United Aircraft Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 14, 1949

85 N.L.R.B. 183 (N.L.R.B. 1949)

In the Matter of CHANCE VOUGHT AIRCRAFT DIVISION OF UNITED
AIRCRAFT CORPORATION and LODGE 1639, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIA-
TION OF MACHINISTS
Case No. 16-CA-130.-Decided July 14,1949
DECISION
AND
ORDER
Upon a charge filed on January 17, 1949, by Lodge 1639, Inter-
national Association of Machinists, herein called the IAM, the General
Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, herein called the
General Counsel, by the Regional Director for the Sixteenth Region
(Fort Worth, Texas), issued a complaint dated May 3, 1949, against
Chance Vought Aircraft Division of United Aircraft Corporation,'
herein called the Respondent, alleging that the Respondent had
engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and 8 (a) (3) and
Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat.
449, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61
Stat. 136, herein called the Act. Copies of the charge and the com-
plaint, together with notice of hearing, were duly served upon the
Respondent.
With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint alleged
in substance (1) that on December 2, 1948, the Respondent suspended
and, on February 21, 1949, it discharged employee Pierre L. Rossini
because he joined or assisted the IAM or engaged in other concerted
activity for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, and thereafter failed and refused to reinstate him; (2) that
the Respondent (a) interrogated its employees concerning their union
affiliations (b) urged, persuaded, threatened, and warned its employees
to refrain from assisting, becoming or remaining members of the IAM
and (c) made promises of benefits to its employees for the purpose
of inducing them to withdraw from the IAM and made threats of
reprisal if such employees did not withdraw from that labor organiza-
The name of the Respondent appears as amended at the hearing.
85 N. L. R. B., No. 32.
183
184 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tion; and (3) that on or about October 15, 1948, Respondent's foreman
Fleischer, told an employee that "I was going to reprimand Rossini
when he supposedly left for his mother's funeral. I know that he its the
one who has been writing about me in the Union paper and because of
his union activities I am going to lay him off when he gets back."
On May 17, 1949, the Respondent filed its answer to the complaint,
denying the commission of any unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held at Dallas, Texas, on May 24,
25, 26, and 27, 1949, before William E. Spencer, the Trial Examiner
duly designated by the Chief Trial Examiner. The General Counsel,
the IAM, and the Respondent were represented by counsel or other
representatives and participated in the hearing. All parties were
afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine
witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing on the issues.
At the close of the hearing, the Respondent moved to dismiss the
complaint. With the consent of all the parties, the Trial Examiner
orally analyzed the evidence in lieu of an Intermediate Report and
granted the Respondent's motion? During the course of the 1i earing,
the Trial Examiner made rulings on other motions and on the admis-
sion of evidence. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed.
After the close of the hearing, the IAM filed exceptions to the Trial
Examiner's findings, and a supporting brief. The Board has con-
sidered the IA-TNT's exceptions and finds them to be without merit.
Upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following :
FINDINGS Or FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
United Aircraft Corporation is a Delaware corporation engaged in
the manufacture, sale, and distribution of aircraft and related products.
It operates plants in many parts of the United States. At Grand
Prairie, Texas, it operates an aircraft manufacturing plant known as
the Chance Vought Aircraft Division of United Aircraft Corporation.
This plant is still in the process of organization. However, the Re-
spondent has purchased for its Grand Prairie plant, raw materials such
as aluminum and steel valued in excess of $100,000, of which 90 percent
has been shipped to the plant from points outside the State of Texas.
'The TAM excepts to the procedure adopted by the Trial Examiner in dismissing the
complaint without issuing a written Intermediate Report . As all parties originally agreed
to this method of disposing of the case, we find no merit in this exception.
CHANCE VOUGHT AIRCRAFT DIVISION 185
It has made sales of products manufactured at the plant valued in
excess of $100,000, of which 90 percent has been shipped to points out-
side the State of Texas.
We find that the Respondent is engaged in commerce within the
meanig of the Act .3
II. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Lodge 1639, International Association of Machinists, is a labor
organization admitting to membership employees of the Respondent.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The alleged discriminatory discharge of Pierre L. Rossini
(a) Chronology of events
In the summer of 1948, the Respondent transferred its Chance
Vought Division from Stratford, Connecticut, to Grand Prairie,
Texas. In connection with this plant shift, it also transported a con-
siderable number of its Stratford personnel, including the discharged
Rossini, to the new plant in Texas.
The employees in the Stratford plant had been represented by -In-
ternational Union, United Automobile, Aircraft & Agricultural Im-
plement Workers of America, CIO, herein called the UAW, of which
Rossini was a member. After the establishment of the Texas plant, the
JAM and the UAW both actively sought to organize the new plant's
employees. Rossini became the leading organizer for the IAM in the
plant and the president of its local organization. The Respondent was
aware of his leadership in behalf of the IAM.
Apparently, there was considerable rivalry between the IAM and
the UAW, and complaints were made to the management that various
employees were conducting organizing activities on company time
on behalf of either the UAW or the IAM. The Respondent dis-
charged one UAW organizer and forced the resignation of another,
in both cases on the complaint of the IAM. The Respondent also
warned Rossini in October 1948 against organizing for the IAM on
company time under penalty of discharge, after the UAW had com-
plained that he was involved in such activities. While there is no evi-
dence that Rossini did any organizing work on company time, he was
frequently away from his work bench without permission and was
observed by the Respondent's supervisors in unauthorized conversa-
3 Matter of United Aircraft Corporation, 67 N. L. R. B. 594.
186 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tion with employees in his own and other departments during working
hours.
Our dissenting colleagues assert that Rossini was not derelict in
the performance of his duty and that therefore his alleged deficiencies
in that respect afford no basis for his suspension and ultimate disc
charge. We disagree. After considering all the testimony, the Trial
Examiner found in this connection that "lie [Rossini] was taking too
much time off the job, and I believe that there was a legitimate ground
for complaint there." The record clearly. supports the Trial Exam-
iner's finding and negatives the dissent's contention. The record
shows that Fleischer was a strict disciplinarian who kept tabs on all
his men, not only on Rossini as the dissent implies.4 The record shows
and be believe, that Fleischer and Williams did not consider Rossini's
behavior satisfactory.5 Finally, our dissenting colleagues rely on the
testimony of Skaer and Walsh. Both of the witnesses admitted
that they worked with their backs to Rossini. They could not readily
observe Rossini's excursions in and out of the department. Further-
more, a reading of their testimony clearly indicates that they had no
credible knowledge of the peregrinations of Rossini. Under these cir-
cumstances, we are convinced, and agree with the Trial Examiner, that
Rossini was derelict in his duties and that the Respondent had legiti-
mate cause for complaint on that account.
As part of its program of readjustment, the Respondent allowed
transferees from the Stratford plant to take as many as 3 days off with
pay to straighten out their personal affairs. Rossini was absent from
the plant on November 18, 1948. He later reported to his foreman,
Fleischer that he had used the time to move his furniture from the
place of storage to his new home .6 Upon this representation, he was
paid for the day. On or about November 29, 1948, Fleischer received
a routine notice from the accounting department which said that.Ros-
sini's furniture was still in storage, and that Rossini would have to pay
' Skaer , a union official and witness for the General Counsel , admitted that Fleischer
kept a "close observance . . . on all the men."
° Although Rossini continued to loaf on the job, Fleischer "bent backwards ," did not
complain to his superiors, and refrained from discharging Rossini not only because, as
the dissent points out , supervision was "lenient ," but also because Fleischer took into
account Rossini ' s youth and veteran 's status and the pregnancy of Rossini 's wife as well
as the Respondent ' s expense in transferring Rossini and his family to Texas.
Rossini unequivocally testified that Williams warned him against soliciting on company
time ; that he had promised Williams that he would not do so; and that Williams had
acknowledged Rossini's cooperation in this matter . With respect to Rossini 's neglecting
his work , Williams testified that Rossini had admitted that he was [ still] talking on the job
and that he had nothing to worry about if he cut out this loafing. Accordingly, we do
not believe that Williams thanked Rossini for keeping his promise to stay on the job, but
for keeping his promise not to solicit on company time.
° Rossini denied that he had given this explanation of how he used the November 18 day
off. We credit Fleischer ' s testimony on this point.
CHANCE VOUGHT AIRCRAFT DIVISION 187
for any storage charges in excess of 60 days. Foreman Fleischer was
disturbed by what he considered to be Rossini's untruthful explana-
tion for his absence on November 18, 1948. He asked the plant per-
sonnel head if Rossini could not be discharged, because he did not want
any man who lied working for him. The personnel department head
dissuaded Fleischer from any such action, but suggested that they in-
vestigate the excuse given by Rossini the next time he took any time
off.7
The very next day, November 30, 1948, Rossini asked for and was
given 2 hours off, without pay, upon stating that he wished to take his
wife to the doctor. The Respondent assigned one of its internal secu-
rity investigators to follow Rossini and check on how he used the time
off." The investigator reported back that Rossini had not taken his
wife to the doctor and, moreover, had not even gone home.9 The fol-
lowing day, December 1, 1948, the personnel department head con-
fronted Rossini with the investigator and accused him of lying when
he asked for the 2 hours off. On December 2, 1948, the Respondent
suspended him for lying, pending further investigation to determine
whether he should be reinstated or discharged. On February 21,1949,
after a full investigation of Rossini's activities the Respondent dis-
charged him.10 The principal alleged reasons for the discharge were
Rossini's untruthfulness, which was the immediate cause of his sus-
pension, his loafing on the job, and his roaming around the plant with-
out permission.
The dissent argues that there is "no evidence in the record that the
excuse given by Rossini for his November 18 absence was contempo-
raneously asserted on December 2 as a reason for his suspension on the
latter date." We do not agree. The record shows that both Fleischer,
and Skerritt, one of the Respondent's personnel advisers, testified
credibly that on December 2, they advised Rossini that one of the rea-
sons for his suspension was his lying to the Respondent on different
' The personnel department head testified that he was reluctant to take immediate action
against Rossini because his family and friends were in Connecticut, his wife was pregnant,
and he wanted to be absolutely certain of the facts before invoking any disciplinary
procedure against so prominent a union man.
8 There was nothing unusual in this check-up procedure. This investigator testified
that he had made approximately 6 investigations during the 4-month period ending
December 31, 1948, checking on whether employees had given truthful reasons for taking
time off. He also made about 300 investigations during the same period to determine
why employees were absent from work.
The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that the Respondent made this check not
because of Rossini's union activity, but in order to ascertain whether his explanation in
taking time off was true.
G Rossini admitted that he had not taken his wife to the doctor, but contended that his
wife had felt better and therefore there was no need to take her there.
10 Meanwhile, on January 17, 1949, the IAM had filed charges with the Board alleging
that Rossini had been discriminatorily discharged.
188 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
occasions li Our dissenting colleagues further rely upon the testi-
mony of Skerritt and Melton, international representative of the
IAM, to show the Respondent's animosity to Rossini's union leader-
ship. We do not attach this significance to this testimony. Nor does
the record bear it out. It is clear from a reading of Skerritt's testi-
mony that when he stated that Rossini "should have been smarter and
stayed on the job," he was referring to organizing on company time
and not to Rossini's protected activities. Furthermore, Personnel Man-
ager Wacks' statement concerning Rossini, made in a conversation with
Melton, is more reasonably interpreted as an expression of opinion
concerning Rossini's personal character rather than to any animosity
towards his union leadership. During this conversation Wacks men-
tioned to Melton that Rossini had been lying and loafing. It seems
noteworthy that Melton himself did not attach the significance to
Wacks' remarks that our dissenting colleagues do. Under these cir-
cumstances, we believe, contrary to our dissenting colleagues, that the
record does not show a dislike for Rossini's union leadership, but
rather a dislike for Rossini's personal characteristics as an employee.
(b) Conclusions
The Respondent honestly and reasonably believed that Rossini had
not given a truthful explanation for the time which he took off on No-
vember 18 and 30, 1948. The Respondent says that it suspended him
for that reason. The General Counsel and the IAM contend that
Rossini's union activities were the real reason for the suspension. But
the burden rests on the General Counsel to prove that the assigned rea-
son was only a pretext designed to obscure the real reason-Rossini's
union activities. We agree with the Trial Examiner that the General
Counsel has not sustained this burden. We regard as particularly
significant the fact that the respondent is actively recognizing and
bargaining collectively with both the IAM and the UAW at other
plants, and that there is not the slightest evidence of favoritism on the
part of the Respondent toward either of the unions now seeking to
organize the employees in the Grand Prairie plant. Nor indeed is
there any competent legal evidence of antiunion bias on the part of
the Respondent.
Nor can we find discriminatory the decision to discharge Rossini.
His known prominence in the IAM did not afford him immunity
against discipline. We agree with the Trial Examiner that there was
"Fleischer testified that "I told him [Rossini] that lie was always lying to me on so
many occasions already . . . Skerritt told Rossini that ". . . you wanted some time
off for one reason and you had another reason, you used it for another purpose."
CHANCE VOUGHT AIRCRAFT DIVISION 189
nothing unreasonable in the Respondent's making a full investigation
of Rossini's conduct before determining whether to lift his suspension
or to discharge him, especially since he had threatened the Respondent
with Board action at the time of his suspension. We can perceive no
impropriety in the Respondent's taking into account Rossini's delin-
quent work habits in reaching its decision to discharge him. The fact
that the Respondent did not earlier seek to discipline him for such
conduct did not bar it from considering that conduct in determining
whether to lift the suspension or to discharge him. Accordingly, we
find, as did the Trial Examiner, that the Respondent did not discharge
Pierre L. Rossini in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. We
shall therefore dismiss this allegation of the complaint.
B. The alleged interference, restraint, or coercion
1. The complaint alleged that the Respondent interrogated its em-
ployees concerning their union affiliations. No proof was offered in
support of this allegation. Accordingly, we shall dismiss it.
2. The complaint also alleged that on or about October 15, 1948,
Foreman Fleischer told an employee that he was going to discharge
Rossini because of his union activities. The only witness who testified
to this alleged conversation said that he did not observe Fleischer
make the statement, nor the person to whom it was made, but merely
heard Fleischer's voice through a partition. Fleischer denied making
the statement. The Trial Examiner credited his denial. We accept
the Trial Examiner's resolution of this issue of credibility, as it was
not clearly erroneous.12 Accordingly, we shall also dismiss this allega-
tion of the complaint.
3. The only evidence offered in support of the allegation that the
Respondent threatened employees, or offered them benefits, in order to
influence their union activities was orientation speeches made by Per-
sonnel Adviser Taylor, in the fall and winter of 1948, to small groups
of employees. During these talks, which were intended to acquaint
employees with the Respondent's policies and procedures, Taylor said
that the Respondent would prefer to operate without a union for a
year and asked the employees to wait that long before they decided
whether they wanted a union. He mentioned the benefits that the
Respondent had already given and contemplated giving its employees,
including retirement benefits, insurance, medical service, hospitaliza-
tion, credit union, a company store, and a company club. As a matter
of company policy, these benefits were granted to employees in all of
the Respondent's plants throughout the United States. They had also
12 Matter of Kentucky UtiUt %es Company, 83 N. L. R. $. 981.
190 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
formerly been enjoyed by the employees at the Stratford, Connecticut,
plalit, the former site of the Chance Vought Division plant. Neither
expressly, nor by implication, can Taylor's speech fairly be said to
have tended to convey the thought that these benefits would be granted
or withheld depending upon whether employees did or did not join
a union. Under these circumstances, we find (in agreement with the
Trial Examiner, that the speech, although it indicated the Respond-
ent's preference for no union for at least a year, did not contain a
promise of benefit nor a threat of reprisal and therefore was privileged
under Section 8 (c) of the Act.13 Accordingly, we shall unanimously
dismiss these allegations of the complaint.
As we have found that the Respondent has not engaged in any of the
alleged unfair labor practices, we shall dismiss the complaint in its
entirety.
ORDER
Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint issued herein against
the Respondent, Chance Vought Aircraft Division of United Aircraft
Corporation, Grand Prairie, Texas, be, and it hereby is, dismissed.
MEMBERS REYNOLDS and MURDOCH, concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part :
We concur in so much of the majority opinion as dismisses the 8 (a)
(1) allegations in the complaint. We would not, however, dismiss the
8 (a) (3) allegation in the complaint.
The majority finds, as did the Trial Examiner, that Rossini was
suspended on December 2, 1948, and later discharged on February 21,
1949, for continued absences from the job, for loafing on the job, and
for lying to a supervisor. We do not agree.
Rossini reported to the Grand Prairie plant on August 2, 1948?4
About the first week in October 1948, Earl Williams, assistant to the
chief tool engineer, warned Rossini that his job would be in jeopardy if
he was caught loafing. Rossini promised Williams that he would pay
is Section 8 (c) provides : The expressing of any views , argument , or opinion . . . shall
not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any provisions of this Act,
if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."
14 There can be little doubt that Rossini's work was satisfactory prior to his transfer
from the Stratford , Connecticut , plant to the Grand Prairie , Texas, plant . Otherwise, the
Respondent would not have spent $ 1,100 to transfer Rossini from Connecticut to Texas.
Nor, if his work at Stratford had been unsatisfactory , would Rossini have been able to
secure the signatures of four members of the Respondent ' s supervisory staff at Stratford
as required for transfer in instances where the individual was not earning $300 a month.
There is no convincing evidence in the record to show that Rossini ' s work was unsatis-
factory during the months of August and September at the Grand Prairie plant.
CHANCE NOUGHT AIRCRAFT DIVISION 191
stricter attention to his job. Williams at that time advised Kurt
-Fleischer , Rossini 's immediate supervisor , to keep a close watch on
Rossini's activities. Rossini was then instructed to report his ab-
-sences, no matter how trivial , from his department . His activities
,were thereafter closely watched . As a result , on about November 6,
Rossini sought out Williams to inquire why so much "pressure" was
being applied to him. In the course of this discussion , according to
Rossini's undenied testimony , Williams thanked Rossini for keeping
his promise to stay on the job made during their October conversation.
It appears, therefore, that Williams was satisfied that Rossini had not,
been neglecting his work during October and the first week in,
November.
Sometime during the first week in November , Arthur Skerritt, a
.personnel advisor , was instructed by his superior, Peter Wacks, plant
personnel manager, to inform Fleischer that Rossini should be dis-
charged if he was caught loafing or was otherwise derelict in his du-
ties. Fleischer nevertheless did not terminate Rossini for any alleged
infractions during the month of November . For that matter,
Fleischer testified that he never had reason to complain to a superior
about Rossini.- Therefore , it appears that Rossi ni 's behavior during
the months of October and November , the crucial period here in ques-
tion, was considered satisfactory by Fleischer and as indicated above
also by Williams , Fleischer 's superior.
In coming to a contrary conclusion and apparently adopting the
Trial Examiner 's finding that Rossini "took too much time off of his
job," we believe that our colleagues have failed to accord certain vital
facts their entitled weight. Accepting the Trial Examiner 's ruling
that the testimony of the Respondent 's witnesses concerning Rossini's
,alleged loafing and absences was exaggerated, the credibility of these,
witnesses on this particular issue is impugned . It is our opinion that
the Board should, therefore , independently consider the testimony of
two witnesses for the , General Counsel to the effect that Rossini was
not absent or loafing any more than other ' employees . We perceive
no reason why this testimony of witnesses Skaer and Walsh should not
be credited , as it appears forthright and.'honest. Furthermore, as-
suming that Rossini was away from his department on occasion,16 the
"In view of this testimony of Fleischer , and in view of Fleischer ' s further testimony
that he first thought of suspending Rossini on December 1, we do not credit Wacks' testi -
mony , as does the majority, to the effect that Fleischer asked him sometime before the-
November 30 episode " If Rossini could be discharged , because he did not want any man;
who lied working for him ." ( The quotation is from the majority opinion.)
" Skaer testified that he did not "notice " that Rossini left his work bench any more
frequently than other employees. And Walsh's testimony was to the effect. that Rossini:
did not take "any more or less time" off during working hours than did other employees.
192 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
evidence discloses that the Respondent viewed occasional absences as
normal during the period in question. At that time operations were
admittedly in a state of flux due to the incompleted organization of
operations at Grand Prairie. The record shows that machinery was
then being installed' and that the number of employees at -the Grand
Prairie plant increased from 700 in September to 1,900 in December.
Fleischer, Rossini's supervisor, testified that there was considerable
"confusion" in the departments under his supervision in the fall of
'1948, and that because of this condition supervision was "lenient" at
that time.
Upon the basis of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that Rossini
was not derelict in the performance of his duties during the months
of October and November, and that, contrary to the contention of the
Respondent, his alleged work dereliction during those months affords
no justifiable reason for his December 2 suspension and his ultimate
discharge.
We come now to the episodes which the Respondent asserts were the
immediate cause for the disciplinary action taken against Rossini.
Sometime in November, Rossini was advised by his supervisor,
Fleischer, that in keeping with the Respondent's readjustment policy
Rossini was entitled to a day off which if not taken immediately would
be lost. Rossini thereupon did not report for work on November 18.
Since Rossini had presumably taken this day off pursuant to the advice
of Fleischer, it indeed seems unusual for the Respondent to raise a
question concerning the veracity of any excuse given by Rossini for this
absence. The Respondent nevertheless contends that because of the
alleged untruth of Rossini's excuse on this occasion, it decided to
check Rossini's excuses for future absences and accordingly, during the
2 hours leave granted him on November 30, subjected him to the sur-
veillance which led to his December 2 suspension. However, for rea-
sons appearing below, we are of the opinion that (1) the alleged un-
truth of Rossini's explanation on November 18 was not the real reason
for the surveillance of his activities on November 30,x7 and (2) the
alleged untruth of Rossini's excuse of November 30 was used as a pre-
text to suspend and then discharge Rossini.
"In this posture of the case, the excuse , if any, given by Rossini on November 18 Is
unimportant . We therefore find it unnecessary to choose between the conflicting testi-
mony of Fleischer and Rossini on this point. Accordingly, we do not take issue with the
credibility finding of the majority made in footnote 6, supra. Moreover, assuming that
Rossini did not move his furniture on November 18 despite his assertion to Fleischer that
:he did, we do not believe that this disparity proves that Rossini improperly used company
compensated time. The record discloses that the 3 clays allotted for readjustment were to
be used to settle "personal affairs," such as housing , banking , and insurance . There is no
,evidence in the record to show that Rossini did not so use November 18.
CHANCE VOUGHT AIRCRAFT DIVISION 193
Early in October 1948, reports reached the Respondent that Rossini
was soliciting membership in the IAM during working hours. There-
after, because of these reports, Rossini's activities on the job came
under the close surveillance of top management officials is as well as of
Rossini's immediate supervisors. While the Respondent's right to
engage in such surveillance cannot be questioned, we are convinced,
that the background and the intensity of the surveillance in this case
exceeded the bounds of caution usually taken to enforce rules against
solicitation. On the record before us, it appears that the excessiveness
of this incident, including the final surveillance of November 30, stern-
med from the Respondent's desire to rid itself of Rossini's services
because of the totality of his activities on behalf of the IAM.
We rely on the following in support of this position. There is no
evidence in the record that the excuse given by Rossini for his Novem-
ber 18 absence was contemporaneously asserted on December 2 as a
reason for his suspension on the latter date. Skerritt, the Respondent's
personnel adviser, in explaining to Rossini the reasons for his suspen-
sion told him on December 2, among other things, that he "should have
been smarter and stayed on the job, to organize a plant you got to be
careful that you don't just roam all around." Since Skerritt testified
that he did not know that Rossini ever organized on company time and
that he did not on December 2 tell Rossini that the latter had been
organizing on company time, we construe Skerritt's explanation of the
suspension as indicating that the suspension was prompted by Rossini's
participation in protected union activities.
. Further evidence of the part Rossini's union activities played in his
suspension may be gleaned from personnel manager Wacks' remarks
on December 8 to Melton, international representative of the IAM.
On that occasion, according to Melton's undenied testimony, Wacks
stated that "Rossini is not the type of man you want to represent the
union. We just don't want him here. Why don't you get him a job
some place else? Get him a job at Consolidated. We don't want
him. He is not the type of lean we want." In our opinion, these
remarks disclose an animosity for Rossini's union leadership. It is sig-
nificant to note that Rossini's suspension came soon after the announce-
ment on November 24 that Rossini was the sole nominee for the presi-
dency of the IAM local at the Grand Prairie plant, and that the
18 The list of top management personnel who engaged in the surveillance is impressive.
It includes the personnel director of all plants of the United Aircraft Corporation, the
personnel manager of the Grand Prairie plant , a personnel adviser, and the superintendent
of detail manufacturing . In addition , as stated above, Rossini's activities were closely
watched by the supervisors in his own department , as a result of instructions from the
assistant to the chief tool engineer.
194 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
foregoing statement of Wacks was made shortly after Rossini's elec-
tion on December 2, making Rossini the chief JAM official with whom
the Respondent would have to deal. In considering the Respondent's
antiunion animus toward Rossini, we have not overlooked the fact
that the Respondent is actively recognizing and bargaining collectively
with both the IAM and the UAW at its other plants. We merely treat
this fact as consistent with our belief that the Respondent's discrimina-
tion resulted not necessarily from a dislike for a particular labor organ-
ization, but from a dislike for a particular union leadership.
We agree that Rossini's leadership in the IAM did not immunize
him against discharge. However, we have difficulty in attaching the
same significance to the November 30 episode as does the Respondent.
On that date, Rossini requested 2 hours leave. It was granted unhes-
itatingly by Fleischer; it caused no disruption in production; and it
caused the Respondent no monetary loss as it was taken on Rossini's
own time. Therefore, even if the Respondent honestly believed that
Rossini lied in the reason given for taking off, we are convinced that
the alleged lie was of little consequence. Accordingly, in view of the
Respondent's antiunion animus toward Rossini, we are of the opinion
that the alleged November 30 lie merely served as a pretext for the
discharge.
Upon the basis of all the evidence in the case with particular empha-
sis upon the intensity of the surveillance and upon the statements of
Skerritt and Wacks on December 2 and December 8, respectively, we
are of the opinion that the surveillance herein was motivated by the
Respondent's animus toward Rossini because of his prominence in the
TAM and his activities on its behalf and that the alleged episode of
November 30 was used as a pretext to obscure the real reason for
Rossini's discharge, namely said union activities. Contrary to the ma-
jority, we believe that the General Counsel has sustained the burden
of proof and, therefore, that the 8 (a) (3) allegation in the complaint
should be sustained.