United Aircraft Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 10, 1972

204 N.L.R.B. 879 (N.L.R.B. 1972)

UNITED AIRCRAFT CORP.
United Aircraft Corporation (Pratt & Whitney and
Hamilton Standard Division ) and Local Lodges #
1746, 743 and 700, International Association of Ma-
chinists and Aerospace Workers , AFL-CIO
United Aircraft Corporation (Pratt & Whitney Divi-
sion) and Canel Lodge No. 700, International Asso-
ciation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-
CIO. Cases 1-CA-7234, 1-CA-6952, and 1-
CA-7518
July 10, 1972
DECISION AND ORDER
On April 17, 1972, Administrative Law Judge 1
Melvin Pollack issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, General Counsel, Respon-
dent, and Charging Party filed exceptions, supporting
briefs, and reply briefs.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge only to
the extent consistent herewith.
The Administrative Law Judge found that
Respondent's history of unfair labor practices,2 plus
the additional unfair practices which he found were
committed in this case, demonstrates Respondent's
continuing enmity towards its employees' exercise of
rights protected by the Act. In these circumstances,
the Administrative Law Judge concluded that defer-
ral to arbitration of the instant dispute is inappropri-
ate and, indeed, precluded under the Board's doctrine
in Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837, which, in
finding deferral appropriate, specifically relied, inter
alia, on the absence of evidence establishing employer
enmity towards its employees' exercise of protected
rights. We find merit in Respondent's exceptions to
these findings.
It is true that in Collyer, supra, we noted, as one of
the factors supporting our decision to defer to the
parties' available grievance and arbitration machin-
ery, that there had been a long relationship between
the company and the union and a lack of any employ-
er hostility towards unions in general. We continue to
believe that an exploration of the nature of the rela-
tionship between the parties is relevant to the question
of whether in a particular case we ought or ought not
defer contractually resolvable issues to the parties'
'The title of "Trial Examiner" was changed to "Administrative Law
Judge" effective August 19, 1972.
2 United Aircraft Corporation, 179 NLRB 935, enfd. 440 F.2d 85 (C.A. 2,
1971); United Aircraft Corporation, 180 NLRB 278, enfd. 440 F.2d 85 (C.A.
2, 1971; United Aircraft Corporation, 188 NLRB 633 ; and United Aircraft
Corporation, 192 NLRB 382. The unfair labor practice findings in these cases
are based on events and conduct which occurred from 1960 through 1969.
879
own machinery. Where the facts show a sufficient
degree of hostility, either on the facts of the case at bar
alone or in the light of prior unlawful conduct of
which the immediate dispute may fairly be said to be
simply a continuation, there is serious reason to ques-
tion whether we ought defer to arbitration.
However, the nature and scope of the acts currently
alleged to show such hostility, together with a measure
of the current impact of any past such acts, must all
be evaluated and then together be weighed against
evidence as to the developing or maturing nature of
the parties' collective-bargaining relationship and the
proven effectiveness (or lack thereof) of the available
grievance and arbitration machinery. Upon a totality
of those facts, it must then be determined whether the
parties ' agreed-upon grievance and arbitration ma-
chinery can reasonably be relied on to function prop-
erly and to resolve the current disputes fairly.
If the conduct here complained of, viewed in the
context of serious past unlawful conduct, appears to
establish a continuing pattern of efforts to defeat the
purposes of our Act then, particularly if the evidence
also should indicate that the parties' own machinery
is either untested or not functioning fairly and
smoothly, it would seem obvious that we could not
reasonably rely on the parties' voluntary machinery
fairly and promptly to resolve the underlying prob-
lem. In such a situation, therefore, the Act's purposes
could best be served by our taking jurisdiction in the
first instance.
But if , on the contrary, there is now effective dis-
pute-solving machinery available, and if the combina-
tion of past and presently alleged misconduct does
not appear to be of such character as to render the use
of that machinery unpromising or futile, then we
ought not depart from our usual deferral policies.
As we said in National Radio Company, Inc., 198
NLRB No. 1:
The question whether, in fact, the policies and
purposes of the Act will be furthered by absten-
tion here and in similar cases is more complex.
The crucial determinant is, we believe, the reason-
ableness of the assumption that the arbitration pro-
cedure will resolve this dispute in a manner
consistent with the standards of Spielberg. [Empha-
sis supplied.]
In cases such as this, therefore, it is incumbent upon
us to review the past conduct and the present allega-
tions of misconduct so as to test whether it appears
sufficient to rebut the reasonableness of our funda-
mental assumption that the parties' own procedures
will effectively resolve the current disputes in a
prompt and fair manner.
Attempting to place the relevant factors in context,
we note at the outset that the unfair labor practices
204 NLRB No. 133
880 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
previously found to have been committed by Respon-
dent, as well as those here alleged, occurred in various
of Respondent's nine plants within the State of Con-
necticut which employ a total of well over 40,000
employees. We note further that the events in this
proceeding occurred at Respondent's East Hartford
plant which employs nearly 24,000 workers, the Mid-
dletown plant with 3,500 employees, and the Windsor
Locks plant which has over 4,700 employees.
It is in this context of a sizeable employee popula-
tion that we must examine the allegations in this case.
In so doing, we note that in large part the acts of
harassment and coercion alleged herein consist of ac-
tivities of some 13 or so individual first-level supervi-
sors and several plant security employees.' When we
consider that there are 1,274 supervisors in the East
Hartford plant, 235 in the Middletown plant, and 136
at the Windsor Locks plant, it becomes apparent that
the proportion of allegedly offending supervisors and
the nature of the allegations are minor indeed. Thus
we do not find that the number and nature of these
instances of alleged misconduct reflect a pattern of
continuation of prior unfair labor practices found
against this Respondent.
In evaluating whether we can reasonably rely on
contractual machinery satisfactorily to resolve dis-
putes, alleged misconduct by a few should not lead us
to overly hasty conclusions. Such occasional first-lev-
el supervisory misconduct does not, in our view, nec-
essarily establish a disinclination on the part of
Respondent to accept the reality of collective repre-
sentation or to honor its contractual commitments
dealing with procedures for dispute resolution.
On the other side of the coin, we note specifically
that the Administrative Law Judge here dismissed the
8(a)(3) allegations as to employees Sullivan and Urba-
nowicz on the ground that their suspensions had been
fully and successfully processed under the parties'
voluntary machinery. The Union's claims of unjust
suspensions have thus been arbitrated, the suspen-
sions found unjustified, and the Company has in each
instance fully complied with the arbitrator's awards.
This, then, is evidence that the parties' agreed-upon
grievance and arbitration machinery has worked-
and worked fairly-when given a chance.
Turning then to the alleged failures by Respondent
to comply with certain contract requirements relating
to notification of layoffs, furnishing of information,
and summoning of union stewards to management
interviews with employees, we note that these are
clearly matters of contract interpretation uniquely
within the province of the arbitrator's skills. Here, the
3 Without passing on the accuracy of his findings , we note that the Admin-
istrative Law Judge found only six of these allegations to have merit involving
only four supervisors and two plant security employees.
parties' bargaining agreement specifies that Respon-
dent provide the Union certain information at step 2
of the grievance proceeding but is silent as to a like
requirement during step 1. Whether or not this silence
constitutes a waiver and whether or not the step 2
requirement mandates the production of the particu-
lar records and/or information which the Union re-
quested are matters best resolved by arbitration.4
Similarly, the questions of what constitutes "timely"
notice of layoffs under the contract, and whether Re-
spondent was required by the contract to summon a
union steward when it sought to interview particular
employees, are also matters best resolved through the
parties' agreed-upon arbitration procedures. By the
same token, the alleged acts of harassment and dis-
crimination, it seems to us, could also be resolved by
the parties' grievance procedures.5
Being keenly aware of the limited resources of this
Agency, we are not particularly desirous of inviting
any labor organization, particularly one representing
employees in so large a context as this, to bypass their
own procedures and to seek adjudication by this
Board of the innumerable individual disputes which
are likely to arise in the day-to-day relationship be-
tween employees and their immediate supervisors re-
lating to merit ratings and other matters. Fortunately,
most labor organizations under such circumstances
do not come to us with such problems and instead
voluntarily resolve them with the employers under
their contracts. When a labor organization seeks in-
stead to have us resolve each such dispute, we think
it proper to require it, before invoking our services,
initially to invoke the available voluntary machinery.
In earlier cases we have pointed to the congressional
intent evidenced by Section 203(d) of the Act of the
Labor Management Relations Act, declaring
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by
the parties is hereby declared to be the desirable
method for settlement of grievance disputes aris-
ing over the application or interpretation of an
existing collective-bargaining agreement.
And as we have recently said in a somewhat differ-
ent context 6
4 The Supreme Court in N.L R B v Acme Industrial, 385 U.S. 432 ( 1967),
clearly sets forth the Board 's authority to decide questions as to the obliga-
tion to provide information needed by the collective -bargaining representa-
tive A careful reading of the Court's opinion indicates that the Court was
not thereby suggesting that the Board would be precluded from withholding
its processes in such cases where, as here, the contract makes available a
quick and fair means for the resolution of the dispute including, if appropri-
ate, a fully effective remedy for any breach of contract which occurred.
5 As to virtually all of the matters involved in this proceeding there appears
to be no question but that they are covered by the provisions of the contracts
providing for arbitration on the request of either party if the dispute is not
settled under the grievance procedures (the contracts have identical griev-
ance and arbitration provisions ). To the extent that there may be some
question as to the arbitrability of some items, that issue is, of course , for the
arbitrator Norfolk, Portsmouth Wholesale Beer Distributors Association, 196
NLRB 1150.
UNITED AIRCRAFT CORP. 881
... But with the ever-expanding caseload, it is
more important than ever that the Board be per-
mitted to husband its limited resources and apply
them where they have maximum impact in effec-
tuating the Act. Otherwise, time, energy and
manpower are dissipated in seeking to rectify
situations of no real moment while, backed up
behind them, significant violations remain un-
remedied.
We are not persuaded that, if directed to do so by
this Board, the parties here will not make sensible and
effective use of their own procedures to resolve the
kinds of disputes involved in this proceeding. While
the litigious characteristics exhibited in the past by
both parties cannot but create some doubt about this
matter, we believe there is positive evidence of matu-
ration of the collective-bargaining relationship. We
are therefore willing to proceed on the assumption
that the procedures which have been shown to work
well can and will work effectively again to resolve the
disputes here. At least, we think there is sufficient
promise of such a result to justify a temporary with-
holding of our processes and to give the parties an
opportunity to make their own machinery work. We
have observed that such machinery has already effec-
tively resolved two of the three disputed suspensions
which were included in the instant complaint. We see
no reason why the remaining areas of dispute ought
not similarly be referred to the parties for handling
under those contractual procedures.
Having found that the parties' contractual griev-
ance-arbitration process can, and does, function ef-
fectively and fairly and has continued to be utilized
by the parties to their satisfaction, "[w]e believe it to
be consistent with the fundamental objectives of Fed-
eral law to require the parties here to honor their
contractual obligations rather than, by casting this
dispute in statutory terms, to ignore their agreed-upon
procedures." Collyer Insulated Wire, supra.
THE REMEDY
Without prejudice to any party and without decid-
ing the merits of the controversy, we shall order that
the complaint herein be dismissed, but we shall retain
jurisdiction for a limited purpose. We are aware that,
with the exception of the Sullivan and Urbanowicz
suspensions, the parties have not resolved their dis-
putes by the contractual grievance and arbitration
procedure and that, therefore, we cannot now inquire
whether resolution of the dispute will comport with
the standards set forth in Spielberg Manufacturing
6 American Federation of Musicians, Local 76, AFL-CIO (John C Wakely),
202 NLRB No. 80.
Company.' In order to eliminate the risk of prejudice
to any party, we shall retain jurisdiction over this
dispute solely for the purpose of entertaining an ap-
propriate and timely motion for further consideration
on a proper showing that either (a) the dispute has
not, with reasonable promptness after the issuance of
the Decision here, either been resolved by amicable
settlement in the grievance procedure or submitted
promptly to arbitration, or (b) the grievance or arbi-
tration procedures have not been fair and regular or
have reached a result which is repugnant to the Act .8
Respondent contends that there is no need to retain
jursidiction over the matter of the Raymond suspen-
sion as the Union had consciously abandoned the
contractual provision for resolving disputes over dis-
ciplinary suspensions in order to pursue statutory
rights. However, the controversy arose at a time when
the Board decisions may have led the parties to con-
clude that the Board would not defer to arbitration
but would consider that issue on the merits. There-
fore, we shall follow our usual policy and dismiss this
allegation but retain jurisdiction in accordance with
our decision in Collyer, supra.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board hereby orders that the complaint herein
be, and it hereby is, dismissed, provided, however,
that:
Jurisdiction of this proceeding is hereby retained
for the limited purposes indicated in that portion of
our Decision and Order entitled "The Remedy."
MEMBERS FANNING AND JENKINS , dissenting:
The majority here demonstrates that much of the
justification used to support its Collyer policy is sim-
ply meaningless rhetoric to be ignored when the facts
do not fit the mold. Thus the majority is deferring here
where there is a history of enmity by Respondent
toward employee rights, the Respondent and the
Union have not for some time had a stable bargaining
relationship, the arbitration procedure may not be
reasonably available, arbitration as to most of the
allegations is not likely to result in a quick resolution
of the disputes, and some of the matters are subject
to arbitration only upon a mutual agreement of the
parties.
The Administrative Law Judge finds that Respon-
dent has a history of enmity towards union support-
ers. This finding is in keeping with the findings the
Board and the court of appeals have made in recent
7112 NLRB 1080
Collyer Insulated Wire, supra
882 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS $OARD
cases involving the Respondent. Thus, in United Air-
craft Corporation, 179 NLRB 935, 937, the Board
found Respondent's conduct "demonstrated hostility
towards unionism and proclivity towards violating the
Act." In United Aircraft Corporation, 188 NLRB 633,
the Board found "the record shows that a pattern of
discrimination against union stewards has been
perpetrated by the Respondent in prior cases." 9 On
enforcement of the cases reported at 179 NLRB 935
and 180 NLRB 278, the court found that the many
unfair labor practices "follow a general pattern of
anti-union hostility and discriminatory conduct."
United Aircraft Corporation v. N. L. R. B., 440 F.2d 85,
100 (C.A. 2, 1971).
Ignoring these previous findings the majority in ef-
fect holds that where it can find any evidence, no
matter how little, to indicate that employee rights may
be vindicated through the arbitration process they will
defer to arbitration. Thus, though our colleagues in-
clude some language to the effect that there is serious
question as to whether the Board ought to defer where
the facts show a sufficient degree of hostility, either on
the facts of the case at bar or in the light of prior
unlawful conduct of which the immediate dispute
may fairly be said to be simply a continuation, these
considerations are almost entirely cast aside in con-
cluding that arbitration is appropriate herein. No-
where in the majority's opinion is there any mention
of several of the recent cases involving these parties in
which this Board has found Respondent has commit-
ted violations which demonstrate its desire to frustrate
employee rights.10
Instead the majority brushes aside the allegations
involving the harassment of employees acting as stew-
ards because of their union activities as being the
activities of first echelon supervisors and plant securi-
ty employees. In doing so the majority ignores the
recent findings that similar conduct was done with the
approval of upper echelon officials:
[I]n light of the many instances where internal
security investigators went out of their way to
find grounds for discharging stewards, even to
the point of falsifying statements, it defies credu-
lity to argue that the investigators were doing this
without the knowledge and sanction of upper-
echelon company officials. In fact, the record
reveals numerous instances of investigations
being initiated or supervised by the personnel
9 Citing United Aircraft Corporation, 180 NLRB 278, and United Aircraft,
179 NLRB 935.
10 United Aircraft Corporation, 139 NLRB 39, enfd 324 F.2d 128 (C A 2,
1963), United Aircraft Corporation, 144 NLRB 492, enfd . 333 F.2d 819 (C.A.
2, 1964); United Aircraft Corporation, 181 NLRB 892, enfd . 434 F.2d 1198
(C.A. 2, 1970), United Aircraft Corporation, 179 NLRB 935, enfd 440 F.2d
85 (C A 2, 1971); UnitedAircraft Corporation, 180 NLRB 278, enfd 440 F.2d
85 (C.A. 2, 1971), United Aircraft Corporation, 188 NLRB 633; and United
Aircraft Corporation, 192 NLRB 382
department. United Aircraft, supra, 440 F.2d at
92.
Also ignored is the Board's finding in 188 NLRB 633,
made just prior to the court's handing down its deci-
sion, cited above, that the record showed a pattern of
antiunion hostility and discriminatory conduct in the
cases enforced in that court decision. Although the
majority finds a maturation of the collective-bargain-
ing relationship, apparently finding that the conduct
of the earlier cases did not continue in this case, that
finding is without basis and ignores the fact that much
of the conduct alleged in the instant case is contempo-
raneous with the conduct ,found unlawful in the case
reported in Volume 188. In any case, the character of
harassment and discrimination alleged as unlawful in
this case appears to be virtually identical or sufficient-
ly close in many instances to the conduct found un-
lawful in the Volumes 179, 180, and 188 cases to
permit no other conclusion but that, the conduct, if it
occurred as alleged, is part of the same pattern of
conduct.
Although in past cases the majority has pointed to
the stability of the collective-bargaining relationship
as a basis for deferring, they do not attempt to de-
scribe the relationship here as a stable relationship,
ignoring another of their stated criteria for deferring.
That is quite understandable as this relationship in
recent years has been quite unstable." Since the diffi-
cult strike of 1960, the relationship between Respon-
dent and the Union has been marked by constant
litigation over one issue or another. The issues herein
represent a continuation of that turbulent relation-
ship. We do not see how the Board's refusal to decide
the issues presented to it can do other than exacerbate
the difficulties in that relationship.
As noted above our colleagues seek to ignore the
Respondent's history of enmity and the lack of a sta-
ble relationship on the basis of two arbitration awards
wherein employees' rights were at least partially vindi-
cated. They state, in effect, that if an employee has
even a small chance of having his rights vindicated by
arbitration or if one or two employees somehow have
managed to do so, that is sufficient justification to
warrant deferral to arbitration of all issues in the case.
This hardly seems like a sufficient basis for ignoring
a prior pattern of enmity toward basic employee
rights.
Moreover, the allegations in the complaint suggest
that in many cases employees of Respondent find it
11 This has not always been so The Board once described the pre-1960
relationship of the Respondent and the Union as "amicable extending back
to 1946." United Aircraft Corporation, 134 NLRB 1632, 1633. We would hope
that the Respondent and the Union would make every effort to again attain
that relationship . Unfortunately, unlike our colleagues , we do not see any
positive evidence of a maturation of the collective -bargaining relationship.
Until there is such progress we must deal with the situation as it is and not
as we would like it to be
UNITED AIRCRAFT CORP. 883
very difficult or impossible to obtain vindication of
their rights through the arbitration procedure. Thus,
Respondent is alleged to have refused to provide in-
formation necessary to the processing of certain griev-
ances. Although the subject matter of those
grievances is different, if these allegations were sus-
tained, serious • questions would be raised as to the
reasonable availability of the arbitration process for
the vindication of employee rights. Clearly, the un-
lawful failure to provide information relevant to the
arbitration process even in a case not involving em-
ployer hostility toward union activity strikes at the
heart of the process itself and inhibits full and fair use
of that process. The majority's policy of placing great
reliance on probate dispute settlement procedures
makes the full availability of information relevant to
the disposition of grievances extremely important.
Board enforcement of the duty to furnish relevant
information is an essential means of assuring that
arbitration awards will be supported by substantial
evidence bearing on the issues raised by the dispute.
Thus the majority observed in Joseph T. Ryerson &
Sons, Inc., 199 NLRB No. 44, that in "declining to
intervene in disputes best settled elsewhere we must
assure ourselves that those alternative procedures are
not only `fair and regular' but that they are and were
open, in fact, for use by the disputants. These consid-
erations caution against our abstention on a claim
that a respondent has sought, by prohibited means, to
inhibit or preclude access to the grievance proce-
dures." Despite the great importance of the access to
information in making the arbitration process func-
tion properly the majority sees fit to abdicate its re-
ponsibility to see to it that such information is readily
available ignoring still another of their stated criteria.
The effect of our colleagues' holding is to violate
the spirit of the Supreme Court's decision in N. L. R. B.
v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967). In that
case, the Court noted that Board orders compelling
the disclosure of information are an aid to the arbitra-
tion process, stating at 438:
Arbitration can function properly only if the
grievance procedures leading to it can sift out
unmeritorious claims. For if all claims originally
initiated as grievances had to be processed
through to arbitration, the system would be woe-
fully overburdened. Yet, that is precisely what
the respondent's restrictive view would require. It
would force the union to take a grievance all the
way through to arbitration without providing the
opportunity to evaluate the merits of the claim.
[Footnote omitted.]
Thus the Court emphasized the ability of the union to
evaluate the merits of a grievance. The majority's
holding will preclude such evaluation.
Furthermore, the majority's decision will preclude
a quick vindication of employee rights, thus ignoring
still another of its Collyer criteria. The effect of our
colleagues holding herein is to require employees in
many cases to go through two arbitration proceedings
before they can obtain vindication of their rights.
Thus, under the contract herein, an employee may file
a grievance concerning his merit rating. At step 2, the
employee is entitled to "such pertinent existing pro-
duction, payroll, attendance records, and disciplinary
notices pertaining to the employees involved as may
be necessary to the settlement of a grievance at this
step of the grievance procedure." Respondent is al-
leged to have denied employees this information in
violation of Section 8(a)(5). The collective-bargaining
agreement provides that violations of step 2 of the
grievance procedure are themselves subject to the
grievance procedure and ultimately to compulsory ar-
bitration. Thus, in order to obtain the information
necessary for the processing of a merit rating griev-
ance under the contract, a grievant will initially have
to file a grievance and process it to the point where the
requested information is denied at step 2 and file an-
other grievance which will be filed and processed to
arbitration, at which point the employee presumably
can seek to further process the original grievance. This
cumbersome procedure can hardly be described as a
quick vindication of employee rights. Moreover, it
places the exact strain on the arbitration process
which concerned the Court in Acme Industrial, supra.
Finally, and least understandable of all, is the
majority's unwillingness to decide those issues which
none of the parties contend are subject to the manda-
tory arbitration provisions in the contract. As to most
of the allegations of 8(a)(1) violations there is no con-
tention that the violations are subject to arbitration
upon demand under the contract.12 The majority sim-
ply glosses over these items by saying that the jurisdic-
tion of the arbitration is for the arbitrator to decide.
The effect is to compel the Union to go through the
expense and effort of arbitration so as to obtain the
rejection on jurisdictional grounds, which it is certain
to obtain, and then to bring the matter back to the
Board for resolution. The net effect is likely to be a
decision by the Union and/or grievants that the whole
matter is not worth the trouble. The result is a com-
plete frustration of employee rights. This result is in-
defensible.
12 The contract limits the right of a party to insist on arbitration to 39
specified items.
884 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MELVIN POLLACK , Trial Examiner : The above-captioned
cases , arising under the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended , were consolidated for hearing on May 13, 1971,
and were heard by the Trial Examiner at Hartford Connect-
icut, on 25 days beginning June 1 and ending July 28, 1971.
Charges in Case l-CA-7234 were filed on August 10, 1970,
December 23, 1970, and February 22, 1971. A charge was
filed on December 22, 1969 , in Case 1-CA-6952. A charge
was filed on February 22, 1971, in Case 1-CA-7518. A
complaint in Case 1-CA-7234 was issued on February 4,
1971, and amended on April 15, April 28, May 3, and May
13, 1971. The complaint was further amended when the
cases were consolidated for hearing on May 13 , 1971. Briefs
were filed by each of the parties and have been duly consid-
ered. Upon the entire record in the case ,' and from my
observation of the witnesses and their demeanor , I make the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
United Aircraft Corporation, a Delaware corporation, is
engaged in the manufacture and sale of aircraft engines,
helicopters, aircraft accessories and parts, electronic devices
and components thereof. Involved in this proceeding are
plants of the Company's Pratt & Whitney Division at East
Hartford and Middletown, Connecticut, and the Windsor
Locks, Connecticut, plant of its Hamilton Standard Divi-
sion . The annual interstate purchases and sales of the
Company's Connecticut plants each exceed $1 million. The
Company is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
Local Lodges 1746, 743, and 700, International Associa-
tion of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, are
each labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act.
III THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES 2
A. The Issues
The charging parties (herein referred to collectively as the
Union) represent employees at the Pratt & Whitney East
Hartford and Middletown (Canel) plants, and the Hamilton
Standard Windsor Locks plant. in separate plantwide units.
' The following documents submitted after the close of the hearing have
been received into evidence - ( I) A letter dated August 19, 1971, from Joseph
C. Wells, to Mozart G. Ratner, as C.P . Exh. 4 , (2) A document captioned
"Offer of Proof" as Resp Exh. 90 (rejected), (3) Arbitrator Gregory's deci-
sion and award of September 17, 1971, concerning the suspension of Robert
Sullivan , as Resp . Exh. 91 (a), and (4) a check issued to Robert Sullivan and
attached payroll deduction record as Resp . Exh 91 (b). The General
Counsel's motion to make part of the record material submitted as an appen-
dix to his brief is denied.
The principal matters alleged in the complaint are that the
Company harassed and discriminated against shop stew-
ards at the foregoing plants, in violation of Section 8(a)(1)
and (3) of the Act, and that the Company violated the
Union's representation rights, inter aha, by failing to give
timely notice of layoffs, and by refusing to supply informa-
tion necessary for the handling of merit rating grievances,
in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
B. Harassment and Discrimination
1. Michael Dorsey
Dorsey, an employee at the East Hartford plant, is a
"top" union organizer and has served as shop steward, shop
committeeman, and union delegate. He ran unsuccessfully
for union office in 1969 and was a union steward at the time
of the alleged harassment and discrimination. Union stew-
ards, unlike shop stewards, are not recognized as union
spokesmen for purposes of administering the union con-
tracts. Dorsey's supervisors knew that he was an active
union man.
Dorsey began work with the Company in July 1964 at
labor grade 7. He was promoted to labor grade 5 in Septem-
ber 1966 and by November 1968 had advanced from 95
percent job rate to "R" rate.' Foreman Drysdale told Dor-
sey that one reason for his failure to get a "P" rate was
excessive talking, people coming to [his] area . . . stopping,
passing the time of day or asking [him] a question or asking
[him] for a tool." Drysdale was transferred in October 1969
and was replaced by Foreman Daniel Propiescus.
On one occasion in November, Propiescus watched Dor-
sey at work so intently as to cause comment by leadman
Raymond Updike. Shortly after an employee had talked to
Dorsey, Propiescus called Dorsey over to his desk and repri-
manded him for talking too much to people coming into the
area, saying it showed poor use of working time. He asked
Dorsey if he was conducting union business on company
time . Dorsey said he was not. He said it was "funny" that
Propiescus singled him out for talking. Propiescus replied
that Dorsey was working on a "number one priority" en-
gine.
2 The Company argues that certain matters alleged as unfair labor practic-
es should be deferred to arbitration on the basis of Collyer Insulated Wire,
192 NLRB 837 In Collyer, the central issue was whether contract provisions
authorized unilateral changes in wage rates In deciding to defer to arbitra-
tion , the Board , inter aha , relied upon the fact that "no claim is made of
enmity by Respondent to employees' exercise of protected rights." The Com-
pany has a history of enmity to union supporters United Aircraft Corporation,
179 NLRB 935, enfd 440 F 2d 85 (C.A. 2, 1971), United Aircraft Corporation,
180 NLRB 278, enfd 440 F.2d 85 (C.A. 2, 1971, United Aircraft Corporation,
188 NLRB 633; United Aircraft Corporation, 192 NLRB 382 I find in this
decision that the Company has further infringed upon its employees ' statuto-
ry rights. In these circumstances, I find Collyer inapplicable to the issues in
this case
' The Company' s rating system is described below, sec. III, C, 3.
UNITED AIRCRAFT CORP. 885
One day in December, General Foreman John Reinhart
observed Dorsey talking to employee Tim Bronstein in the
latter's work area. Pursuant to Reinhart's instructions, upon
Dorsey's return to his work area, Propiescus asked Dorsey
what he was doing in Bronstein's work area. Dorsey ex-
plained that he was visiting Bronstein that evening and had
stopped to ask him directions.
On February 26, 1970, upon completing his work, Dorsey
went to the men's room. When he returned, Updike, who
had been promoted to assistant foreman, gave Dorsey a
verbal warning for leaving the area for an "excessive
amount of time" a and another verbal warning for improper
assembly of "burner cans." 5 He told Dorsey "from now on
let me know when you leave the line and when you come
back." Propiescus subsequently informed a shop steward
that Dorsey had to check in only when he left the depart-
ment and not every time he left the line, even to go to the
men's room.
About 3 weeks later, Propiescus asked Dorsey, a "B"
man, why Ryan, the "C" man working with him, was not
wearing safety glasses . Dorsey said he had told Ryan to
wear glasses but that Ryan had refused because he had only
a couple of nuts to wire and the glasses bothered him. Pro-
piescus gave Dorsey a verbal warning for not requiring
Ryan, a new man in the department, to wear safety glasses.
On March 6, 1970, Propiescus gave Dorsey an employee
report to the effect that he would be demoted if his work did
not improve. Propiescus told Dorsey that he was talking
excessively to people going through his work area and re-
minded Dorsey of some instances of faulty work on his part.
In May 1970, Propiescus gave Dorsey a merit rating of 90
percent of job rate. The rating covered the period Septem-
ber 1969 to March 1970. Propiescus also gave him an em-
ployee report similar to the March report. He told Dorsey
he had downrated him for excessive talking, faulty work,
quitting early, and safety glasses incidents.
During the period September 1969 to March 1970, Dor-
sey was charged with causing a heat shield to be burnt off,
with failing to make a proper engine check, and with im-
proper installation of burner cans. On one occasion, he
ignored assistant foreman Updike's request that he sign off
certain work performed by him. On an assignment to anoth-
er department, Dorsey's failure to pass on information
caused work to be redone.
Drysdale, Propiescus' predecessor, told Dorsey he talked
too much on the job. It does not appear that Dorsey thereaf-
ter made any effort to cut down on his talking to the other
employees. As noted above, he performed some faulty work
during the September to March rating period. Dorsey's
chief and repeated complaint was that Dorsey engaged in
excessive talking. I find that the General Counsel has not
established by a preponderance of the evidence that Re-
spondent, by its supervisors Rinehart, Propiescus, and Up-
dike, harassed Dorsey in his work and downrated him
° Dorsey said he had been away 5 minutes. Updike placed Dorsey's ab-
sence at about 25 minutes.
1 Dorsey's error required rework of 8-10 manhours.
6 Propiescus had told Dorsey in January 1970 that it was his responsibility
that men under him observe safety rules.
because he was an active union man .7
2. Joseph M. Gleason
Gleason, an employee at the East Hartford plant, became
a shop steward in 1965 and a shop committeeman in 1957.
He was a union (unrecognized) steward from 1969 until
1971. Toward the end of February 1970, he received a ver-
bal warning from Assistant Foreman George Newman be-
cause the day before, pursuant to instructions from General
Foreman Ben Deskus, Newman had checked on Gleason
and noted that Gleason left his work area 17 times. New-
man said Gleason was carrying tools 7 times and asked
Gleason to explain his other absences from his work station.
After Gleason gave his explanations, Newman instructed
him to report to him every time he left his work area, includ-
ing visits to the men's room. A few days later, Foreman
George Gifford told Gleason he should report to Newman
only when he left the department.
On June 8, 1970, Gleason walked over to Deskus' desk to
have him "sign a rush." Deskus was on the telephone. Glea-
son noticed a personnel form in front of Deskus with a
notation charging Gleason with "poor output and use of
working time" on June 5. He took the matter up with Gif-
ford, who reported back to him that he had misread the
notation. He also spoke to Newman, who had observed his
work on June 5. Newman said he had no business sneaking
around Deskus' area "and that it was in the hands of securi-
ty.,,
According to Gleason, whenever he spoke to another
employee, Newman "would come over there and stand
there."
Gleason was told in 1968, in connection with his merit
rating, that he was away from his job too much. He received
an employee report for poor attendance in April 1969, a
"first warning" for poor attendance in June 1969, and a
5-day reprimand in January 1970 for extending his lunch
period. The June 5 notation that Gleason saw on Deskus'
desk was never used against him. I find that the Company
did not harass Gleason on his job, in violation of Section
8(a)(1).
3. William C. Gaskins
Gaskins is employed at the Middletown plant. In April
1970, employee Roosevelt Kane obtained a cigarette from
Gaskins, a shop steward, and paused to watch Gaskins
operate his machine. Foreman Howard Lyman came up
and ordered Kane to return to his work area. He remarked
that Gaskins was a shop steward and knew under the
Company's rules he was not supposed to talk to an employ-
ee during working hours. Gaskins asked if the rule applied
only to shop stewards. Lyman said it applied to everyone
and Gaskins pointed to a group of employees who had been
drinking coffee without interference from Lyman.
A few days later, employee Carolyn Hill came over to
7 I have considered the evidence in light of the Company's history of unfair
labor practices. While that history permits an inference of union animus, it
does not of course diminish the statutory requirement that any unfair labor
practices findings in this case be supported by the preponderance of the
evidence
886 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Gaskms' machine and asked him to change a dollar. Lyman
came up and ordered Hill to return to her work area. He
reminded Gaskins of their previous conversations about
talking during working hours and said the rule applied to
everyone and not just stewards. Gaskins complained that
"other people talk and you don't bother them." Lyman said
he knew the rule and must abide by it.
About this time, Gaskins' leadman sent him to another
department to get parts from employee Koch. Lyman
stopped him on his way back and said he should have
checked in with Koch's foreman "so that you won't be
accused of conducting union business on company time."
In October 1970, Gaskins had a conversation with Virgin-
ia Moody at her machine. About an hour later, Lyman came
up to Gaskins' machine and said Foreman Savarese told
him Gaskins had been talking to Moody. He complained
that he had told Gaskins over and over that employees
could not talk to stewards during working hours. He said
Savarese could think he was trying to sign Moody into the
Union.
I do not credit Lyman's testimony to the effect that he
only cautioned Gaskins against excessive talking. Lyman
conceded that he allowed employees to spend a few minutes
in nonwork related conversations if they did not abuse the
privilege. I find that Lyman did not afford the same privi-
lege equally to Gaskins because he was a shop steward,
thereby violating Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
In April 1970, Gaskins on his lunch hour passed out merit
ratings to employees in other departments. He was told by
Lyman and General Foreman Foster that by agreement of
the Company and the Union merit ratings could be passed
out only in the cafeteria and locker room. Gaskins said he
was permitted to engage in union work on his own time. A
few days later Lyman told Gaskins that he was wrong and
Gaskins right. I find no unlawful harassment of Gaskins in
this episode.
Prior to April 23, 1970, shop stewards at the Middletown
plant where Gaskins worked had been permitted to take
their union briefcases in and out of the plant upon a "sight
inspection" by a plant guard. On April 23, a guard advised
Gaskins that he had been instructed by the personnel de-
partment not to permit anyone to take a union briefcase out
of the plant without a pass .9 Gaskins took the matter up with
Foreman Lyman. He said that he used the briefcase to bring
in merit ratings, contract books, employee service records,
checkoff cards, and other union material. Lyman replied
that he would issue a pass for the briefcase only when Gas-
kins was called out on a grievance or to attend a second step
grievance meeting. Lyman issued 18 briefcase passes to
Gaskins between April 24, 1970, and July 27, 1971. Gaskins'
testimony to the effect that these passes were limited to
grievance proceedings stands uncontradicted. The Compa-
ny has advanced no reason why Lyman should not have
issued passes to Gaksins to take his union briefcase out of
the plant after an inspection of its contents. I find his failure
to do so violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
8 The pass required by the Company's security regulations to take materi-
als in and out of the plant had been orally waived at the Middletown plant
by Personnel Director Colby
4. Dennis J. Havener
Havener is a vice president of Local 700 and a shop
steward at the Middletown plant. A guard told him on April
24, 1970, that he needed a pass to take his union briefcase
out of the plant. The next day, Havener told Foreman Rob-
inson that as a steward he needed a pass every day for the
briefcase. Robinson issued Havener a daily pass for several
weeks and then informed him that he would issue a pass for
the briefcase only when it was necessary. Havener said it
was necessary for him to take the briefcase out each night.
Robinson repeated that he would give Havener a pass when
it was "necessary" such as when Havener was presenting a
grievance to a foreman or attending a Friday grievance
meeting with the Company. About a week later, Robinson
told Havener he would limit him to one pass per week. A
few days later, Robinson refused to issue a pass to Havener.
Havener asked the guard at the gate to call personnel. The
guard did so and told Havener "to go back and sign in and
get a pass." Havener asked the guard to call Robinson and
tell him "what personnel had instructed him to do." Haven-
er walked inside the plant and received a pass from Rob-
inson.
In September, Havener renewed his request for a daily
pass to take his briefcase out of the plant. Robinson asked
him "are we going to start that all over again?", gave him
a pass, and said "don't make a habit of it everyday because
you won't get it." On one occasion in September, Robinson
refused Havener a pass. Havener had the guard at the gate
call personnel. The guard told Havener to return to the
plant and get a pass from Robinson. Havener told Robinson
what the guard had said. Robinson called personnel and
then issued a pass to Havener.
On June 11, 1971, in issuing a pass to Havener, Robinson
again said that he would not give Havener a pass on a daily
basis.
I find Robinson's refusal to issue a daily pass to Havener
violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. Gary J. Raymond
Raymond has been a shop steward at the Last Hartford
plant since August 1968. On June 11, 1970, at Raymond's
request, Foreman Herbert Heim signed his requisition for
a box of wipers (cleansing tissues). Raymond obtained the
wipers and, when asked by employee Willy Stevenson how
he could get wipers, told him he needed a signed slip from
Heim. When Stevenson asked Heim for wipers, Heim
walked over to Raymond, took wipers from his box, and
gave them to Stevenson. Heim said to Raymond that he
would make his production standard if he spent as much
time worrying about his job as he did about the wipers.
Heim walked away as Raymond started to protest that he
was "well ahead on the standard." Stevenson came over to
Raymond and said that Heim, using coarse language, had
complained about his talking to Raymond and asking Heim
for wipers and had asked him if there was "some kind of
conspiracy going around here."
On June 16, Heim criticized Raymond for taking "too
much time in general" handling grievances.
On June 25, 1970, Raymond along with other employees
UNITED AIRCRAFT CORP. 887
edged toward the timeclock just before the luncheon buzzer.
After lunch, Heim reprimanded Raymond for "jumping the
clock." Raymond asked Heim why he had not spoken to the
other employees. Heim did not reply. In his testimony Heim
named other employees he had spoken to about leaving
their machines before the luncheon buzzer sounded.
I find that the foregoing incidents, viewed separately or
together, do not warrant a finding that Heim harassed Ray-
mond in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
About June 30, 1970, Raymond went to another depart-
ment to obtain the signature of an employee to a grievance.
He approached Foreman Bly's desk to ask permission to
speak to the employee. Bly stared at him for "quite some
time" and then said Raymond talked too much. Raymond
replied, "I don't think it's really any of your business how
much I talk." He asked Bly to get the employee and Bly did
so. The incident occurred in an area where about 50 em-
ployees were working. Bly was rude to Raymond because
he was a union steward, but his display of antiunion senti-
ment was not accompanied by any coercive act or expres-
sion. I find that Bly did not harass Raymond in violation
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
On October 1, 1970, Raymond asked Heim for his current
merit rating. That afternoon, Heim told Raymond to copy
a merit rating, dated September 28, 1970. Raymond copied
the rating and asked Heim if the rating was "current" or
"new." Heim said it was a new rating. Raymond questioned
Heim about the rating and asked to see his previous rating.
Heim questioned the need for the previous rating and Ray-
mond said, "I think this is a grievable matter. I'm asking for
a steward and I'll handle it myself."
Later that day, Heim told Raymond to punch out on
union business and report to his desk. Raymond did so and
asked Heim for a grievance form. The men got into a heated
argument during which Raymond used vulgar epithets.
Heim waved a pencil at Raymond, who knocked it out of
his hand. Heim ordered Raymond back to work. Raymond
refused to leave until Heim would sign his grievance. Heim
called the personnel department. He then signed the griev-
ance and Raymond returned to work. The company investi-
gated the incident and, on October 5, 1970, suspended
Raymond for 2 weeks.
The record shows strained relations between Raymond
and Heim for some time and the past use of vulgar epithets.
I credit Raymond's testimony that in knocking the pencil
out of Heim's hand, he acted "instinctively." I find that
Raymond, in handling his grievance, did not go beyond
permissible limits and, accordingly, that his suspension was
violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
Prior to his suspension, Raymond was questioned over a
4-hour period by two security investigators. He said that he
would like a steward present but would not press the issued
because another employee, Lionel Labbe, had been threat-
ened with discharge if he insisted on a steward. He was
asked to sign a statement prepared by the investigators. He
objected to a sentence in the preamble that he was present
at Internal Security of his own free will and "without fear,
threat, or promise of favor," but signed the statement. Ac-
cording to Raymond the two investigators "became very
rough" and read statements from the company rule book,
saying, "you know this was true, didn't you." He testified,
however, that the statement "was pretty much as I had
said."
In Quality Manufacturing Company, 195 NLRB 197, the
Board held that an employer violates Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act by disciplining an employee for refusing to submit to
an investigative interview without union representation
where "the employee has reasonable ground to fear that the
interview will adversely affect his continued employment,
or even his working conditions." It would appear equally
violative of Section 8(a)(1) for an employer to compel an
employee under investigation to submit to an interview
without union representation by threat of discipline. I find
below that Lionel Labbe was threatened with discharge if
he insisted on having a shop steward present at an investiga-
tive interview concerning the Raymond-Heim incident.
Raymond told the security investigators in effect that he
would like to have a steward present but that he was not
insisting upon a steward because he understood from Labbe
that he faced discharge if he did so. The investigators' fail-
ure to assure him that no reprisal would follow if he insisted
upon a steward in these circumstances constituted an im-
plied threat to discharge him if he insisted upon having a
steward present at the interview, and hence was violative of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
6. Lionel Labbe
Labbe was called to Internal Security to give a statement
concerning the Raymond-Heim incident. He insisted at first
upon a steward being present but gave a statement to an
investigator when informed by two personnel advisors that
if he persisted in his refusal they would "walk [him] out the
door." As Labbe himself was not under investigation, I find
no violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act in the threat to
discharge him if he refused to submit to an interview with-
out the presence of a union steward.
7. Russell A. Lee
Lee, an employee at the Windsor Locks plant, was elected
shop steward on July 23, 1970. Five days later, Foreman
James Kane told Lee that as a steward management would
look on him differently, that he would be expected to follow
the contract 100 percent, and that disciplinary action would
be taken if he did not. As an example, he said Lee would
be expected to follow the designated aisles in the shop to
walk to the men's room or the cafeteria. Kane also told Lee
that he was not to engage in nonwork related conversations,
and that as a steward he "would be dealt with more harshly
than anyone else" if he broke the Company's work rules.
The next day Kane told Lee that he did not mean to threat-
en him by these remarks and that he could forget them.
Kane's remarks despite his disclaimer were such as to re-
strain employees from engaging in union activity and hence
were violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Lee also testified that he observed General Foreman Ga-
luska "looking down" on him from the mezzanine several
times. I find this testimony insufficient to warrant a finding
that Lee was harassed by excessive surveillance of his work .13
9 Galuska testified that it was impossible to observe Lee at work from the
mezzanine
M DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
8. Robert Sullivan
Sullivan is employed at the Windsor Locks plant. Sulli-
van, a former union officer and an active union member,
was suspended for 3 days for handing some merit ratings to
another employee in a conversation which continued I or
2 minutes after the work buzzer sounded. An arbitrator
found that the suspension was not for "good cause" under
the union contract and awarded Sullivan backpay. The
Company has complied with the award. An unfair labor
practice finding based on this incident would not add mate-
rially to the order in this case . I therefore find it unnecessary
to determine whether Sullivan was suspended for his union
activity.
In interviewing Sullivan about the above incident , securi-
ty officer Porter asked him whether he had obtained the
merit ratings from the Union and whether he was still active
in the Union. When Sullivan said he was not , Porter re-
marked "well how come you have [the merit ratings] if you
are not active with the Union ." Evaluated against Sullivan's
subsequent suspension , I find Porter's interrogation of Sulli-
van about his union activity violative of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
9. Thomas Williams
Williams, an employee at the East Hartford plant, was
appointed a union steward in June 1970. On June 18, Fore-
man Morris Toyen complained to shop steward Berthiaum
that Williams had not yet begun to work although the shift
had started a half hour ago. Berthiaum checked with Wil-
liams, who denied the charge. On June 23, Toyen told Wil-
liams that he had "better put out as much as you possibly
can because I'm going to be here." Toyen stood watch over
Williams throughout the shift. Toyen credibly testified that
the parts Williams was working on were urgently needed.
On June 25, Toyen reprimanded Williams for starting to
wash up too early. Williams complained that Toyen had
said nothing to two other employees who were washing up.
Toyen replied that he was telling Williams what he wanted
Williams to do. He then spoke to the other men. On June
24, Toyen reprimanded Williams for stopping to talk to
Berthiaum and ordered him to use a particular aisle in the
department. He withdrew this order the next day upon
Berthiaum's protest. Williams was assigned to vapor blast
work, an undesirable job, more frequently after he became
union steward. Toyen credibly testified that he rotated the
vapor blast work among several employees.
I find that Toyen did not harass Williams in violation of
Section 8(axl) of the Act.
10. Andrew Sidusky and Richard Duhamel
Sidusky and Duhamel were interviewed separately by
internal security investigators at the East Hartford plant in
connection with a complaint by employee James Carmi-
chael that shop steward Otis Sheline had asked him during
working time to join the Union and since his refusal was
calling him derogatory names. Sidusky and Duhamel were
each called to internal security about three times and signed
statements each time. The investigators asked some ques-
tions about the name calling in the first interview but other-
wise questioned the men intensively on whether Sheline had
ever breached the Company's rule against union solicitation
during working time. The questioning was lengthy and re-
petitive but free of other pressures. I find that Sidusky and
Duhamel were not harassed in violation of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
11. Thaddeus Piorek, Jr.
At a step two grievance meeting at the Middletown plant
on August 21, 1970, concerning the merit rating grievance
of steward Spear, senior steward Piorek and John Phelps,
the Company's chief representative, got into an argument
over the accuracy of Spear's notes that the foreman who
rated him said he "would take his top man in the depart-
ment and rate everyone to that man's standards." Piorek
asked Phelps if he was calling all union representatives
"liars ." Phelps said "yes" and Piorek retorted that he was
calling all the foremen "liars." Phelps said "another state-
ment like that and you are in trouble." Piorek asked if
Phelps was threatening him. Phelps said he was and that
"another outburst like that, you are in trouble and I am
going to fix you." He then denied the grievance.
Both Piorek and Phelps obviously lost their tempers. I do
not believe that Phelps' threat to "fix" Piorek, made in a
moment of anger and not carried out, warrants an unfair
labor practice finding.
C. Refusal to Bargain
1. Notification of layoffs
Paragraph 12(h) of the amended complaint alleges that
since August 27, 1970, the Company has failed to give the
Union timely notice of its intent to lay off employees and
has bypassed the Union and unilaterally notified employees
of layoffs. The union contracts provide in pertinent part
that "where there are general layoffs for an indefinite peri-
od, as much notice as is practicable shall be given in writing
to the shop committee before the layoff. A list will be made
available indicating the names of the employees to be laid
off and their seniority status in relation to the remaining
employees in the occupational group."10
It has been the Company's practice over the years, once
a layoff list is "finalized," to have its personnel advisors
notify the foremen of the affected employees in their re-
spective departments, and the foremen, in turn, inform the
employees. This notification to employees spans a 24-hour
period, since the layoffs are by seniority and usually affect
all three shifts . As the contracts provide that the layoff list
will be given only to the shop chairman, who usually works
the 7 a.m. shift, employees on the swing and midnight shifts
at times receive notice of their layoff before the Union. The
layoffs are effected 2 days after notification. Thus, notice is
10 This provision follows provisions in prior union contracts.
UNITED AIRCRAFT CORP.
given on Wednesday for a layoff effective on Friday.
The union contracts reserve to the Company the right to
determine whether there shall be a layoff and in what areas
the layoffs shall be effected. Layoff must be by seniority or
"demonstrated ability" once the layoff areas are de-
termined. The Union checks the layoff list for seniority
before the layoff is effected. It also has 5 working days after
a layoff to correct an error through the grievance procedure,
and additional time if the layoff affects 300 or more employ-
ees.
The General Counsel and the Union contend that the
Company's notice procedure, by not giving the Union ad-
vance notice of a layoff, detracts from the Union's statutory
representation rights, violates the contract requirement that
the Company give the Union "as much notice as is practica-
ble" of a layoff, and constitutes unilateral action which
serves to belittle the Union in the eyes of the employees.
A union is ordinarily entitled to advance notice of a layoff
so that it may deal with the employer, if it wishes, concern-
ing the necessity and scope of the layoff. The Union, howev-
er, has conceded to the Company the right to determine
unilaterally the need for a layoff and the area in which it
shall be effected. The 3-day notice given the Union has
proved adequate to check out whether the Company has
followed the seniority requirement of the contract. The issue
whether the Company's notice procedure complies with the
contract, a procedure acquiesced in by the Union for years
and not challenged until recently, in the circumstances of
this case does not constitute a statutory violation and is best
left for determination under the grievance and arbitration
provisions of the union contract.
I conclude that the allegations of paragraph 12(b) of the
complaint have not been sustained.
2. Refusals to call shop stewards I
a. Frederick Avery
On August 31, 1970, Foreman Joseph Norton observed
Avery seated on a desk and smoking during working hours
and suspended him for 3 days. On his way out of the plant,
Avery met a shop steward who advised him to request a
shop steward. Avery returned to his department and asked
Norton for a shop steward. Norton ordered Avery out of the
department. Avery went to the union hall to file a grievance.
That evening two personnel department employees called at
Avery's home and told him to report to work the next day.
Avery returned to work the next morning and was not
docked for the time lost the preceding day. He was assigned
to another foreman and asked whether he still wanted a
shop steward. Avery said he did not.
I find that the Company effectively repudiated Norton's
improper refusal to supply Avery with a shop steward.
b. Francis Rogers
On February 5, 1971, Assistant Foreman Kasden told
Rogers to read and sign an employee report that he was not
11 The incidents in this section of the Decision occurred at the Middletown
)Iant
889
making "satisfactory progress toward meeting the minimum
requirements of [his] job." Rogers refused to sign the report
and asked for a shop steward. Assistant Foreman Pearly
Robinson came over and urged Rogers to sign the report.
Rogers repeated that he would not sign the report and again
asked for a steward as Robinson signed the report to com-
plete the disciplinary action against Rogers. Kasden failed
to summon a shop steward as required by the union con-
tract. I find his refusal to do so violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act.
c. Michelle Urbanowicz
On July 22 and again on July 23, 1969, Foreman Ernest
Poppolardo instructed Urbanowicz to sign an attendance
book entry charging her with failing to call in an absence.
Urbanowicz refused to do so and requested a shop steward.
Poppolardo suspended her. In an arbitration proceeding, it
was determined that Urbanowicz "was denied the services
of a shop steward at the guard house on July 23, 1969," and
that this action caused her suspension. Urbanowicz was
awarded backpay. In these circumstances, and as an unfair
labor practice finding based on this incident would not
materially affect the order to be issued in this case, I find
it unnecessary to determine whether Urbanowicz was un-
lawfully denied the services of a shop steward.
3. Refusal to supply merit
rating information
Section 12(a) of the complaint alleges that the Company
has refused to furnish the Union with the standards used by
foremen for merit ratings, as well as other information "rele-
vant and indispensable" to the intelligent processing of
grievances under the Company's merit rating system.
a. The merit rating system
The Company's performance rating plan has been in exis-
tence since 1941. Under the plan, an employee whose per-
formance meets the normal requirements of his job is rated
"J," which stands for job rate, the basic pay for a particular
job. Employees whose performance exceeds normal job re-
quirements are rated R (above standard), P (prenfiinr.}-or
T (top) and may receive additional compensation pre-
scribed for these ratings. Each employee is rated by his
supervisor as to accuracy, output, use of working time, ap-
plication of job knowledge, and cooperation.12 The supervi-
sor is instructed to determine as to each of these factors
whether the employee has met, has not met, or has exceeded
the supervisor's "standard of competency" over the full rat-
ing period. The term "standard of competency" is defined
as "the level of accomplishment with respect to a particular
factor or component of the job's requirements which is ex-
pected by the supervisor as a norm of performance for a
fully qualified employee who is performing all of the re-
quirements of the job."
12 The matters which the Company expects the supervisor to consider in
rating each factor are itemized in a document entitled "Definitions of Perfor-
mance Factors for Hourly Employees." This document, G.C. Exh 39B, is
attached to this Decision as an appendix
890 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Company furnishes the Union sample employee per-
formance rating sheets, together with a description of the
factors, the weight accorded to each factor, the scoring sys-
tem used to determine the rating each employee receives,
and quarterly reports listing those employees who received
pay increases as a result of a higher rating.
b. The processing of merit rating
grievances 13
(1) Tyaack-Bankowski
On June 17, 1970, at Conrad Tyaack's request, Foreman
Anthony Bankowski had shop steward Dennis Havener
called out to handle a merit rating grievance for Tyaack.
After speaking to Tyaack, Havener asked Bankowski what
Tyaack could do to get a better rating. Bankowski asked
Havener what was Tyaack's complaint and Havener replied
to the effect that Tyaack deserved a "T" rating. Bankowski
disagreed and declared that Tyaack should have discussed
his problems with him since he was Tyaack's "immediate
supervision." Havener showed Bankowski the contract arti-
cle giving an employee the right to present a grievance
through the shop steward. Bankowski refused to discuss the
merit rating further with Havener, saying that Havener
knew nothing about toolroom work. Tyaack filed a griev-
ance over Bankowski's refusal to discuss his merit rating
with Havener. About a week later, at a step 1 meeting,
Bankowski denied the grievance and again refused to dis-
cuss the merit rating with Havener because Tyaack had not
first discussed the rating with him and because he did not
believe Havener was qualified to discuss toolroom work.
(2) Doolittle-Wormstedt
On June 3, 1970, at the request of Eleanor Doolittle, shop
steward William Gaskins discussed Doolittle's merit rating
with Foreman Robert Wormstedt. Gaskins asked Worm-
stedt how he rated his employees and Wormstedt replied
that he rated employees based on his experience as a fore-
man and that his rating standards were "in his head."
Wormstedt admitted that he kept records of the employees
but said the records were "personal records" and he did not
have to produce them. Gaskins asked him for Doolittle's
production records and for any E. R.'s (employee reports)
or Q. R.'s (quality review orders) signed by Doolittle.
Wormstedt said such records were his personal records and
he would not produce them. Gaskins reported back to Dool-
ittle, who signed a merit rating grievance.
At a step I grievance meeting on June 10, Wormstedt
reiterated that he rated employees on his experience as a
foreman and that his rating "standards" were "in his head."
He also said he had orders from personnel not to produce
records. He said he felt Doolittle had been rated properly
and denied the grievance.
At a step 2 grievance meeting on June 19, the union
representatives asked for the "standards" used by Foreman
Wormstedt to rate Doolittle and for the records on
13 The incidents described in this section of the Decision occurred at the
Middletown plant
Doolittle's "mistakes." Company Representative Phelps
stated in effect that the foreman's ratings were based on his
experience and observation of the employees. He said Doo-
little had made mistakes and that the Company would pro-
duce Doolittle's attendance record but no other records
"unless the union brings forth arguments, facts and substan-
tiation to support the claims of the grievance, namely that
Doolittle's rating does not correctly evaluate her job perfor-
mance."
(3) Barnes-Savarese
On October 19, 1970, Gaskins asked Foreman Charles
Savarese why he had given Edith Barnes an unsatisfactory
merit rating and requested Savarese for any records he had
relating to her work, such as Friden runoffs, E.R.'s, and
Q.R.'s. Savarese said he relied on his experience as a fore-
man in rating employees. Barnes filed a grievance which
Savarese denied on October 26. Savarese said he believed he
had rated Barnes properly and told Gaskins he had received
orders from personnel not to produce the records which
were "personal." Savarese testified that he had notebook
entries concerning Barnes' work performance and that he
made use of "quality review" and employee reports in rating
Barnes.
(4) Burnett-Lyman
On October 21, 1970, Gaskins asked Foreman Howard
Lyman what Betty Burnett could do to get top rate. Layman
replied that he wished Gaskins "could tell [Lyman's] boss
what he had to do to get top rate." Gaskins asked Lyman
for records relied upon in evaluating Burnett. Lyman said
they were his personal records and he would not show Gas-
kins anything.
(5) DeRaffaele-Keeney
On May 28, 1970, shop steward Theodore Tobin told
Foreman Gordon Keeney that he wanted to talk to him
about the current merit rating of electrician Joseph De-
Raffaele. He asked Keeney to explain his rating standards
and also to make available to him all records that he relied
upon in making the rating. Keeney replied that his stan-
dards were determined by the job itself and that the job
requirements were written up in the job description. He said
he kept personal notes during the rating period but refused
to produce the notes. On June 5, Tobin submitted De-
Raffaele's merit rating grievance to Keeney. He again asked
Keeney what records he kept and what standards he used
"to make the evaluation." Keeney again replied that he kept
personal notes and that the standards came from the job
description and the job itself. Tobin asked Keeney for the
job tickets submitted by the electricians when they complete
assignments . Keeney refused to produce them. On June 12,
1970, at a step 1 grievance meeting, Keeney asked Tobin
what "facts of substantiation" he had to warrant a reevalua-
tion of DeRaffaele. Tobin said he felt DeRaffaele was per-
forming his job "far above" what was actually required of
him. Keeney said that Tobin was not qualified to judge.
Tobin described his interest in electronics. Keeney said he
UNITED AIRCRAFT CORP.
did not think Tobin was qualified and denied the grievance.
On June 19, at a step 2 grievance meeting, Company
Representative Phelps asked the union representatives for
"facts of substantiation" on DeRaffaele's grievance. Tobin
asked Phelps to produce the records used to evaluate De-
Raffaele, including Keeney's personal notes and De-
Raffaele's job tickets. Phelps said the records were not
available and could not be made available. He said the job
tickets were "a very small part of the merit rating." He
commented that DeRaffaele and Keeney were best quali-
fied to discuss the rating and that "this should have been
done." He denied the grievance "in view of few facts and
little substantiation."
(6) Havener-Robinson
On October 7, 1970, shop steward Warren Lee discussed
Dennis Havener's merit rating with Foreman Luke Rob-
inson . Concerning accuracy , Robinson said Havener had
received five Q.R.'s during the rating period . Lee asked to
see the Q. R.'s but Robinson would not produce them. Lee
asked Robinson what his standards were for accuracy and
for output . Robinson replied that he relied upon his many
years as a worker and a foreman . Lee commented that each
job in Robinson 's department had been time studied and
asked Robinson if these times had anything to do with his
production standards . Robinson replied that the times
meant nothing . He denied Lee's request for Havener's pro-
duction records . The men then discussed Havener's use of
working time , application of job knowledge , and coopera-
tion . Following this conversation , Havener filed a grievance
requesting that Robinson turn over "all standards , records
and methods" relied upon in rating Havener and that Ha-
vener should be rated "T " in each rating factor. Robinson
denied the grievance at a step I meeting on October 13 after
asking Lee if he had any facts to substantiate the grievance
and Lee said he did not . At the step 2 meeting on October
23, the union representatives requested Lee's production
records and any E . R.s or Q.R.s. issued to him . Company
Representative Phelps refused to produce them on the
ground that the Union had presented "no facts or substanti-
ation that [Havener] had been improperly rated" and de-
nied the grievance.
(7) Fisher, et al. - Zielinski
On December 2, 3, and 4, 1970, shop steward Warren Lee
discussed the merit ratings of seven employees with Assist-
ant Foreman Robert Zielinski. The seven employees were
then under Zielinski's supervision but had been rated by
other foremen. Lee spoke to Zielinski under "protest," stat-
ing that as an assistant foreman Zielinski was not qualified
under the union contract to discuss the merit ratings with
him. He asked to talk to the rating foremen but Zielinski
said this would not be possible. Lee complained that Zielin-
ski did not know the standards used by the rating foremen
and asked Zielinski to obtain records used by the foremen
in rating the employees. Zielinski said he did not believe he
could. Lee filed grievances alleging that the employees had
been improperly rated in all categories, requesting that the
foremen turn over records and standards relied upon in
891
rating the employees, and that the employees be rerated.
Zielinski denied the grievances on December 14 saying that
he had discussed the ratings with the foremen and they
believed the ratings to be proper.
At the step 2 meeting, Company Representative Phelps
denied the Union's request that the grievances be remanded
for step 1 discussions between Lee and the rating foremen
and also denied the Union's request for the production of
all records relied upon by the foremen in rating the employ-
ees. Phelps asked the union representatives for facts to sub-
stantiate the grievances. He denied the grievances when the
union men replied they had been unable to obtain any
information from the foremen.
(8) Zura-Rodenbaugh
On December 2, 1970, shop steward Gerald Nellis spoke
to Foreman Rick Rodenbaugh about the merit rating of
Donald Zura. Rodenbaugh said he had not rated Zura and
that Nellis should talk to Assistant Foreman Frank Teraba-
si, who had rated Zura. Nellis protested that Rodenbaugh
was the foreman in charge of the department and therefore
the "decision maker" in the department. Rodenbaugh in-
sisted that Nellis speak to Terabasi and Nellis did so under
protest. Nellis asked Terabasi on what he based his merit
ratings and Terabasi said he based it on his general knowl-
edge as a foreman and on his observation of the employees.
Nellis claimed that Zura had improved in all aspects of his
work. Terabasi said he could have made a mistake in rating
Zura and agreed to rerate him upwards after Nellis con-
vinced him that he had the authority to do so. Later that
day, Terabasi told Nellis that he had gone over his notes
with Rodenbaugh and that Rodenbaugh had decided that
Zura did not deserve to be rerated. Nellis protested to Ro-
denbaugh but Rodenbaugh said Terabasi "made a mis-
take."
At the step 2 meeting on Zura's merit rating grievance,
Company Representative Phelps asked the union represent-
atives to substantiate the grievance. Nellis asked for Zura's
records and Rodenbaugh's notebook. Phelps replied that nb
records would be shown until "you substantiate the griev-
ance." Nellis said they could not substantiate the grievance
"without anything to go on." Phelps denied the grievance.
c. Refusal to supply standards of competency
It is alleged that the Company refused to furnish the
Union "the standards used by foremen for merit ratings."
When asked by shop stewards for the standards used by
them in rating an employee under the merit rating plan,
foremen replied to the effect that they observed the
employee's performance during the rating period and evalu-
ated him in light of their experience as workers and fore-
men. The General Counsel and the Union contend that
foremen in fact establish and apply rating "standards" and
hence that their refusal to reveal such standards constitutes
a denial of information indispensable to the policing of the
merit rating system. It is suggested as to output for example
that foremen apply a quantitative standard. In rating the
"output" of employees, however, the amount of acceptable
work produced by an employee is only one aspect which the
892 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
supervisor is expected to consider in rating the employee.
Thus, he is also expected to consider such aspects of output
as the time taken by an employee in making setups or ad-
justments, the speed with which an employee has completed
rush jobs, the extent to which he had "carried his share of
the load" on jobs where he has worked as a member of a
team, and the time he has taken to locate troubles, make
repairs and get equipment back in operation . See appendix.
Such aspects of output are obviously matters of observation
and judgment based on job knowledge and experience. Sim-
ilar consideration apply to the other rating factors of accu-
racy, use of working time, application of job knowledge,
and cooperation.
I find that the Company did not refuse to provide the
Union "the standards used by foremen for merit ratings."
d. Refusal to supply records
As shown above, at steps I and 2 of the grievance proce-
dure, the Union requested and the Company refused to
produce records which I find below were relevant and ne-
cessary to the Union's intelligent processing of merit rating
grievances.14
I find no violation of the Act in the Company's refusal to
furnish records at step 1. While step I is silent on the pro-
duction of records, step 2 provides that "the Company will
produce such pertinent existing production, payroll, atten-
dance records and other disciplinary notices pertaining to
the employee as may be necessary to the settlement of a
grievance at this step of the grievance procedure." I find
that the clear import of this language is to defer the produc-
tion of records until step 2 and, accordingly, that the Union
waived the statutory right to the production of records at
step 1.
I find no merit, however, in the Company's claim that it
did not violate the step 2 provision of the contract concern-
ing the production of records. It argues, in substance, that
it is required to produce records only after the Union has
produced facts at step 1 or step 2 in substantiation of an
employee's complaint that make the production of records
"pertinent" and "necessary to the settlement of the griev-
ance." Such an interpretation of the step 2 provision con-
cerning the production of records would nullify the Union's
statutory right to receive information relevant and neces-
sary to the intelligent processing of a grievance, for a
foreman's merit rating can scarcely be tested without refer-
ence to documents bearing upon the employee's work per-
formance, such as production records and disciplinary
notices . For example, the Union might well decide not to
pursue a merit rating grievance where an employee's low
rating in one or more rating factors seems proper in view of
the disciplinary notices received by the employee during the
rating period. Although a statutory right may be waived by
collective bargaining, the waiver "must be clearly and un-
mistakably established and is not lightly to be inferred."
Cloverleaf Division of Adams Dairy Co., 147 NLRB 1410,
14 In general , an exclusive bargaining agent is entitled to requested infor-
mation which is relevant and necessary to performance of the bargaining
function , including sufficient information to permit it to evaluate the merits
of potential grievances . Acme Industrial Co, 385 U.S. 432 (1967)
1412. See also The Temkin Roller Bearing Co., 138 NLRB 15,
enfd. 325 F.2d 746 (C.A. 6, 1963). The language of step 2
does not of itself warrant a finding of a waiver of the
Union's statutory right to information. Nor may such a
waiver be inferred from the Union's repeated efforts to
change such language. Cloverleaf Division of Adams Dairy
Co., supra.
At step 2 grievance meetings, in addition to general re-
quests for all records relied upon to rate the grieving em-
ployee, the Union requested on one or more occasions
specific documents bearing on the employee's work perfor-
mance.
Employee reports record employee action warranting
commendation or discipline. The Company concedes that
employee reports are relevant to the processing of merit
rating grievances but denies that it refused to produce them.
As the record shows otherwise, I find that the Company
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to
furnish the Union with the employee reports of merit rating
grievants.
Production inventory control (PIC) reports, also known as
Friden runoffs, are data processing printouts showing the
status of parts at various operational locations throughout
the plant. Production employees feed data concerning their
daily production into a computer by means of remote re-
cording devices. The daily PIC report identifies an employ-
ee by name and clock number, and reflects the amount of
time taken to produce a given number of parts or to perform
a given number of operations on the parts. It also shows
nonproductive time and how the employee performed in
relation to a time standard. While the PIC report is used
primarily for purposes of inventory control and cost con-
trol, insofar as it measures an employee's production against
an industrial standard, it provides the Union with a basis for
assessing a foreman's merit rating on the factor of output.
It is not critical that the foremen may not make use of PIC
reports in rating an employee, for the Union's decision
whether or not to process further a merit rating grievance
might well rest , at least in part, on the employee's produc-
tion relative to the Company's expectations as shown in the
PIC reports.
The Company notes that PIC reports are kept only from
I to 3 months. The Company refused to produce PIC re-
ports and other records requested by the Union not on the
ground of unavailability but for the invalid reason that the
production of records was contingent on the Union's pro-
duction of facts to substantiate its claim that the grievant
had been improperly rated. I find its refusal to produce PIC
reports, insofar as available, violative of Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act.
Quality review orders. When an inspector in a production
department finds a substandard part, he notifies the fore-
man and a quality review order (Q.R.) is executed which
requests the quality review department to determine wheth-
er the part can be salvaged. The name of the operator who
worked on the part will be entered on the Q.R. if he can be
identified and it is determined that he was at fault. The
record indicates that foremen caution employees about Q.
R.s and may keep a record of Q.R.s concerning their em-
ployees. As Q.R.s thus bear on the job performance of
employees, I find that the Company's refusal to produce the
UNITED AIRCRAFT CORP.
Q.R.s of merit rating grievants was violative of the Act.15
Foremen's notes. The Company encourages foremen to
keep notebooks on the job performance of their subordi-
nates as a help in evaluating their work and in defending
against employee greivances. The record indicates that most
foremen keep such notebooks.16 Although the foremen's
notebooks in evidence include entries on individual employ-
ees relating to the various merit rating factors, the Company
argues that they are not production records required to be
produced under step 2 of the contract grievance procedure
but rather are the foremen's "personal" records. The note-
books are kept pursuant to the Company's recommendation
and I have found that the step 2 language on the production
of documents does not limit the Union's right to all informa-
tion relevant and necessary to the processing of grievances.
I find that the Company was obliged at the Union's request
to produce notebooks maintained by its foremen insofar as
they contained entries bearing on the job performance of
merit rating grievants and that its refusal to do so was
violative of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
e. Other alleged merit rating violations
1. I have found that Foreman Bankowski refused to dis-
cuss Tyaack's merit rating with shop steward Havener. Such
refusal was violative of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
Lee Deane Products, Inc., 181 NLRB 1047.
2. I have found above that the Company refused to per-
mit shop steward Warren Lee to discuss the merit rating
grievances of seven employees with the foremen who had
rated them but insisted that he discuss the grievances with
their current supervisor, Assistant Foreman Zeilinski, who
had not participated in the rating of the employees. The
Company contends that its conduct conformed to the con-
tract, which calls for discussion between the shop steward
and "the employee's foreman ." The question, however, is
whether the Company refused the Union access to informa-
tion relevant and necessary to the intelligent processing of
the grievances. The Company plainly denied the Union
access to such information by denying it permission to talk
to the rating foremen. I find that the Company violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by denying Lee permission
to talk to the rating foremen.
3. I have found above that Foreman Rodenbaugh re-
quired shop steward Nellis to talk to Assistant Foreman
Terabasi about the merit rating grievance of Donald Zura
despite Nellis' protest that Rodenbaugh was the "decision
maker" in the department. Nellis spoke to Terabasi who
agreed to rerate Aura upwards. Rodenbaugh decided, how-
ever, that Zura did not deserve to be rerated. When Nellis
protested, Rodenbaugh said Terabasi "made a mistake."
As Rodenbaugh had not participated in Zura's merit rat-
ing and Terabasi had, I find that he properly required Nellis
to discuss the merit rating with Terabasi. Although Terabasi
told Nellis he would rerate Zura, he expressed doubt wheth-
er he had the authority to do so. He thereafter spoke to
Rodenbaugh about rerating Zura. I find in these circum-
stances that Terabasi did not have authority to commit the
Company to changing Zura's merit rating.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
893
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of the Act.
2. The Charging Parties are labor organizations within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices
in violation of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices, it will be recommended that Respondent
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative ac-
tion to effectuate the policies of the Act.
It having been found that Respondent discriminatorily
suspended Gary Raymond in violation of Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act, the recommended Order will provide that
Respondent make him whole for loss of earnings suffered
by reason of the discrimination against him. Backpay shall
be computed in accordance with F. W. Woolworth Compa-
ny, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138
NLRB 716.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
15 The Company emphasizes the difficulty of locating Q R.s and other
production records of merit rating grievants , and suggests that the Union's
requests for these records are not made in good faith . As the Company did
not deny the Union 's request for this reason , its claim of bad faith would
appear to be an afterthought The Company of course is obliged to make only
reasonable efforts to make records available to the Union
i6 Of 14 foremen listed in a subpena requiring the production of notebooks
at least 8 kept notebooks
APPENDIX
DEFINITIONS OF PERFORMANCE RATING
FACTORS
FOR HOURLY EMPLOYEES
The following definitions outline typical aspects of perfor-
mance which should be considered under each factor by the
Supervisor rating hourly employees. He should rate his em-
ployees' performance on those aspects of each factor which
apply to their particular work. He should also modify or
expand the wording of any definition which may be stated
more clearly and specifically in the terminology which fits
the employees' work.
1. Accuracy
This Ii -tor appraises the quality of the employee's work in
comparison to the requirements for satisfactory perfor-
mance. Consideration is given to the employees's perfor-
mance during the rating period with regard to the aspects
of quality that apply on his particular job, such as:
a. The accuracy and thoroughness of the employee's
work as shown by the consistency with which it has con-
formed to quality standards.
894 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
b. The number, type and potential seriousness of errors
for which the employee has been responsible, whether de-
tected while his work was in process or subsequently.
c. How carefully the employee has checked the material
he receives , reporting or correcting , as required , unusual or
incorrect conditions before proceeding to do his work.
d. How well the employee has followed operation sheets,
procedures and other written and oral instructions in car-
rying out his work.
e. The workmanship , appearance and neatness of the
employee's work.
f. How accurately and clearly he has completed any re-
quired paperwork.
g. How successfully the employee has met quality stan-
dards on any work which was unusually exacting or "fussy."
h. If the employee 's job requires leadership of others,
how completely, clearly, and accurately he has instructed
his employees, how accurately and thoroughly he had
checked their work , and how successful he has been in
making them "quality conscious."
2. Output
3. Use of Working Time
This factor appraises the extent to which the employee has
utilized his working time for productive effort during the
rating period. Typical aspects of performance considered
are:
a. The promptness with which the employee begins work
at the start of the workday, after receiving a new assign-
ment, and after lunch or other time away from the job.
b. How effectively the employee minimizes time away
from the job for such purposes as getting tools , materials,
and equipment.
c. How well he organizes his work to avoid unnecessary
activity.
d. How diligently the employee applies himself to his
work.
e. The extent to which he avoids time wasting activities
with other employees.
f. The readiness with which the employee reports for new
assignments on completion of previously assigned work.
g. How well he refrains from "stretching" work assign-
ments.
H. How well the employee minimizes clean up time at the
end of his shift.
This factor appraises the quantity of acceptable work com-
pleted by the employee in comparison to the requirements
for a satisfactory day's work. The rating summarizes the
employee's output on his various daily assignments over the
rating period. Only days worked are considered in the ap-
praisal . Consideration is given to the employee 's perfor-
mance with regard to the aspects of output which apply to
his work , such as:
a. The amount of acceptable work the employee has pro-
duced.
b. How much time the employee has taken in making
setups or adjustments.
c. How quickly the employee has completed rush jobs or
handled peak workloads.
d. The extent to which the employee has "carried his
share of the load" on any jobs on which he has worked as
a member of a team.
e. The size of assignment the employee has covered. (On
a job where the size of his assignment is indicative of the
employee's ability to produce).
f. How much time the employee has taken to locate trou-
bles, make repairs and get equipment back in operation.
g. If the employee's job is one where a part of the work
cycle is automatic , consider the possibilities for variations
in output which are under the employee's control. How well
the employee has kept his machine running and has mini-
mized down time for such purposes as loading or checking
work and making machine setups and adjustments will gen-
erally have a significant effect on output on this type of job.
h. If the employee's job requires leadership of others,
how well he has kept his employees supplied with work, how
quickly he has found solutions to problems or difficulties,
how well he has covered his group with respect to instruct-
ing employees and checking their work ; and, in general,
how successful he has been in keeping the work moving.
4. Application of Job Knowledge
This factor appraises the job knowledge which the employee
has demonstrated in the performance of his work. The fac-
tor is rated with reference to the requirements in the
employee's job description. Consideration is given to the
employee's performance during the rating period with re-
gard to the aspects of job knowledge which apply to his
classification , such as:
a. How thorough a knowledge the employee has shown
of all the duties covered in his job classification including
the methods and techniques required and the proper use of
tooling and equipment.
b. How well the employee has proceeded on his own in
carrying out his work without asking unnecessary questions.
c. How well the employee has applied his knowledge in
carrying out new work assignments and adapted himself to
new methods and practices.
d. How broad an understanding the employee has shown
of related jobs or trades where this may be useful in the
performance of his regular job.
e. How well the employee has handled problems arising
in his work and has contributed towards their solution.
f. The extent to which the employee has shown the ability
to fill in from time to time on work other than that covered
in his job classification.
5. Cooperation
This factor appraises the employee's effective cooperation
during the rating period in all matters relating to the opera-
tion of his department or the work of his fellow employees.
Typical aspects of performance considered are:
UNITED AIRCRAFT CORP.
a. How well the employee works with his leader and
supervisor and shows a willingness to "pitch in" to further
the work of his department.
b. How well the employee observes company and depart-
mental rules and regulations and how constructive an atti-
tude he shows towards them.
c. How readily the employee accepts the less desirable
assignments or hours of work.
d. The manner in which the employee accepts and carries
out instructions from his supervision including changes in
895
methods and procedures.
e. How well the employee gets along with other employ-
ees and shows a capacity for teamwork.
f. The willingness of the employee to help other employ-
ees (to the extent this is desirable on the particular job).
g. The reasonableness of the employee 's requests for spe-
cial considerations.
h. On jobs which include leadership responsibilities, the
employee 's success in getting the cooperation of his employ-
ees and encouraging teamwork and constructive relation-
ships and attitudes in his group.