United Aircraft Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 2, 1970

181 N.L.R.B. 892 (N.L.R.B. 1970)

892 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
United Aircraft Corporation ( Pratt & Whitney
Aircraft and Hamilton Standard Divisions) and
District 91 , International Association of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO.
Case I -CA-6492
April 2, 1970
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND JENKINS
On November 28, 1969, Trial Examiner Owsley
Vose issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in
and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision.
Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial
Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief. The
Charging Parties filed cross-exceptions and a reply
to Respondent's brief. The General Counsel filed a
brief in support of the Trial Examiner's Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a
three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and
the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Act by refusing, in September and October 1968, and
thereafter, the requests of Lodges 1746, 1746A, 743 and
700 of International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, that each Lodge be
furnished with the names and home addresses of all the
employees in each of their respective collective-bargaining
units The Respondent filed an answer admitting the
refusal to furnish the requested information but denying
any legal obligation to furnish such information All
parties were represented by counsel and fully participated
in the trial Since that time all parties have filed
comprehensive briefs which have been fully considered.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my
observation of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. THE RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS
The Respondent, a Delaware corporation having its
principal office at East Hartford, Connecticut, is engaged
in the manufacture and distribution of aircraft engines,
helicopters, aircraft accessories and parts, electronic
devices and components thereof The Respondent operates
several plants in the State of Connecticut, including plants
located at East Hartford, Manchester, Middletown and
Southington (Pratt & Whitney Division), and two plants
at Windsor Locks (one known as the Windsor Locks plant
and the other known as the Building 3 plant) Previously,
the operations carried on in the Building 3 plant had been
performed in a plant at Broad Brook, Connecticut, called
the Broad Brook plant In addition, the Respondent
operates plants in the States of Florida, New York and
California. In connection with its operations in the State
of Connecticut, the Respondent annually purchases and
receives from outside the State of Connecticut goods and
materials valued in excess of $1,000,000, and also ships
from its plants in the State of Connecticut to points and
places outside the State of Connecticut goods and
materials valued at in excess of $1,000,000. Upon these
facts which are admitted by the Respondent, I find that
the Respondent is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act and that it will
effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction
herein.
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
II THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Lodges 1746, I746A, 743, and 700 of International
Relations Board hereby adopts as its Order the Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and AFL-CIO, are all affiliated with District 91, a District
orders that Respondent , United Aircraft
Corporation (Pratt & Whitney Aircraft and
Hamilton Standard Divisions ), its officers, agents,
successors , and assigns , shall take the action set
forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
OWSLEY VOSE, Trial Examiner: This case was tried at
West Hartford , Connecticut , on July 22-24, 1969,
pursuant to a charge filed by District 91 , International
Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers,
AFL-CIO, on October 16, 1968, and a complaint issued
on July 3, 1969. The complaint alleged in substance that
the Respondent had violated Section 8 (a)(5) and ( 1) of the
Lodge chartered by the International . All four local lodges
and District Lodge 91, the Charging Party herein, are
labor organizations within - the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The Respondent's refusal of the Lodges' request for
the addresses of employees in their respective
bargaining units, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act.
A. The Facts
1. Background; history of bargaining relations
a The bargaining history prior to the 1960 strike
As indicated above, the Respondent's operations are
181 NLRB No. 150
UNITED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION 893
carried on in two main divisions, the Pratt & Whitney
Division and the Hamilton Standard Division. Involved in
this case are six units of employees at various of the
Respondent's plants in both divisions The parties
stipulated at the hearing that each of these six units
discussed below constituted appropriate units for the
purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(b) of the Act
In the Pratt & Whitney Division, the Board certified
Lodge 1746 as the collective-bargaining representative of
the employees in the East Hartford, Connecticut plant
following an election in 1945. Certification of Lodge 1746
as the exclusive representative of the employees of the
Manchester plant followed an election among these
employees in 1957 Lodge 1746A was certified by the
Board as the collective-bargaining representative of the
employees at the Respondent's Southington plant in 1951
The record does not reveal the origin of the bargaining
relationship between the Respondent and Lodge 700
representating the employees at the Respondent's
Middletown plant. However, the record indicates that
Lodge 700 has had contracts covering the employees of
the Middletown plant going back some years, as has
Lodge 1746A for the employees at the Respondent's
Southington plant. Lodge 1746 has had
collective-bargaining contracts covering the employees at
the Respondent's East Hartford and Manchester plants
going back, with few interruptions, almost to the dates of
the original certifications
In the Hamilton Standard Division, Lodge 743 was
certified by the Board as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the employees at the Respondent's
Windsor Locks plant in 1941, and at the Respondent's
Broad Brook plant in 1954. The employees in these two
plants also have been covered by collective-bargaining
contracts between the Respondent and Lodge 743 almost
continuously since their original certification.
b The strike, the actions and counter actions
commenced by the Respondent and Lodges 1746 and
743
The negotiations between the Respondent and Lodges
1746 and 743 for new contracts to succeed those expiring
in the latter part of 1959 and the early part of 1960
covering the employees of the Respondent's East
Hartford, Manchester, Windsor Locks and Broad Brook
plants became stalemated, and on June 8, 1960 the
employees of these four plants went out on strike Lodges
1746A and 700, representing the employees at the
Respondent's Southington and Middletown plants,
respectively, reached an agreement with the Respondent
concerning the terms of successor contracts and the
employees at these plants did not participate in the strike
The strike in which Lodges 1746 and 743 engaged
commencing on June 8, 1960, was attended, as the Board
has found, by " mass picketing and violence" (United
Aircraft Corporation, 134 NLRB 1632) A few days after
the strike began the Respondent commenced actions
against Lodges 1746 and 743 and District Lodge 91 in the
Connecticut Superior Court, Hartford County, seekirtg
injunctive relief and large sums in damages The
Respondent also filed unfair labor practices charges
against Lodges 1746 and 743. Upon the basis of these
charges the Board's Regional Director initiated
proceedings in the United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut seeking an injunction against the
Lodges under Section 10(j) of the Act In both the State
and Federal Court proceedings the parties entered into
stipulations about the middle of June 1960 whereby the
Lodges agreed to cease their mass picketing and other
illegal activities.
As a result of these stipulations the mass picketing and
violence at the picket lines subsided However, the Lodges
thereafter continued to engage in violence away from the
picket lines against nonstrikers. As was stated much later
in the opinion of Judge Gaffney of the Connecticut
Superior Court, Hartford County, in sustaining the action
for damages brought by the Respondent against Lodges
1746 and 743 resulting from tortious conduct during the
strike (68 LRRM 2488, 2494)
As such they [the night riders] damaged automobiles of
non-striking employees. They flooded the cellars of their
houses, they burned their hedges, they threw paint
bombs through their house windows. They tried to burn
a barn behind a house where many non-strikers lived.
They burned one of the non-striking employee's
automobile.
Ultimately, on August 9, 1960, Lodges 1746 and 743
agreed on the terms of new contracts, and a strike
settlement agreement was reached on August 11, 1960
On November 21, 1960, Lodge 1746 filed the first of a
lengthy series of charges which were filed with the
Regional Director against the Respondent by Lodge 1746,
Lodge 743, Lodge 700 and by various individuals alleging
in substance that the Respondent had discriminated
against some 3800 strikers, in violation of Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act, by failing to restore them to their
prestrike jobs, and had refused to bargain collectively with
the Lodges in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by
failing to furnish certain employee data and information
to the Lodges
In 1961 Lodges 743 and 1746 commenced an action
against the Respondent in the United States District
Court for the District of Connecticut seeking damages and
specific performance of the 1960 strike settlement
agreement. The crux of the Lodges' complaint was that
the Respondent had failed to recall about 3800 strikers to
jobs which they had held before the strike
c The 1963 unfair labor practice proceeding heard by
Trial Examiner Best, the related Section 10(j)
proceeding in the United States District Court
In February 1963 the General Counsel, on the basis of
the various charges mentioned above, issued a complaint
alleging that the Respondent had violated Section 8(a)(1)
and (3) of the Act by failing at the end of the strike to
restore about 3800 strikers to their prestrike fobs and had
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing to
provide the Lodges with information and data concerning
its employees (Case 1-CA-3355, et a!) A hearing on this
complaint commenced on May 16, 1963, before Trial
Examiner Lee Best. The hearing continued intermittently
until June Il, 1968 During this period, the General
Counsel frequently amended his original complaint to
include events occurring during the hearing Thus, in 1964
the Lodges requested that the Respondent furnish them
with copies of almost all of its personnel records for each
employee in the bargaining units here involved When the
Respondent refused to do more than make such records
894 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
available to the Lodges for their inspection and copying,
unless they would agree to pay the cost of reproducing
such copies, the complaint was amended at the request of
the General Counsel to allege that the Respondent's
action violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
Thereupon the General Counsel petitioned the United
States for the District of Connecticut an order under
Section 10(j) of the Act compelling the Respondent to
furnish the copies of the requested records This action
had not been heard as of the time of the hearing in the
instant case in July 1969 because of a stipulation of the
parties, entered into with the Court's approval, whereby
the Respondent undertook to supply copies of the
documents and records upon the Lodges' posting a bond
insuring payment of the Respondent's costs in the event
that it was eventually determined that the Respondent was
not required as a matter of law to furnish the copies to
the Lodges at its own expense. Among the copies of
documents supplied by the Respondent were copies of
so-called "Put on" slips recording the hire of employees.
Under the stipulation the Respondent supplied the Lodges
with copies of these forms on which the new employee's
home address was blocked out.
The proceeding before Trial Examiner Best ultimately
culminated on July 29, 1969, in his decision finding that
the Respondent had violated Section 8(a)(3) and'(1) of the
Act by its action, as the jobs of certain unidentified
strikers who had registered for reinstatement pursuant to
the strike settlement agreement became available, in
promoting or transferring previously reinstated strikers
into these jobs rather than reinstating the registered
strikers to their former jobs, by its action in requiring all
strikers not reinstated prior to January 1, 1961 to apply
for jobs as new employees, and by depriving strikers who
were reinstated after January 1, 1961, of their previously
acquired seniority and other rights and privileges Trial
Examiner Best dismissed the allegations of the complaint
that the Respondent had refused to furnish information in
violation of section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act Trial
Examiner Best 's decision and recommended order are
presently pending before the Board.
d. The 1965-1966 bargaining negotiations with
Lodges 1746 and 743; the Respondent's withdrawal of
recognition from the Lodges, the 1966 unfair labor
practice proceeding heard by Trial Examiner Ricci
The contracts which were entered into with Lodges
1746 and 743 at the time the strike was settled were
succeeded by contracts executed by the parties late in 1962
and early in 1963 which were due to expire late in 1965
and early in 1966. The Lodges gave timely notice of
intention to terminate these contracts and early in October
1965 the Respondent's representatives commenced
negotiations with Lodge officers and committeemen
concerning the terms of successor contracts During this
same period the Respondent's officers and officers and
representatives of the International were having
"off-the-record" discussions regarding possible settlement
of all the pending lawsuits, including the civil actions in
which each party was seeking damages running well into
the millions of dollars from the other and the unfair labor
practice proceeding which was then being heard by Trial
Examiner Best . Agreement was reached between the
Lodges' negotiators and the Respondent's representatives
on economic terms early in December The International
officers and representatives continued their
"off-the-record" discussions with the Respondent's
officers The Lodge negotiators and the Respondent's
representatives could not resolve - their differences
concerning the Lodges ' demand for some form of union
security and an acceptable arrangement for reinstatement
or seniority rights for the 1960 strikers . Informed of this,
the Lodge negotiators instructed the International
representatives to present a list of 21 demands , most of
them far in excess of previous union proposals , including
quick payment of a $22 5 million back pay settlement.
When the Respondent ' s representatives were informed of
these new demands at a meeting on March 2, 1966, the
negotiations collapsed.
However , the next day Lodge 1746 (Lodge 743's
contract had not yet expired ) offered to renew the old
contract for 3 years , modified only in respect to the
economic items which had previously been agreed upon,
and with the understanding that the contract would be
subject to the Board and court decisions in the pending
unfair labor practice cases.'
At a meeting on March 10 and 11, 1966, the
Respondent questioned the Lodges' majority status and
refused to negotiate further until they could demonstrate
their majority status in a Board-conducted election
Lodge 743 responded by filing a charge alleging
violations of Section 8 (a)(5) and ( 1) of the Act (Case
I-CA-5372). As stated above, Local 1746 had previously
filed a Section 8(a)(5) and ( 1) charge against the
Respondent in Case i-CA-5245 The General Counsel
consolidated both of these cases and issued his complaint
on June 2, 1966 . At about the same time the General
Counsel filed a petition in the United States District
Court for the District of Connecticut for an injunction
under Section 10(1) of the Act to compel the Respondent
to continue its recognition of the Lodges The District
Court on August 5, 1966, entered an order directing the
Respondent to recognize and bargain collectively in good
faith with Lodges 1746 and 743. The Respondent did not
appeal from this order
Instead , in the latter part of September 1966 the
Respondent entered into comprehensive
collective-bargaining contracts with Lodges 1746 and 743.
These contracts , which expired November 30, 1968, and
April 21, 1969, respectively , provided for, among other
things, recognition of the Lodges as exclusive
collective-bargaining agents of the employees in the units
involved (Article II) and the checkoff of union dues
(Article IV) No other form of union security was
provided in the contracts The contracts also provided for
the naming of an undetermined number of shop stewards
to represent various areas of the plants in connection with
the handling of grievances; for paying shop stewards for
time spent handling grievances up to a maximum of two
hours per week , and for compulsory arbitration of certain
specified types of grievances (Article V). The contracts,
specifically prohibited the solicitation of employees for
union membership or dues on company premises by union
representatives or employees during working hours
(Article III). The contracts also provided for the posting
on company furnished bulletin boards of certain categories
of union notices after approval by company
representatives (Article X). In addition the contracts
contained the following "savings clause" (Article XIII).
'In addition to the case which was pending before Trial Examiner Best
Lodge 1746 had filed a charge on November 19, 1965, alleging that the
Respondent was refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with the
Lodges (Case I-CA-5245 ) The General Counsel had not as yet issued a
complaint in this case.
UNITED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION 895
This agreement shall not in any manner constitute any
admission, concession, or waiver of any position,
contention, right, or argument which either party
signatory hereto has heretofore advanced or asserted in
connection with the subject matter of any case now
pending before the National Labor Relations Board or
in Court (including any issue of fact or law therein). It
is further agreed that, in the event, during the life of
this agreement, it is determined by the Board, or, if
appeal is taken from the Board's decision, by the final
reviewing Court with jurisdiction in Case Nos.
1-CA-5245 and 1-CA-5372 now pending before the
National Labor Relations Board that the Company was
not, on March 11, 1966, obligated under the National
Labor Relations Act to recognize and bargain with [the
unions] as the exclusive representative of the employees,
for the purpose of negotiating new contracts, the
company may terminate this agreement on ten (10)
days' written notice notwithstanding the provisions of
Section 1, 2, or 3 of Article XII of this agreement, and,
in the event of such termination, all obligations of ether
party shall immediately terminate under the conditions
provided in Section 3 of Article XII
When in the course of subsequent proceedings in the
District Court the fact of the Respondent's execution of
the contracts with Lodges 1746 and 743 was reported to
the Court, the Court on September 29, 1966, sua sponte
dissolved its order of August 5, 1966
The unfair labor practice proceeding involving the
Respondent's withdrawal of recognition from Lodges 1746
and 743 in March 1966 and its refusal to bargain
collectively with these Lodges thereafter came on for
hearing before Trial Examiner Thomas Ricci in July 1966
On October 17, 1966, Examiner Ricci issued his decision
finding that the Respondent had refused to bargain
collectively with Lodges 1746 and 743, in violation of
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, by its conduct in
March 1966 and thereafter
As indicated above, Lodge 700 had in the past
represented the employees at the Respondent's
Middletown plant and had collective-bargaining contracts
with the Respondent covering the employees at this plant
However, at some time prior to the middle of 1966 the
Respondent had ceased operating the Middletown plant
After the Respondent reopened the Middletown plant in
July 1966, Lodge 700 requested recognition as the
exclusive representative of the employees in the reopened
plant. At this time the Respondent agreed to grant such
recognition, upon being furnished with proof of majority
status, and to enter into a collective-bargaining contract,
provided that there was included in the contract with
Lodge 700 Article XIII of the contract between the
Respondent and Lodges 1746 and 743, the "savings
clause" giving the Respondent the option of terminating
the contract upon 10 days' notice under the conditions
stated in Article XIII.
On November 27, 1967, the Board issued its decision
and order upholding Trial Examiner Ricci's findings (168
NLRB No. 66, 67 LRRM 1010) Petitions for review of
the Board's decision and order were promptly filed, and
ultimately the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, on May 29, 1969, handed down its
decision setting aside the Board's decision and order of
November 27, 1967 (71 LRRM 2336)
e The collective-bargaining negotiations in late 1968
and early 1969
In view of the positions taken by the Respondent
during the 1968-1969 negotiations concerning the Lodges'
majority status , it may be helpful to set forth at this point
the evidence concerning dues checkoff authorizations
which the General Counsel contends proves the majority
status of the Lodges in the appropriate units at all times
relevant in this case.
As to the Pratt & Whitney Division, records furnished
by the Respondent ( Resp . Exh 3-A) establish that
sometime in the month of November 1968 the number of
Lodge 1746 dues checkoff authorizations in the
Respondent ' s possession reached 53 percent of the
approximately 17,000 employees in the East Hartford and
Manchester plants 2 This percentage gradually increased in
the following 6 months for which figures are available.
These records show with respect to the Middletown plant
that sometime in October the number of Lodge 700 dues
checkoff authorizations delivered to the Respondent
reached 54 4 percent of the approximately 1500 employees
at this plant . These records also show that the payroll at
this plant steadily increased in the ensuing 7 months, and
that while the percentage of employees on checkoff
fluctuated during this period, it never declined below 50.8
percent. As to the Southington plant , the employees of
which are represented by Lodge 1746A, the Respondent
has consistently acknowledged its majority status. At the
time of the 1968 negotiations over 80 percent of the 3,000
employees at the Southington plant were on checkoff
Regarding the Hamilton Standard Division, the
Respondent records reveal that sometime during the
month of November 1968, the number of Lodge 743 dues
checkoff authorizations in the Respondent ' s possession
from Windsor Locks employees reached 51.2 percent of
the approximately 4,000 employees at this plant The
percentage of employees on checkoff continued gradually
to rise in the following 6 months for which figures are
available Similarly the Respondent ' s records show that
sometime during the month of December 1968 the number
of dues checkoff authorizations from employees at the
Building 3 plant ( formerly Broad Brook) reached 51.2
percent of the 502 employees at this plant . The percentage
of employees at this plant on checkoff fluctuated, but it
remained above 51 . 2 percent for each of the 5 following
months for which figures are available
The negotiations for collective - bargaining contracts to
succeed the contracts entered into in 1966 after the entry
of the District Court Section 100) injunction order
commenced in November 1968 for the plants in the Pratt
& Whitney division and in March 1969 for the plants in
the Hamilton Standard Division
On November 4, 1968, at the beginning of the
negotiations between the Respondent and Lodge 1746
covering the East Hartford and Manchester plants, the
Respondent raised a question concerning Lodge 1746's
majority status at East Hartford , the largest of all the
plants here involved At the second meeting on November
11, 1968, Lodge 1746 offered the Respondent 400
'Although I have been unable to find an explicit statement in the record
to the effect that the figures prepared by the Respondent giving the
percentage of employees on checkoff at East Hartford include also the
150-200 employees in the nearby Manchester plant, I infer that this is the
case from the fact that Resp Exh I was prepared on this basis (Tr 110)
and that the Respondent has not singled out the Manchester plant for a
special challenge of its majority status
896 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
additional dues checkoff authorizations at this time,
asserting that these checkoff authorizations together with
those already in the Respondent's possession should
establish its majority status to the Respondent's
satisfaction. However, at this time Lodge 1746 offered to
submit to a Board-conducted election if the Respondent
deemed the checkoff authorizations insufficient for this
purpose. The Respondent, without attempting to ascertain
the precise nature of Lodge 1746's offer to submit to an
election, decided that it would rather continue the
negotiations with the understanding its rights would be
protected by the inclusion of the "savings clause" (Article
XIII) giving it the option to terminate the contract in the
event the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit should rule in the case then pending that the
Respondent had not been obliged to recognize the Lodge
in March 1966. The Lodge took the position in response
that the alternatives proposed by it to establish its
majority status should be sufficient to satisfy the
Respondent and that it would oppose the inclusion of the
"savings clause" in any future contract.
In the negotiations on November 13, 1968, it was stated
on behalf of Lodge 700 representing the employees at the
Middletown plant (about 1,400 employees) that the dues
checkoff authorizations from more than a majority of the
employees at this plant had, already been submitted to the
Respondent, and that in view of this fact Lodge 700 would
oppose the inclusion of the "savings clause" in, any
contract negotiated
At the negotiating meeting on November 29, 1968,
Justin Ostro, the union negotiator, after reciting the
Lodges' previous offers of proof that a majority of the
employees "in all bargaining units, East Hartford,
Middletown, and Southington," have voluntarily executed
checkoff authorizations, and asserting that the Respondent
had refused their offer to prove their present majority in a
Board-conducted election, asked that the Respondent
"unconditionally and unequivocally" recognize the Lodges
as exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in
these Pratt & Whitney plants and that it abandon its
demand for the inclusion of Article XIII, the "savings
clause," in the new contracts At the bargaining meeting
the next day, the day the 1966 contracts expired, the
Respondent agreed to sign a contract with the Lodges
containing the exclusive recognition provisions requested
by the Lodges and agreed to delete Article XIII, the
"savings clause," from the contract However, the parties
orally asserted that they were not, by such action, waiving
any legal positions previously taken, and intended to take
action in the future to protect all their legal rights
Thereafter new 3-year contracts were signed by the
Respondent and Lodge 1746, effective December 1, 1968,
covering the employees at the East Hartford and
Manchester plants' A similar contract effective about the
same date was signed by the Respondent and Lodge 700
covering the employees of the Middletown plant And a
3-year contract, effective December 5, 1968, was
thereafter signed by the Respondent and Lodge 1746A
covering the employees of the Southington plant.
'After a disagreement between the parties resulting from the discharge of
a union steward , Thomas Wiseman, in January 1969, the Respondent
contending that the discharge should be processed under the grievance
provisions of the new contract and Lodge 1746 taking the position that the
discharge was an unfair labor practice to be processed by the Board, the
Respondent in January 1969 filed a charge with the Board's Regional
Director against Lodge 1746 alleging that it had violated Section 8 (b)(3) of
the Act by refusing to bargain collectively with it about the discharge of
Wiseman Lodge 1746 had on January 31, 1969, filed a charge with the
In the negotiations commencing in March 1969 between
the Respondent and Lodge 743 for successor contracts
covering the Windsor Locks and Building 3 plants in the
Hamilton Standard Division, the Respondent did not
question the Lodges' majority status in these two units At
the bargaining meeting on March 19, 1969, Ostro, the
union negotiator, asked whether, in view of the number of
employees on checkoff the Respondent was challenging
Lodge 743's status as exclusive bargaining representative
The only reply of Nathaniel Morse, the Respondent's
Industrial Relations Director, was "have you heard any,"
meaning any such challenge, to which the union negotiator
replied "no " After several months of bargaining,
successor contracts covering the employees at the Windsor
Locks and Building 3 plants were signed on July I The
contracts were made effective as of April 21, 1969
All of these contracts covering the employees in both
the Pratt & Whitney and Hamilton Standard Divisions
contained the exclusive recognition provisions and the
other provisions mentioned in connection with the
discussion of the 1965 and 1966 contracts. In addition
these contracts contained new provisions granting various
benefits not previously accorded the,, Respondent's
employees None of the contracts contained Article XIII,
the "savings clause," giving the Respondent the option of
terminating the contract upon 10 days notice, depending
upon the outcome of the case then pending in the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. It is to be
noted that at the time of the actual signing of the Windsor
Locks and Building 3 contracts, the Court of Appeals
decision upholding the Respondent's position, had been
outstanding for about a month, the Court of Appeals
decision having been rendered on May 29, 1969
2. The Respondent's refusal to furnish the Lodges
with the addresses of its employees
By letter dated September 19, 1968, signed by the
presidents of all four Lodges, the Lodges requested that
the Respondent furnish each Lodge with the names and
addresses of all members of each bargaining unit In the
letter the Lodges reminded the Respondent of the previous
occasions in 1964 and 1965 on which Lodges 1746 and
743 had previously requested that they be furnished with
the addresses of all the employees in their respective
bargaining units and, after referring to the forthcoming
negotiations, asserted that lists of the names and addresses
of all employees in the bargaining units were indispensable
to the performance of their statutory responsibilities with
respect to contract negotiations , grievance investigations,
preservation of their status as exclusive bargaining agents,
and were necessary to afford the Lodges an equal
opportunity to counter company propaganda In support
of their request, the Lodges cited the recent holding of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the Standard
Oil case,4 under circumstances asserted to be anologous to
those in this case, that the union there involved was
entitled to a list of the names and addresses of all the
employees in the bargaining unit. In the letter, the Lodges
quoted from the Court's decision language to the effect
that communication with all of the employees is essential
Regional Director alleging that Wiseman's discharge , violated Section
8(a)(3) of the Act The Regional Director issued a complaint on Lodge
1746's charge and declined to issue a complaint on the Respondent's
charge On May 2, 1969 , the Respondent appealed to the General Counsel
from the Regional Director 's refusal to issue a complaint on its charge
against Lodge 1746
'Standard Oil Co of California v N L R B , 399 F 2d 639 (C A 9)
UNITED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION 897
in order to enable the bargaining agent adequately to
perform its statutory duty fairly to represent the interests
of all the employees in the unit, nonunion employees as
well as union members
In a letter to District 91 dated September 30, 1968, the
Respondent declined to furnish the addresses, without
expressly saying so Instead it advanced various reasons to
why the Lodges were in error in requesting the addresses.
The Lodges replied to this letter by letter dated October
10, 1968, in which they attempted to answer arguments
advanced by the Respondent and gave further reasons
supporting their request for the addresses.
In its response to District 91 dated October 15, 1968,
the Respondent offered, as an alternative to furnishing the
addresses to allow the Lodge to use its mailing facilities
for the purpose of mailing letters to all unit employees
"on matters related to contract negotiations " This offer
and the Lodges' response is discussed more fully below.
On November 29, 1969, the Respondent's continuing
refusal to furnish the addresses of unit employees was
referred to in the contract negotiations with Lodge 1746
In the negotiations on the following day the Lodge
explicitly stated that by entering into the contract, "the
union does not intend to waive, and has not waived, any
statutory rights . . heretofore asserted in litigation
such as . addresses of bargaining unit employees "
At the hearing in this case on July 24, 1969, Industrial
Relations Director Morse testified that the Respondent's
policy, which has been in effect for 30 years, is to refuse
to release the address of any employee to any organization
or any person for any purpose, without the permission of
the employee
3. The Lodges' need to have employees ' addresses in
order to communicate with unit employees
Justin Ostro, the Lodges' chief negotiator, was a
representative of the International assigned to District 91
and the four Lodges here involved Ostro testified that the
Lodges needed the employees' addresses so as to be able
to communicate with not only members of the Lodges,
but also nonmembers about various matters The Lodges
desired to give information to the employees, among other
things, about impending elections , both union and civil,
new services afforded by the Lodges, the interpretation of
contract provisions, and the rights of the employees with
respect to group insurance, pensions , workmen's
compensation, social security and medicare. Other
subjects concerning which the Lodges sought to inform the
employees were the handling of grievances , decisions of
arbitrators, the Board and the courts, and the actions of
legislative bodies regarding matters of interest to the
employees
According to Ostro, the Lodges also needed the
addresses of unit employees in order to ascertain the
desires of nonmembers as well as members of the Lodges,
with respect to proposals to be made in bargaining
negotiations.
Ostro further testified that having the employees'
addresses, would facilitate the contacting of employees to
investigate grievances or alleged unfair labor practice
charges. Finally, Ostro testified that reaching employees
by mail at their homes enabled the Lodges to place the
material in the employees hands at a time when they
would have time carefully to consider it The Lodges
experience has been, according to Ostro, that when the
material disseminated includes business reply envelopes, a
larger number of employees participate when the materials
are mailed directly to the employees' homes than when
any other method of distribution is used
4 The methods of communicating with employees
currently utilized by the Respondent and the Lodges
a. The problem of communicating with the
Respondent's employees in view of the large numbers
involved and their wide dispersion
In view of the very large numbers of the Respondent's
employees and the wide dispersal of their homes
communication, with all of them is necessarily a difficult
undertaking. As of the end of 1968 there were almost
17,000 employees at the Respondent's East Hartford and
Manchester plants. An exhibit prepared by the
Respondent (Resp Exh. 1) shows that only a little over
6,000 of these employees live in towns which are closer
than 7 miles from the plant. The rest live in some 118
different towns in Connecticut, in 27 towns in
Massachusetts , and in various places in Rhode Island,
New Hampshire, Vermont, Maine, New York, and other
States A few of these employees live more than 50 miles
from East Hartford and a substantial number live more
than 25 miles from the East Hartford plant
Respondent Exhibit l shows a comparable dispersion of
employees working at the other plants in the Pratt &
Whitney Division Of the approximately 3,000 employees
working at the Southington plant in December 1968, only
641 lived in Southington itself The homes of the rest are
scattered over a radius of 41 miles from the plant. Only
693 of the 1,700 employees working at the Middletown
plant in December 1968 lived in Middletown. The rest are
scattered over a radius of 66 miles from the plant, in
various towns in Connecticut , Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, Maine, New York and other States
The same wide dispersion of employees' homes is found
at the Respondent's Windsor Locks and Building 3 plants
in the Hamilton Standard Divis ion Respondent Exhibit 2
gives the figures as of June 20, 1969, as to the places of
residence of the employees of the Windsor Locks plant,
which are stipulated to be representative for the employees
of the Building 3 plant also Windor Locks had over 4,500
employees as of June 20, 1969 and Building 3 a little over
500. The Windsor Locks employees lived in 105 different
towns in Connecticut and 65 towns in Massachusetts.
Only 821 of the 4,500 Windsor Locks employees lived
closer than 7 miles from the plant. The rest of the
employees were dispersed over an area having a radius of
more than 45 miles from the plant
b The Respondent's methods of communicating with
employees
The Respondent has traditionally used various means of
communicating with employees. In addition to the
handbook "You and Your Company" which is given to
all employees at the time of their hiring, the Respondent
puts out semimonthly house organs to the employees of
both divisions. In the Pratt & Whitney Division it is
called the "Power Plant" and in the Hamilton Standard
Division the publication is called the "Hamilton
Standard." In addition to these two division-wide
publications , the Respondent issues a quarterly
corporation-wide publication called the "Bee-Hive." None
898 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of these publications normally contains any information
about contract negotiations or labor relations matters
These various house organs are distributed to the
employees by means of racks placed at the various plant
exits. The racks are so constructed that they can be
locked, and the Respondent ' s practice is to have the racks
locked at all times except at the end of the various shifts,
so that these publications are available to the employees
only on their way home
For many years the Respondent has used bulletin
boards as a means of communicating with its employees
At the East Hartford plant Respondent has for a long
time had specially constructed glassed - in locked bulletin
boards about 3 feet high and 8 feet wide erected at
prominent places in the plants These bulletin boards are
divided into separate sections , a section for the
Respondent ' s general notices, and smaller sections for
credit union notices, Aircraft Club notices and union
notices. In the Hamilton Standard Division the bulletin
boards are apparently smaller. The collective-bargaining
contracts covering the employees in both divisions in
recent years have provided that employer-approved notices
concerning union meetings , elections , and union social
affairs could be posted on the company bulletin boards
The Respondent has traditionally used the mails to
communicate important messages to its employees While
this means of communications has not been used with
great frequency in the past , it has been used with some
regularity by the Respondent when it has had serious
problems in connection with contract negotiations or other
phases of labor relations.
Thus, in the 1960 negotiations with Lodge 743 for
successor contracts covering the Windsor Locks and
Broad Brook plants, the Respondent mailed letters to the
employees ' homes to urge them to reject the
recommendations of the Lodge 743 negotiators that the
Respondent's proposals be voted down Similarly, after
the rank - and-file members of Lodge 1746 in 1960 had
voted down the contract proposals previously agreed upon
by the Respondent and Lodge 1746 negotiators for the
East Hartford and Manchester plants, the Respondent
mailed letters to all the unit employees at these plants
setting forth various arguments justifying the
Respondent ' s position on the issues on which the parties
were in disagreement . Again, after the negotiations
between the Respondent and Lodges 1746 and 743
collapsed in March 1966, the Respondent mailed a series
of letters to the employees of the East Hartford,
Manchester and Windsor Locks plants explaining and
justifying its action , and informing them of an employee
complaint procedure which it was putting into effect for
the employees ' benefit . In November 1968, after the
Respondent refused the Lodges ' request for the home
addresses of the employees , the Respondent utilized the
mails to explain its action to all the employees involved.
In a letter dated November 5, 1968, to the employees, the
Respondent stated that it had agreed to permit the Lodges
to have the use of its mailing facilities in order to enable
them to communicate with non - members as well as
members about contract proposals and negotiations This
procedure , the Respondent explained, would enable it to
adhere to its longstanding policy of protecting the privacy
of the employees' homes
Industrial Relations Director Morse testified in effect
that the Respondent would continue to communicate with
its employees by mail whenever it decided that this would
be the most effective means of communicating with the
employees about the particular subject which was
involved.
c The means used by the Lodges to communicate
with employees
The Lodges used handbills more than any other means
of communications when they had messages to impart to
the employees The Lodges would have handbills passed
out to the employees as they entered the plants at the
beginning of the various shifts During 1968, the Lodges
distributed handbills on 45 to 50 occasions In addition to
handbills, the Lodges also passed out copies of the District
91 monthly publication, the "New Union News" to the
employees as they entered the plants.
The Lodges prefer the beginning of the shift for the
distribution of union literature , so George Cope, a
business representative of District 91, testified , for the
reason that employees who arrive early have time to read
'them before starting to work , others can read them during
the lunch hour , and also employees are more likely to
take handbills at the beginning of the shift than when they
are rushing to get home at the end of the shift
International Representative Ostro testified that another
reason the Lodges chose the beginning of the shifts as the
time to distribute union literature was that frequently the
material referred to situations in the plant which the
Lodges desired the employees to look into during their
shift
At some undisclosed time in the past the Local 1746
president requested the Respondent to permit it to station
its handbill distributors inside the plants to avoid bad
weather While denying such permission , the Respondent
offered to open the racks, which it used to make available
its house organs to the employees , to union handbills,
providing no conflicting use of the racks was planned.
This possibility was explored by the Lodges and Lodge
743 accepted the offer for a considerable period of time
However, the other Lodges, after ascertaining that the
racks would be open only at the end of the shifts, as the
employees were leaving the plant, and that advance notice
was required to avoid conflicting demands on the use of
the racks, declined to accept the offer
The Lodges also use the mails to reach those of their
members for whom they have up-to-date addresses
Members of the Lodges receive the weekly newspaper put
out by the International, the Machinist, as well as various
individualized mailings Lodge 1746, the largest of the
Lodges here involved , sent out three such mailings in 1969
up until the hearing in July . Two of these were letters
notifying members of an impending election of officers.
The other was a letter explaining a discount tire purchase
program which was available for union members
As indicated above, on one occasion , during the
pendency of the 1968 negotiations , the Respondent offered
to allow Lodges 1746, 1746A, and 700 to use its mailing
facilities to mail information to all unit employees This
offer was contained in the Respondent 's letter to District
91 dated October 15, 1968 In this letter the Respondent
referred to the Lodges' apparent interest in ascertaining
the views of nonmembers regarding proposals to be
advanced in the forthcoming negotiations , as indicated in
handbills distributed by the Lodges The letter then went
on to offer , whenever a Lodge wished to write letters to
all employees in the bargaining units "on matters related
to contract negotiations," to permit the use of its
addressograph equipment for the addressing of the sealed,
UNITED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION 899
stamped envelopes furnished by the Lodges and, with the
Lodges participating, to handle the mailing of these
letters. In the discussions about the Lodges' acceptance of
this offer which followed, it was made known to the union
negotiators, as International Representative Ostro
testified, that the offer was subject to the availability of
the Respondent's addressograph equipment, and that the
Respondent had first call on that equipment
Lodges 1746, 1746A, and 700 accepted the
Respondent's offer to use its mailing facilities in the first
half of November 1968, sending out on this occasion to all
employees in the units represented by these Lodges a copy
of the Lodges' contract proposals together with a covering
letter pointing that if they wanted to have an opportunity
to vote on acceptance of the Respondent's final offer that
they would have to become members of a Lodge
However, when the Lodges sought to use the
Respondent's mailing facilities a second time in March
1969 to mail out a survey concerning the employees'
interest in an automobile insurance plan, the Respondent
refused permission on the grounds that the survey related
to a commercial matter and did not have anything to do
with collective bargaining ,
The Respondent's offer of mailing privileges was
unsatisfactory, Ostro testified, because of the limited
subject matters about which the Respondent would permit
the Lodges to communicate with the employees, and
because of the unavailability of the Respondent's
equipment on short notice. On occasions, so Ostro
testified, the Lodges have a need to communicate with the
employees overnight, and due to the Respondent's own
needs for the use of its addressograph equipment, it
understandably could not always provide such prompt
service
Anothei means of communicating with employees used
by the Lodges is through their stewards. The Lodges had
between 85 and 100 shop stewards who were authorized to
spend up to 2 hours per week handling grievances arising
under the contractual grievance procedure. The Lodges
had about 400 additional union stewards who could
communicate with employees before and after work and
during lunch hours, if the stewards could locate the
employees. However, there are many departments on
some shifts for which no steward is available or is not
accessible, as a practical matter, because of his distant
work station. A few of the employees have roving work
stations and thus cannot be located by stewards even
though the Respondent furnishes the Lodges periodically
with lists of the departments to which each employee is
assigned. Another factor limiting the ability of the
Respondent's stewards to communicate with employees is
the Respondent's strict enforcement of its no-solicitation
rules and of the contract ban on solicitation of union dues
and memberships during working hours. This limits the
union stewards' opportunity to discuss matters with
employees in their jurisdiction to periods before work and
lunch periods (the employees leave the plant promptly
after work). However, the employees have staggered
15-minute lunch breaks, spread over 2 hour period, and
this further limits the opportunities for conversations
between stewards and employees.
5. The Respondent's contentions concerning the
adequacy of the Lodges' present modes of
communicating with employees
The Respondent contends that the various means of
communicating with employees which have been utilized
by the Lodges in the past, together with the additional
methods offered by the Respondent and declined by the
Lodges, constitute more than an adequate means of
communicating with the employees, in the bargaining
units, nonmembers of the Lodges as well as members.
With respect to handb illing, in large plants like the
Respondent's (there are almost 17,000 employees at East
Hartford), the very large number of employees in itself
makes the attainment of nearly 100 percent coverage of
the unit employees - the Lodges' goal - extremely
difficult. Wherever a large number of employees enter the
same entrance at the same time, which is frequently the
case at the Respondent's plants, numerous employees are
missed by the handbillers. Representatives of the Lodges
testified to the very serious logistical problems involved in
having a sufficient number of handbillers adequately
supplied with a sufficient quantity of handbills at the
numerous entrances to the various plants In addition to
this, bad weather and personal problems, such as car
breakdowns, last minute illnesses, and even oversleeping,
prevent the Lodges from achieving satisfactory coverage
of the employees Because of most of the most effective
locations for passing out handbills are on company
property, and because the Respondent does not permit
non-employees to distribute handbills on company
property at the locations deemed by them the most
effective, the Lodges for the most part do not use their
own paid employees to distribute handbills Instead, they
rely on active members working in the plant to do so. As
found above, the handbillers pass the handbills out before
the beginning of their shift They have to stop distributing
the handbills in time to reach their work stations before
starting time. This leaves their handbilling stations
unmanned while the late comers arrive The Lodges also
have difficulty in covering the employees who have
irregular starting times because the employees who
normally would take care of them 'are already at work Of
course, the handbillers cannot reach absent employees In
view of the Lodges' responsibility of acting for all of the
employees in their respective bargaining units, handbilling,
in my opinion, does not afford an adequate means of
communicating with the employees
Although the Respondent makes available space on its
bulletin boards for the posting of union notices, the
collective-bargaining contract, as found above, strictly
limits the subjects about which union notices can be
posted, and the Respondent's approval must first be
obtained before the Respondent posts the notice
Twice in recent months the Respondent has refused to
post notices submitted by the Lodges for posting. On the
first occasion the Respondent refused to post a notice
submitted by Lodge 700 concerning a golf league. The
Respondent took the position that the notice concerned a
recreational activity within the realm of the Aircraft Club
rather than a social activity within the scope of the topics
permitted by the contract On the second occasion Lodges
1746, 1746A, and 743 had specially printed notices
prepared regarding shop steward elections. The
Respondent refused to permit the posting of these notices
with the explanation that they were too large for posting
within the existing union space on the bulletin boards. The
Respondent also asserted that the inclusion on the notices
of very small scale maps of the plants created security
problems. Even after the Lodges pointed out that the
Southington and Windsor Locks maps revealed no
information of a security nature and offered to block out
900 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
maps on the notices for those two plants , the Respondent
still refused to permit the posting of the notices at these
two plants . The Respondent persisted in its refusal
throughout all four steps of the grievance procedure and
finally refused to agree to arbitration of the dispute.
Even if the Respondent had not placed restrictions upon
the Lodges ' use of its bulletin boards, bulletin boards by
their very nature do not provide an effective means of
communicating with employees about important matters.
At the Respondent ' s plants a large number of notices
usually remained posted at the same time - notices
posted by the Respondent, the credit union, the Aircraft
Club and the Lodges. Among this galaxy of notices it was
difficult for the Lodges to attract attention to their
notices, as International Representative Ostro testified.
Employees tend to hurry past the notices on the way out
of the plant after work , as Ostro further testified , and the
only time employees normally glance at the bulletin
boards is on their way in to work and during lunch hours,
which affords employees comparatively little exposure to
the messages which the Lodges would like to convey. In
my opinion bulletin boards fall far short of constituting an
adequate medium of communications with the employees
as a whole.
With respect to the Lodges' use of the mails to
communicate with employees , at best this enables the
Lodges to communicate with members only , since the
Lodges do not have the addresses of the nonmenbers. As
found above, for some time the Respondent has been
furnishing the Lodges with copies of employment
authorization forms called "Put-on" slips . These forms as
originally filled out contain the names and addresses of all
newly hired employees . But on the slips furnished the
Lodges the addresses of the employees are blocked out.
This practice originally arose under the stipulation entered
into in the District Court proceeding before Judge Clarie.
Consequently , the mails are of no assistance whatever
insofar as communicating with nonmembers is concerned.
Even with respect to members, the mails are not a
completely satisfactory means of reaching them , since the
Lodges have no effective means of keeping their members
addresses up to date. Quite frequently mail addressed to
members is returned to the Lodges because the addressees
have moved. The Respondent requires that all of its
employees report changes of address to it and had a
special form for this purpose . Thus the furnishing of
addresses of all employees to the Lodges, as requested by
them , would enable them to reach not only nonmembers,
but also more members than they are presently reaching
Finally the Respondent asserts that the Lodge can
communicate with their constituents through their
stewards It points out that at the East Hartford plant
there are about 500 stewards , including almost 100 shop
stewards who are paid for handling grievances. It is true,
as found above, that the 85 - 100 shop stewards are allowed
up to 2 hours pay per week for handling grievances The
General Counsel replied that even 100 stewards for 17,000
employees provides too thin coverage and he points to
various other factors discussed hereinabove , which limit
the ability of the stewards to communicate with
employees , including the unavailability or inaccessability of
stewards in certain departments on some shifts and the
Respondent ' s strict enforcement of no-solicitation rules
and contract provisions which effectively prohibit any
discussion of union business during working hours.
Considering all the factors discussed above, I conclude
that while the stewards serve as one channel of
communications with employees, they are unable to reach
more than a small fraction of the employees in the plant
In my opinion , when measured against the effectiveness
of direct mailings to the home addresses of unit
employees, none of the methods currently used by the
Lodges of communicating with employees, either singly or
in combination , furnish an adequate means of reaching all
unit employees, both members of the Lodges and
nonmembers
B Conclusions
1 The Lodges' status as exclusive bargaining
representatives of the employees in their respective
bargaining units
Before reaching the principal question in this case -
whether the Respondent violated its obligations under
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act in refusing to furnish the
Lodges with lists of addresses of all the employees in the
various bargaining units here involved - the threshold
question of the Lodges ' status as exclusive bargaining
representatives so as to be entitled to request the lists of
addresses must first be disposed of, that is, with the
exception of the majority status of Lodge 1746A. Lodge
1746A' s status as the exclusive bargaining representative
of the employees at the Southington plant has not been
questioned by the Respondent in this proceeding or
before
I have found that by the time the negotiations were
concluded on November 30, 1968, for the new 3-year
contracts between the Respondent and Lodges 1746A,
1746, and 700 covering the employees at the Respondent's
plants in the Pratt & Whitney Division, East Hartford and
Manchester, Southington and Middletown, the
Respondent had in its possession current dues-checkoff
authorizations signed by a majority of the employees in
each of these plants. I have further found that months
before the conclusions of the negotiations between the
Respondent and Lodge 743 in April 1969 covering the
employees at the Windsor Locks and Building 3 plants in
the Hamilton Standard Division , the Respondent had in
its possession current dues-checkoff authorizations signed
by a majority of the employees at each of these plants In
view of my finding that the Lodges' request for the
addresses of unit employees was a continuing request, the
foregoing evidence concerning the extent to which
employees had signed checkoff authorizations would
normally be conclusive of the Lodges' status as exclusive
bargaining representative of all the employees in all six
bargaining units at all times pertinent in this case
However, the Respondent contends that the dues
checkoff authorizations relied upon by the Lodges as
establishing their majority status cannot be regarded as
having been voluntarily executed in view of the assistance
allegedly conferred upon the Lodges by the Respondent by
its recognizing and entering into a collective - bargaining
contract with the Lodges in the negotiations begun in 1965
and by its similar action in the negotiations begun in
1968. According to the Respondent, it granted recognition
involuntarily on both occasions . The first time, so the
Respondent asserts, it accorded recognition to Lodges
1746 and 743 as a result of the entry by the District
Court, at the request of the Board, of an order under
Section 10(j) of the Act requiring the Respondent to
recognize and bargain collectively with these Lodges. (This
order, as found above, was issued in aid of the pending
unfair labor practice proceeding based upon the
Respondent's withdrawal of recognition from Lodges 1746
UNITED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION 901
and 743 on March 11, 1966.) On the second occasion, in
1968 negotiations, the Respondent says that it acted under
the compulsion of the Board's own bargaining order
entered on November 27, 1967, which was entered in the
proceeding based on the Respondent's March 11, 1966
withdrawal of recognition. The Respondent urges that
since the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in its May 29, 1969, decision set aside the Board's
order of November 27, 1967, its grant of recognition to
the Lodges in the 1966 and 1968 negotiations was
improper, that the Lodges were unlawfully assisted by
these coerced grants of recognition, and that for this
reason the dues checkoff authorizations obtained by the
Lodges in their 1968 membership drive cannot be
regarded as having been executed voluntarily
While it is fair to state that the Respondent's grant of
recognition to the Lodges in the negotiations beginning in
1966 was attributable to the compulsion of the District
Court's order, it is not reasonable, in my opinion, to
attribute the Respondent's recognition of the Lodges in
the negotiations beginning in 1968 to the Board's order of
November 27, 1967.
The Lodges had been carrying on a membership drive
all during 1968 The number of dues checkoff
authorizations turned over to the Respondent steadily
increased in all plants as to which the Respondent raises a
question concerning majority status from approximately
20 percent of the employees in January 1968 to over 50
percent in December 1968.
As found above, by the time the negotiations with
Lodge 743 commenced in March 1969, the Respondent
for several months had been checking off union dues from
the wages of a majority of the employees at both the
Windsor Locks and Building 3 plants When Lodge 743
inquired at the start of these negotiations whether the
Respondent was challenging its majority status, the
Respondent replied in the negative.
While the Respondent at the outset of the negotiations
with Lodges 1746 and 700 in November 1968 challenged
their majority status, after the Lodges offered additional
dues-checkoff authorizations to prove their majority
status, and offered to submit to a Board conducted
election if the Respondent did not regard the checkoff
authorizations as sufficient proof (an offer which the
Respondent declined), the Respondent entered into
comprehensive negotiations for new contracts.'
In my opinion it was knowledge of the Lodges' steadily
increasing strength among the employees at all the plants
here involved, as evidenced by the dues-checkoff
authorizations in its hands, which impelled the
Respondent to enter into the negotiations beginning in
1968, rather than any compulsion flowing from the
Board's order of November 27, 1967 This evidence of the
Lodges' majority status was of a kind which the
Respondent was entitled to accept and act upon
The new contracts ultimately entered into by the
Respondent and the Lodges were not mere extensions of
the previous contracts. Portions of these contracts were
substantially rewritten and new benefits not previously
accorded the employees were granted by the Respondent.
The new contracts did not include the "savings clause"
'The Respondent did not raise as a barrier to the negotiations the
pending proceedings in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
for the District of Columbia Circuit in which it was seeking the reversal of
the Board ' s order of November 27, 1969, although it had reason to
anticipate that the Court ' s decision would be forthcoming in the near
future (The cause had been argued on October 15, 1968)
formerly contained in Article XIII of the previous
contracts giving the Respondent the option of terminating
the contracts upon 10 days notice if the Court of Appeals
set aside the Board's order of November 27, 1967,
although the Respondent up until the very end of the
negotiations had insisted that any new contracts should
also contain the "savings clause "
The Respondent has treated the new contracts which it
had entered into with the Lodges as being in full force and
effect until the time of the filing of its answer to the
complaint herein on July 11, 1969, when the Respondent
for the first time raised a question concerning any aspect
of the current contracts with the Lodges Even in this
proceeding the Respondent has challenged only the
binding effect upon it of the exclusive recognition clauses.
It relies on the Court of Appeals decision handed down on
May 29, 1969, setting aside the Board's order of
November 27, 1967, as the basis for its action in this
regard. This court decision is discussed more fully below
In all other respects, the Respondent's position is, as I
understand it, that the contracts are valid and enforceable
At no time has the Respondent taken any steps, or
attempted to take any steps to terminate the contracts as
a whole On the contrary, as late as May 2, 1969, when
the Respondent filed its appeal from the Regional
Director's refusal to issue a complaint upon its charge,
alleging that Lodge 1746 had refused to bargain
collectively with it in violation of Section 8(b)(3) of the
Act, the Respondent was seeking to hold Lodge 1746 to
the bargaining obligations which it assumed in entering
into the 1968 contract
To summarize, the Respondent recognized and entered
into the negotiations for new contracts after having
received from the employees in the units involved a
steadily increasing number of dues-checkoff
authorizations By the time the agreements were reached
the Respondent had in its possession dues-checkoff
authorizations from a majority of the employees in each
of the appropriate units here involved. The Respondent
did not raise the Court of Appeals proceeding in which it
was attacking the Board's order of November 27, 1967, as
a barrier to the negotiations. The new contracts arrived
and contained substantial revisions of the old contracts
and offered the employees new benefits In the new
contracts, the Respondent retreated from its prior position
that the "savings clause" must be included, and consented
to the inclusion of an unconditional exclusive recognition
clause. Since the signing of the new contracts the
Respondent treated them as being valid and subsisting
contracts, and still does, except that it urges that the
exclusive recognition clauses may not be relied upon by
the Lodges as establishing their majority status.
In view of all these facts I conclude that the Board's
order of November 27, 1967, was not a factor of any
significance in the Respondent's decision to go ahead with
the 1968 negotiations and that the Respondent must be
deemed to have acted upon its own responsibility in
entering into these negotiations and in concluding the new
contracts with the Lodges This being true, the
Respondent cannot be heard to say that recognition of the
Lodges in 1968 and 1969 was granted under the improper
compulsion of the Board's order of November 27, 1967,
and that the assistance to the Lodges resulting from this
recognition interfered with the employees' free choice of
bargaining representatives. To hold otherwise on the facts
of this case would be the essence of disorderly
administration of the collective bargaining provisions of
the Act. If the Respondent had any question in its mind
902 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
about whether the employees had voluntarily executed the
checkoff authorizations which had been turned over to it
by the Lodges, and which it was then honoring, the time
to raise such questions was before commencing the
negotiations, not after these difficult and time
consuming negotiations were concluded and the
contracts enforced by all parties for some months. To
permit the Respondent to raise the question of the
voluntary nature of execution of the checkoff
authorizations at this late date would be to sanction a
most flagrant breach of the duty to bargain collectively in
good faith.
The Respondent is mistaken, in my opinion, in relying
upon the Court of Appeals decision of May 29, 1969,
setting aside the Board's order of November 27, 1967, as
justifying its challenge in this proceeding of the Lodges'
majority status. The Court of Appeals held that when the
Respondent withdrew recognition from Lodges 1746 and
743, after the collapse of the negotiations in March 1966,
it had reasonable grounds for doubting the Lodges'
majority status and had acted in good faith, and that
consequently the Board had been in error in finding an
illegal refusal to bargain on this occasion and in issuing a
bargaining order to remedy this alleged unfair labor
practice This decision with respect to alleged March 1966
unfair labor practices, which incidentally does not
constitute a holding that Lodges 1746 and 743 in fact
lacked majority status in March 1966, has no bearing on
the Lodges' majority status in October 1968 and
thereafter The Lodges' claim of majority status at this
time was based upon newly obtained dues-checkoff
authorizations which were turned over to the Respondent
during these and the preceding months. As stated above,
employers are entitled to rely upon such evidence of
majority status, in determining whether or not to grant
recognition. The Court of Appeals decision does not in my
opinion warrant the Respondent's belated challenge of the
Lodges' majority status.
I conclude that each Lodge acquired majority status at
least by the last day of the month during which the total
number of dues-checkoff authorizations furnished the
Respondent by the Lodge reached a number in excess of
50 percent of the employees in the unit. The Respondent's
records show and I find these dates to be as follows-
Lodge 1746, East Hartford and Manchester units,
November 30, 1968.
Lodge 700, Middletown unit, October 31, 1968.
Lodge 743, Windsor Locks unit , November 30, 1968.
Lodge 743, Building 3 unit, December 31, 1968.
As stated above, there is no question in this case about
Lodge 1746A's majority status in the Southington unit at
any time pertinent herein
2 The Respondent 's obligation under Section 8(a)(5)
of the Act to furnish the Lodges , as the exclusive
bargaining representatives of the employees in the
respective collective-bargaining units, with the
addresses of all unit employees
Prudential Insurance Co v. N.L.R B, 412 F.2d 77
(C.A. 6), cert. denied November 17, 1969, 396 U.S. 928,
and Standard Oil Co of California v N.L R B., 399 F 2d
639 (C A. 9), both involve the same question as is
presented in this case, i.e., whether an employer is
required to comply with a union ' s request for a list of the
names and addresses of all the employees in a bargaining
unit of which the union is the exclusive bargaining
representative. Both Courts concluded, in the
circumstances there presented, that the obligations of
employers under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act include the
duty to furnish such address information upon request to
the exclusive bargaining representatives of their
employees. More recent decisions. of the Board to the
same effect are Southern Counties Gas Co ,' 174 NLRB
No. 11, and General Electric Co , 176 NLRB No. 84. The
validity of a Board direction to an employer to furnish
employees' names and addresses in an election context has
been upheld by the Supreme Court N L R.B v.
Wyman-Gordon Co, 394 U.S. 759, 767 See also JP
Stevens & Co, Inc v. N L.R B, 417 F 2d 533 (C.A. 5).
The Sixth Circuit in Prudential after referring to the
general obligation of employers "to provide the
employees' statutory bargaining representative with
information that is necessary and relevant to the proper
performance of its duties" and citing "wage data" as an
example of a type of information which is "presumptively
relevant" to the proper performance of a bargaining
agent's duties, stated with respect to the address
information sought in that case, as follows (412 F.2d at
84)•
The kind of information requested by the Union in this
case has an even more fundamental relevance than that
considered presumptively relevant The latter is needed
by the union in order to bargain intelligently on specific
issues of concern to the employees. But data without
which a union cannot even communicate with
employees whom it represents is, by its very nature,
fundamental to the entire expanse of a unions'
relationship with the employees. In this instance it is
urgent so that the exclusive bargaining representative of
the employees may perform its broad range of statutory
duties in a truly representative fashion and in harmony
with the employees' desires and interests. Because this
information is therefore so basically related to the
proper performance of the unions' statutory duties we
believe any special showing of specific relevance would
be superfluous
The facts of the instant case are similar to those of
both the Prudential and Standard Oil cases, and in my
opinion they more closely parallel those in the Standard
Oil case. In the Standard Oil case the Court, sustaining
the Board, held that the exclusive bargaining
representative of employees has a statutory duty fairly to
represent all of the employees in the bargaining unit,
nonunion employees as well as union members.
Fulfillment of the statutory duty, the Court stated,
requires that the bargaining representative have effective
means of communicating with the beneficiaries of its
statutory obligation, including nonunion employees, with
respect to such matters as "their preferences and priorities
in contract negotiations,. their experience and
recommendations with respect to the operation of the
grievance-arbitration machinery, and their thoughts on the
wisdom of striking over a particular issue" (399 F 2d at
641). The Court in Standard Oil, adopting the reasoning
of the Board, held that in view of the relatively low union
membership in the unit, the absence of a union-security
clause in the collective-bargaining agreement, the
residential dispersion of unit employees over a wide area,
the apparent; ineffectiveness of the steward system, the
lack of adequate exposure of unit employees to union
bulletin boards, and the inefficiency of handbilling efforts,
UNITED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION 903
that the union there involved could not in any effective
manner communicate with the beneficiaries of its
statutory obligation. In these circumstances , the Court
upheld the Board 's conclusion that the furnishing of the
employee address list was relevant to the union's
performance of its responsibilities in collective bargaining
and contract administration and required that the
employer furnish the requested list of addresses.
The parallel between the facts of the Standard Oil case
and this case is apparent Thus, here as in the Standard
Oil case the Lodges had a relatively low membership in
the unit , having as members only a little more than 50
percent of the employees in each of the units, leaving a
very substantial minority of nonmembers to whom the
Lodges owed the duty of fair representation. In this case
also the collective bargaining contract did not contain a
union security clause. The employees' residences in this
case were scattered over a considerably wider area than in
the Standard Oil case, rendering personal contacts with
employees at their homes almost an impossibility from a
practical standpoint Here, as in the Standard Oil case,
the alternative means of communicating with employees
open to the Lodges were not adequate. I have found that
neither the Lodges' handbilling efforts, its use of the
Respondent's bulletin boards, the activities of its stewards
or its mailings to members, either singly or in
combination, constituted an effective means of
communicating with the employees as a whole,
nonmembers as well as members of the Lodges.
The mechanics of the furnishing of the Lodges with the
requested list of addresses present no serious problem. The
Respondent has mechanical addressing equipment for all
its plants. As found above, in November 1968, the
Respondent, in an effort to counter the Lodges' request
for addresses, voluntarily offered the use of its mailing
facilities to the Lodges for certain limited types of
mailings Lodges 1746, 1746A, and 700 accepted this offer
on one occasion. In one respect, in connection with the
Respondent's furnishing the Lodges with information
concerning newly hired employees, it would simplify
matters for the Respondent to furnish addresses, since it
would enable the Respondent to stop blocking out the
addresses on the "Put-on" forms
The Respondent seeks to justify its action in refusing
the lists of addresses requested by the Lodges on two main
grounds I have dealt with and rejected the first contention
- that the various methods of communicating with
employees which have been utilized by the Lodges in the
past together with the additional methods offered by the
Respondent and declined by the Lodges constitute an
adequate means of communicating with all the employees
- in connection with my discussion of the facts. There
remains the Respondent's second contention that it is
entitled to withhold the addresses in order to protect the
employees' right of privacy at their homes, particularly in
view of the violence which occurred at the homes of
nonstrikers during the 1960 strike.
The Charging Party contends that, vis-a-vis the
statutory collective bargaining representative, address
information is no more entitled to be kept private than
wage information; that an employer is no more permitted
in one case than the other to assert employees' alleged
individual interest in privacy to justify nonperformance of
its statutory obligation to furnish data necessary to the
carrying out of the bargaining agent's statutory functions
Logic, in my opinion, supports the Charging Party's
position. In the Prudential case in the Sixth Circuit the
employer's policy with respect to furnishing employee
addresses was identical with Respondent's in this case.
The Sixth Circuit's decision requiring the furnishing of
address information answers the Respondent's "privacy"
.contention in the typical situation See also British Auto
Parts, Inc v. N L R.B , 405 F 2d 1182, 1183 (C.A 9);
N L R B v. Hanes Hosiery Division, Hanes Corp., 384
F.2d 188, 191 (C.A 4), cert. denied 390 U.S. 950;
N L R B v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 274 F. Supp.
432, 437 (S.D.N.Y.), aff d. 406 F.2d 253, 259 (C.A. 2);
N L.R B v. Wyman-Gordon Co , 394 U.S. 759, 766
The question remains whether the violence which
occurred at the homes of nonstrikers during the 1960
strike in which members or representatives of Lodge 1746
and 743 allegedly engaged justifies a different outcome in
this case. Assuming that this violence can be properly
attributed to Lodges 1746 and 743, I question whether, in
a reasonable balancing of the competing considerations,
these'acts 8 years before should be regarded as calling for
the indefinite suspension of the Respondent's statutory
obligation to furnish information which is relevant to the
bargaining agent's performance of its statutory functions.
There is no evidence in this case of any present threat by
agents of Lodges 1746 and 743 to engage in acts of
violence at the homes of nonunion employees. Though the
Lodges may have misconducted themselves in the past,
they have "a locus penitentiae," and the Respondent is
not thereby relieved indefinitely of its obligation to furnish
relevant information. Cf N L R B v Remington Rand,
Inc , 94 F.2d 862, 872-873 (C.A. 2), cert. denied 304 U.S.
576. See also N L R B v. Duncan Foundry & Machine
Works, 67 LRRM 2516, 2517, (C.A. 7), decided January
16, 1968; and Howell Refining Co. v N L R.B, 400 F 2d
213, 216 (C.A. 5), in which the production of employees'
names and addresses was required under the Board's
Excelsior rule' despite evidence of some contemporary
violence And see N L R B v. Q-T Shoe Manufacturing
Co, 409 F 2d 1247, 1250 (C.A. 3); N L.R -B. v. Delaware
Valley Armaments, Inc, 72 LRRM 2927 (D.C.N.J.),
decided October 23, 1969. Cf. Sign and Pictorial Union
Local 1175 v. N.L R.B, 419 F.2d 726 (C.A D.C.).
Accordingly, I conclude that the violence allegedly
engaged in by agents of Lodges 1746 and 743 in 1960 does
not justify a different result in this case, and that the
Respondent was obliged under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act
to furnish the address information sought by the Lodges
3. The Respondent's violation of Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act
The Lodges' requests for the lists of addresses of the
employees in the various bargaining units which gave rise
to the instant proceedings were made by the Lodges in
letters to the Respondent dated September 19, 1968 and
October 10, 1968. These requests were in effect renewed in
the bargaining negotiations between Lodges 1746 and 700
and the Respondent on November 29 and 30. (As found
above, earlier requests for the addresses of unit employees
had been made in 1964 and 1965.) Under all the
circumstances I find that the Lodges' requests for the
addresses of unit employees were of a continuing nature.
I have found that Lodge 1746 achieved majority status
in the East Hartford and Manchester units by November
30, 1968, that Lodge 700 reached such status in the
Middletown unit by October 30, 1968, and that Lodge 743
acquired its majority in the Windsor Locks unit by
November 30, 1968 and in the Building 3 unit by
'Excelsior Underwear Co Inc, 156 NLRB 1236
904 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
December 31, 1968. There never has been any question in
this case about Lodge 1746A's status in the Southington
unit I have further found that under the circumstances of
this case the Respondent was obliged under Section
8(a)(5) of the Act to furnish the address information
requested It follows that the Respondent's continuing
refusals, after having been given proof of each Lodge's
majority status, to furnish the requested address
information violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
With respect to Lodges 1746, 700, and 743, the
violations occurred on the dates set' forth in the preceding
paragraph. Regarding Lodge 1746A, the Respondent's
violation occurred commencing on September 30, 1968,
when the Respondent wrote District 91 its first letter
refusing to furnish the addresses of unit employees.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. All production and maintenance employees of the
United Aircraft Corporation, Pratt & Whitney Aircraft
Division, at the East Hartford plant (including the DE
Lab and the Willgoos Lab), including inspectors, 'crib
attendants, material handlers, factory clerks and working
leaders, but excluding timekeepers, engineering and
technical employees, laboratory technicians, foremen's
clerks, salaried office and clerical employees, medical
department employees, first-aid employees, plant
protection employees, executives, plant superintendents,
division superintendents, general foremen, foremen,
assistant foremen, group supervisors, watch engineers, and
all other supervisors as defined in the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, constitute a unit appropriate
for the purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
2. All production and maintenance employees of the
United Aircraft Corporation, Pratt & Whitney Aircraft
Division, at its Manchester, Connecticut plant (Cheney
Mills Buildings 1, 2, 3, 19, the Finishing Mill, and the
Weaving Mill) including inspectors, crib attendants,
material handlers, factory clerks and working leaders, but
excluding all timekeepers, professional employees,
engineering and technical employees, laboratory
technicians, foremen's clerks, office and clerical
employees, medical department employees, first-aid
employees, plant production employees, executives, plant
superintendents, division superintendents, general foremen,
foremen, assistant foremen, group supervisors, watch
engineers , and all other supervisors as defined in the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, constitute a
unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
3. At all times on and after November 30, 1968, Lodge
1746, International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, has been the duly
designated exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
the employees in the units described in paragraphs 1 and
2, above
4. All production and maintenance employees of the
United Aircraft Corporation, Pratt & Whitney Division,
at the Middletown, Connecticut plant, including
inspectors, crib attendants, material handlers and working
leaders, but excluding all timekeepers, engineering and
technical employees, professional employees, laboratory
technicians , foremen's clerks, salaried office and salaried
clerical employees, medical employees, first-aid
employees, plant protection employees, executives, plant
superintendents, division superintendents, general foremen,
foremen , assistant foremen , group supervisors, watch
engineers , and all other supervisors , constitute a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
5. At all times on and after October 31, 1968, Lodge
700, International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, has been the duly
designated exclusive collective -bargaining representative of
the employees in the unit described in paragraph 4 above.
6. All production and maintenance employees of United
Aircraft Corporation , Pratt & Whitney Division, at its
Southington , Connecticut , plant, including inspectors, crib
attendants , material handlers , factory clerks and working
leaders, but excluding timekeepers , engineering and
technical employees, apprentices , trainees , laboratory
technicians, foremen's clerks, salaried office and clerical
employees , medical department employees , first-aid
employees , plant protection employees , executives, plant
superintendents , division superintendents , general foremen,
foremen , assistant foremen, group supervisors, watch
engineers , and all other supervisors , constitute a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
7. At all times on and after September 19, 1968, Lodge
1746A, International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, has been the duly
designated exclusive collective -bargaining representative of
the employees in the unit described in paragraph 6 above
8. All production and maintenance employees of the
United Aircraft Corporation , Hamilton Standard
Division , at the Windsor Locks plant , including working
leaders and all hourly rated technicians in the chemical,
rubber , metallurgical , vibration , and electronics
laboratories , but excluding executives , professional
employees, salaried technicians in the Engineering
Department, foremen ' s clerks who have access to
confidential information , draftsmen , plant protection
employees , medical department employees , salaried office
and salaried clerical employees , outside servicemen,
truckdrivers , watch engineers , group supervisors and all
other supervisors as defined in the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , constitute a unit appropriate
for the purpose of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act.
9. At all times on and after November 30, 1968, Lodge
743, International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, has been the duly
designated exclusive collective - bargaining representative of
the employees in the unit described in paragraph 8 above
10. All production and maintenance employees of
United Aircraft Corporation, Hamilton Standard
Division, at the Building 3 plant , Windsor Locks,
including working leaders and hourly rated technicians in
the electronics laboratory , but excluding executives,
professional employees , salaried technicians in the
Engineering Department , foremen's clerks who have
access to confidential information , draftsmen, plant
protection employees , medical department employees,
salaried office and salaried factory clerical employees,
timekeepers , outside servicemen, truckdrivers, watch
engineers, group supervisors and all other supervisory
employees as defined in the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended , constitute a unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(b),of the Act.
11. At all times on and after December 31, 1968, Lodge
743, International Association of Machinists and
UNITED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION 905
Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, had been the duly
designated exclusive collective - bargaining representative of
the employees in the unit described in paragraph 10
above
12 By denying the requests of the Lodges for the
addresses of. all of the employees in the respective
bargaining , units on and after the dates specified in
paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 9, and II above, the Respondent has
engaged in ' unfair labor practices affecting commerce
within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(5) and ( 1) and 2(6)
and (7) of the Act
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent, in violation of its
duty under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, refused to furnish
the Lodges with the home addresses of all the employees
in the units represented by them, my recommended order
will direct the Respondent promptly to furnish each of the
Lodges with the home addresses of all the employees in
their respective collective-bargaining units My
recommended order will further direct the Respondent to
bargain collectively with the Lodges, upon request,
concerning :the manner and form in which such
information' shall be furnished the Lodges in the future
and the intervals at which such information shall be
brought up to date
Upon the foregoing findings and conclusions and the
entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act,
there is hereby issued the following:
RECOMMENDED ORDER
The Respondent United Aircraft Corporation (Pratt &
Whitney and Hamilton Standard Divisions), its officers,
agents, successors , and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from refusing to furnish Lodges
1746, 1746A, 700 and 743, International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, with the
home addresses of all the employees in their respective
collective - bargaining units
2 Take the following affirmative action which it is
found will effectuate the policies of the Act
(a) Promptly furnish each of the Lodges, Lodges 1746,
1746A, 700, and 743, International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, with the
home addresses of all the employees in their respective
collective - bargaining units
(b) Upon request, bargain collectively with each of the
Lodges concerning the manner and form in which the
home addresses of the unit employees will be furnished the
Lodges in the future and the intervals at which such
information shall be brought up to date
(c) Post at its East Hartford, Manchester, Middletown,
Southington, Windsor Locks and Building 3 , Windsor
Locks, plants copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix " Copies of said notice, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 1, after being duly
signed by an authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted Reasonable steps shall
be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in
writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision,
what steps have been taken to comply herewith '
Dated By
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations
Board an agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT in the future refuse the requests of
Lodges 1746, 1746A, 700 and 743 International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
AFL-CIO, for the home addresses of all of the
employees in their respective collective-bargaining units.
WE WILL promptly furnish Lodge 1746, Lodge
1746A, Lodge 700 and Lodge 743, International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
AFL-CIO, with the home addresses of all of the
employees in their respective collective-bargaining units.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with
each of the Lodges concerning the manner and form in
which the home addresses of the unit employees will be
furnished the Lodges in the future'and the intervals at
which such information shall be brought up to date
UNITED AIRCRAFT
CORPORATION (PRATT &
WHITNEY AIRCRAFT AND
HAMILTON STANDARD
DIVISIONS)
(Employer)
In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings , conclusions , recommendations , and Recommended Order herein
shall, as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be
adopted by the Board and become its findings , conclusions , and order, and
all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes in the event
that the Board's Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States Court
of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "posted
pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing
an Order of the National Labor Relations Board "
'1n the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read . "Notify said Regional Director, in
writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent
has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
(Representative) ' (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance
with its provisions, may be directed to the Board's Office,
20th Floor, John F. Kennedy Federal Building,
Cambridge & New Sudbury Streets, Boston,
Massachusetts 02203 Telephone 617-223-3300