or failures to act.
But they do not stand alone as the Respondent's negotia-
tors continued well beyond such early remarks. Coughanour
testified that toward the close of the March 10 meeting Zovko
told him and Maher that their action in organizing and form-
ing a committee was causing a great deal of dissension and
hard feelings among the members of the Executive Board and
the delegates to the District Council and that "they felt that
[the two] were nothing but'a couple of young punks who they
had trained and now ... were using the knowlege ... gained
against them." Although questioned and cross-examined at
considerable length, Coughanour maintained a consistent,
reasonable, and apparently credible testimony. His recollec-
tion was better than that of Zovko, who omitted details of
consequence, referred to his notes throughout, and admit-
tedly did not recall some important items. I credit Cough-
anour's testimony with respect to these remarks.
At a meeting of the Executive Committee on June 2, to
which Maher and Coughanour were summoned, apparently
in response to their written request of April 13 for a bargain-
ing meeting, one member of the Committee asked Cough-
anour why he had worded the letter so strongly. After the
letter explained that the Committee's negotiators were not
bargaining in good faith, he replied further that what the men
wanted was a negotiating team which would bargain in good
faith and work out a fair agreement. A member of the com-
" Cf the course of conduct noted in Crispo, supra We shall, shortly and
briefly note a Council summons to a meeting I % months after a mid-April
request to meet and bargain Another month and one-half later, a bargaining
session was held
mittee then remarked that Coughanour and Maher were be-
ing overpaid, and asked whether they were going to return to
the Council their overpayments. This was not only an offen-
sive remark hardly calculated to further negotiations, but it
was an indication of the Council's bad faith since it did not
in fact support any position taken by the negotiators for the
Council.
Without condoning it, one can understand such an attitude
among the Council or its Executive Committee. Here were
locally top officials, accustomed to making "demands," them-
selves faced with demands from their employees. The attitude
generally of such officials and in negotiations specifically is
tempered by their knowledge of the adversary, including his
power resources and his ability to withstand claims and to
make counterclaims. Now they were facing two lone in-
dividuals who had no economic strength and whose only
support lay in statutory requirements. Aggravating the situa-
tion was the fact that the special representatives had been
hired to represent the Council and its constituents in contests
with others; the Council was now being compelled to ward
off its own representatives.
The skills which the latter had honed on the job in the
interest of the Council, its members, and those whom it repre-
sented, were being turned against the Council. Where grati-
tude if not an element of subservience might be expected,
independence was now being asserted.
Selected and hired," indeed "made" by the Council, the
two were in fact newcomers on the scene without the power
which rests on election and the support of the respective
locals: Where background, support, and power are so impor-
tant, the special representatives, whatever their status and
regard in the eyes of employers and the employees for whom
they spoke, now lacked status.and were regarded as upstarts
or "punks."
Such an attitude on the part of the Executive Committee
of the Council and its negotiators indicated a lack of good
faith. It determined the tone of the negotiations, and it ex-
plains some acts or statements which might otherwise be
ambiguous.
Were there any doubt about the Council's unwillingness to
bargain-and there is 'none-its attitude was further dis-
closed when, in the attempt to make this a nonbargaining
unit, it terminated Maher's employment as we shall soon see.
3. Authority to negotiate
Coughanour testified that at the February 2 meeting he
asked Zovko whether the latter and Blumlmg had full power
on behalf of the Council to negotiate a contract with the
Committee, and that Zovko replied that "to the best of his
knowledge, he had this power to negotiate a contract or a
working agreement. That anything' that [he] and Blumling
agreed to at [the] negotiating sessions and they recommended
to the Executive Board of the District Council to accept,
would be accepted by the Executive Board of the District
Council. He said,that in order to be sure that he was correct,
he would have an answer [at the] next negotiating session."
Zovko told us that he did not recall whether he was asked at
that meeting if he had power to negotiate.
Coughanour further testified that at the February 10 meet-
ing he asked Zovko if he had checked to find out whether or
not he and Blumling had full power to negotiate a working
agreement; and that Zovko replied that he had such full
power, and that anything agreed ' ppon at the negotiating
sessions would be agreed upon by the Executive Committee.
,< That their position is not elective was brought out by the Respondent
UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS
Zovko testified , "I told them that our powers said that -we
could negotiate but any negotiations we had would have to
go back to the executive board for their recommendations
and then to the District Council ... This was agreeable to all
four. If we could agree on everything and then take this to
the executive board with the support of the two subcommit-
tees and its passage in the District Council executive board
and the executive board then would use its support to pass it
on to the District Council and it would come back to the
District Council executive board as a package so it wouldn't
be piece meal so they could rip it apart. Not article by arti-
cle."
Recognizably , the authority of the Council's negotiators
was a matter of great importance to the Negotiating Commit-
tee, and the question was raised early. One may also recognize
that experienced negotiators would not without objection and
discussion accept a plan under which they could not count on
any element of agreement until the "package" had been
agreed upon first by the negotiators , then by the Executive
Committee of the Council , and then by the Council , with the
possibility , if not the likelihood , of a proposal somewhere in
transit for change which would require return of the package
for agreement or modification by all of the negotiators; and
then repetition of the process of referral for approval . This is
a very intricate machinery , wholly and predictably nonpro-
ductive.
It is not to say that such procedure cannot be adopted. But
the fact that the Negotiating Committee voiced no objection
to Zovko's reply and did not thereafter mention the item
during any of the negotiation sessions itself suggests that the
reply which Zovko actually made did satisfy the Committee
and that there remained no more than the problem of per-
suading the negotiators as testified to by Coughanour, with-
out subsequent reference to and approval by the Council or
its Executive Board, whatever earlier consultation there
might be between the negotiators and their principals.
The question of the negotiators ' authority (the issue re-
maining whether they had claimed to have such authority)
arose again at the second meeting thereafter, that of April 3,
which is referred to as the fifth in the series . Coughanour
testified that when he pointed out that the Council's counter-
proposal did not include several articles which had been
agreed upon previously , "Zovko said-it didn 't make any
difference what we agreed upon here at these meetings , it still
had to be okayed by the Executive Board"; and that Zovko
denied that he had previously stated ' that what was agreed
upon at the meetings would be approved by the Executive
Committee . On the stand, Zovko did not deny this ;.it was
quite in line with his testimony concerning what he had said
in this connection at the February 10 meeting . But if he had
previously insisted on referral of a package to his principals,
as noted above, he was now truly making a mockery of the
bargaining process. Granted for the moment, without credit-
ing his testimony, that approval of a package agreement
would be necessary , to claim that any agreement on specific
articles was therefore tentative and permitted the negotiators
themselves to withdraw from such agreement would inject a
fast and loose procedure at the very first of possibly innumer-
able steps . If the package was to be presented to the Executive
Committee, Zovko reneged on what he had agreed to-and
this before presentation to the Executive Committee.
Coughanour testified that, after he had explained at the
June 2 Executive Committee meeting why he wanted the
Committee to appoint new negotiators who would negotiate
in good faith , Zovko and Blumling denied that they had said
that they had power to negotiate and needed only to make a
recommendation to the Executive Committee for its ap-
proval . It does not appear that any member of the Executive
803
Committee addressed himself to this point or in any way
indicated to Coughanour or Maher that its negotiators lacked
the authority which Coughanour told the Executive Commit-
tee that they had claimed.
My observation of the witnesses ' demeanor supports the
finding which I would make on the basis of the testimony and
inference that this question of credibility should be resolved
in favor of Coughanour . Zovko and Blumling claimed full
authority to act on behalf of the Executive Board in these
negotiations ; I find that they did not indicate any restrictions
on their authority . It is to be noted that at no time did they
state that withdrawal (considered below) from earlier de-
clared assent was due to Council unwillingness to agree. Zov-
ko's and Blumling 's agreement to and subsequent withdrawal
of several items indicates their own bad faith in negotiating,
for which the Respondent is liable.
Beyond this , were ratification required , it does not appear
that ratification was refused of terms agreed upon by the
Executive Committee 's designated and experienced negotia-
tors.15
Zovko told us that he "probably had said" at the June 2
and at an earlier Executive Committee meeting that he and
Blumling had the power to negotiate and recommend, and
would support their recommendations before the Executive
Committee for necessary approval . Were this the required
procedure , there would have been no reason for Zovko to
have "made that position clear," as he testified he did, at two
Executive Committee meetings after having allegedly so in-
formed the Negotiating Committee at one or more bargaining
sessions . Reflecting on the extent of their authority or the
performance of their duty as Council negotiators , or both, the
reports concerning the negotiations , made by Zovko and
Blumling to the Executive Committee , were rare and sparse.
We were told also that the Executive Committee was not
asked to approve or disapprove items under negotiation.
Thus, if agreement depended on approval of the Council or
its Executive Committee , as Zovko claimed , we would have
bad faith and violation in the failure to submit proposals and
to obtain counterproposals from them.
While it appears and I find that Zovko, the Council's presi-
dent, and Blumling , its auditor, were authorized by the Coun-
cil to come to terms with the special representatives' Nego-
tiating Committee , the significant point is that the former
claimed to have such authority . Even if such claim were
unwarranted and the two were acting on their own beyond
the scope of their authority , we would have a failure to bar-
gain in good faith . If, as appears, their claim of authority was
valid , the later insistence on returning for the Council's ap-
proval was dilatory, ' indicated bad faith , and constituted
refusals to consummate an agreement.
4. Proposals and counterproposals
Again without citing all of the proposals and counter-
proposals submitted , several items testified to indicate that
the Council's negotiators failed and refused to bargain in
good faith.
Not only did Zovko 's summary rejection of a seniority
clause16 further manifest the Council 's attitude in the negotia-
tions, but the stand that the Council "should have the full
power to lay off or fire, discharge , without having to answer
to anyone" effectively precluded meaningful discussion and
the possibility of negotiation: It cast a dim light on any
proposal made to the Council and indicated in advance that
" Cf Industrial Wire Products Corporation, 177 NLRB No 56.
s It maybe noted that Coughanour, who was the junior of the two special
representatives, urged a provision that layoffs follow seniority
804 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
counterproposals would have little, if any, value. This was in
line with Zovko's even earlier declaration, later repeated, that
the special representatives did not need a working agreement,
itself an undisguised attempt to evade the obligation to bar-
gain and execute an agreement.
The proposal that salaries be increased to what was com-
puted to amount to $331.20 per week for Maher, who was
then earning $248, and Coughanour, who was earning ap-
proximately $180, could properly be made; it-could as prop-
erly be rejected. But the Council's counterproposal for a re-
duction, computed to be to $168.96 and $137.28, respectively,
calls for use of the sometimes employed reference to what no
self-respecting labor organization could accept. Reference to
an ancient formula long ignored does not bolster the Coun-
cil's position.
While some requests exceeded existing provisions applica-
ble to the special representatives and, negotiated, might have
been rejected, the Negotiating Committee's proposal for va-
cations, expenses, and reports appeared to be-but a codifica-
tion or reference to what the Council's constitution and
bylaws already provided. A refusal now would again indicate
unwillingness to enter into an agreement. A different tactic
was here employed. At the February 10 meeting, Zovko de-
clared that the Council was drafting new guidelines covering
such matters for its employees, and he would try to have them
ready for the next meeting. The guidelines were not ready
when the parties met a month later; indeed on July 21 the
Council representatives stated that the guidelines were not
yet ready, and pointed out that the constitution and bylaws
of the International and the Council adequately covered ev-
erything. (With the Council's negotiators making bargaining
and agreement dependent on guidelines, the latter had not yet
been formulated at the time of the trial, a year later.) Without
dwelling on items which were characterized by mere failure
to make concessions, we have here a failure to reply to some
proposals, directly or by counterproposals, and a failure to
submit guidelines or information promised and necessary to
the negotiations. It will serve little purpose to trace each of
the other items proposed through discussion or failure to
discuss.
A different form of refusal to bargain is seen in withdrawal
of provisions on which agreement had previously been
reached. Thus on March 10 there had been at least partial
agreement with respect to probationary employees, out-of-
town expenses, and mileage rates. But at the April 3 meeting,
reminded that these items had previously been agreed upon
and were to have been included in his proposal, Zovko re-
plied, "That's tough. This is the final proposal."
As pointed out above, there is no evidence that the Coun-
cil's negotiators had submitted these matters to the Council
or that the latter had turned them down. Withdrawal of
agreement on matters previously agreed upon, as was here
done, constitutes a failure to bargain in good faith regardless
of or within Zovko's ideas of tentativeness at this and every
other stage of negotiation and approval.
Withdrawal of proposals previously submitted was itself
violative. It precluded even submission to the Executive
Committee for its approval. On the other hand, if the se-
quence was submission of counterproposals, disapproval by
the Executive Committee, and withdrawal, the original sub-
missions were irresponsible and constituted a failure and
refusal to bargain in good faith, particularly in view of the
status of the Council's negotiators and their claim of, au-
thority.
Indeed the latter displayed a complete disregard of the
bargaining process when they declared that, until they were
furnished a copy of the Negotiating Committee's constitution
and bylaws and wage structure, they would not discuss or
negotiate a provision that the "bargaining unit shall consist
of that as outlined m'the certification issued by the National
Labor Relations Board on December 11 F, - 1969." When
Zovko, as he put it, assured the Committee that the Council
would follow established procedures in connection with cer-
tain proposed benefits but would not put this in writing, he
refused to abide by the law in this respect. The short answer
to his explanation that these matters,were covered in writing
in the Council's bylaws is that the bylaws themselves can be
changed by the Council.
Accustomed to dealing with employers as the collective-
bargaining representative of their employees, the Council and
its members apparently regarded their special representatives
as guilty of lese majeste in themselves acting as collective-
bargaining representatives and seeking a contract with the
Council as their employer. Such regard or lack of it was
expressed in the reference to Maher and Coughanour as
"young punks." Not being elected officials themselves, the
two were regarded as "young punks" by those who had come
up through the ranks and were exposed to the elective pro-
cess. The picture of Zovko shouting was in no way brightened
by his recollection in tranquility that he had "a rather boom-
ing voice to start with." Reference to this by Coughanour,
who is well acquainted with Zovko's voice, suggests that this
was more than a "start" by Zovko. Whether or not he "fright-
ened" the others is irrelevant.
Nor was the alleged temerity of these "punks" lessened by
their failure to heed the uranic tones. As the witnesses tes-
tified, they spared us any implication other than that the
special representatives were hired hands in the most invidious
sense. If in the performance of their duties these are fran-
chised to negotiate, they were now being spoken to ex cathe-
dra.
Even randy language would not, be violative in these cir-
cumstances. But the deprecatory and condescending attitude,
triggered by no more than the relationship and the request to
bargain, reflect a conscious refusal to bargain in good faith.
At the first discussion of items to be negotiated, Zovko told
the Negotiating Committee, as we recall, that they did_not
need a working agreement, everything being covered by the
constitution and bylaws of the Council and the International.
This is akin to a commercial and literally nonunion employer
maintaining that employees do not need an agreement, as their
rights are covered by the corporate charter and company
rules. As for giving the Negotiating Committee a voice with
respect to layoffs, Zovko's reply that the Council should have
full power without having to answer to anyone, however
convenient that might be, displayed an atitude which is the
antithesis of that to be expected, in good-faith bargaining.
If as an employer itself, the Council found it less conven-
ient to be in the position of employers with whom it as repre-
sentative of employees, deals, this exemplifies the saw, "Do
as I say, not as I do." Not surprisingly, the Council and its
employees do not share the same attitude in, confrontation
with one another. But convenient or not, the obligation to
bargain in good faith remains. Experienced negotiators can
frequently camouflage a lack of good faith. The facts here
directly evidence a refusal to bargain.
This was not a matter of hard bargaining. Bearing in mind
the relationship among the individuals involved, their back-
ground and experience, the procedure followed and the reti-
cence suggested in arranging meetings, the attitude disclosed
and the tone which characterized such meetings, and the
now-you-have-it-now-you-don't aspect of items in issue, not
to mention personal reactions disclosed on the record, this
was not a case of hard bargaining: The Council's performance
was incondite, and these were negotiations manque. The fail-
UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS 805
ure and the refusal to bargain were willful and attributable
solely to the Council.
B. The Alleged Violation of Section 8(a)(3)
Maher was hired by the Council as a special representative
in February 1966. Starting at $166 per week, he received five
or six increases until he was being paid $248 He was notified
on December 15, 1970, that his employment would be ter-
minated as of the first of the year; he continued in the Coun-
cil's employ until January 5. Coughanour was hired in Febru-
ary 1968; -we recall that his salary had been increased to about
$180.
On September 19 Maher had filed the representation pro-
ceeding petition which led to the certification of December
11. A week later, still prior to the 10(b) period, but bearing
on the question of motivation, Senge telephoned Maher and
asked whether he had filed the petition. Maher replied in the
affirmative, and, in response to Senge's question, explained
that the special representative felt that they needed a con-
tract. Whether or not, as Maher testified but Senge denied,
Senge threatened that by the time he got through with Maher,
the latter would'be lucky to be making a minimum wage and
to have a job, the record considered to this point and below
indicates sufficiently that the movement for representation
and bargaining displeased- and disturbed the Council.
Although at the trial the Council explained that Maher had
been laid off, and expressed a willingness to "rehire or rein-
state" him when economic conditions permit, it did not con-
sider that he would be on temporary layoff with the expecta-
tion of return when, in connection with the refusal-to-bargain
issue, reference was made to this becoming a one-man unit.
Certainly, as we shall now see, there was no evidence on
December 15 of any intention to reemploy Maher: The tes-
timony pro and con relates to the reasons why he was "ter-
minated."
Maher testified that on December 15, when he asked why
he was being terminated, Senge told him that it was because
of his general attitude and for lack of information in his
reports. According to Coughanour, when he asked, after be-
ing summoned to appear before the Executive Committee on
that day, why Maher had been terminated, Senge replied that
it was because of his general attitude. (Coughanour testified
that Zovko and Blumling several times at the negotiating
meetings referred to his own and Maher's "general attitude.")
Testifying that he told Maher that his services would be
terminated, Senge was asked to "tell us what were the reasons
assigned for that termination." He then undertook to detail
on the record the economic need, and went on to explain the
selection of Maher. There is no evidence in the testimony of
these three witnesses that Maher or Coughanour was told of
an economic need to halve the staff.
With respect to the matter of economic need, Maher was
allegedly discharged because of the parlous state of the Coun-
cil's Organizing Fund, out of which the special representa-
tives are paid. But the history and practice of contributions
to the Fund by the local unions, the fluctuating deficit in the
Fund, and payments (so-called "adjustments") out of and
back to the Council's General Fund, indicate a ready maneu-
verability and manipulation of the various accounts to, the
point where figures could be employed to prove anything, and
therefore nothing." Senge admitted that at various times in
" Aside from the fact that there was no clear proof of any such unusual
economic situation in December 1970 as to warrant Maher's discharge, It
appears that the situation deteriorated thereafter and was worse at the time
of trial There was no explanation for this even though only one special
representative was now on the payroll; nor any suggestion of further steps
to be taken to rehabilitate the Fund.
the past the Organizing Fund had been the beneficiary of gifts
and loans from the International to the Council.
Deficits and loans appear to have been much larger in the
middle of the last decade; for the fiscal year 1969 the Interna-
tional contributed $3,000 to the Organizing Fund. If signifi-
cance can be found in the figures submitted under arrange-
ments which include several variable and fluctuating factors,
one could point to the fact that the small loss in the Organiz-
ing Fund in fiscal 1970 was less than 20 percent of that for
fiscal 1969. The latter had not prompted any discharge.
I have also noted that adjustment was made by the Organ-
izing Fund to the Council's General Fund in the amount of
more than $7,000 in December 1970, when Maher was
notified of his discharge: Senge told us that such adjustments
or repayments are made when the Organizing Fund can
afford it. Finally in this connection, it was stipulated that the
special representatives' salaries paid. out of the Organizing
Fund in fiscal 1969 were approximately twice the total for
fiscal 1968; and that the 1969 total was cut by approximately
one-third in fiscal 1970. It has not been shown that, after the
latter marked reduction, there was less opportunity and need
for such services or less ability to pay for them.
Beyond this, we should not overlook the Council's power
to set in motion a special assessment to augment its funds. If
there be no certainty that this would have been permitted,
neither is there any explanation for failure to seek it. For that
matter, of the various "adjustments" between the Council
and its Organizing Fund, we have no adequate explanation
for additional payments into and out of the latter or any
reason why such or similar payments were not available for
continued payment of the salaries of the two special repre-
sentatives. Discriminatory motive having been established,
and with the power and settled practice to augment the Or-
ganizing Fund, the Council may not, without explanation or
reason for departure from that practice, rely on its refusal to
continue it as justification for discharge.
While the testimony noted to this point warrants an infer-
ence that Maher was not discharged for economic or any
other 'valid reasons, the Council's motive was directly and
reliably explained by Miller, a longtime local official and
member of the Council's Executive Committee, whose rela-
tionship with the Executive Committee as a whole has been
poor since at least the middle of 1970. He testified that at an
Executive Committee meeting on September `22, 1969, a
Board notice that the representation petition had been filed
was read; that "there was discussion of the possibility of first
of all alienating one of the two" special representatives; that
one of the items discussed was the fact that it might be easier
to "get rid of Coughanour because he had been caught
sleeping in his car and had been accused of having been drunk
(this would'suggest Maher's relatively greater desirability),
and that another was that it might be possible to get one of
the two special representatives to "go along with the' Coun-
cil's position." Senge allegedly pointed out that if one of the
two were eliminated, this would become a one-man unit peti-
tion and that an election would therefore not be held.
Even if Miller were biased because of his apparent es-
trangement from the Council, his testimony concerning what
was said at the Council meeting stands uncontradicted. The
issue here is not whether Coughanour had in fact been drunk
and could lawfully be discharged. Our concern is with the
fact that, whether or not he had been, this was considered, not
to discharge him (Maher, not Coughanour, was later ter-
minated), but as an excuse for reducing the unit to avoid
bargaining.
Having considered the Council's negotiators' attitude dur-
ing thebargaining sessions, we can understand Senge's decla-
ration to Coughanour on December 15 that Maher had been
806 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
terminated because of his "general attitude." There is no
credible evidence that Maher shirked his work, lacked inter-
est, or was otherwise guilty of an attitude which warranted
his termination. (We shall soon consider the testimony in this
respect.) We recall that the defense is one of economic need.
But immediately after the discharge and before a better rea-
son was thought of and claimed, Senge cited Maher's atti-
tude.
Viewed in the light of the Council's attitude, Maher's
would appear undesirable. But to judge and discharge him in
that light would be improper and unlawful. Although that
reason was not relied on as a defense, the statement thereof
by Senge indicates the Council's motive in terminating
Maher.
Its defense being economic need, the Respondent under-
took to explain why it selected Maher for discharge rather
than Coughanour. In declaring that Maher had a bad attitude
and failed to carry out instructions, Senge first cited the situa-
tion at a plant where employees had charged Coughanour
with being drunk. Senge referred to a contract, which was in
fact approved, and to Maher's failure to have a steward rein-
stated, the Board later finding that there was no case there.
Asked by Respondent's counsel for "any other specific
situation," Senge stated a second reason for selecting Maher
for discharge: "We thought that A] Coughanour was more
qualified and could do a better job"-this despite and without
reference to what had been testified to concerning Cough-
anour being asleep and drunk.
Recalled to the stand, Senge found "something additional
to say" in this connection: He charged that in the middle of
1969 (1% years before Maher's discharge) Maher had failed
to direct properly the organization and meetings of em-
ployees at another plant. Aside from the staleness of this item,
Maher testified that he had explained the matter and was
never criticized for his work there. Senge added that in May
1969 DeSio, another Council employee, himself thereafter
discharged, had declared his dissatisfaction with Maher.
Were these alleged defenses as serious as was suggested,
both special representatives could have been discharged law-
fully, and indeed, according to Senge, the Executive Commit-
tee had in September 1969 discussed possible discharge of
Maher or Coughanour; but no action was at the time taken
against either. It is to be noted that these references to Cough-
anour's and Maher's alleged shortcomings are in marked
contrast to the uncontradicted testimony that, at an Execu-
tive Committee meeting 2 months before Maher was in-
formed of his termination, both were told that there were no
complaints with regard to their work.
The explanation for the selection of Maher for discharge
was no more persuasive or credible than the testimony con-
cerning economic need to reduce the staff. I find and conclude
that Maher's discharge was discriminatory and unlawful.
C. The Alleged Violation of Section 8(a)(4)
The Board at various times, in cases which need not here
be cited, has indicated the necessity for continuing to a
finding of violation of Section 8(a)(4) in addition to a finding
of 8(a)(3) violation. Conversely, it has declared an 8(a)(4)
finding unnecessary where 8(a)(3) has been found." Whether
as it has recently said in another connection, "Board prece-
dent on the issue is something less than a model of clarity,""
is not for me to say.
" Similarly, the Board has variously declared an 8(a)(3) finding to be
necessary or unnecessary after violation of Section 8(a)(4) has been found.
11 Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co., 190 NLRB No. 116.
The discrimination found because of Maher's protected
concerted activities generally is no less such because his ter-
mination followed the filing of the unfair labor practice
charge in 6-CA-5078. Further, the inference may fairly be
drawn that, antagonized by Maher's other concerted activi-
ties, the Council was increasingly outraged by his cling of the
charge against it. I find and conclude20 that the Council was
also moved to discharge Maher by his filing of that charge,
and that it therefore violated Section 8(a)(4) of the Act.
D. The Alleged Independent Violation of Section 8(a)(1)
Coughanour testified and Senge admitted that in the latter
part of January 1970 Coughanour told Senge that employee
DeSio (whether he was a special representative or as the
Council claims, an office clerical, need not concern us), who
had been discharged the previous September and to whose
presence in the negotiations the Council had objected, would
not participate in the negotiations; and that Senge had replied
that he would not arrange any bargaining meetings until
refusal-to-bargain charges theretofore filed (and thereafter
withdrawn) were withdrawn. Senge's explanation that DeSio
"was not authorized by law to negotiate a contract" did not
justify the imposition of the condition to bargaining and, as
alleged, violated Section 8(a)(1). Related to this but not al-
leged, is a statement attributed to Zovko that if Maher and
Coughanour forgot the action taken in filing that early
charge, the Council would take care of them. It may be noted
that that charge had been withdrawn that morning.
It stands uncontradicted that, as Coughanour testified, he
asked Zovko on February 10 whether DeSio was still on leave
of absence and that Zovko replied that, because of DeSio's
attitude and his involvement with the Negotiating Commit-
tee, he would not work for the Council as long as Zovko was
its president. I credit Coughanour's testimony, although
Zovko denied this, that at that time Zovko also told Cough-
anour that DeSio's expense bill, which had not been paid,
would have been paid had DeSio not gotten involved with the
Negotiating Committee. Both of these statements by Zovko
were violative of Section 8(a)(1).
The findings already made make it unnecessary to deter-
mine the question of credibility involved in Senge's denial of
Maher's testimony that on October 14, 1970, Senge told him
that there would be no further negotiations and there proba-
bly would never be a contract.
I find it unnecessary to "construe" as a threat of discharge
the statement that the Council might no longer augment the
Organizing Fund. If there be evidence of additional interfer-
ence I have not rejected it: My attention has not been directed
to it and I have not passed on it.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
'0 This is with full realization that I face the alternative risks that a finding
of violation of Section 8(a)(4) will be declared unnecessary , or that omission
of such a finding will be met by a declaration "contrary to the Trial Exam-
iner" that the "discharge [sic] ... was also moved by considerations in con-
flict with Section 8(a)(4) and (1) of the Act." Sinclair Glass Company, 188
NLRB No. 33.
UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS 807
ORDER21
Respondent, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Join-
ers of America, Carpenters District Council of Western
Pennsylvania, AFL-CIO, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, its offic-
ers, agents, and representatives, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in Negotiating Committee
for Special Representatives or in any other labor organiza-
tion, by discriminatorily terminating the employment of any
of its employees or discriminating in any other manner in
respect to their hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment because of their activities on behalf
of any labor organization or because they had given tes-
timony under the Act.
(b) Refusing to bargain collectively with Negotiating Com-
mittee for Special Representatives as the exclusive representa-
tive of all of its employees in the appropriate unit, with re-
spect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment.
(c) Informing employees that Respondent would not
negotiate a contract with the Negotiating Committee unless
and until the latter withdrew unfair labor practice charges
against the Respondent; that a fellow employee was ter-
minated because of his union activities; and that a fellow
employee would not receive reimbursement for expenses in-
curred, because of his union activities.
(d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary
to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to William J. Maher, Jr., immediate and full
reinstatement to his former position or, if that position no
longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without
prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges, and
make him whole for any loss of pay sustained by reason of
the discrimination against him, with interest to be computed
in the customary manner;22 and notify him if he is presently
serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of his right
to full reinstatement upon proper application after discharge
from the Armed Forces.
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll
records, social security payment records, timecards, person-
nel records and reports, and all other records to facilitate the
checking of the amount of backpay due.
(c) Upon request, bargain collectively with Negotiating
Committee for Special Representatives as the exclusive repre-
sentative of the employees in the appropriate unit, and em-
body in a signed agreement any understanding reached.
(d) Post at its offices and meeting halls copies of the at-
tached notice marked "Appendix."23 Copies of said notice, on
11 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in
Section 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall
be deemed waived for all purposes.
11 The Chase National Bank of the City of New York, San Juan, Puerto
Rico Branch, 65 NLRB 827; Crossett Lumber Company, 8 NLRB 440,
Republic Steel Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 311 U.S 7; F. W Woolworth Com-
pany, 90 NLRB 289, 291-294; Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB
716.
11 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "POSTED
BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD"
shall be changed to read "POSTED PURSUANT TO A JUDGMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING AN OR-
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 6, shall
be posted by the Respondent, after being duly signed by its
representative, immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in con-
spicuous places, including all places where notices to the
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Council to insure that- said notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 6, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Decision,
what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.24
DER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD."-The lan-
guage in the notice is "simple" [the employees and the employer are not]
and readily understandable Cf. Harry F Berggren & Sons, Inc, 165 NLRB
353
1' In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board
after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read:
"Notify the Regional Director for Region 6, in writing, within 20 days from
the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Negotiating
Committee for Special Representatives or in any other
labor organization, by discriminatorily terminating the
employment of any of its employees or discriminating in
any other manner in respect to their hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment
because of their activities on behalf of any labor organi-
zation or because they had given testimony under the
Act.
WE WILL NOT inform employees that we will not
negotiate a contract with the Negotiating Committee for
Special Representatives unless and until the latter with-
draws unfair labor practice charges against us; that a
fellow employee was terminated because of his union
activities; or that a fellow employee will not receive reim-
bursement for expenses incurred, because of his union
activities.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their
right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to
join or assist Negotiating Committee for Special Repre-
sentatives, or any other labor organization, and to en-
gage in other concerted activities for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or
to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the
extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condi-
tion of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of
the Act.
WE WILL offer to William J. Maher, Jr, immediate
and full reinstatement to his former position or, if that
position no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent
position, without prejudice to his seniority or other
rights and privileges, and make him whole for any loss
of pay suffered as a result of the discrimination against
him.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain with Negotiating
Committee for Special Representatives as the exclusive
representative of all employees in the bargaining unit
described herein with respect to rates of pay, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment, and
808 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
embody in a signed agreement any understanding Dated By
reached. The bargaining unit is:
All Special Representatives working out of our
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, office, excluding business
representatives, office clerical employees, janitors,
coordinators, auditors, and guards, professional
employees and supervisors as defined, in the Act.
All our employees are free to become or remain, or refrain
from becoming or remaining, members of Negotiating Com-
mittee for Special Representatives or any other labor organi-
zation , except to the extent that such right may be affected
by an agreement requiring membership as a condition of
employment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF
CARPENTERS AND JOINERS
OF AMERICA, CARPENTERS
DISTRICT COUNCIL OF
WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA,
AFL-CIO
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
We will notify immediately the above-named individual, if
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States,
of the right to full reinstatement, upon application after dis-
charge from the Armed Forces, in accordance with the Selec-
tive Service Act and the Universal Military Training and
Service Act.
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by any-
one.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 1536
Federal Building, 1000 Liberty Avenue, Pittsburgh, Pennsyl-
vania 15222, Telephone 412-644-2977.