United Association of Journeymen

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 21, 1950

90 N.L.R.B. 500 (N.L.R.B. 1950)

In the Matter of UNITED ASSOCIATION OF JOURNEYMEN AND APPREN-
TICES OF THE PLUMBING AND PIPE FITTING INDUSTRY OF THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA, PLUMBERS AND STEAMFITTERS UNION, LOCAL
498, A. F. OF L., AND ROBERT HADAWAY, BUSINESS AGENT, RESPOND-
ENTS and PETTUS-BANISTER COMPANY
Case No. 10-CC-16.-Decided June 21, 1950
DECISION AND ORDER
On March 23, 1949, Trial Examiner Maurice M. Miller issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondents had engaged in certain unfair labor practices in viola-
tion of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended, and recommending that they cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the
Intermediate Report attached hereto.'
Thereafter, the Respondents filed exceptions to the Intermediate
Report and a supporting brief. The Respondents requested oral argu-
ment which is hereby denied, as the record and brief, in our opinion,
adequately present the issues and positions of the parties.
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudical error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in
the case. We find merit in the Respondents' contention that the
business operations involved herein are essentially local in character
and the Board should exercise its discretion to decline jurisdiction.
In our opinion, the commerce facts, as fully set forth in the Inter-
mediate Report, do not warrant the assertion of jurisdiction. While
the operations of Pettus-Banister Company and its subcontractors are
not unrelated to commerce, they are essentially local in character, and
their interruption by a labor dispute could, at most, have only a very
1 On March 3 , 1950, the Trial Examiner issued a Supplemental Intermediate Report
which dealt solely with the merits of the alleged unfair labor practices . In view of our
disposition of this proceeding , the matters relating to the Supplemental Intermediate Report
and the exceptions filed thereto are not material.
90 NLRB No. 80.
500
UNITED ASSOCIATION OF JOURNEYMEN AND APPRENTICES, ETC. 501
remote and insubstantial effect on commerce.2 Accordingly, we find
that it will not effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction
in the instant proceeding, and we shall therefore dismiss the complaint.
ORDER
Uuon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint herein against the
Respondents, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of
the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and
Canada, Plumbers and Steamfitters Union, Local 498, A. F. of L., and
Robert Hadaway, Business Agent, be, and it hereby is, dismissed.
MEMBER STYLES took no part in the consideration of the above De-
cision and Order.
MEMBER REYNOLDS, dissenting :
For the reasons expressed in my dissent in the Chwrclies case,3 I
would assert jurisdiction in this case.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
Mr. Gilbert Cohen, for the General Counsel.
Messrs. George C. Hawkins, of Gadsden, Ala., and O'Donoghue, Dunn, Mills
and Walsh, of Washington, D. C., of counsel for the Respondent.
Mr. John W. Vardaman, of Anniston, Ala., for the Pettus-Banister Company.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge and amended charges duly filed by the Pettus-Banister
Company, a partnership, designated herein as the Company, the General Counsel
of the National Labor Relations Board,' in the name of the Board, caused the
Acting Regional Director of the Tenth Region, at Atlanta, Georgia, to issue
a complaint, on the 12th day of November, 1948, against the United Association
of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of
the United States and Canada, Plumbers and Steamfitters Union, Local 498,
A. F. of L., and Robert Hadaway, its business agent, herein called the Respond-
ent Union and Hadaway, respectively, and designated collectively as the Re-
spondents, which alleged that the Respondents did engage and have continued
to engage in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 8 (b) subsection (4) (A) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National
Labor Relations. Act, 49 Stat. 449, as amended, and reenacted in the Labor
2 Denver Building and Construction Trades Council and B. W. Fellers , Inc., 88 NLRB
1321; Denver Building and Construction Trades Council and William G. Churches , et at.,
90 NLRB 378.
.2 See footnote 2, supra.
' The General Counsel and his representative are designated herein as the General
Counsel , and the National Labor Relations Board as the Board.
502 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Management Relations Act of 1 .947, 61 Stat . 136, designated herein as the Act.
Copies of the amended charge, the complaint and a notice of hearing were duly
served upon the Respondents and the Company.
With respect to the unfair labor practices , the complaint alleged , in substance,
that the Respondents , on or about September 20, 1948, and thereafter , in viola-
tion of Section 8 (b) subsection ( 4) (A) of the Act : ( 1) Called or engaged in a
strike or concerted refusal in the course of their employment to perform certain
services ; and (2 ) induced and encouraged the employees of the Pettus -Banister
Company and the Thrasher Electric Company, herein called Thrasher-"by
orders, threats , picketing , directions and instructions and by permitting such to
remain in existence and effect" to engage in a strike or concerted refusal in
the course of their employment to perform certain services , an object thereof
being to force or require the Company , as an employer , to cease doing business
with the Collins Heating and Plumbing Company, designated herein as Collins.
Thereafter, on November 26, 1948, the Respondents filed a joint and several
answer , in which they denied the sufficiency of the complaint to establish the
activity of the Company in a business which substantially affected interstate
commerce , and went on to deny any characterization of the Respondent Union
as a labor organization subject to the Act. The Respondents contended, in
language equivalent to a demurrer , that the complaint was insufficient to show
a violation of Section 8 (b) subsection (4) (A) of the Act, or to state a claim
on which relief could be granted ; they went on to deny, however , in language
equivalent to that of the general issue, that they are now engaged in a strike or
concerted refusal in the course of their employment to perform any services,
or that they are now-"by ordbrs , threats, picketing , directions or instructions"-
inducing or encouraging the employees of the Company and the Thrasher Electric
Company to engage in a strike or concerted refusal in the course of their employ-
ment to perform certain services , for the purpose mentioned in the complaint,
in violation of Section 8 (b) subsection ( 4) (A) of the Act.
Pursuant to notice , a hearing was held at Anniston , Alabama, on November
30 and December 1, 1948, before the undersigned , Maurice M . Miller, the Trial
Examiner , duly designated by the Chief Trial Examiner . The General Counsel,
the Respondents , and the Company were each represented by counsel .2 All of
the parties were afforded a full opportunity to participate in the case, to be
heard, to examine and cross -examine witnesses , and to introduce evidence
pertinent to the issues.
At the outset of the case , on behalf of the General Counsel, a motion was made
for the issuance of a recommended order on the basis of the complaint and the
answer; it was contended that the failure of the Respondents to deny any
course of conduct in the past, violative of the Act, amounted to an admission
with respect to such past conduct, sufficient to warrant the order . The motion
was denied . Several objections with respect to the relevancy and materiality of
certain evidence offered by the General Counsel's representative were subse-
quently overruled by the undersigned . Oral argument was heard at the close
of the case , and forms a part of the record. A memorandum brief has been
received from the General Counsel, and a further brief from counsel for the
Respondents.
2 Mr. Vardaman , the Company 's counsel , excused himself in the midst of the General
Counsel's presentation , with the consent of the other parties, indicating only that he
wished the record to show his concurrence in the stipulations made or to be made, by the
representative of the General Counsel.
UNITED ASSOCIATION OF JOURNEYMEN AND APPRENTICES, ETC. 503
FINDINGS OF FACT
Upon the entire record in the case, and upon his observation of the witnesses,
the undersigned makes the following findings of fact: 3
I. TIIE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
Marcus R. Pettus and Grady H. Banister, general building contractors,
doing business as a partnership in the name of the Pettus-Banister Company,
maintain their principal office and place of business in Anniston, Alabama. The
partnership came into existence -on February 6, 1947; and it has been active
without interruption, since that date.
In the course of its business, the Company has received a gross income of
$236,471.02 for work performed. This figure, upon the record, includes the
compensation received by the Company for two construction projects, under-
taken locally, for enterprises engaged in interstate commerce. One project,
undertaken for the Peerless Pipe Company, a manufacturer of soil pipe, in-
volved compensation of $22,134.45; the other, which involved a contract in
the sum of $4,500, was performed for the J. 1. Case Company, a manufacturer
of agricultural machinery. The other sources of company income do not appear
in the record.
Between the date of its organization and the date of the hearing in the instant
case, the Company purchased services and materials in the amount of $130,-
683.93.4 Of this amount $4,470.89 relate to purchases made directly in inter-
state commerce.' At various times in 1947 and 1948, also, the Company secured
a number of contract bonds and various forms of insurance from insurance and
guaranty companies, with home offices outside of the State, doing business in
Alabama.' The purchases involved $4,693.53 in premium payments ; remittances
were made in every case to one of two local insurance agents, each of whom re-
mitted the payments made to the companies which had contracted to assume the
risk.
Building materials, equipment, and supplies, of the type already noted, were
purchased by the Company from a number of suppliers doing business in the
State. Fourteen of these are noted in the record. Their shipments to the
Company account for $35,418.09 worth of its total purchases ; of this amount,
3 Except as noted, the findings of fact herein are based upon testimony which is not in
dispute. The minor variations which mark the record are attributable , in the opinion of
the undersigned , to differences in observation or recollection , or incompleteness of narration
on the part of the witnesses . Conflicts with respect to immaterial matters , therefore, have
been ignored.
" The materials purchased include woodworking machinery , paint and painting supplies,
contractors tools and equipment , blackboards , nails, screen wire and general building
hardware , glass, tires, gasoline , grease and oil, millwork , tile, reinforcing steel , hand tools,
and miscellaneous building materials and supplies . The purchases of the Company as
shown , however , include , additionally , the amount remitted to subcontractors for the labor
and materials involved in their performance of contracts with the Company.
5 The figure cited appears in the record ; detailed figures , however, reveal the amount of
direct interstate purchases to be $4 , 490.05. The Company purchased materials and service
from 11 firms which maintain their principal office or place of business outside of
Alabama. With respect to 5 of these , the record indicates that shipments were made
to the Company , or that services were performed for it , at various points in the State; it is
clear , however, in every case , that the payments were made by the Company to the out-of-
State office of the firms involved.
The insurance purchases included workmen's compensation insurance, builders' risk,
liability and property damage, fire , and contractors ' liability insurance.
504 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
approximately $21,200 was spent for materials, equipment and supplies pur-
chased by the suppliers, as a part of their stock in trade, outside of the State.
The amount expended by the Company in payments to subcontractors, for
labor and materials, approximated' $31,000; this figure involves a summary,
by the undersigned, of detailed figures given with respect to five subcontractors.
A breakdown, with respect to three of them, indicates actual payments by the
Company of $9,107.06 for labor and $15,076.82 for materials ; of the latter
amount, approximately $13,500 was estimated to cover the amount of the
materials purchased by the subcontractors outside of Alabama. The evidence
with respect to the other subcontractors involves an estimate as to the total
value of the labor and materials furnished and to be furnished, by each, on
work in progress at the time of the hearing; a division of the figures is not
feasible, therefore, on the basis of the record. It is indicated, however, that
25 percent, approximately, of the materials furnished and to be furnished by
one of them came from a source or sources outside of the State, and that 85
percent of the materials provided and to be provided by the other were pur-
chased, in similar fashion, at points outside of Alabama.
Figures with respect to the amount of the purchases and total sales income
of each material supplier and subcontractor with which the Company deals are
available-together with an estimate, as to each, in regard to the extent of its
involvement in commerce. No useful purpose would be served by a detailed
review, in this Report, of the evidence in this respect. It is sufficient to note
that one of the insurance agencies with which the Company deals remitted all of
the net premiums it received to companies which maintain home offices outside
of the State, and that the other insurance agency to which reference has been
made remitted 99 percent of the net premiums it received to companies similarly
situated ; that each of the subcontractors utilized by the Company purchased
materials outside of the State in a different proportion, ranging from 25 percent of
its total purchases, in the case of the Alabama Roofing and Sheet Metal Company,
to 99 percent of its total purchases, in the case of Thrasher ; ' that each of the
material suppliers, in similar fashion, purchased a substantial part of their
materials, equipment, and supplies outside of the State, ranging from 100 percent
of the total purchased, in two cases, to 6 percent of the total purchased, in
another; and that the total sales of each supplier, with two exceptions, involved
some out-of-State sales income, amounting to 5 percent in several cases and rang-
ing up to 61 percent in the case of other suppliers.
At the time of the events with which this case is concerned, the Company
was engaged in two construction projects involving a Salvation Army Citadel,
herein to be called the Salvation Army job, or the Citadel, for which the general
contract had been awarded in the latter part of August 1945, and a church,
to be designated as the Pine Avenue Baptist Church, on which construction had
begun in the latter part of duly. The contract price of the Company for the
construction of the Pine Avenue Baptist Church was $52,123 ; . the expenses of
the Company in connection with it, from the date on which construction began
to the 24th of November, amounted to $41,433.65 for direct labor, direct materials,
subcontractors' fees, and overhead. The evidence with respect to the Salvation
Army job establishes the total cost of the project as $35,913; at the hearing,
it was testified that the expenses of the Company,in connection with it "up to
7 Henry L. Beckman and Company, of Birmingham, Alabama, a dealer in tile and other
types of flooring, appears to be the only subcontractor which derived any portion of its
income from sales or other activity outside of the State; 5 percent of its income, approxi-
mately, was earned outside of Alabama.
UNITED ASSOCIATION OF JOURNEYMEN AND APPRENTICES) ETC. 505
date" had amounted to $29,255.59, similarly divided. The Company employed
8between 40 and 47 laborers and craftsmen, directly, in connection with both jobs;
and the men were shifted from one to another, as needed, to expedite the work.
Six subcontractors were utilized, also, in connection with various specialized
aspects of the work at each project. Thrasher, in particular, was utilized, at
both projects, for the electrical work; Collins, under circumstances noted else-
where in this Report, was engaged to install the plumbing and heating equipment.'
With respect to Collins, the record reveals that his total business with the Com-
pany "to date" has involved it in the expenditure of $9,007.23 for labor and mate-
rials"' Of this sum, $2,055.15 was spent for labor, and $6,922.08 was involved in
the expenditure of the Company for materials. In 1947, the only year for which
figures are available, the total purchases of Collins amounted to $19,991.59; of
this amount, 85 percent came directly from outside of the State. The income of
the firm amounted to $42,183.46; all of the work involved, however, was done
within the State of Alabama.
Construction activity, in general, accounts for a substantial part of the total
business of the country. The value of all construction in the United States,
during 1946, was $15,667,000,000; new construction accounted for $10,007,000,000
of the indicated total31 In 1946, more workers were employed directly in the
construction industry than in mining, or railroad transportation, or iron and steel
manufacture.
. Available statistical information, for 1945 and 1946, establishes-with respect
to such primary construction materials as lumber, copper, lead and iron ore-
that the principal sources of raw material for the construction industry are
located in States which account for a minor part of our total construction activity.
Conversely, it is clear that the greatest amount of construction activity is to be
found in States which produce a minor part of the materials used, or none at al112
The figures establish, by the disproportionate relationship they show between the
volume of raw materials production and the volume of construction activity,
across the country, the undoubted movement of these materials in commerce.
The ramifications of the construction industry then, substantially affect the
railroad industry and many types of productive activity ; since firms engaged,
directly, in construction clearly constitute a principal, if not the principal, market
for the products of our mining industry, lumber, the cultural and extractive
industries, and the various manufacturing industries devoted to the processing
and fabrication of building materials.
8 The group included carpenters and carpenters' helpers, brick masons and brick masons'
helpers, a mortar mixer, roofers, cement finishers, plasterers, • steelworkers, and truck
drivers.
° The other subcontractors included the S. L. Collins Painting and Decorating Company,
the Alabama Roofing and Sheet Metal Company-their business names being self-explana-
tory--Henry L. Beckman and Company for the installation of tile floors, and R. L. Perkins
and Company for the installation of completed millwork.
30 The figures include a total expenditure of $2,861.69 on the Pine Avenue Baptist
Church, for labor and materials supplied by Collins, and a total expenditure of $2,557.60
in connection with the construction of the Salvation Army Citadel, up to the date of the
hearing.
11 The undersigned notes, officially, that new private construction in 1946 was valued
at $7,856,000,000 ; of this amount $72,000,000 was involved in the construction of reli-
gious edifices, $121,000,000 was devoted to construction for social and recreational pur-
poses, and $85,000,000 was devoted to construction work for hospitals and institutions.
Construction and Construction Materials, Industry Report ; Statistical Supplement , Dollar
Construction Estimates , 1915-1946; United States Department of Commerce , May 1947.
12 Alabama , the State in which the Company operates , produces no lead or copper.
506 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In short, it may be said, most aptly, that the "web of commerce" involved in
the industry covers the country, and that it affects, directly or indirectly, a sub-
stantial part of the national economy.
In this web of commerce the Company has its place. As a buyer of material
and employer of labor, and as a "broker" engaged in the integration of that labor
and material on particular construction projects, the Company serves, essentially,
as a "funnel" through which materials moving widely in the stream of interstate
commerce are directed to the points at which construction is under way. And
thus, although it may be true as the Respondents contend that the direct pur-
chases of the Company outside of the State represent but a small part of its
total purchases, that fact is not decisive of the issue. The business of the Com-
pany, whether considered in its totality or merely in the light of its relationship
to the construction directly affected by the conduct challenged in this case,
clearly involves a "network of commercial relationships" on the part of the
Company. These relationships, in turn, are necessarily dependent, as the Re-
spondents concede, upon other business relationships, noted, between subcontrac-
tors and suppliers of the Company and their sources of supply, which directly
involve or affect commerce-and the undersigned so finds.
The Respondents argue that the Company is engaged in commerce to a "de
naiiaimis" extent only, and that its operations are essentially "local" in nature ;
it is contended, therefore, that the unfair labor practices alleged did not "affect"
interstate commerce within the meaning of the Act, and alternatively that they
affected it so indirectly and insubstantially as to preclude the application of the
statute to the conduct now in question.
The undersigned finds no merit in these contentions. The test of the Act's
application is not to be confined, as the Respondents contend, to a determination
of whether or not a specific course of conduct, at the point of construction,
affected, or could reasonably be expected to affect or burden, commerce. It is,
rather, to be found in our answer to the broad question of whether aivy interrup-
tion of the Company's operations, by industrial strife, would or could impede or
disrupt the free flow of goods in the normal channels of interstate commerce's
Congress is clearly entitled to take "reasonable preventive measures" in the face
of conduct likely to affect commerce.
The reliance of the Respondents on.the cases which have held certain types of
concerted activity in the construction industry not subject to the sanctions of
the Sherman Act," is misplaced here. The Sherman Act does not proscribe
restraints "affecting" commerce ; and whatever the requirements of that act
may be with respect to proof of a "direct ; substantial and intentional interfer-
ence" with interstate commerce, they have no application in the context of this
case.16 It is too well settled, now , to require more than simple statement that:
13 N. L. R . B. Y. Jones d Laughlin Steel Corp ., 301 U. S. 1, 41-42.
14 Industrial Association of San Francisco , et at . v. United States, 268 U. S. 64 ; Levering
d Garrigues Co., et at . v. Morris, at at ., 289 U. S. 103.
11 The Respondents also argue that Congress , by its adoption of the jurisdictional lan-
guage of the original Act, evinced its approval of the decisional rule, adopted under that
Act, by which the Board refrained from the assertion of jurisdiction over the construction
industry . This contention is sufficiently answered , however , by the observation that the
legislative history of the statute , as amended , contains a number of references to the
expected impact of the Act on "unfair labor practices" in this field. See the statements
of Representative Hartley , 93 Cong. Rec. 3534 ; Senator Ellender , 93 Cong. Rec. 4255 ;
Representative Robison , 93 Cong. Rec . 7506 ; Senator Ball , 93 Cong. Rec . 5040, 5143
Senator Lucas , 93 Cong. Rec. 3329-30; and Senate Report No . 105 (80th Congress, First
Session ) p. 22. In any event , it- is clear that the refusal of the Board to assert jurisdic-
tion over the construction industry before the amendment of the Act does not estop It
UNITED ASSOCIATION OF JOURNEYMEN AND APPRENTICES, ETC. 507
An employer may be subject to the National Labor Relations Act although
not himself engaged in commerce. The end sought in the enactment of the
statute was the prevention of the disturbance to interstate commerce conse-
quent upon strikes and labor disputes induced or likely to be induced because
of unfair labor practices named in the Act'0
The effect of unfair labor practices on commerce "is not to be determined by
confining judgment to the quantitative effect of the activities immediately before
the Board. Appropriate for judgment is the fact that the immediate situation
is representative of many others . . . the total incidence of which, if left
unchecked, may well become far reaching in its harm to commerce."' Even
under the Sherman Act, it is now clear that the power of Congress to insulate
interstate commerce against harmful encroachment may be exercised in par-
ticular cases without a showing that the "encroachment" had a specific effect
upon such commerce-if it is established that the activity subjected to challenge
is of such a character that, when multiplied into a general practice, it could
reasonably be expected to exert an adverse effect upon the interstate economy
that would call for preventive regulation.'e
The total effect of the conduct attributed to the Respondents, in short, is not
to be measured by the effect, if any, noted at the site of construction only ; any.
extension of the activity to other general contractors doing business with
Collins," and any effort to repeat it in connection with the future construction
activity of the Company-which can reasonably be anticipated on the basis
of this record-could well result in a substantial reduction of the total business
done by Collins and the Company, and the amount of materials purchased, by
each of them, outside of the State.
The undersigned concludes and finds, in the light of the record, that the course
of conduct attributed to the Respondents affects, and could reasonably be ex-
pected to affect and burden commerce, sufficiently to establish the jurisdiction
of the Board.
The Respondents contend, however, that the assertion of jurisdiction in this
case would not effectuate the policies of the Act. It is argued that the unions
in the construction industry have not been permitted, thus far, to utilize the
facilities of the Board in connection with certifications under Section 9 (c)
subsection (1) (A) of the Act, or "union-shop" elections under Section 9 (e)
subsection (1) of the statute, because of the difficult problems implicit in the
specialized organization of the industry and the rapidity with which employees
shift between employers and from one construction project to another. And
the Respondents assert, therefore, that it would seem rather "strange and
unorthodox" to apply the statute in the instant matter. This contention is
addressed, essentially, to the sound discretion of the Board; with respect to it
the undersigned expresses no opinion, noting only that the recent decisions in
the Watson and Wadsworth cases 20 have expressly held the Act to be applicable,
now. N. L. R. B. v. Baltimore Transit Company, 140 F. 2d 51, 55 (C. A. 4). The under-
signed finds the contention to be without merit.
'O N. L. R. B. v. Fainblatt, 306 U. S. 601, 604-605.
17 Polish National Alliance v. N. L. R. B., 322 U. S. 643, 648; Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U. S. 111.
- Mandeville Island Farms, Inc., et al. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219.
1O There are two other licensed general contractors with offices in Anniston.
° Matter of Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, A. F.
of L. et al. and Ira A. Watson Co., d/b/a Watson's Specialty Store, 80 NLRB 533 ; Matter of
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, District Council of Kansas
City, Missouri and Vicinity, A. F. of L. et al. and Wadsworth Building Company, Inc., et al.,
81 NLRB 802.
508 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
in unfair labor practice matters, to the construction industry. Whether the
Board ought to reconsider these decisions, in the light of the "equity", cited by
the Respondents, is not a question for the undersigned, appropriately, to answer.
II. THE RESPONDENTS
The United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and
Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, Plumbers and Steam-
fitters Union, Local 498, A. F. of L., which maintains its principal office at
Gadsden, Alabama, is a labor organization organized to promote and protect
the interests of its employee members.2' Its geographical jurisdiction covers five
counties in the northeastern part of the State.22 By virtue of its status as a
constituent local of the United Association, it is affiliated with the American
Federation of Labor and the Building and Construction Trades Department of
that organization. Additionally, it maintains membership, in conjunction with
other craft unions of building tradesmen with a similar national affiliation, in the
Anniston Building Trades Council.
Robert Hadaway is the business agent of the Plumbers and Steamfitters Union.
He is engaged in promoting and protecting the interests of its members, and is
an agent, in law, of the organization.
The Anniston Building Trades Council-mentioned in the record but not a
respondent in this case-is a labor organization composed, as noted, of various
local unions, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, which are engaged
in construction work. In addition to the Respondent Union, the membership
of the Council includes local unions of every craft with members presently in
the employ of the Company and its subcontractors, except for the carpenters"
The council has no constitution or bylaws ; its only organic law, according to
undisputed testimony in the record, is the constitution of the Building and Con-
struction Trades Department of the American Federation of Labor.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The general course of events
On July 27, 1948, after the submission of a bid on the 21st, the Company re-
ceived the general contract, noted, for the construction of the Pine Avenue
Baptist Church. Work began on the following day 24 Subsequently, on the
13th of August, the Salvation Army, to which reference has already been made,
called, in its turn, for bids in connection with the construction of the Citadel.
The record establishes that the Company, which had previously invited bids
from subcontractors to assist it in the formulation of a bid for the general con-
tract, submitted its bid on that date. And the undersigned infers, although the
21 The organization does not have a constitution of its own. According to Hadaway.
whose testimony is undisputed, it is "guided" by the constitution of its parent body, the
United Association.
22 The record establishes that its membership includes residents of communities in Tal-
ladega, Calhoun, Etowah, Marshall, and Jackson Counties.
23 This finding, which is based upon the testimony of Hadaway, establishes the member-
ship of the Council as including plasterers, painters, steelworkers, cement finishers, mortar
mixers, roofers, electricians, and laborers. Hadaway was uncertain as to the Council
membership of any organization representing truck drivers ; lie also omitted any reference
to brick masons, since members of this craft in the employ of the Company were not
unionized.
24 Collins, as noted, had been engaged-under circumstances not revealed in the record-
to install the plumbing and heating equipment.
UNITED ASSOCIATION OF JOURNEYMEN AND APPRENTICES, ETC. 509
record is not explicit in this connection, that an inspection of the bids revealed
the Company to be the lowest bidder. In any event, it was awarded the contract
shortly thereafter.
Before the general contract for the construction of the Citadel was actually
signed, however, on the 23rd or 24th of August, Pettus and Banister were visited
by Hadaway. Their encounter took place in front of the company office. Hada-
way drove up in a car and spoke, at first, to Banister, the only representative
of the firm then present. The credited testimony of Banister, as corroborated
by that of Hadaway, establishes that the business agent asked the Company,
generally, to use a unionized master plumber for the plumbing and heating
work on.the Salvation Army job.'' He was told that it was the policy of the
Company to award its subcontracts to the lowest responsible bidder, and that
the only unionized master plumber in the community had been a high bidder on
several jobs. Hadaway's reply, according to the record, was that :
We have been trying to work with you fellows here and don't seem to
be getting along,2' and, if we don't, we are going to use some other tactics
to see if we can't get along with you and work with you.
The reference to "other tactics" was not explained. At this time, however,
Pettus reached the scene of the conversation; almost immediately, after his
arrival, Banister left. Hadaway renewed his request that "union plumbers" be
utilized on the Salvation Army job; and Pettus replied that the job had not yet
been awarded to the Company, and that he could not tell what he would do
until he got the award. According to Pettus, whose testimony in this respect
is credited, Hadaway ended the conversation with an expression of his intention
to "see" that the job was handled as a "union" job.
The record establishes that Pettus knew, at the time of this conversation,
that Collins, a "non-union" plumber, was, in fact, the "lowest responsible bidder"
for the plumbing subcontract on the Salvation Army project 2' And thereafter,
on the 25th of August, when the general contract for the job was formally
awarded to the Company, it assigned the plumbing subcontract to Collins-who
was already at work, as noted, on the Pine Avenue Baptist Church.
On September 16, 1948, Hadaway called, again, at the office of the Company.28
23 The record establishes that the laborers and craftsmen in the direct employ of the
Company-at the church-with the single exception of the brick masons and possibly
with the exception of the truck driver as well) were unionized. Banister testified, without
contradiction, that three of the subcontractors, already noted, used union labor. He was
uncertain with respect to the union status of the men employed by two other firms.
Collins, it is clear, used journeymen plumbers who did not, in August or September of
1947, maintain any membership in the Respondent Union.
2^ Pettus and Hadaway agreed, in testimony, that this conversation did not, in fact,
represent the first occasion on which the latter had requested the Company to use a
plumbing subcontractor who hired union labor. And the record establishes that Hadaway,
in fact, had made a similar request in 1.947, just before the Company got a contract for
the construction of a school. The plumbing work on the job, however, had been given by
the Company, thereafter, to a "non-union" subcontractor.
=' The Crestview Plumbing and Heating Company, a unionized firm, had been the low
bidder on the work-but had lost its chance to get the job by raising its original bid on
August 13, 1948, before the Company's bid for the general contract was opened.
28 Hadaway's visit had been arranged on the previous day, after "Judge" Boozer of the
Salvation Army Building Committee had, telephoned Banister to request that he confer
with the business agent of the Respondent'Union in regard to the complaints of the latter.
Banister testified that Boozer, in substance, had urged him to reach an agreement with
Hadaway which would make it possible for the work to proceed without "labor trouble" of
any kind.
510 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The testimony.of Hadaway with respect to the conversation, which is corrobo-
rated, in substance, by that of both Pettus and Banister, reads as follows :
Well, of course, I was talking along the line of getting the general con-
tractor to let a fair subcontractor have the plumbing and heating on those
jobs because I seemed to be the only craft that was left out . . . then
they said, "Now, what can we,do?"
I said, "Well, I'd recommend that let's get Collins off the job and get my
fair contractors on the job," and I named Crestview. Plumbing Company
and I named W. A. Harvey. I told them it didn't make any difference to
me which one they employed and they could get one anywhere they wanted
to just so he was a fair contractor, "All I'm interested in is getting one
of my men on the job through a fair contractor."
He [Pettus] said, "Well, what's going to happen if Collins has already
done some work?" 20
I said, "Well, they can work that out among themselves, the master
plumbers can." They both belong to the master plumbers association and
he said, "Well, then you want us to just straighten out the whole thing [and]
to let another contractor have it besides Collins?"
I said, "That's right."
He [Pettus] said, "All right, suppose I let John [Henderson] who is
manager of the Crestview Plumbing Company and Collins work it out among
themselves?" . . . I said, "That's what I want." So he picks up the phone
and calls Crestview Plumbing Company. At that time Crestview Plumbing
Company's Manager wasn't in, Mr. Henderson, and he said . . . to me, that,
"I'll get in touch with Junior and iron that end of it out and everything is
going to be all right." So with that, why, I was satisfied because I felt
that I had accomplished my aim ... and left with the impression that my
fair shop would get the job 30
Within a day or two, Hadaway was advised, however, by several members
of the Respondent Union that Collins was still active at the Salvation Army
project. He determined forthwith to picket the job, and requested the business
agent of the local Hod Carriers union to provide two members of that organiza-
tion for picket duty.' This, the business agent agreed to do.
On the 20th of September, a Monday, Hadaway appeared at the Salvation
Army job, at 7: 30 a. m., with two members of the Hod Carriers union. He pro-
vided each of them with a sign which read, "Unfair to Plumbers and Steamfitters
Local Union No. 498," and posted them on the sidewalks adjacent to the project.
All of the workers present ceased their work on the job at once.
29 The work on the church and the citadel, in fact, was well advanced at the time.
Collins, according to the record, had finished about one-half of the plumbing work at each
job.
30 Hadaway admitted, in cross-examination, he "probably" had referred to the use of
"other tactics" in the conversation, but denied specifically that he had made any reference
to pickets or to the possibility of a strike if Pettus and Banister refused to give the work
to a "union" plumber.
3i Hadaway's testimony that he did not discuss his plan to establish a picket line with
any other union representative is credited, although it is clear that the Anniston Building
Trades Council had previously been made aware, at least, of the "problem" implicit in
the action of the Company. In any event-and without regard to any inference which
might be drawn on the basis of the testimony about that antecedent discussion-Hadaway
testified, for the Respondent Union, that he had sought hod carriers for picket duty
because of the "policy" of the Respondent Union in that regard, and that he had not
explained the reason for the request to the business agent of the local Hod Carriers union,
His testimony that he had made a bare request, and that it had been acknowledged without
question , stands without contradiction and is also credited by the undersigned.
UNITED ASSOCIATION OF JOURNEYMEN AND APPRENTICES, ETC. 511
Although Pettus had assembled the crew and set them to work at the Salvation
Army project before the pickets appeared, the record establishes that he was at
the Pine Avenue Baptist Church when informed, by telephone, of the interruption
at the citadel. He returned at once-and, after noting the situation, picked
up several of the idle laborers, intending to put them at work on the church.
The truck in which the men were being transported to that project, however, was
followed by Hadaway, who removed one picket from the Salvation Army job,
forthwith, in order to post him at the church. This maneuver was completed,
approximately, at S : 30 a. m. Upon the arrival of the picket at the Pine Avenue
Baptist Church, all work at this job also ceased.
The company crew at each project, on the 20th of September, included brick-
layers,'- carpenters, laborers, cement finishers, and steelworkers. A total of 45
men had been at work on the previous Friday ; the same number had been asked to
report. on the 20th-and the assumption is that they were, in fact, present. The
only subcontractor with men at work on that date, however, was the Thrasher
Electric Company, which had assigned 1 man to the Salvation Army project. No
subcontractors were at work on the Pine Avenue Baptist Church. The stoppage,
then, affected approximately 45 employees of the Company, and 1 electrician in the
employ of a subcontractor.
Shortly after the picket appeared at the Pine Avenue Baptist Church, the busi-
ness agent of the local Hod Carriers union also put in an appearance. His ac-
tivities in connection with the stoppage were described by Pettus, as follows :
Q. (By Mr. HAwKINS.) Do you know of any employees, either of your
Company or any subcontractors, who tried to get across the picket line and
were forcibly stopped? . . .
A. Yeah, the business agent come up and told them they couldn't cross it,
that was against the international laws.
Q. That was the labor business agent, wasn't it'?
A. Yes, Sir.
Trial Examiner MILLER. I recall now the question I had in mind which I
failed to ask a few moments ago. You mentioned, Mr. Pettus, that the labor-
ers upon whose work the bricklayers were dependent, had been informed by a
representative of the Hod Carriers union that they ought to respect the picket
line?
The WITNESS. They would have to.
* * * * *
Q. (By Trial Examiner MILLER.) Did you personally hear him make any
statement to your Hod Carriers employees'?
A. Yes, I heard him tell them that they would have to come off, that the.
International would [fine] them if they didn't come off.
Q. Is that a quotation of his words, as best you recall them?
A. Well, he came up and all the laborers was there ; they were all hud-
dled up together. He just come over and said, "All right, boys, you will all
have to come off ; if you don't come off, you will find the International will
fine you."
This testimony has not been disputed or explained. Hadaway, although aware
of the business agent's presence, could shed no light on the statements attributed
to the latter at the construction site of the Pine Avenue Baptist Church.
0
32 The bricklayers, although nonunion , appear to have chosen voluntarily to respect the
picket line.
512 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
All construction activity ended immediately, at both jobs, after the pickets
were posted. No work, in fact, was done at either job, thereafter, while the picket
lines continued.33 After 7V/.2 days, however, Hadaway requested the business
Agent of the Hod Carriers union to remove the pickets. They were removed, pur-
suant to his instruction, at noon on the 29th of September ; 3' Hadaway was in-
formed of their removal, by the business agent, at the next meeting of the
Anniston Building Trades Council. Construction activity began immediately
at both jobs; and it continued, thereafter, without interruption. Representa-
tives of the Company have had no further contact with the Respondents.
Pettus, on behalf of the Company, estimated, at the bearing, that both of the jobs
would be complete at the end of the year.
B. Conclusions
This case involves a sympathetic strike. The complaint alleges in this con-
nection, that:
The respondents have called, engaged in, and by orders, threats, picketing,
directions and instructions and by permitting such to remain in existence and
effect have induced and encouraged the employees of Pettus-Banister and
Thrasher Electric Company to engage in a strike or a concerted refusal in
the course of their employment to perform services.
for an object proscribed by the statute. It is clear, however, that the Respondent
Union did not, itself, engage in a strike, and that members of the Respondent
Union did not, themselves, engage in a concerted refusal to perform any services
in the course of their employment-since no members of the organization were
employed, on either Company project, at the time. The General Counsel's repre-
sentative admitted, in oral argument, that the complaint in this respect had not
been sustained-and the undersigned so finds.
There remain, however, the allegations of the complaint with respect to the
"inducement or encouragement" of employees to engage in concerted activity
for a purpose proscribed by the Act. Section 8 (b) subsection (4) (A) of the
Act, with respect to which a violation is alleged, insofar as it is material, reads
as follows :
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
. .. to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in a
strike . . . where an object thereof is . . . forcing or requiring . . . any
employer . . . to cease doing business with any other person.
In the light of the statute, as quoted, any conclusion as to the commission of an
unfair labor practice, in this case, must rest, necessarily, upon reliable, pro-
bative, and substantial evidence that the conduct of the Respondents was cal-
culated to force or require an employer to terminate a business relationship
with another person, and that it amounted to an inducement and encouragement
of the employees to engage in a strike, within the meaning of the Act as amended.
The absence of proof in either connection, as the Board pointed out in the
Wadsworth case, would be sufficient to defeat the charge.
33 For reasons which do not appear in the record, the Company retained.the bricklayer
crew and several carpenters on its payroll, and provided them with reporting pay each day,
in the expectation that work might be resumed momentarily.
31 The record establishes that there had never been more than two pickets on behalf of
the Respondent Union-one at each job. Hadaway testified , however, that he "under-
stood" one of the original pickets had been removed and replaced in the course of the
picketing . The record is silent as to the manner in which the replacement was made ;
Hadaway testified that he had not spoken to either of the pickets after giving them the
assignments noted. . I
UNITED ASSOCIATION OF JOURNEYMEN AND APPRENTICES, ETC. 513
It is the argument of the General Counsel, briefly stated, that the purpose
of the picket line established in the name of the Respondent Union was to force
or require the Company to take its "plumbing work" away from Collins and to
"give it" to a unionized plumbing subcontractor ; this "object" of the conduct
cited is said to subject the Respondent Union, and its business agent, to the
sanctions of the Act.
The Respondents argue in reply, however, that their activity was not directed
to the achievement of a proscribed object. In support of this contention, they
argue that the relationship between a general contractor and a subcontractor
in the construction industry is, essentially, that of an employer and an employee
or, in the. alternative, that of a•principal and an agent. It follows, they say, that
the relationship is not a "business" one, and that any attempt to persuade a
general contractor to dispense with the services of a particular subcontractor
is not an attempt to persuade the former to cease "doing business" with the
latter. Secondarily, it is contended that the relationship between a general
contractor and its subcontractors in the construction industry is such as to
warrant their designation as "allies" in a labor dispute context 3' It is also said
that Collins, the subcontractor, should be considered, in fact, a subordinate or
alter ego of the Company, by which it sought to avoid the establishment of a
contractual relationship with the Respondent Union. On these grounds, it. is
argued that Collins is not "another person" within the meaning of that term
as used in the legislation. Lastly, in this connection, it is argued that the
object of the activity chargeable to the Respondent was not to force or requite
the Company to cease doing business with Collins, but to persuade it to agree,
prospectively, to limit its choice of master plumbers to those approved as "fair"
by the Union and its authorized agent. The dispute, in the case at bar, then,
is said to be, essentially, a "primary" dispute between the Respondent Union
and the Company, with respect to the practices of the latter as a supposedly
"fair" contractor-and it is argued, therefore, that the Respondent Union was
not engaged in the exertion of "secondary" pressure upon the Company, as an
"innocent" party, intended to force a change in the employment policies of its
subcontractor.
The issue between the General Counsel and the Respondents is thus joined, at
the outset, on the question of whether the conduct of the Respondents was intended
to achieve a forbidden object. It is to that question that the undersigned now
turns.
The undersigned finds no merit in the contention that Collins, the subcon-
tractor, is merely an agent or employee of the Company. It is true, in the con-
struction industry, that subcontractors are engaged to perform a part of the
work for which the general contractor, ultimately, is responsible. The ultimate
responsibility of the general contractor, however, is not determinative of the
status to which other "factors" involved in the enterprise may be entitled. The
Respondents, themselves, refer in their brief to a distinction between the con-
struction industry and others in this connection. "Other industries," they say
in quotation, "have achieved a considerable degree of integration. States in the
manufacture of a finished product which were formerly separately controlled are
now under unified control ; therefore, employees engaged in what were previously
separate businesses are now employees of one employer in one business. But the
building industry continues to use an elaborate system of subcontracting." as
"Cf. Douds v. Metropolitan Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists and Tech-
nicians, 75 F. Supp. 672 (S. D. N. Y.).
se Restatement, Torts, Volume III, § 799, subsection (e).
903847-51-vol. 90-34
514 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The organization of the industry, in short, is such as to indicate substantial
justification for the view that it has not yet achieved a degree of integration
sufficient to warrant the obliteration of the conventional distinction between
business enterprises jointly involved on a given projectS4
Under the circumstances, the community of interest-which may well exist-
between the employees of a general contractor and those of a subcontractor on the
same construction project cannot be considered determinative of their status in
the eyes of the law. Nor is the fact that the guarantor of the general contractor's
performance bond may be responsible to the property owner for defective or inade-
quate performance on the part of a subcontractor, determinative with respect to
the status of the latter. Although the Respondents allege that general con-
tractors usually "superintend" the work of the subcontractors and fix the time
at which the work of the latter is to be performed, the record in this case contains
no evidence of the extent to which the Company exercised control, or a right of
control, over the manner in which its subcontractors did their work, the time at
which it was to be done, or the number and kind of employees they were to use.
The contingent liability of the general contractor to the employees of a subcon-
tractorunder Workmen's Compensation and Mechanics Lien statutes cannot be
considered significant in this connection. These liabilities represent a special
situation in which the State, as a matter of public policy, has swept aside dis-
tinctions based on the identity of the "employer" in order to give the most com-
plete protection possible to employees. Upon the entire record, the undersigned
finds that Collins, the subcontractor, was, in fact and law, an independent
employer-engaged in a business of his own-and not a mere agent or employee
of the general contractor.
The Respondents argue, in this connection, that "doing business" must be con-
strued in the light of its association with the rest of the statutory language. The
phrase in question is clearly associated with language which defines a refusal to
work on or with the "products" of another business enterprise; in the light of
this fact the Respondents argue, in effect, that to cease "doing business" with a
business enterprise is to cease "trade" with it. They contend, in substance,
that the language in question has no application to a relationship which involves
the provision of a service and materials for. a single consideration.
The undersigned finds no merit in this contention. While it may be true that
the effective administration of the Act will require some limitation of the broad
scope usually given to the "business" concept,38 the undersigned is unable to
accept the conclusion that it will require the acceptance of the limited view, in
this connection, which the Respondents defend. In the field of conflicts, the
concept has not received such a limited construction a3 And in the field of legisla-
tion intended to fix the conditions under which a "foreign" enterprise may "do
business" within a State, the phrase has been judicially construed to cover the
activities of a subcontractor on a construction project.4° The Board, in the
37 See William Haber, Industrial Relations in the Building Industry , Harvard University
Press, 1930, pp. 59-60; How Collective Bargaining Works, Twentieth Century Fund, 1942,
p. 193.
38 Douds v . Metropolitan Federation of Architects , Engineers, Chemists and Technicians,
supra.
3' Insofar as it applies to the problems of corporate activity , the term has been defined
as "doing a series of similar acts for the purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit, or
otherwise accomplishing an object, of doing a single act for such purpose with the intention
of thereby initiating a series of such acts ." Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § 167 (a).
40 Kansas City Structural Steel Co. v. State, 161 Ark. 483, 256 S. W. 845 ; cf. O'Pry
Heating and Plumbing Co. v. State, 241 Ala. 507, 3 So . 2d 316, 321.
UNITED ASSOCIATION OF JOURNEYMEN AND APPRENTICES, ETC. 515
Watson case already noted, held without objection that the Act applied to an
effort on the part of a respondent union to force or require a building owner
to terminate a contractual relationship with a firm equipped to provide both
services and material in connection with the installation of a floor. The con-
tention of the Respondents that the. relationship, here under attack, was not a
"business" relationship, accordingly, is rejected.
The Respondents, however, go on to argue, as noted, that Collins, the sub-
contractor, is not "another person" in the statutory sense.
It is suggested, in their brief, that Pettus and Banister may have lost any
right to claim an immunity, under the Act, when they assumed the relationship,
knowingly, of an "ally" with respect to Collins, in the dispute between that em-
ployer and the Respondent Union. Much of this contention is based upon the
rationale of the decision in Metropolitan Federation of Architects case, already
noted. The Respondents, however, misconceive the significance of that decision.
Superficially, the cases may be comparable : In the cited case the object of the
union was to force or require a subcontractor to cease doing business with a prime
contractor with which the union, currently, had a labor dispute. In this case,
without regard to the contention still to be noted in this connection, the object
of the union was to force or require a general contractor to cease doing business
with a subcontractor with which the union had a persistent, although momen-
tarily dormant, dispute. The undersigned, nevertheless, is unable to conclude, in
the context of the instant case, that the Company is an "ally" of Collins by
virtue of any "unity of interest" between it and the latter, arising out of the
general contractor-subcontractor relationship." And certainly, it cannot be
argued in the face of the evident congressional intent. to "eliminate [secondary
boycotts] from the American industrial scene" that the Company ought to be
considered an "ally" of Collins merely because it might benefit from the use of
nonunion labor by the latter in the form of lower bids for plumbing and heating
installation work. 42
Nor can it be said-in reverse-on the basis of the decision cited, that Collins
is merely a subordinate or alter ego of the Company, in the light of the relationship
noted. The Company did not purchase the "service" of the subcontractor's
employees; and there is no evidence that it supplied direction and supervision of
the "detailed and pervasive" character noted in the Metropolitan Federation of
Architects case. In that case, also "Project's employees did work, which, but for
the strike of Ebasco's employees, would have been done by Ebasco" ; there was no
attempt in this case, however, to show that Collins was engaged to assume a func-
tion which the Company would have assumed directly but for the demands of the
Respondent Union. There is no evidence, in short, that Collins and the Company
were involved in a plan to checkmate the Union. The "moral climate" is different.
The record establishes that all of the Company's direct labor is unionized, with
the single exception of the bricklayers-and with respect to them, it establishes
that the Company made an effort to secure bricklayers from the Union and hired
the workers. now in its employ when advised that union bricklayers were not
available. Nor is there any reason to infer a special animus, on the part of the
Company, with respect to the Respondent Union or its authorized agent. The
Company did not ask its subcontractors whether or not they employed union men.
It advertised openly for bids with respect to the plumbing work to be done at
each of the construction projects; and there is undisputed testimony that the
0
" See Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910 (1937) ; and Gromfine,
"Labor's Use of Secondary Boycotts," 15 George Washington Law Review, 327 (1947).
42 Cf. The Watson and Wadsworth cases, supra.
516 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
contract for the work would have been given to a "unionized" subcontractor if
o the latter had not raised its bid. The undersigned infers and finds that the
engagement of Collins was dictated by economic considerations, that it was a
normal incident of the construction trade, and that it cannot be characterized
as the enlistment of an "ally" on the part of the general contractor or the sub-
contractor, in connection with a plan to withhold deserved recognition from the
Respondent Union.
Finally, as noted, the Respondents argue, on the basis of the legislative history,
that Section 8 (b) subsection (4) (A) prohibits certain types of concerted
activity only when there is no labor dispute over union recognition or particular
economic issues between the employees engaged or induced to engage in the con-
certed activity and their immediate employer. Only in such cases, it is said,
can the action of the employees be characterized as "secondary" pressure, in-
tended to persuade an "innocent" or disinterested employer to boycott "another
person" with whom the union actually has a labor dispute. And the Respondents
contend that the Respondent Union here was engaged in a "primary" dispute
with the Company because it had not acted as a "fair" contractor ought to act,
when it engaged a "non-union" subcontractor.'' The Respondents argue with
vigor that the primary object of their activity was to effectuate a change in the
"employment" policy of the general contractor and that it was not merely the
innocent victim of secondary pressure intended to force a change in the employ-
ment policy of Collins, the subcontractor. In effect, it is contended that the
concerted activity with which this case is concerned was equivalent, in law, to a
primary strike for recognition, in the absence of a Board certification, which is
not prescribed by the Act.
The contention has no merit. The testimony of );Iadaway, to the effect that he
had no "interest" in the ultimate fate of the relationship beween the Company
and Collins, and that he had never asked the Company to suggest a change in the
employment policy of the subcontractor, must be characterized as disingenuous.
It is clearly an "objective" of the Respondent Union to organize its branch of the
labor market in the construction industry so thoroughly that Collins, the sub-
contractor, will be forced to dispense with the services of any obdurate non-
union employees or face the prospect of losing his business opportunities" And
43 The record suggests a belief on the part of Hadaway that Pettus and Banister acted in
bad faith when they gave the plumbing subcontract to Collins-in view of the fact, estab-
lished by stipulation, that "Judge" Boozer of the Salvation Army Building Committee had
indicated and assumption that workers on the job would be paid the union scale, and the
acceptance of the general contract by the Company in the face of that assumption. It is
clear, however, that the Company-even if it accepted the contract in the face of the assump-
tion-breached no "contractual" obligation to the Salvation Army or the Respodent Union
when it gave the plumbing subcontract to Collins, and that its action gave the Respondents
no "justification" for the conduct challenged in this case.
'" The testimony of Hadaway, in this connection, is clear. It reads as follows :
Q. (By Mr. CoHEN .) Was it your understanding . . . that Pettus and Banister
should hire union men even when the union men . . . I mean subcontractors, were
higher than non-union men?
A. Really, it doesn't matter to me whether their bid is high or low, all I am inter-
ested in is getting my men on the job. . . .
Q. So [even if ] a non-union man is paying union wage scales, [ and] if a union man
bids higher . . . you think that the union man should get it, and [that] Pettus-
Banister should have . . . awarded the contract to Crestview, even though he was
higher than Collins?
A. In my estimation, that's what I'd say that I want, yes.
And the Respondents, in their brief, admit, in substance, that a strike for recognition, in
the construction industry, is "generally" a strike to "compel" general contractors to sign a
"closed-shop" agreement ; to hire unionized craftsmen only, when hiring directly; and to
"hire" only "union" subcontractors.
UNITED ASISOCIATION OF JOURNEYMEN AND APPRENTICES, ETC. 517
when questioned as to the "object" of the conduct challenged in the case at bar,
Hadaway testified as follows :
Q. Mr. Hadaway, what was the purpose of picketing?
A. To get the contractor to use my men on his work.
Q. Did you want them to take Collins off this job?
A. He had to take him off if he gave the work to my people, because we
wouldn't work on the job with Collins.
Q. Would you say the purpose of picketing was to cause Pettus-Banister
Company to take the plumbing work. from Collins Plumbing and Heating
Company and give it to a union plumbing company?
A. That's right, yes ... I wanted Pettus-Banister Company to give their
plumbing work to a union contractor.
Q. And to take that plumbing work away from another person, Collins
Plumbing and Heating Company?
A. My purpose was to get my men on the job.
Q. I will ask you again, Mr. Hadaway, either answer yes or no. The
purpose of the picketing was to cause Pettus-Banister Company to take
the plumbing work from Collins Plumbing and Heating Company and give
it to a union plumbing company?
A. That's right.
In the light of this testimony the undersigned is constrained to reject the sub-
sidiary contention of the Respondents, in this connection, that the object of
the strike with which we are concerned was to compel the Company to refuse
to do business "thereafter" with a nonunion subcontractor or to hire non-
union employees. It is clear that any compliance with the demands of the Re-
spondent Union would have required the Company to terminate its then current
business relationship with Collins. What the disposition of this case would be if
it were established that the demand of the Respondents was of "prospective"
import only and called merely for a commitment by the Company to refrain, in
future, from the engagement of a nonunionized master plumber, generally, is
a question which the undersigned, upon the present record, is not required to
consider."
Upon the entire record, the undersigned concludes and finds that the purpose
of the picket lines established in the name of the Respondent Union was to
evoke concerted activity, on the part of the employees at the Salvation Army
job and the Pine Avenue Baptist Church, for. an object which is one of those
subject to proscription, under the Act.
In view of the conclusion that an object of the activity attributable to the
Respondents was to compel the Company to cease doing business with Collins,
the subcontractor, the undersigned now turns to the question of whether that
activity amounted to the illegal "inducement and encouragement" of employees
to engage in a sympathetic strike. The only activity questioned in this con-
nection is that involved in the establishment of picket lines at the Salvation
Army job and the Pine Avenue Baptist Church 9e The Respondents argue that
" There is no allegation , in this case , of a violation of Section 8 (b) (2) on the part of
the Respondent Union or its authorized agent.
48 It is true that the complaint refers to inducement and encouragement of employees by
"order, threats . . . directions and instructions," and that the record reveals the busi-
ness agent of the local Hod Carriers union to have made a threat of union discipline to hod
carriers in the employ of the Company , in the event of any failure on their part to respect
518 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the pickets were peaceful ; that the establishment of the picket lines was not
equivalent to an order , direction , or instruction ; and that their action amounted,
therefore , to free speech protected from infringement by the first amendment
of the Constitution and Section 8 (c) of the Act. In reply , the General Counsel
argues that the picket lines of the Respondent Union amounted , in law, to the
"inducement and encouragement" forbidden in the Act , regardless of their peace-
ful character , on the ground that "a lawful act which is employed to accomplish
an unlawful object is unlawful ." The argument, at the hearing , ran as follows :
It is true that peaceful picketing , which we have had in this case, is
protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution , and also by Section
S (c), but when it is used to accomplish that which is unlawful it is no longer
protected by [either ]. In the instant case the peaceful picketing was em-
ployed to accomplish a secondary boycott and also to encourage a strike awl
refusal to work , both of which are violative of the Act . . . . Although [the
Respondents ] have employed peaceful picketing , they did it for an unlawful
purpose; therefore , the peaceful picketing is no longer protected as free-
dom of speech but is a violation of the Act because it was employed to
accomplish an unlawful purpose.
Whatever the presumptive merits of the contention made by the Respondents
may be, the undersigned, in the light of the Wadsworth case, is constrained
to accept the above contention of the General Counsel's representatives. The
considered judgment of the Board , in this connection , as "trustees" of the Con-
gress in the administration of the Act , has been expressed as follows :
Granting , as the Supreme Court held , that peaceful picketing is a phase
of speech-( Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88; Carlson v. California, 310
U. S. 106; A. F. of L. v. Swing , 312 U. S. 321 ; Bakery and Pastry Drivers
Union v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769; Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320
U. S. 293 )-but not necessarily of privileged speech- ( Carpenters and
Joiners Union of America v. Bitter's Cafe , 315 U. S. 722 ; accord, United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. Sperry , 170 F. 2d 863
(C. A. 10) ; Printing Specialties and Paper Converters Union, Local 388 v.
LeBaron, 23 L. R. R. M. 2145 ( C. A. 9) December 13, 1948; Douds v. Local
1250, Retail , Wholesale Department Store Union , 170 F. 2d 700 (C. A. 2) ;
Cf. Goiapers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., 221 U. S. 418 ; Duplex Printing
Press Company v. Deering , 254 U. S. 443; Allen Bradley Co . v. Local Union
No. 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 325 U. S. 797)-
This section obviously is broad enough to prohibit picketing, whether or
not peacefully conducted . Apparently, Congress , by design, chose words
of broad connotation in defining the unfair labor practice as inducement
or encouragement . . . . Viewing the language of Section 8 (b) (4) (A)
in the light of the manifest purpose of Congress and the interpretive
meaning given to it by both the proponents and the opponents while the
section was under consideration, we are impelled to the conclusion that
Section S (b) (4) (A) embraces within its proscription peaceful picketing.
The Respondents, who do not , expressly , attack the validity of this conclusion,
argue, nevertheless, that Section 8 (b) subsection ( 4) (A) must be construed
in conjunction with Section 8 (c) of the Act . That section provides that:
The expressing of,any views , argument or opinion , or the dissemination
thereof, whether in written , printed, graphic , or visual form , shall not
the picket lines of the Respondent Union. The General Counsel, however , did not contend
that this threat is imputable to the Respondents . In the light of the decision recommended
in this Report, the undersigned finds it unnecessary to consider that question.
UNITED ASSOCIATION OF JOURNEYMEN AND APPRENTICES, ETC. 519
constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the pro-
visions of this Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or
force or promise of benefit.
The Respondents argue, in substance, that picketing, when peaceful, is an
expression of "views, argument or opinion" constitutionally protected as free
speech ; that the pickets, in this case, conveyed no threat of reprisal or force or
promise of benefit, expressly or by implication ; and that the establishment of
the picket lines therefore, did not constitute illegal "inducement or encourage-
ment" subject to the sanction of the statute.
In the light of the Wadsworth decision, noted, it may now be taken as datum,
in cases before the Board, that this contention is without merit. By a limitation
of Section 8 (b) subsection (4) (A) in the light of Section 8 (c) "the manifest
intention of Congress would be substantially frustrated" and language care-
fully chosen to effectuate that intent would suffer impairment and be made
ineffective :
Section 8 (b) (4) (A) was aimed at eliminating all secondary boycotts
and their concomitant activities which Congress thought were unmitigated
evils and burdensome to commerce. It was Congress' belief that labor dis-
putes should be confined to the business immediately involved and that
unions should be prohibited from extending them to other employers by
inducing and encouraging the litters' employees to exert economic pressure
in support of their disputes. It was the objective of the union's secondary
activities, as legislative history shows, and not the quality of the means
employed to accomplish that objective, which was the dominant factor,
motivating Congress in enacting that provision. Both the proponents and
opponents of the Act so interpreted Section 8 (b) (4) (A) and understood
that it prohibited peaceful picketing, persuasion, and encouragement, as well
as non-peaceful economic action, in aid of the forbidden objective. In these
circumstances, to construe Section S (b) (4) (A) as qualified by Section 8
(c) would practically vitiate its underlying purpose and amount to imputing
to Congress an unrealistic approach to the problem . . . because we believe
that to apply Section 8 (c) to Section 8 (b) (4) (A) would lead to "absurd
or futile results" or, at least, to "an unreasonable one 'plainly at variance
with the policy of the legislation as a whole'," we consider it our duty as the
administrative agency entrusted with the enforcement of the public policy
embodied in the Act, to follow the "purpose [of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) ] rather
than the literal words [of Section S (c) ]," and thus effectuate the will of
Congress.
This language is dispositive of any contention based upon the language of the
statute. The undersigned, therefore, is constrained to conclude that Section 8
(b) subsection (4) (A) prohibits peaceful picketing in furtherance of an objective
proscribed by it, and that Section S (c) does not immunize such conduct."
The Respondents argue, however, that peaceful picketing, of the type involved
in this case, is protected by the first amendment of the Constitution. It is im-
plied, apparently, that Congress had this in mind when it drafted-Section 8 (c)
47 It is thus unnecessary to consider the contention that a picket line is not within the
ambit of the immunity established by Section 8 (c) by virtue of its alleged character as an
order, direction , or instruction . Nor is the undersigned required to determine whether or
not the presence of the pickets implied any threat to the employees of Thrasher and the
Company , or whether the express threat of union discipline by the business agent of the
Hod Carriers union might be imputed to the Respondents under a theory of "joint enter-
prise" or agency.
520 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and that a construction of the statute which would hold that section to be without
application to Section 8 (b) subsection (4) (A) would make the latter unconstitu-
tional. This contention, if broadly made, imputes to an agency of administration
a power which it does not have ; it is not within the province of the Board, in
short, to pass, in terms, upon the constitutionality of the Act.48 It cannot be
doubted, however, that a serious constitutional question is raised, with respect
to the validity of this part of the Act, by the use of the Board's "interpretive
powers" to find that Congress intended to prohibit, under the terms "induce or
encourage," the type of picket activity which the Supreme Court has held to be
constitutionally protected speech.l9 A majority of the Board, in the Wadsworth
case, declared this interpretation of the Act does not involve an "unconstitu-
tional" choice. That decision is controlling in the case at bar. Candor on the
part of the undersigned, however, requires some discussion, in his opinion, of the
logical basis for that conclusion, as inferred in the light of the relevant judicial
pronouncements. To that question, then, the undersigned now turns.
The obligation of the courts, in connection with the interpretation of legisla-
tion, has been described as an obligation to construe it, if fairly possible, so as
to avoid not only the "conclusion" that a given statute is unconstitutional, but
also "grave doubts" upon that score5° Whether a similar obligation ought to be
imputed to agents of the executive branch, or. "quasi-judicial" officials charged
with the implementation of a congressional policy, may be an arguable question.
If it be assumed, however, for the purpose of this discussion, that officials vested
with discretion in the interpretation and application of statutes ought to choose
and enforce the interpretation best calculated to avoid a constitutional issue, the
undersigned finds ample justification, for the conclusion of the Board, in the
Wadsworth case, that it has met its obligation in that respect.
It is true, as the Respondents argue, that picketing, when peaceful, has been
held to be a phase of the right of free expression guaranteed by the first amend-
ment of the Constitution.51 And in the Wohl case it was held that a State court,
which had construed its own law to permit the issuance of an injunction against
peaceful picketing-even when directed to the interest of persons not considered
"strangers to the issue" in dispute-had exceeded the permissible limits of State
action under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment thereby. The
scope of the right thus given protection against State action under the Consti-
tution is not, however, unlimited. In the Ritter case,` the Supreme Court held a
State court's interpretation of its statute law, which operated to render peaceful
picketing enjoinable when its purpose was to "conscript neutrals" without an
economic interest in the primary dispute, to be a permissible exercise of State
power. In effect, it held that a State may constitutionally prohibit peaceful
picketing in labor disputes, when employed to "conscript neutrals" outside the
"allowable area" of industrial conflict, and that the action of the State, there
challenged, which limited the right to picket peacefully in labor disputes to busi-
ness enterprises having a direct economic "nexus" with the employer involved
in the primary dispute, did not deprive the union involved, or its members, of
liberties guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitution.
14 Rite-Form Corset Co., Inc., 75 NLRB 174.
11 See the concurrence of Chairman Herzog in the Wadsworth case , already noted.
60 United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U. 5..394, 401. °
61 Senn v. Tile Layers Union , 301 U. S. 468 ; Thornhill v. Alabama, supra ; Carlson V.
California, supra; A. F. of L. v. Swing, supra; Bakery & Pastry Drivers Union V. Wohl,
supra; Cafeteria Employees Union v . Angelos, supra.
12 Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritter 's Cafe, supra.
UNITED ASSOCIATION OF JOURNEYMEN AND' APPIRENTICES, ETC. 521
The precise constitutional question presented by Section 8 (b) subsection (4)
(A), as construed independently of Section 8 (c), may then be phrased as fol-
lows : May Congress, in its exercise of the commerce power, subject to the
limitations of the fifth amendment, define the circumstances under which the
freedoms of the first amendment, insofar as they include a right to picket,
may be exercised in a labor dispute context? And if so, did it define the "allow-
able area" of economic conflict so narrowly as to deprive the union and its mem-
bers of a liberty to picket and organize secondary pressures, guaranteed by the
fifth amendment against infringement without clue process of law? While the
Wohl case, it is true, may suggest the possibility of an. affirmative answer to the
last question u3 two courts of appeal, both of which relied upon the Ritter case,
have already held that Section 8 (b) subsection (4) (A), construed, albeit on
other grounds, to proscribe the employment of peaceful pickets for a forbidden
object, is a valid exercise of congressional power 54 In this state of the law,
as the Board has indicted, the legislative judgment, here interpreted, cannot be
described as so clearly unreasonable as to require the administrative acceptance
of an alternative view in regard to the legislative intent. Even judicial review,
in matters of similar import, is often subject to self-imposed restraints :
The right of association like any other right carried to its extreme, en-
counters limiting principles. . . . At the point where the mutual advantage
of association demands too much individual disadvantage, a compromise
must be struck. . . . When that point has been reached-where the inter-
section should fall-is plainly a question within the special province of the
legislature. . . . Whether it is preferable in the public interest that trade
Unions should be subjected to State intervention or left to the free play
of social forces, whether experience has disclosed "union unfair labor prac-
tices" and, if so, whether legislative correction is more appropriate than
self-discipline and the pressure of public opinion-these are questions on
which it is not for us to express views. The very limited function of this
Court is discharged when we recognize that these issues are not so un-
related to the experience and feelings of the community as to render
legislation addressing itself to them wilfully destructive of cherished rights.u6
Administrative officials cannot be required to declare a lesser deference to the
legislative judgment. The undersigned, accordingly-in conformity with the
judgment of the Board majority-finds no merit in the proposition that Section
8 (b) subsection (4) (A), as here interpreted, is of such doubtful constitutionality
as to require the adoption of an alternative interpretation.
Upon the entire record, the undersigned concludes and finds that the Re-
spondents, by the establishment of picket lines at the Salvation Army job and
the Pine Avenue Baptist Church, both projects of the Company, induced and
encouraged the employees of the Company and Thrasher to. engage in a strike,
an object thereof being to force.or require the Company to cease doing business
with Collins, a subcontractor.
e3 Ratner & Come, "The Norris-LaGuardia Act in the Constitution, 11 George Washington
Law Review , 428, 469.
54 Carpenter's & Joiners Union of America v. Sperry, and Printing Specialties and Paper
Converters Union, Local 888 v. LaBaron, supra.
cs Mr. Justice Frankfurter , concurring, in the Closed Shop cases , 23 L. R . R. M. 2205,
2207-2208.
522 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activity of the Respondents, set forth in Section III, above, insofar as
it occurred in connection with the operations of the Company, set forth in
Section I, above, has a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic,
and commerce among the several States, and would tend to lead, and in this
instance has led, to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the
free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
The Respondents, it is found, have violated Section 8 (b) subsection (4) (A)
of the Act by the establishment of a picket line at each of the construction
projects of the Company. Although it is true that the pickets were thereafter
withdrawn, and that both of the projects may now be complete, the matter before
the undersigned, in spite of a contrary contention on the part of the Respondents,
is not thereby rendered moot. Upon the entire record, there is a possibility, the
undersigned finds, that similar action may be undertaken in the future, by the
Respondent Union and its business agent. It will be recommended, therefore,
that the Respondents be ordered to cease and desist from the use of pickets, and
related conduct,66 to induce or encourage the employees of the Company,
Thrasher, or any other employer, to engage in a strike or. concerted refusal in 'the
course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise
handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform
any services, where an object thereof is to force or require the Company or any
employer to cease doing business with Collins. It will be recommended, also
that the Respondents take certain affirmative action to effectuate the policies of
the Act, as amended.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Upon these findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, the under-
signed makes the following conclusions of law :
(1) The United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing
and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, Plumbers and Steam-
fitters Union, Local 498, A. F. of L., is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2 (5) of the Act. Robert Hadaway is an agent of the aforesaid organ-
ization.
(2) The Pettus-Banister Company is engaged in commerce, and business activi-
ties which affect commerce, within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the
Act.
(3) By inducing and encouraging the employees of the Thrasher Electric
Company and the Pettus-Banister Company to engage in a strike, an object
thereof being to force or require the Pettus-Banister Company to cease doing
business with the Collins Heating and Plumbing Company, the Respondents have
engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) subsection
(4) (A) of the Act.
(4) The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices that effect
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
56 Nothing in this Report , however , is intended to prevent the use of "other traditional
modes of communication" by the Respondents to publicize the facts of the "labor dispute"
between the Respondent Union and Collins, the subcontractor, or to outlaw "whatever
psychological pressure may be involved " in the mere use of publicity for that purpose. Cf.
Carpenters and Joiners Union of America v. Ritter's Cafe, supra.
0
UNITED ASSOCIATION OF JOURNEYMEN AND' APPRENTICES, ETC. 523
RECOMMENDATIONS
Upon these findings of fact and conclusions of law, the undersigned recommends
that the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and
Pipe Fitting Industry of the United' States and Canada, Plumbers and Steam-
fitters Union, Local 498, A. F. of L., and its officers, representatives, and agents,
including Robert Hadaway, should :
(1) Cease and desist from inducing and encouraging the employees of the
Pettus-Banister Company, the Thrasher Electric Company, or any other em-
ployer, by picketing or related conduct, to engage in a strike or concerted re-
fusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport
or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities,
or to perform any services, where an object thereof is to force or require the
Pettus-Banister Company, or any employer or other person, to cease doing busi-
ness with the Collins Heating and Plumbling Company.
(2), Take the following affirmative action, which the undersigned finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Post at the business office of the United Association of Journeymen and
Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States
and Canada, Plumbers and Steamfitters Union, Local 498, A. F. of L., in Gadsden,
Alabama, and the office utilized by it in Anniston, Alabama, copies of the notice
attached to this Report. Copies of the notice, to be furnished by the Regional
Director of the Tenth Region, as the agent of the Board, should be posted by
the Respondents, immediately upon their receipt, after being duly signed by an
official representative of the Respondent Union and individually by Robert
Hadaway, as its agent, and should be maintained by them for sixty (60) con-
secutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices
to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps should be taken by the
Respondents to insure that these notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material ;
(b) Send copies of the notice attached to this Report to the Anniston Building
Trades Council and to each of its affiliated labor organizations.
(c) File with the Regional Director of the Tenth Region, as the agent of the
Board, within twenty (20) days after the date of service of this Intermediate
Report and Recommended Order, a report in writing setting forth in detail, the
manner and form in which they have complied with the foregoing recommenda-
tions.
All parties are advised that upon the filing of this Intermediate Report and
Recommended Order and the service of copies upon the parties-as provided in
Section 203.45 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations
Board, Series 5, as amended, effective August 18, 1948-the Board will enter an
order transferring the case to itself, and will serve a copy of the order upon each
of the parties, setting forth the date of the transfer.
If, within twenty (20) days after the date of service of this Intermediate
Report and Recommended Order, the Respondents satisfy the Regional Director,
as the agent of the Board, that they have complied, or will comply, with the
foregoing recommendations, it is recommended that the National Labor Rela-
tions Board issue an order, or take other appropriate action, to close the case on
compliance. Unless the Respondents satisfy the Regional Director, within
twenty (20) days after the date of service of this Intermediate Report and Rec-
ommended Order that they have complied, or will comply, with the foregoing
recommendations, it is recommended that the National Labor Relations Board
issue an order requiring the Respondents to take such action.
524 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
All parties are advised, however, that any party may, within twenty (20)
days after the date of service of the order transferring the case to the Board,
file with the Board, Washington 25, D. C.-pursuant to Section 203.46 of the
Rules and Regulations-an original and six copies of a statement in writing
setting forth such exceptions to the Intermediate Report and Recommended
Order or to any other part of the record or proceeding (including rulings upon
all motions or objections) as he relies upon, together with the original and six
copies of a brief in support of the exceptions. Matters not included in the state-
ment of exceptions may not thereafter be urged before the Board, or in any
further proceeding under the Act. Any party also may, within the same period,
file an original and six copies of a brief in support of the Intermediate Report and
Recommended Order. Immediately upon the filing of such a statement of
exceptions and supporting brief, or the filing of. a brief in support of the Inter-
mediate Report and Recommended Order, the party filing any such document
shall serve a copy of it upon each of the other parties. Proof of service upon
the other parties shall be promptly made, as required by Section 203.85, with re-
spect to all papers filed with the Board.
Should any party desire permission to argue orally before the Board, a request
for such permission must be made in writing to the Board within ten (10) days
after the date of service of the order transferring the case to the Board.
The parties are further advised that, in the event no statement of exceptions
is filed, as provided by the Rules and Regulations, and in the absence of com-
pliance, all objections and exceptions to this Intermediate Report and Recom-
mended Order shall be deemed to be waived for all purposes-as provided. in
Section 203.48 of the Rules and Regulations-and the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations contained in it shall be adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions, and order.
Dated at Washington, D. C., this 23rd day of March 1949.
MAURICE M. MILLER,
Trial Examiner.
APPENDIX
NOTICE
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, we hereby give notice that :
WE WILL NOT induce or encourage any employees of the PETTUS-BANISTER
COMPANY, the THRASHER ELECTRIC COMPANY, or any other employer, by
picketing or related conduct, to engage in a strike or concerted refusal in
the course of their employment, to use, maitufacture, process, transport, or
otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities,
or to perform any services, where an object thereof is to force or require
UNITED A'SISOCIATION OF JOURNEYMEN AND APPRENTICES, ETC. 525
the PET us-BANISTER COMPANY, or any employer or other person to cease
doing business with the COLLINS HEATING AND PLUMBING COMPANY.
UNITED ASSOCIATION OF JOURNEYMEN AND APPRENTICES
OF THE PLUMBING AND PIPE FITTING INDUSTRY OF
THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA , PLUMBERS AND
STEAMFITTERS UNION , LocAL 498, A . F. of L.
Labor Organization.
By ------------------------------------------------
(Title of Officer)
ROBERT HADAWAY ,, Business Agent.
Dated --------------------
This notice must remain posted for sixty (60) days from the date of posting
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.