Uniroyal, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 27, 1972

197 N.L.R.B. 1034 (N.L.R.B. 1972)

1034 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Uniroyal , Inc. and United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and
Plastic Workers of America , AFL-CIO. Case
10-CA-9191
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTION
June 27, 1972
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND JENKINS
On March 30, 1972, Trial Examiner Benjamin B.
Lipton issued the attached Decision in this proceed-
ing. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a
supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed
cross-exceptions and a supporting brief.'
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the Trial
Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the Trial Examiner's
rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt his
recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders
that Respondent, Uniroyal, Inc., Dublin, Georgia, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the Trial Examiner's recommend-
ed Order.
I The General Counsel's motion to strike Resp Exhs 5, 7, and 10 (as
amended) and all testimony in relation thereto is hereby denied as lacking
in merit
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
BENJAMIN B. LIPTON, Trial Examiner: This case was tried
before me on December 21, 1971,1 in Dublin, Georgia,
upon a complaint by the General Counsel2 alleging certain
independent violations of Section 8(a)(1) and the discharge
of an employee in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
Upon the entire record in the case,3 with due considera-
tion of the briefs filed by General Counsel and Respon-
dent, and from my observation of the demeanor of the
witnesses on the stand, I make the following:
I All dates are in 1971, unless otherwise specified
2 The original charge was filed and served by the Union on September 7,
the complaint was issued on November 10
3 Respondent's motion to dismiss is disposed of in accordance with the
findings herein.
Uniroyal, Inc., herein called Respondent, operates a
plant at Dublin, Georgia, among other places, where it is
engaged in the manufacture and sale of rubber sole canvas
footwear. During the year 1970, Respondent had, a direct
outflow in interstate commerce of finished products valued
in excess of $50,000. Respondent admits, and I find, that it
is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
United Rubber , Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of
America , AFL-CIO, herein called the Union , is a labor
organization within the meaning of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Restraint and Coercion
On Friday, August 20, Respondent received a letter from
the Union advising it that an organizing drive was being
conducted at the plant4 and that seven named employees
were working as "in-plant organizers." On August 23,
during the morning, each of the employees listed in the
Union's letter was summoned and reported to the office of
Jerral Keith, industrial relations manager.5 Testimony was
given by three of these employees and Keith describing the
private interview which took place in each instances In
substance, the following was related by James Richardson:
Keith showed him the Union's letter and asked him if he
knew anything about it. Then he was asked if he had
signed a union card, and if a union man had been to his
home. He answered affirmatively to each question. He was
asked if the Union had threatened him in any way, and he
said no. Keith requested that he be informed if this
occurred, stating that "they were not to go around trying to
threaten people." Keith told him that two of the listed "in-
plant organizers" had their names scratched from the
Union's letter and asked him if he wanted to stay on. If he
stayed on the list, he "couldn't talk to anybody in the
plant." So he told Keith to scratch it off, which was done
and then initialed by Richardson. Keith indicated he
would post the Union's letter on the bulletin board.
Richardson had talked to employees concerning the Union
during break periods and before the shift began. During
the organizing campaign, which began in May, he signed
an authorization card, and solicited two or three employees
to sign.
In the afternoon that day, the Union's letter was posted
in the canteen, together with a large notice in red letters
announcing that four of the seven employees had removed
their names from the list. Respondent did not attempt to
contact the Union concerning the designation of the in-
plant organizers or the changes on the list which were
made in Keith's office.
4 About 480 "wage employees" are employed at the Dublin plant
5 Keith is subordinate to the factory manager
B Witnesses were sequestered from the courtroom , pursuant to a motion
to invoke the rule; by agreement , Keith was permitted to remain at
Respondent's counsel table
197 NLRB No. 172
UNIROYAL, INC. 1035
Clark Bonner testified Keith asked him if he had "talked
to the Union people," and he said yes. Keith told him that
"several other people" scratched their names from the list,
and asked him if he wanted to scratch his name off or let it
stay on. Bonner signified the latter. Keith said that, with
his name on this committee, he would not get any special
privileges, but would be treated like anyone else; that he
had a right to be on or off the committee; that he was not
supposed to talk to anyone concerning the Union during
working and break time; that if caught talking, he would
be discharged immediately; that the letter would be
posted; and that if he changed his mind he could always
scratch his name off the list.
Bobby L. Hightower, answering Keith, said he was
aware his name was on the list and did not want it
removed. Keith stated that he was expected to do his job
like the other employees. Hightower was asked if he knew
two named agents of the Union, and he replied yes. Keith
told him he could not talk to anyone about the Union
"during working hours," and if caught he would be
"automatically discharged." Keith added that some of his
fellow employees might see his name on the list, might not
want to talk to him, and there might be a disturbance in
the plant.
Keith testified that the plant rules and disciplinary policy
are promulgated in a "packet" distributed or verbally
conveyed to all employees during orientation sessions. One
of the offenses listed in the "packet"7 of rules states:
"Solicitating (sic) on company property for raffles, sales of
products, or any other form of solicitation." In addition, a
plant rule book is stationed at the timeclock for employees
to read if they desire. The following prohibition appears in
an extract from the rule book: "Solicitation or collection of
funds or sale of products on Company premises at any
time without the written permission of the Industrial
Relations Manager." This offense, among 28 described
under one heading, is "subject to disciplinary action,
suspension, or termination."
Keith's version of the August 23 interviews, as pertinent,
includes the following: All seven employees were told
essentially the same thing. Their names were listed in the
Union's letter, and he planned to post the letter on the
bulletin board. He asked if they agreed to the use of their
names and said if they did not wish to appear on the list
they would be allowed to remove their names. As in-plant
organizers, they would have no special privileges, but
would not be discriminated against for their activities.
They were "being made aware of the no-solicitation rule
... during working hours on plant property." Richardson
indicated he had only spoken with the union people once
when they tried to get him to sign a card, that he refused,
and "that is the last I saw of them." He asked Richardson
if he would like to take his name off the list; he said he
would, and "so I let him take it off." In Hightower's case,
the only difference was that he chose to leave his name on
the list. With Bonner, the question was raised, "if I leave
my name on there, is everybody going to be riding my
back?" Keith replied that he had the "right to remain on
there provided he followed the rules of no solicitation at
the work station during work times." He would not be
discriminated against for his activities "so long as they did
not create disturbances in the plant." In addition, general
denials were elicited from Keith regarding the testimony of
these employees relating to the no-solicitation rule and the
questions they were asked concerning the Union.
Concluding Findings
I am persuaded that Richardson, Hightower, and Bonner
testified honestly as to these events in their own unsophisti-
cated language. They are credited in substance.8
As described, these employees were systematically
summoned to Keith's office and there privately inter-
viewed concerning the Union's letter listing them as in-
plant organizers. No legitimate business reasons were
shown to justify Respondent's inquiries on this subject
matter. Indeed, Keith's course of conduct on August 23
stands out as a grossly unwarranted intrusion into the
employees' protected activities and relations with the
Union. These employees were not given the appropriate
assurances against reprisal, nor did Respondent conform
to the well-established safeguards to minimize the coercive
impact of the interrogations and solicitations it assumed to
undertake .9 The method of questioning these employees
and the utilization of Keith's office as a locus of high
management authority generally tended to create an
intimidatory atmosphere. Significantly, Keith's solicita-
tions succeeded in influencing four of the seven designated
in-plant organizers to remove their names from the
Union's list.10 More specifically, I find that Keith engaged
in interference and coercion in soliciting and exerting
pressure on the seven listed employees to withdraw their'
names from the Union's list and, as contemplated in the
interviews, by posting the Union's letter with the promi-
nent announcement of four such withdrawals. Further, it is
found that, in the coercive context which : prevailed, his
questioning Richardson, Hightower and Bonner concern-
ing their individual dealings with the Union, which would
tend to reveal the extent of their sympathy, constituted
unlawful interrogation.ii These alleged violations of
Section 8(a)(1) are therefore sustained.
Keith testified that, during the August 23 interviews, he
made these employees aware of the existing no-solicitation
rule. (The published rule in the "packet," quoted supra,
prohibits all forms of solicitation "on Company property.")
In the orientation sessions, the rule, as written, was
disseminated and explained to all employees.
Briefly stated, broad company rules which prohibit
union solicitation on plant property during nonworking
time are presumptively unlawful.12 And whether the rules
relate to working or nonworking time their disparate
application against union solicitation is proscribed. No
special circumstances or justification having been shown,
the written rules of Respondent which forbid union
solicitation generally on plant property, and solicitation of
r See fn 20, infra 10 See Bourne Co, v N L R B, 332 F 2d 47 (C.A 2)
8 Keith's testimony impressed me as being frequently unresponsive, 11 The Blue Flash Express, Inc, 109 NLRB 591
evasive, preoccupied with legal effects, and unreliable 12 Walton Mfg Co, 126 NLRB 697, enfd 289 F 2d 177 (C A 5),
9 E g, Johnnie's Poultry Co, eta!, 146 N LRB 770, 775 Stoddard-Quirk Mfg Co, 138 N LRB 615 (lead cases)
1036 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
funds, e.g., union dues, without the written permission of
the industrial relations manager are clearly unlawful.13 It
may reasonably be inferred that Keith intended to describe
to these employees on August 23 the substance of the
written no-solicitation rules, which are invalid. As under-
stood by Bonner, the restriction embraced the nonworking
break periods accorded the employees. Furthermore, the
threat of immediate or automatic discharge, if these rules
were violated, conveyed to the employees a clear variance
and disparity from Respondent's declared disciplinary
policy.14 Accordingly, it is concluded that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) by promulgating and maintaining
plant rules restricting solicitation on nonworking time, and
by notifying employees that such rules will be enforced
against union solicitation in a discriminatory manner.
B. Discharge of Richardson
On August 23, Richardson was discharged for violating a
plant rule in failing to wear his safety glasses during the
operation of a machine. Hired in February 1969, Richard-
son was transferred within that year to the job he held
when discharged-that of "pinning and stripping" shoes in
a production line process. He worked at a large machine
which continuously rotated with the shoe lasts, stopping at
certain intervals for the employee to perform his functions.
The employee could halt the rotation of the machine, but
was not permitted to do so except in an emergency. As part
of the operation, the employee uses a pinning knife, which
has a sharp blade and hooks. The plant was not air
conditioned. Particularly during the summer months,
perspiration would sometimes run down into Richardson's
eyes and block his vision.
Richardson testified that, about noontime on August 23,
his immediate supervisor, Foreman Wendell Killingsworth,
came up, stated Vogler wanted to see him , and removed
him from the job. Larry Waters, a utility man, who
accompanied Killingsworth, was put into his place at the
machine . At the time, Richardson had taken off his safety
glasses, while the machine was operating, to wipe the
perspiration from his eyes. Killingsworth escorted Richard-
son to the office of Shift Manager William F. Vogler. He
told Vogler that Richardson was working without his
safety glasses. Questioned by Vogler, Richardson explained
he had been wearing them all morning, had just taken them
off to wipe some sweat out of his eyes, and was going to
put them back on. Vogler said it appeared that they would
have to discharge him and began preparing the necessary
papers. Richardson, in the company of Foreman Billy
Foskie, was sent back to the work area to pick up his
equipment. There he observed Waters working without his
safety glasses. He returned to Vogler's office,-and was then
taken to see Keith, the industrial relations manager. Vogler
brought in the papers and told Keith that Richardson was
not wearing his glasses. Keith indicated that it was a
company rule, he hated to do it, but they would have to let
him go. Richardson repeated the same explanation he gave
13 E g, Fasco Industries, Inc, 173 NLRB 522, 524
14 Discussed infra
15 The report was not prepared in Richardson's presence, and he
otherwise had no knowledge of it The standard form provides for the
employee's comment and signature, however, Killingsworth testified these
to Volger, that he was momentarily wiping the sweat from
his eyes. He also pointed out that Waters, who was now
doing his job, did not have his glasses on. Keith replied he
would see Waters later. The discharge was then consum-
mated.
Richardson further testified that Killingsworth was
around the work area all day, had seen him remove his
glasses to wipe sweat from his eyes, and had never said
anything before. He added that, once or twice, Killings-
worth asked him where his glasses were, and when
Richardson showed the glasses Killingsworth walked away.
He recalled one previous occasion, about July 23, when he
could not find his glasses which he had stored in a locker,
and he proceeded to his job. After about 10 minutes, he
was questioned by Killingsworth and explained that his
glasses were missing . Killingsworth then took him to the
first aid room, where he was given another pair of glasses,
and he resumed work. Impliedly, he was not otherwise
reprimanded concerning this incident. Richardson could
not recall any other occasions of being "warned" by
supervision about not wearing his glasses.
Killingworth gave the following testimony, in substance:
On Thursday, August 19, he told Richardson he must not
be concerned about his eyesight as he was working without
his glasses . Richardson said he would "start wearing them"
and put them on. Killingsworth prepared a "verbal"
incident report, which he placed in Richardson's personnel
file, stating:
On this date this operator was told to put on safety
glasses while pinning on machine [sic] he also has been
told twice in the period of the last two working weeks
to put the glasses on, he knows this is against company
rules on using of safety equipment.15
Within the month prior to August 19, he had spoken to
Richardson three or four times concerning the same
offense. He could not remember the dates or circumstances
of the first two occasions. On the third occasion, the
conversation was the same as that on August 19, and he
also made out a verbal report for Richardson's file. (No
such report was produced, and it evidently does not exist.)
On August 23, he again saw Richardson without his
glasses . He asked where they were, and Richardson showed
him the glasses hanging on the "safety gate." He reminded
Richardson he had been told about this offense before and
then took him to Shift Manager Vogler. Richardson
admitted to Vogler that he was aware of the rule, and that
he was not wearing the glasses in this instance.
Vogler testified that Killingsworth brought Richardson
to his office stating that this employee was working without
his safety glasses , and that an incident report for the same
infraction was made out on August 19. Vogler asked
Richardson if it was true, and Richardson said it was. This
was the entire conversation. After first examining Richard-
son's personnel file, Vogler suspended him with a recom-
mendatio' of discharge and took him to Keith's office.
Keith estified Vogler stated he was recommending
discharge, as Richardson was warned 4 days before for the
entries are not required on a "verbal " report, although "sometimes"
employees are asked to sign them It is further noted that the two previous
incidents referred to the report on August 19 were not entered in
Richardson's file as apparently required by the written procedures,
described infra
UNIROYAL, INC. 1037
same offense. Keith told Richardson he would investigate
and make a final decision in the matter; if the statements
in the incident report were true, he would be discharged.
Richardson related that he took off the glasses and decided
not to put them back on. He had said nothing about other
employees (i.e., Waters) not wearing the safety glasses. As
Richardson "bluntly" admitted the truth of the charge,
Keith told him there was no need to investigate. And he
was then discharged.
The written incident report for August 23 reads:
On this date the above operator was observed by me of
him working without his safety glasses . . . . Operator
has been warned several times about this and is
recommended to IND. Relations for discharge.
At what point this report was prepared was left unclear.
Richardson indicated that, while he was in his office,
Vogler was writing up the discharge papers, and that,
arising from his interview with Vogler, he signed the
incident report. Killingsworth testified that about 15 to 20
minutes after he first observed Richardson, he made out
the above written report recommending discharge. The
testimony shows that Vogler made the decision of
suspension and recommendation of discharge. He also
signed the report.16 From this evidence, it appears
probable that the instruction was given to Killingsworth by
Vogler, after Richardson was brought to his office, to
prepare the report, and that Richardson's signature was
obtained, without opportunity to enter a comment thereon,
after Vogler's decision to recommend discharge.
Respondent's witnesses undertook to describe in testimo-
ny the established disciplinary procedures and practices;
the record also contains certain pertinent exhibits which
were submitted during and after the close of the hearing.
Killingsworth stated that an employee is verbally warned
twice, followed by a written incident report containing the
employee's signature, and then a final written report signed
by the shift manager.17 Vogler testified that the Company
policy is immediate discharge after one violation of any
"major safety" rule, indicating that the failure to wear
safety glasses falls within this category. He asserted that
the policy is in writing and has always been followed.
Keith testified "the safety rule is -laid out in a general
sense ;" and "there has to be a judgment factor as to what
discipline is meted out." It is a "much more serious"
violation than those involving the production rules. As to
procedure, the employee receives (1) a verbal incident
16 Apparently in conflict, Killingsworth testified that the incident reports
were regularly kept in Vogler's office , while Keith stated he was the
custodian of the personnel files, including incident reports
17 It is noted that he did not follow this procedure as to Richardson.
is A more specific date could not be recalled
19 Respondent requests that official notice be taken of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act This Act, effective August 27, 1971, provides for the
issuance of safety and health standards by the U.S Department of Labor
and for the enforcement of these standards with sanctions or penalties for
violations Its primary purpose is to ensure that each employer shall furnish
to his employees employment which is free from hazards likely to cause
death or serious physical harm The particular standards or provisions of
the Act relied upon by Respondent are not specified In all the
circumstances , I find this Act is not relevant to the immediate issue of
Richardson 's discharge
20 The "packet" was received in Washington, D.C., on March 6, 1972,
pursuant to a telegraphic order of the Trial Examiner to the effect that
Respondent had failed to submit this material under clear rulings made at
report, placed in his file; (2) a written incident report on
the same form, where the employee is called in, the matter
discussed, and the employees signs the report; (3) a further
written report within a "reasonable period of time," and
the employee is taken to the shift manager , who then refers
the case to the industrial relations manager for disposition.
(4) Whether the employee is discharged depends on the
seventy of the infraction; for safety violations, a "far less"
number of incident reports will be required. He stated that
these procedures are clearly explained to all employees.
New employees go through orientation sessions and
receive a "packet" of the rules. Richardson was an
"existing employee" when the packet procedure was
begun; he was not given a packet, but the contents were
read to him.
The particular rule requiring the wearing of safety glasses
was adopted sometime in 1969,18 after two incidents in
which employees injured their eyes while using a pinning
knife. In the testimony and exhibits, there is no showing of
the form or manner in which this asserted addition to the
existing rules was promulgated.19
Respondent adverts to a document entitled "Key Safety
Points" covering Richardson's specific job function, which
was signed by him on October 16, 1969. As pertinent, it
states:
Safety equipment must be worn at all times on jobs that
require safety equipment. If accident occurs and
operator is not wearing proscribed safety equipment,
operator shall be subject to disciplinary action. [Em-
phasis supplied.]
The "packet," referred to above, was required to be signed
by those employees to whom it was distributed. Under the
caption, "Company Rules In Brief," nine offenses are
listed which "could result in disciplinary action," including
termination if "serious enough." None of these items deals
with safety equipment or practices. It is also stated that the
employees should become familiar with additional rules
contained in "the rule book [hanging at the timeclock 1." 20
Also in evidence, relied on by Respondent, are extracts
from the rule book (Resp. Exh. 5), aforementioned. Under
the caption "Rules of Discipline" are listed 27 offenses
which "may be subject to disciplinary action, suspension,
or termination." Item 20 states: "Failure to wear safety
equipment or follow safety rules." Under "Your Health
and Safety," the failure to observe the listed rules "will
the hearing Respondent's "Motion to Correct the Record" is granted, to the
extent as follows: The documents previously sent in as Resp Exh 7 are
remarked Resp. Exhs. 10(a) through (l). (10(e) through 10(j) are essentially
the same as Resp . Exh. 5 in more complete form .) The recently received
"packet," together with the covering letter , are marked Resp . Exhs. 7(a)
through (e). While certain of these materials were gratuitously sent in after
the hearing, they are placed in the exhibit file to reflect the documentary
representations made by Respondent in order to evaluate the consistency of
its testimonial positions . The correspondence from the parties and the Trial
Examiner 's telegraphic order are marked TX Exhs. 1-4. On March 10, 1972,
the General Counsel filed a motion to strike Resp . Exhs 5, 7, and 10 (as
remarked), and all testimony concerning the contents of these documents
This motion (marked G .C. Exh. 3) is denied General Counsel 's insistence
on the originals is overdrawn , particularly as these documents were
disseminated or utilized in duplicated form Under the provisions made at
the hearing , the postheanng submissions could not result in prejudice to the
General Counsel
1038 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
result in disciplinary action including discharge." Item A-I
states: "Wear safety shoes, goggles,21 respirators, gloves on
job as required in your job instructions or posted
notices." 22 In addition, certain material was erroneously
sent in by Respondent under the exhibit reserved for the
"packet." It is in the form of a memorandum dated June
18, 1970, from Keith, apparently addressed to management
personnel in all departments, which updates the "written
standard practice" regarding disciplinary policy.23 The
stated purposes include the establishment of uniformity
and consistency in handling similar offenses by employees.
A sequence of steps is outlined leading to disciplinary
action. A supervisor is required to notify the industrial
relations office as soon as he suspects discipline is going to
be necessary. After a verbal warning and two written
warnings, the employee's record is sent to the industrial
relations manager for determination whether another
offense will warrant discharge. A fourth offense will
warrant suspension, pending investigation, followed by
disciplinary action and "possible discharge." Safety viola-
tions are to be dealt with according to the seventy and
repetitive nature of the infraction; an employee should not
have to be warned more than twice for safety violations;
discharge will result in cases of repeated violations.
It can thus be seen that among the higher supervision
there was considerable inconsistency as to their views of
the policy and procedures regarding safety infractions, and
that the agglomeration of written material was similarly
conflicting and confusing as to the seriousness of a
particular safety violation and the disciplinary conse-
quences. Keith's testimony and Respondent's position can
scarcely be accepted that the wage employees were clearly
apprised and understood the procedural steps and penal-
ties which would follow upon failure to observe a specific
safety regulation. All this evidence by Respondent, in net
effect, indicates that it reserved for itself a broad latitude in
dealing with individual cases.
Whether in practice Respondent conformed to the
written policy of treating similar offenses in a uniform and
consistent manner presents a further relevant considera-
tion. Keith testified that, prior to the union campaign, he
had occasion to discharge several employees, naming four,
for the offense of failing to wear safety glasses.24 Of these
employees, one was on the pinning and stripping opera-
tion, and he walked out, refusing to wear the glasses. The
others "either failed or refused" to abide by the rule.
Vogler named one additional employee, discharged in
1969, who refused to wear the glasses. As ground for
discharge, the insubordination inherent in a refusal to obey
21 This reference covers the safety glasses or spectacles, which were
required to have hardened lenses resistant to breakage Other safety rules,
treated categorically by Respondent, include, e g, the "wearing of loose
clothing, rings or ornaments around moving machinery
22 There is no related evidence of posted notices or printed job
instructions
23 Presumably, this memorandum was not accessible to the employees It
is distinguishable from the extracts from the rule book stationed at the
timeclock, supra It was gratuitously submitted and then emphasized in
Respondent's brief
24 No incident reports or documentary evidence were shown
25 The report is signed by Waters with a protesting comment that he
could properly have allowed another operator to use his glasses while he was
group leader at the time (and was called to take Richardson's place at the
machine)
this instruction can clearly be understood. The vague
reference to the others as having either failed or refused,
without the circumstances being shown, cannot serve to
demonstrate a consistent practice. A written incident
report by Killingsworth states that, on August 23, Larry
Waters "was caught not wearing his glasses." 25 This
evidence tends to corroborate Richardson's version of the
events on August 23, and I would infer that this incident
report was made out after Richardson's complaint to Keith
about Waters. It is also observed that in this instance
Waters received a full written report rather than a "verbal"
warning, although there is no indication he had previously
been reported for the same infraction.26
As earlier described, Hightower was one of the designat-
ed in-plant organizers who decided to leave his name on
the Union's list when interrogated by Keith on August 23.
He testified that, as a pinning and stripping operator, there
were five or six times, known to his foreman, when he
failed to wear his safety glasses after the rule was begun.
During this period, from 1969 through 1971, he "got wrote
up about two times" for such infraction by his foreman,
Roosevelt Robinson.27 On August 30 he was recommended
for discharge by Shift Manager Vogler for turning in false
reports and was referred over to Keith. Upon reviewing
Hightower's record, Keith remarked that he had only one
wnteup during his entire employment and he could not
understand why Vogler recommended discharge. Hightow-
er said he couldn't understand it either but "reckoned" it
was because his name was "on that Union Committee list."
Keith said that "could have something to do with it."
Hightower then told him that, if it did, to scratch his name
from the list. Keith instructed him to scratch it off, which
he did. The final disposition was that Hightower was put
on probation for 30 days and then sent back to work.28
Killingsworth testified that sweat does frequently get into
an operator's eyes while he is pinning and stripping. He
"assumes" that the operator "wipes it out" and has to take
off his glasses to do so. It is not necessary to stop the
machine for an operator to wipe sweat from his eyes; and
he has specifically instructed employees not to stop the
rotation of the machine, except in an emergency. He could
not remember Richardson's exact words at the machine on
August 23 about having to remove his glasses to wipe the
sweat from his eyes. Vogler also stated the "safety gate" to
shut down the machine should be used only in an
emergency. But if the operator cannot see because he had
"that much sweat in his eyes," then he could either call for
a relief or use the emergency gate.
Particularly in view of all the foregoing circumstances, I
26 Bonner testified that on August 20, the Friday before, he had seen
Waters for a substantial period doing pinning and stripping without his
safety glasses , while his foreman, Billy Foskie, was continuously around the
machine all day I credit Bonner that he had made such a, recent
observation, whether or not he was mistaken as to the precise date
27 Robinson testified that the only occasion involving safety glasses, "to
his knowledge ," consisted of one verbal warning, not entered in Hightower's
file, and one written incident report , both in October 1971 Respondent did
not produce the reports in Hightower's personnel file
28 Hightower is credited Keith related that he found Hightower had a
"pretty good record ," and he therefore "overruled" the discharge. He could
not recall any conversation concerning the Union's list; to his knowledge, it
was not brought up However , it is not disputed that Hightower 's name was
stricken from the list on this occasion
UNIROYAL, INC. 1039
credit Richardson's general version of the events and
conversations which took place leading to his discharge on
August 23.
Concluding Findings
The sweating factor was a recurring problem which was
known by Respondent and not effectively clarified for the
pinning and stripping operators, who were faced with the
choice of operating the machine blindly or committing a
technical safety violation by removing their glasses to wipe
the sweat from their eyes.29 Richardson testified that he
had an interval of time to clear the sweat from his eyes
without halting the machine and still perform the required
functions. There is substantial evidence, and I find, that
Richardson was reasonably led to believe he could
momentarily take off his glasses for such purpose. That an
operator, such as Richardson, would "frequently" have to
remove his glasses to clear his eyes was conceded by
Killingsworth. Indeed, it could be anticipated by Respon-
dent. On August 23, Killmgsworth could observe and was
told by Richardson that this was the reason he removed his
glasses. Vogler and Keith were similarly informed.'
Under Respondent's published procedures, all indicated
infractions of this safety rule should have been entered in
Richardson's file. The evidence shows that, prior to August
23, there existed only one "verbal" incident report for this
offense, on August 19, without Richardson's signature or
knowledge, during his 3-year tenure on the job. Richard-
son had no real warning of discharge in the event of a
further infraction. The discipline was summary and
extreme. Under the circumstances of Richardson's case, I
cannot reasonably view his offense as more serious than
that committed, for example, by Hightower, who submit-
ted false reports and was merely put on probation. The
disciplinary procedures relied on by Respondent, as
described in testimony and the documents submitted, are
conflicting and inconsistent. They fail to provide substanti-
ation for the procedures followed which resulted in
Richardson's discharge.
Respondent's union animus is well demonstrated by its
prompt course of action on August 23 following its receipt
of notice from the Union of the designated in-plant
organizers. As found, Industrial Relations Manager Keith
engaged in coercive interrogations, solicitations of the
employees to withdraw from the organizing committee,
invoked unlawful no-solicitation rules carrying a threat of
immediate discharge, and prominently posted a notice,
admittedly "to let everyone know," that four of the seven
organizers had withdrawn from the list. It is sufficiently
evident that, by such conduct, Respondent sought to
interfere with or prevent the renewed union movement
which was geared to take place at the plant. As one of the
in-plant organizers, Richardson was a designated leader
among the employees in the union campaign. The timing
of his discharge on this same date, August 23, cannot
readily be ascribed to mere coincidence. Rather, in my
view, it is entitled to significant weight as consistent with
Respondent's coercive purposes. From all the circum-
stances detailed herein, it is my finding that Respondent
seized on Richardson's literal failure to observe a safety
regulation as a pretext for the discharge, and that its actual
motive, at least in substantial part, was to discourage its
employees from seeking union representation. According-
ly, it is concluded that, in discharging Richardson,
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3), as alleged.
IV. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act . A broad
cease-and-desist order is warranted in view of Respon-
dent's discriminatory conduct and other violations 30
It has been found that Respondent unlawfully dis-
charged James Richardson on August 23, 1971. It will
therefore be recommended that Respondent offer him
immediate and full reinstatement to his former position or,
if such position no longer exists , to a substantially
equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or
other rights and privileges , and to make him whole for any
loss of earnings he may have suffered as a result of the
discrimination against him, by payment to him of a sum
equal to that which he would normally have earned , absent
the discrimination , from the date of the discrimination to
the date of Respondent 's offer of reinstatement, with
backpay and interest computed in accordance with the
Board 's established standards.31 It will be further recom-
mended that Respondent preserve and make available to
the Board, upon request, all payroll records , social security
payment records , timecards , personnel records and reports,
and all other records necessary and useful to determine the
amounts of backpay and the right to reinstatement under
the terms of these recommendations.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact , and upon the entire
record in the case , I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By discharging James Richardson on August 23,
1971, thereby discouraging membership in the Union, the
Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
4. By the foregoing, and by other acts and conduct
interfering with, restraining , and coercing employees in the
exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act,
Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a)(1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
29 Blindly operating the machine might conceivably present even greater Entwistle Mfg Co, 120 F 2d 532 (C A. 4)
danger of serious physical harm to the employee than would a temporary 31 F W Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, Isis Plumbing & Heating
removal of the safety glasses Co , 138 NLRB 716
30 N L R B v Express Publishing Company, 312 U S 426, N L R B v
1040 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Upon the above findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: 32
ORDER
Respondent, Uniroyal, Inc., of Dublin, Georgia, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Coercively interrogating employees concerning their
union activities; soliciting employees to withdraw from
their official positions, assignments, titles, membership, or
other activities and support on behalf of the Union, or any
other labor organization; or posting, publicizing, or
announcing to the employees the results of such unlawful
solicitations.
(b) Promulgating, maintaining, or enforcing rules which
prohibit employees from engaging in union solicitation
during their nonworking time.
(c) Enforcing rules prohibiting solicitation in a manner
which discriminates against union solicitation.
(d) Discouraging membership in United Rubber, Cork,
Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or
in any other labor organization, by discharging, terminat-
ing, or in any other manner discriminating in regard to hire
and tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment.
(e) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaran-
teed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer James Richardson immediate and full reinstate-
ment to his former position or, if such position no longer
exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without
prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges, and
make him whole for any loss of earnings, in the manner set
forth in "The Remedy" section of the Trial Examiner's
Decision.
(b) Notify the above-named employee, if presently
serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, of his
right to reinstatement upon application in accordance with
the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military
Training and Service Act of 1948, as amended, after
discharge from the Armed Forces.
(c) Preserve and make available to the Board or its
agents all payroll and other records, as set forth in "The
Remedy" section of the Trial Examiner's Decision.
(d) Post at its Dublin, Georgia, plant copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix." 33 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 10, shall, after being signed by Respondent, be
posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof,
in conspicuous places, and be by it maintained for a period
of 60 consecutive days. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 10, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Trial
Examiner's Decision, what steps Respondent has taken to
comply herewith.34
72 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall , as provided in
Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions , and order , and all objections thereto shall
be deemed waived for all purposes.
33 In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals , the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read
"Posted pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
34 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board
after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read
"Notify the Regional Director for Region 10, in writing , within 20 days
from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States ('rovernment
WE WILL NOT ask you anything about your Union
activities in a manner which would coerce you
regarding your rights under the Act.
WE WILL NOT ask you to withdraw from your official
positions, assignments , membership, or other activities
and support on behalf of United Rubber, Cork,
Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, AFL-CIO,
or any other union, and WE WILL NOT post or
announce the results of such solicitations.
WE WILL NOT establish, announce, maintain, or
enforce any rules which prohibit you from engaging in
union solicitation during your nonworking time.
WE WILL NOT enforce any rules in a manner which
discriminates against you because you were soliciting
on behalf of the Union, or any other labor organiza-
tion.
WE WILL NOT discharge, terminate, or otherwise
punish you in order to stop you from joining or
supporting the Union or any other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of rights
guaranteed employees in the National Labor Relations
Act, which are as follows:
To engage in self-organization;
To form, join, or help unions;
To bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing;
To act together for collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection;
To refuse to do any or all of these things.
Since it has been found that we unlawfully terminat-
ed James Richardson, WE WILL offer to give him
back his regular job, or if that job no longer exists,
we will give him a substantially equivalentjob; and WE
WILL pay him for the earnings he lost because of the
discrimination, plus 6 percent interest.
WE WILL notify James Richardson, if presently
serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, of his
right to reinstatement upon application, in accordance
with the Selective Service Act and the Universal
UNIROYAL, INC. 1041
Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after
discharge from the Armed Forces.
All of our employees are free to become , or remain, or
refrain from becoming or remaining, members of any
union of their choice.
UNIROYAL, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material . Any questions concern-
ing this notice or compliance with its provisions may be
directed to the Board 's Office , Room 701 , Peachtree
Building, 730 Peachtree Street N.E., Atlanta, Georgia
30308 , Telephone 404-526-5760.