Union Carbide Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 30, 1967

166 N.L.R.B. 441 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

UNION CARBIDE CORP.
Union Carbide Corporation , Olefins Division, En-
gineering Department Design and Construction
and Local 625, United Association of Jour-
neymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe
Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada,
AFL-CIO. Cases 9-CA-3987 and 9-RC-6750
June 30, 1967
DECISION, ORDER, AND DIRECTION OF
SECOND ELECTION
By MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN , AND JENKINS
On March 30, 1967, Trial Examiner Phil Saun-
ders issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had en-
gaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision.
The Trial Examiner further found that the Respond-
ent has not engaged in certain other unfair labor
practices alleged in the complaint. He also found
that interference with the election in Case
9-RC-67500 was not established by the evidence
presented. Thereafter the General Counsel,
Respondent, and Charging Party filed exceptions
to the Decision and supporting briefs, and the
Respondent and Charging Party filed answering
briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a
three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Triai
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed.- The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and
briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby
adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner, with the following
modifications.
The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
interrogating employees concerning their union ac-
tivities; by creating the impression of surveillance,
of union activity; by the job transfer of a union ad-
herent; and by issuing a written reprimand to a
union adherent while failing to take similar action
for the same offense against another employee. We
also agree with the Trial Examiner's finding that
this conduct is not of such a serious nature as to
warrant a finding that Respondent completely re-
jected the collective-bargaining principle or that it
refused to bargain so as to gain time to undermine
the Union.2 However, contrary to the Trial Exam-
iner ,3 we find that Respondent's preelection con-
166 NLRB No. 39
441
duct, found violative of Section 8(a)(1) herein, was
sufficient to constitute interference with employees'
freedom of choice in the election. Accordingly, we
shall set it aside and direct a second election.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner, and hereby
orders that the Respondent, Union Carbide Cor-
poration, Olefins Division, Engineering Depart-
ment Design and Construction, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set
forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the election held on
July 14, 1966, among Respondent's employees, be
and it hereby is, set aside, and that Case
9-RC=6750 is remanded to the Regional Director
for Region 9 for the purpose of conducting a new
election at such time as he deems that circum-
stances permit the free choice of a bargaining
representative.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Notice attached
to the Trial Examiner's Decision, be, and it hereby
is, modified by striking therefrom the third indented
paragraph in its entirety and substituting therefor
the following:
WE WILL NOT transfer a known adherent for
the Union from one job to a less desirable job
because of his sympathies for, membership in,
or activities on behalf of, any labor organiza-
tion.
[Direction of Second Election4 omitted from
publication. ]
I Member Jenkins finds the evidence insufficient to support a finding of
unlawful surveillance.
2 In view of our adoption of the Trial Examiner's dismissal of the 8(a)(5)
allegation in the complaint, we find it unnecessary to consider any of the
Trial Examiner's findings on issues related to the Union's majority status
3 In adopting the Trial Examiner's dismissal of the allegation of an un-
lawful threat to contract out work made by Supervisor Mitchell in his con
versation with employee Debord, we rely solely on the Trial Examiner's
credibility finding.
4 An election eligibility list containing the names and addresses of all
the eligible voters, must be filed by the Employer with the Regional
Director for Region 9 within 7 days after the date of issuance of the
Notice of Second Election by the Regional Director. The Regional
Director shall make the list available to all parties to the election. No ex-
tension of time to file this list shall be granted by the Regional Director ex-
cept in extraordinary circumstances. Failure to comply with this require-
ment shall be grounds for setting aside the election whenever proper ob-
jections are filed. Excelsior Underwear Inc., and Saluda Knitting Inc.,
156 NLRB 1236
TRIAL EXAMINER 'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PHIL SAUNDERS, Trail Examiner: Upon a charge filed
on July 20, 1966, by Local 625, United Association of
Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe
442 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada,
AFL-CIO,, herein called the Union or Charging Party,
against Union Carbide Corporation, Olefins Division,
Engineering Department Design and Construction,
herein called Respondent or Company, the General
Counsel issued a complaint on October 31, 1966, alleging
that the Respondent had engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, as amended. The Company
filed an answer to the complaint denying the commission
of any unfair labor practices. The parties were
represented by counsel and participated fully in the hear-
ing, and all of the parties filed briefs.
Upon the entire record and from my observation and
demeanor of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent is a New York corporation engaged in the
manufacture of chemicals and related products at its
plants located in and around Charleston, West Virginia.
During the past year, which is a representative period,
Respondent had a direct outflow of its products valued in
excess of $50,000 which it sold and caused to be shipped,
in interstate commerce, from its said West Virginia plants
directly to points outside the State of West Virginia. The
complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that the
Company is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
At all times material herein , the Union is and has been
a labor organization as defined in Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The complaint alleges that Respondent interfered with,
restrained, and coerced certain employees in the exercise
of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. Respondent
denies that any of its conduct violated the Act or ex-
ceeded the free speech guarantees of the Act, and further
maintains that even if accepted, arguendo, as true, the al-
leged incidents were isolated to a very few employees
when considered in light of the total number of employees
involved in the unit in question, and had no impact on the
overwhelming majority of employees.
The complaint also alleges that a particular unit found
by the Regional Director in his decision in representation
case 9-RC-6750, rendered June 8, 1966, constitutes an
appropriate unit for the purpose of collective bargaining
under Section 9(b) of the Act.' Respondent denies and
takes issue that the said unit is an appropriate one.
The complaint further alleges that since on or about
March 10, 1966, the Union has requested the Respond-
ent to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclu-
sive bargaining representative and that at all times since
on or about March 15, 1966, Respondent has refused to
recognize and bargain in good faith with the Union, and
The unit found appropriate is as follows:
All pipe fitters, instrument fitters, welders and pipe shopmen, and
all of their helpers and trainees employed by Respondent in its Field
Group and Pipe Fabrication Shop , working in and out of its Institute
and South Charleston, West Virginia locations, excluding all Metal
Fabrication Shop employees , all office clerical employees , guards,
further, since on or about June 8, 1966, a majority of the
employees of Respondent in the above unit have
designated or selected the Charging Party as their exclu-
sive representative, and that all the foregoing constitutes
a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. The Company
denies that it has violated Section 8(a)(5) in any manner
and maintains that they had a good-faith doubt as to the
Union's majority at all times.
The case for the General Counsel and the Charging
Party is based upon the Bernel Foam theory set forth by
the Board in Bernel Foam Manufacturing Company, 146
NLRB 1277, and clarified in Irving Air Chute, 149
NLRB 627, enfd. 350 F.2d 176 (C.A. 2, 1965).
Generally, it is their position that as of June 8, 1966, the
Union represented a majority of the employees in an ap-
propriate unit and the Company was under an obligation
to bargain with the Union as of that date and all times
thereafter. Further, they maintain that the Respondent's
refusal was not based upon a good-faith doubt of the
Union's majority status in an appropriate unit, but was
based upon a repudiation of the principle of collective
bargaining and was done to gain time to dissipate the
Union's majority by unlawful interference, restraint, and
coercion of the employees, and but for the Respondent's
interference which dissipated the Union's majority, the
Union would have won the Board election held on July
14,1966.
Under the factual circumstances of this case the main
issues for determination are as follows:
1. Whether the Union's initial demand for recognition
was a continuing demand.
2. Whether the Union represented a majority of the
employees in an appropriate unit for which it was seeking
recognition.
3. Whether the Respondent's refusal to recognize the
Union was based upon a good-faith doubt of the Union's
majority status and appropriateness of the unit.
4. Whether the Respondent interfered with and
coerced the employees between the date of the original
demand on March 10, 1966, and the date of the election
in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
A. Background and Events
As previously noted the Company is engaged in the
manufacture of chemicals and related products at its
plants located in and around Charleston , West Virginia.
The operation of the Respondent for the unit alleged in
the complaint and found appropriate by the Board in the
earlier representation case, 9-RC-6750 (General Coun-
sel's Exhibit 1(f)), involves Olefins Division , Engineering
Department Design and Construction . The headquarters
for the department under which the pipefitters work is
located at the technical center . The Respondent employs
a maximum of 228 employees in the appropriate unit
listed on General Counsel 's Exhibit No. 2 containing the
names of the employees as of June 8, 1966.2
The Union began to organize the employees of the
Respondent's Olefins Division during the early part of
1965 .3 This effort was unsuccessful , and in early 1966
the Union again started another campaign to organize,
professional employees and supervisors as defined in the Act, and all
other employees.
2 All dates are 1966 unless specifically stated otherwise.
2 The Union is affiliated with the Charleston Building and Construction
Trades Council.
UNION CARBIDE CORP. 443
and we are concerned here with the latter. On March 10
the Union made a written demand on the Company to
recognize and bargain with it for a unit consisting of all
"pipefitters, welders, instrument mechanics and their
trainees, helpers and/or apprentices" in Design and Con-
struction of the Olefins Division of the Respondent.
On the same day the Union filed a representation peti-
tion with Region 9 of the National Labor Relations Board
in Case 9-RC-6750 seeking certification for the same
unit. On March 15 the Respondent notified the Union
that its request for recognition was being denied because
the Company had a "good faith doubt that a majority of
the employees in a unit appropriate for bargaining desired
to be represented by your Union" and "there is the
question of the appropriate unit."
A hearing on the representation petition in 9-RC-6750
was held on March 31, and on June 8 the Regional
Director issued his -Decision and Direction of Election
granting the unit requested by the Union, as previously
set forth herein, and excluding the metal fabrication shop
employees, numbering approximately 52, whom the
Company had sought to include in the unit. No review of
the Regional Director's decision was sought by the
Respondent. An election was then held on July 14 which
the Union lost, and on July 20 the Union filed timely ob-
jections to the election and to conduct affecting the
results of the election. At the same time the Union filed
the unfair labor practice charge against the Company
setting forth the allegations involved herein. On
November 22 the Regional Directcr ordered a hearing to
be held on the Union objections numbered 1, 2, and 3 and
further, consolidated hearing on the objections with the
hearing on the complaint in 9-CA-3987. The objections
are, therefore, included within the specific 8(a)(1) allega-
tions involved herein.
In addition to the above, it should also be initially noted
that the International Association of Machinists, herein
called the TAM, was also seeking to represent the em-
ployees involved in this case but in a larger unit. It ap-
pears that the Respondent first became aware of the IAM
efforts about March 3. Joseph Fallon, Respondent's as-
sociate director, engineering department, testified that he
was aware of the IAM organizing efforts toward the em-
ployees in this case early in 1966, prior to March. Fallon
stated that he directed that all recorded messages given
by the IAM over a publicized public telephone number be
transcribed and reduced to writing. Respondent's Ex-
hibits 12A-12H were received as examples of the IAM
recorded telephone messages. As pointed out Respond-
ent's Exhibit 12A, recorded on March 3, was directed
to construction employees, including those involved in
this case; it states, "The IAM will represent all crafts and
all employees under one local lodge and under one con
tract ... "; similarly Respondent's Exhibit 12B recorded
on March 4 stated, "... The construction hourly em-
ployees also can have a local lodge controlled by mem-
bership and all under one contract regardless of craft."
The remaining exhibits, Respondent's Exhibits
12C-12H,, made it clear that the IAM was seeking to
represent all construction department employees, includ-
ing those involved in the instant case, and was aware it
was competing with other unions in its organizational
drive. IAM Grand Lodge Representative, Richard No-
ble, testified that his union was engaged in organizational
efforts since early 1966 toward employees involved in
this case, prior to the demand for recognition and
representation petition filed by the Charging Party. Noble
testified that the IAM sought and received authorization
cards from employees in hourly classifications involved
in the instant case and forwarded those cards to the Re-
gional Director in support, of the IAM
petition-9-RC-6902-filed on July 6. This petition
was preceded by a demand for recognition and request for
bargaining for all of Respondent's hourly employees, in-
cluding those involved in this case and dated July 2. A
few of the General Counsel's witnesses also confirmed
that IAM was active in organizing in the classifications in
this case, and had in fact signed IAM authorization cards.
However, the IAM seeks to represent the employees
herein involved as part of a larger unit, and this was true
from the beginning of 1966 and up to the hearing of this
case. The IAM petition covered all the unit (about 950
employees) rather than the much smaller portion involved
in this proceeding, and after notification the IAM did not
participate in the representation hearing on March 31 on
the petition filed by the Charging Party herein, as -afore-
stated, nor was the IAM on the ballot at the election con-
ducted on July 14.
B. The Demand, the Unit, and the Authorization Cards
The General Counsel introduced 127 union authoriza-
tion cards into the record. On March 10, when the Union
made its original demand for recognition, it had approxi-
mately 88 authorization cards out of a unit composing
about 228 employees. The Union, therefore, did not have
a majority on March 10, but in this respect the General
Counsel and the Charging Party maintain that the
Union's original request for recognition was a continuing
demand, and that the Union did acquire a majority status
in the unit on June 8. When the Company rejected the
Union's demand on March 15, as aforestated, it did not
request a card count and company witnesses testified that
at the time the Respondent had no knowledge as to how
many authorization cards the Union had. Edgar Dryden,
the Union's chief organizer in this case, stated that he
talked to the Respondent's vice president, J. S. Freeman,
in March and June. Dryden told Freeman on one of these
occasions that he represented a "majority of the people
and that I thought that he should go along, and. he
[Freemen] said when you win the election then we will
recognize you." Freemen admitted that Dryden talked
with him a number of times, and that during some of these
conversations informed him that "Union Carbide would
be better off if we had a union."
Paul Gregory, manager of industrial relations at Design
and Construction, denied having any conversations with
Dryden from March 10 up to the time of the election.
However, on cross-examination Gregory admitted that
he did talk with Dryden on March 31 at the hearing on
the Union's petition and possibly on July 13. Gregory
also knew on July 13, at the preelection conference, that
Dryden was seeking to represent the employees and get
recognition. In efforts to explain his answers, Gregory
said he could not remember if he had any conversations
with Dryden on March 31, but if he did it was only social.
This record also shows that again at the preelection
conference on July 13, Dryden requested recognition
from Joseph Fallon, the Respondent's associate director
of engineering, who was attending on behalf of the Com-
pany. Dryden said they could call the election off if the
Company would recognize the Union, but Fallon refused
444 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
recognition and said the Company would go through with
the election. Employee N. R. Lilly corroborated the
testimony of Dryden concerning this conversation, and,
although Fallon testified, he did not deny Dryden's direct
testimony on this point or issue . Moreover , this record
shows that at the representation hearing on March 31 the
Company was specifically asked by counsel for the
Union if they were ready to recognize the Union as the
bargaining agent , and the Company again declined.
I find nothing in this record to indicate that the Union's
demand was ever withdrawn; on the contrary, it appears
from the above testimony and other events in the record
that the Union's demand for recognition continued up to
the time of the election or at least up until the Union did
acquire a majority status.4 Moreover, as pointed out, after
the Union's initial demand was rejected by the Company,
the Union continued to process its election petition by
participating in the hearing on March 31, working out the
arrangements for the election , campaigning among the
employees, attending the preelection conference and,
finally, participating in the election. It has been well
established that a Union's participation in the election
processes of the Board constitutes a continuing demand
for recognition and obligates the Employer to bargain
with the Union when it reaches majority status even
though it lacked majority status at the time of its original
demand. Lake Butler Apparel Company, 158 NLRB 863.
Also in Scobell Chemical Company v. N.L.R.B., 267
F.2d 922, 925 (C.A. 2), where the court, assuming that
the union lacked a majority at the time of its bargaining
request, found that it had such a majority the next day,
and held that in the light of the strike and picketing which
there ensued, the Union's request for bargaining must be
deemed a continuing request. The instant case is
somewhat like Scobell except that here, instead of strik-
ing and picketing, the Union pursued its bargaining
request through a representation petition. See N.L.R.B.
v. Burton-Dixie Corporation, 210 F.2d 199, 200, 201
(C.A. 10), where the union lacked a majority at the time
it requested recognition but where the request was un-
derstood to be of a continuing character. In Burton-Dixie,
as here, the employer's attitude made it quite clear that a
latter request would have been futile, and the court's
holding there suggests the propriety of a similar finding
here: In addition to these cases also see Gotham Shoe
Manufacturing Co., Inc., 149 NLRB 862; American
Compressed Steel Company, 146 NLRB 1463; and
Morris Novelty Company, 157 NLRB 1471. In view of
the above, I am convinced, and find, that the March 10
demand was in fact a continuing demand, and was still in
effect when the Union subsequently attained its alleged
majority status.
It is the position of the Charging Party, joined in by the
General Counsel, that three persons listed on the Em-
ployer's payroll sheet of June 8, 1966, are supervisors
within the meaning of the Act and therefore not in the
unit. A deletion of J. S. Ellis, C. F. Forth, and O. C. Mc-
Callister reduces the appropriate unit to 225 and a neces-
sary majority of 113.5 It is well settled that in an unfair
labor practice proceeding, the Trial Examiner and the
4 Aspects of whether or not the Union did receive sufficient and
adequate authorization cards are discussed subsequently herein.
5 At the hearing the Charging Party objected to the inclusion of four in-
dividuals , but is now withdrawing any objection to O. L. Lambiotte. The
Charging Party agrees with Respondent that he should be included within
the appropriate unit.
Board will not reconsider a determination of the ap-
propriateness of a unit made by a Regional Director or
the Board in a representation case in the absence of newly
discovered evidence. Here the Union is not trying to
relitigate the unit determination made by the Board's Re-
gional Director. The Union is merely saying that there
are persons on the list supplied by the Company who are
not within the unit found to be appropriate by the Re-
gional Director. There was no issue in the representation
hearing concerning the supervisory status of anyone.
Employee N. C. Debord testified that he worked for
Ellis in the summer of 1966, and that at the time Ellis was
a foreman. Debord stated that there were eight em-
ployees in the work crew, that Ellis did not work with
tools, that he reported to Ellis in the mornings, that Ellis
assigned him and the other employees in the crew their
work, that he told them what jobs he wanted done, that
Ellis carried timecards and charges for the different jobs,
that he also kept records pertaining to employee trainees
and gave tests to trainees, and that a foreman has the
authority to make recommendations with regard to
trainees. This record also shows that Debord has worked
for Marvin Stuart and Harry Statts, both of whom are ad-
mitted supervisors, and testified there was no difference
in the direction and orders he received from them when
in their crews and from Ellis when in his crew. Russel
McMellon, a witness for the Respondent, admitted on
cross-examination that Ellis told employees what to do,
and then further admitted that in the summer of 1966 Ellis
was a foreman. The above factors duly establish that Ellis
was and is a supervisor, and I so find.
This record shows, through a stipulation between the
parties, that C. F. Forth and O. C. McCallister moved up
to foremen and back to journeymen. Forth, however, was
a permanent foreman from October 26, 19644, to June
28, 1965, and a temporary foreman from May 2 through
July 24, 1966. McCallister was a temporary foreman
from May 2 to 15, 1966 , and again from July 17 to 31,
1966. The Charging Party argues that although these two
men do not have the same authority as a regular foreman,
they do have the responsibility of directing the particular
job they are on, that they also assign their crews to work,
carry their time, keep job logs, and give trainees tests in
conjunction with the craft superintendent, and, consider-
ing the size of the crews at Carbide, which range from 8
to 15 men, it is submitted that by responsibly directing the
men in their crews on each job, Forth and McCallister are
supervisors under the Act, even if they do not exercise
the full range of authority of regular foremen.6 I agree,
and find that Forth and O. C. McCallister were super-
visors within the meaning of the Act. In accordance with
the above I will delete these three people from the unit.
The Company objected to a number of authorization
cards that were introduced through persons who wit-
nessed the signing of the card , claiming that each signer
must identify his own card.7 The law is clear that
authorization cards may be identified by a person who
saw the individual sign his card. I. Taitel and Son, 119
NLRB 910, enfd. 261 F.2d 1 (C.A. 7, 1958). In the in-
stant case union representatives and organizers testified
6 Joseph Fallon , assistant director of the engineering department, ad-
mitted the above duties in his own testimony.
7 On appeal the Board may or may not have to adopt or pass upon my
findings as to the cards , and with my final conclusions herein I could also
assume card validity , but, for various other reasons , I deem it necessary
to set forth the entire proceeding for complete evaluation and disclosure
of the record
UNION CARBIDE CORP. 445
that cards were obtained in the course of the Union's or-
ganizational campaign, and that some of these cards were
then passed out at union meetings and other places for the
execution by interested employees." Some cards were
also given to key employees on the Union's organizing
committee for distribution. After such cards were signed
they were returned either by the employees who executed
the cards or by the key employees, as aforestated, who in-
itially secured them. With such cards in evidence, the
Respondent also had ample opportunity to check the
authenticity of the signatures on the cards by compaing
them with the payroll records or with the employee's W-4
Federal tax forms.
The Company also objected to authorization cards in-
troduced through witnesses and signers who could not
specifically recall or remember the exact date on which
they signed their card, but in such instances the witnesses
generally concluded in their testimony that their card, or
the ones they received, were signed during the union or-
ganizational campaign in 1966, and in many instances on
or about the date shown on the card. Also, in some in-
stances, the signer did not put the date of their cards, and
the Company objected to these cards so received. How-
ever, the Board law is clear that undated, or cards dated
by someone other than the signatory, are valid if the
testimony in the record shows that the card or cards in
question were signed prior to the crucial date. Here there
is sufficient testimony by the signers, or the one who
received the card, to show that such undated cards were
signed prior to June 8. See Indiana Rayon Corporation,
151 NTLRB 130, and Southland Paint Co., Inc., 156
NLRB 22.
In addition to the above, the Company further objected
to cards where the local union number was left blank, and
in four or five instances where a different local was
designated other than 625. As pointed out in this record
the Union used two types of cards. One stated:
I authorize the United Association Plumbing and
Steamfitting Industry, AFL-CIO, to bargain for me
for a labor contract providing for wage increases,
better vacation pay, paid holidays, job security and
other improved conditions of employment.
This is followed by blank spaces for the employee's
name, address, employer, classification and wage rate.
The other card had blank spaces at the top for the name
of the employee, classification, and location, and then
stated:
Hereby authorize Local Union No. of the United
Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the
Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United
States and Canada, affiliated with the American
]Federation of Labor, to represent men [sic] and on
my behalf to negotiate and conclude all agreements
as to hours of labor, wages and other employment
conditions in accordance with the provisions of the
National Labor Relations Act, July 5, 1935, as
amended by the Labor-Management Act of 1947.
The card then goes on to provide that it shall remain in ef-
fect 1 year and supersedes all prior authorizations.
On some of the latter type cards the local union number
was left blank. Other cards of this type had "625" filled
in, and, as aforestated, a few cards designated other locals
of the Union. This records shows that 625 is the local af-
filiate of the United Association in Charleston, We Vir-
ginia, and the record also shows that Dryden was sent to
Charleston by the United Association to organize, with
Local Union 625, the employees in this unit. Local 625
is merely the branch of the United Association in whose
jurisdiction this plant is located and who would handle
representation of the employees as an affiliate of the
United Association. Moreover, this record reveals that
all the employees knew that the United Association was
organizing the unit. From my observation of the wit-
nesses all the employees involved herein were fully aware
that they were individually designating the United As-
sociation to bargain for them, and in those few instances
where other locals were designated the signators so in-
volved fully understood the interrelations within the
United Association.9
The authorization cards of George Elmore and Clyde
Pettit were introduced throught N. R. Lilly. While Lilly
did not see either one of these employees sign their cards,
he recognized the signature of Elmore on the basis that he
had seen enough of Elmore's handwriting to know that it
was Elmore's signature on General Counsel's Exhibits
3-25. Lilly stated that he gave a card to Pettit who took
it home and then brought it back to Lilly the next day al-
ready signed. Again the Company did not avail itself of
the opportunity of presenting any evidence to contradict
Lilly with regard to his testimony on these cards. The
Company could have, if it had so desired, produced the
W-44 forms or other documents for a comparison of the
handwriting. The Board has repeatedly held that cards
identified in this manner are valid.
The Company also objected to three cards on which
the signer printed his name rather than signing in script.
The employees involved were Parsons, Hoover, and
Moubray. Dryden stated that Parsons printed his name
on his card dated February 18, 1966, in Dryden's
presence. Marvin McCallister, one of the union or-
ganizers who assisted Dryden in obtaining authorization
cards, testified that Hoover also printed his name on his
card on February 14, 1966, in McCallister's presence,
but did not write his signature in script. Moubray testified
that he printed his name on his card on March 2, 1966,
after reading the card. In doing this, he stated he wanted
to authorize the Union to represent him. As pointed out
it is not necessary that employees sign their authorization
cards. The only important point is that they indicate
through some means, such as filling the card out or print-
ing their name on the card, that they want the Union to
represent them. Where names are printed rather than
written in script prior to the crucial date, the Board has
held such cards to be valid. Indiana Rayon Corporation,
151 NLRB 130, and Shapiro Packing Company, Inc.,
1555 NLRB 777.
Two employees, Charles Fletcher and C. S. Massey,
testified that they signed authorization cards for the Inter-
national Association of Machinists as well as the Union.
Fletcher testified that he signed his card for the Union on
March 9, 1966, although he did not date it. He also stated
8 The Company questioned a few of the union organizers who testified
concerning what they had told the employees from whom they were
requesting cards, particularly counsel questioned Marvin McCalhster and
N. R. Lilly on this point Both these witnesses and other individual em-
ployees who testified were quite explicit in stating that they told the em-
ployees, and were told that the cards were to authorize the Union to
represent them and to bargain for them with the Company
9 See Knickerbocker Plastic Co., Inc., 104 NLRB 514, Glass Fiber
Moulding Company and Aurcolo Manufacturing Company, 104 NLRB
383, and Franks Bros. Company, 44 NLRB 898
446 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that he signed a card for the IAM prior to the election but
did not state the day he signed the card or whether it was
subsequent to signing his authorization card for the
Union, The IAM card was not introduced in evidence.
There is no evidence that Fletcher ever withdrew his
authorization from the Union, but, on the contrary, the
evidence is clear that he did not; he testified that he never
asked that his authorization card be returned. Massey
testified that he signed his card on June 3, 1966, and
never asked the Union to return it. Massey's card also
stated it was to be valid for 1 year and superseded all
prior authorizations. On cross-examination, he admitted
that he signed an authorization card for the IAM (not in-
troduced) but was never asked and never volunteered
when or under what circumstances he signed the card for
that union. Under these circumstances it appears to me
that the union cards of Fletcher and Massy are valid, and,
therefore, will be counted.
Employees Emmett Moore and B. M. Farley testified
that they signed their cards in 1965. Moore testified that
he signed his card for the Union in the fall or last quarter
of 1965, but that he left it undated.10 From his testimony
Moore knew what the card was for, and admitted that he
never asked the Union to return the card to him. Farley
testified that he received his union card through the mail
in 1965, and that he signed it and returned it without any
date on it (the card itself is dated February 2, 1966, and
also has an NLRB time stamp of March 10, 1966). Far-
ley stated that he did not receive any card in 1966, but
that he voted in the election on July 14, 1966.11 The only
real clue as to when Farley signed his card was his admis-
sion that people had talked to him about signing a card,
that this was during the "recent campaign" by the Union,
and that it was during this campaign that he signed his
union authorization card. Both cards clearly state that
they were to be "in full force and effect for one year from
date" and it has been held that an employee's designation
of a 1-year time limitation on an authorization card should
be honored. Moore admitted signing his card in the last
quarter of 1965, well within the 1-year time limitation,
and Farley admitted signing his "during the recent cam-
paign," also well within 1 year prior to June 8, 1966.
From the above it appears to me that the two card appli-
cations here involved were made contemporaneously
within the beginning of the Union's most recent cam-
paign, and, even assuming otherwise, they are not too
remote in time to sufficiently demonstrate their continued
adherence to the Union. Blade-Tribune Publishing Com-
pany, 161 NLRB 1512. In accordance with the above the
cards of Moore and Farley will also be counted.
Two card signers, Bishop and Morris, testified that
they were told by Dryden that their union books would be
"pulled" if they refused to sign union authorization cards.
Bishop could not remember when he signed his card, but
admitted that it was in the spring of 1966. The date on his
card is February 16, 1966, but Bishop stated that he did
not put the date on the card. Bishop then testified that
Dryden allegedly told him in May 1966, during a visit to
Bishop's home, that his union book would be "pulled" un-
less he signed an authorization card. Morris testified that
he signed his card on May 2, 1966, and that Dryden had
informed him "maybe that we might lose our card if we
didn't sign one for being a member of 625." Even assum-
ing here, arguendo, that Dryden told Bishop that his book
would be pulled, it is quite clear that Bishop's card was
signed at least 2 months prior thereto and there is no
evidence that he ever asked for his card back. Further-
more, employee Stanley Cornell testified that he was
present during Dryden's visit in May 1966 to Bishop's
home, and that Dryden did not threaten to pull Bishop's
book. Dryden,told Bishop that since he was already a
union member, he, Dryden, would like Bishop's support
in the organizing campaign. Cornell also stated that he is
a member of Local 625 and knows of no one being
threatened that his book would be pulled for not signing
an authorization card. If Dryden made any remark to
Morris about the possibility of losing his card it was ad-
mittedly made at some meeting in 1965. Morris and
Bishop have worked at the Company for many years,
through several elections, have been union members dur-
ing the entire time, and their books have not been pulled.
They knew they did not have to belong to the Union to
work at the Company and Bishop also testified that
Dryden never told him that he could not work at the
Company if the Union lost the election. Bishop knew of
no United Association member whose book was pulled
and only heard a story about a book being pulled from a
a member of another union. The overall evidence shows
that both these employees signed cards voluntarily, and
that, therefore, these two cards are also valid.
The Company also called three employees who
claimed they were coerced or threatened into signing
authorization cards. However, even assuming the truth
of what they claim, their testimony is somewhat irrele-
vant since no cards were introduced for these employees.
Russell McMellon testified that he was a member of
Local Union 625 until October 1965, when he was
brought up on certain charges for conduct detrimental to
the Union. McMellon was suspended and fined but he
never bothered to appeal his suspension and fine to the
Union Association International headquarters. McMel-
Ion did not sign a card during the- 1966 organizational
campaign and he admitted knowledge that the Union
could not get him fired for such a refusal. William Javins
stated that after the 1965 election Dryden informed him
that he would pull the union books out of the Company
since they had lost the 1965 election. Javins testified that
if Dryden attempted this he and a few other employees
had discussed hiring a lawyer to oppose such action.
Javins also stated that in 1966 he signed his union card
under pressure. Javins has been working for the Com-
pany for several years and has been a member of the
Union since 1943. No charges have been brought against
him in the Union as a result of the Union losing any elec-
tion, and he knows he does not need a union book to work
at the Company. Javins is not in good standing either, his
dues being in arrears for 8 months. Andrew Anderson
stated that N. E. Debord threatened to blackball him or
"get him at home" if he did not sign an authorization card.
Anderson did not take the alleged threat seriously, if
made, because he did not sign a card and has not been
hurt. Debord denied making any threats to anyone to
force them to sign an authorization card. Moreover, there
is no evidence that the threats to these employees, even
if made, were common knowledge or, as also pointed out,
that any card signer in the 1966 campaign knew of them.
10 The fill- in date on Moore 's card shows March 4, 1966, and it also had
an NLRB time stamp on it of March 10 , 1966, as did many of the other
union cards involved in this proceeding
11 The cards signed by Moore and Farley, on their face , provide that
they shall remain in force and effect for 1 year.
UNION CARBIDE CORP.
The Company argued that these alleged threats show that
the authorization cards which were received in evidence
must have been obtained under duress and tainted with
doubt. This argument has been repeatedly rejected by the
Board. Snow & Sons, 134 NLRB 709; West Coast Lug-
gage Co., 105 NLRB 414. I find that the Company has
not shown that any employee who signed a card was
coerced or threatened into signing.
The Company also raised several other miscellaneous
objections to some of the authorization cards introduced.
A few cards showed that different colored ink was used
in filling out various portions of the card, one or two had
erasures, and some had initials on them. These grounds
are insufficient to reject an otherwise valid card in the
absence of evidence that the card was signed subsequent
to the crucial date, and no contradicting evidence was in-
troduced by the Company to invalidate such cards. In
some instances the card signers also explained in their
testimony the reasons for the different ink and other
minor variations from the normal. The Company further
tried to maintain that Dryden's letters of May and August
1965 (Respondent's Exhibits 1A through 1C), indicated
an intent other than representation when he was asking
that cards be signed and returned to him. However, as
pointed out by the Charging Party, there is no evidence
that any cards Dryden received as a result of those letters
were introduced in this hearing before me. In fact,
Dryden testified he only received approximately 12 to 14
cards as a result of those 1965letters and none were used
in the 1966 campaign. As also pointed out the Company
objected to the card of H. R. Bennett. Bennett's
testimony and affidavit both show that while he was in the
hospital, he received a telephone call from James Bonham
who asked him if he could sign an authorization card for
Bennett. Bennett was familiar with the card, knew what
it said and told Bonham to sign his name to a card. He
stated in his affidavit "I definitely authorized the signing
of my name to a card about the date shown on the card."
Bonham corroborated Bennett's testimony, and under
such circumstances Bennett's card is valid. As pointed
out the Company raised a question about a card signed by
Kenneth Moubray who, when he signed the card in
March 1966, was a laborer. However, the evidence
shows that Moubray was in the pipe gang before March
and was returned to the pipe gang in May 1966, and is still
there. He was a laborer in March only because of
shortage of work in the pipe gang and, throughout the his-
tory of his employment with the Company, from 1960, he
has moved up and down from the pipe gang to the labor-
ing gang. Moubray's name is also included on the Em-
ployer's payroll eligibility list of June 8, 1966. Moubray
definitely has a community of interest with the employees
in this unit and his card is valid. Scobell Chemical Com-
pany, 121 NLRB 1130 (authorizations cards signed by
laid-off employees who have a reasonable expectancy of
future employment with the employer in the foreseeable
future are valid and must be counted in determining the
union's majority status at the time of its request for
recognition.12
I find that on or by June 8, 1966, the Union had 125
valid authorizations, and that this constituted a majority
in the unit of 225 employees.
12 Two cards were signed after June 8, 1966 . Clair Smith signed his
June ll 3, 1966, and John Morris signed his on June 29, 1966. These cards
cannot be counted toward a majority on June 8.
447
C. The Alleged 8(a) (1) Violations and Conclusions
Charles Thompson testified that on July 7 Supervisor
Clifford Allen asked him several questions about his
medical or health problem. Thompson stated that Allen
told him about a clinic in Cleveland and that a man with
a similar problem had recovered with a cost of $10 or
$12, that Thompson had enough seniority so he did not
have anything to worry about and to take all the time he
needed, and that Allen also told him that they had a union
vote coming up "and he thought he was in trouble this
time and he would like to have my [Thompson's] help."
Thompson further testified that Allen then told him that
he had given jobs to two men when they needed money to
support their families, but that they were now the "big-
gest organizers" that he had, and that Allen also stated
that the Company and employees had a good enough rela-
tion so that a union was not needed. Allen testified that
his discussion with Thompson was in relation to his
health because it had been reported to him by the foreman
that Thompson had missed too much work. Allen denied
having any conversation with Thompson about union
matters. Allen stated, "He was in no shape to talk about
anything. He was actually in a depressed condition when
I saw him." The complaint in this respect alleges that
Allen violated the Act in: "Threatening an employee that
the employee could suffer the loss of employment and/or
other benefits should the Union be selected as the em-
ployee's collective bargaining representative and in sol-
iciting the employee to cast his ballot against the Union
in the then forthcoming Board-conducted representation
election."
Even accepting Thompson's version of the conversa-
tion I am unable to find the alleged violation. There is no
evidence showing any threatened loss of employment to
Thompson. Further, there was no threatenedloss of any
benefits that Thompson enjoyed. As pointed out Allen
made no claim that existing benefits or any promised fu-
ture benefits would cover Thompson's medical expenses.
Thompson admitted that Allen did not imply or state that
Thompson's health insurance benefits would cover the
majority of the expenses, and Thompson did not com-
plain about his bill to Allen and dealt directly with Blue
Cross concerning the debt. The only possible violation is
the statement by Allen that a union vote was coming up
and he needed his help. However, under the circum-
stances of the conversation there were no intimations of
threats, promises, or warnings of any kind nor was there
any interrogation or solicitation as to Thompson's loyal-
ties or feelings toward the Union, and Allen merely asked
for Thompson's support in the election.13 Allen's remark
that he thought the Company and employees had a good
enough relation so that a union was not needed is not a
violation of the Act, and was merely a personal opinion
completely permissible.
The complaint alleges that Respondent Supervisor
Frank C. Eggelton interrogated an employee about his
union sympathies and threatened the employee with a
loss of his job, and approved the conduct of Jack Steele,
an inspector of the Company, in interrogating the em-
ployee concerning his union sympathies and in threaten-
13 Parties in a controversey of this type have alsways been permitted to
ask employees for their support so long as their appeals are not coupled
with violative forms of coercion.
448 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ing the employee with loss of benefits if the Union won
the election.
Charles Fletcher testified that a week prior to the July
14 election , Jack Steele informed Fletcher that Super-
visor Allen had sent him to talk to Fletcher and to find out
how Fletcher felt about the Union. Fletcher stated that
Steele then informed him that the Union was not needed,
and that this conversation changed Fletcher's mind to the
extent that he told Steele he would not vote for the
Union. Steele admitted that he had a conversation with
Fletcher, and also stated that Fletcher was a "material
boy" for Eggelton , but that he would get the various or-
ders "mixed up" and the Company did not know what to
do with him . Fletcher did not give any specifics as to any
alleged threats or coercion by Steele . The only attributa-
ble quote by Fletcher was that Steele said that a union
was not needed at Carbide, and this statement certainly
cannot constitute a violation of the Act. This record ac-
tually shows that Steel was talking to Fletcher concerning
their working together back in 1956 or 1957 when
Fletcher was working for Steele following an accident at
a time when Fletcher was not able to do his regualr work.
At the time Fletcher was talking to Steele, prior to the
1966 election , there was no foreman-employee relation-
ship directly between them . I also agree with the Re-
spondent that Steele made no promises of any benefits or
favors at this time , nor did Fletcher claim Steele made
any promises of benefits . The testimony by Steele that he
would take care of Fletcher clearly related to events and
the accident that transpired many years ago. Moreover,
Fletcher was admittedly on the Union 's organizing com-
mittee and this fact appeared to be well known to about
everyone . It would also appear to me that the main thrust
of this allegation must hinge on Supervisor Eggelton's
participation in approving the statements of Steele to
Fletcher, yet Fletcher's own testimony does not even
mention Eggelton or the presence of Eggelton and if
Steele, as an inspector , is to be deemed a supervisor it will
have to be on very general inferences only as this record
is without sufficient evidence to so establish.
It is alleged that Supervisor Robert Mitchell in April
violated the Act by interrogating an employee in regard
to his membership in, activities on behalf of, and sym-
pathy for, the Union , and in giving the impression to the
employee that he had engaged in surveillance of the em-
ployee's activities of the Union. Fletcher testified that a
week or two before the July 14 election Supervisor
Mitchell stated , "We didn 't need no union and I don't
know, he just went on talking and he changed my mind
also, and I said , well,maybe we don 't need a union but I
said we are going to have one if we are going to work
here, and I said maintenance has got a union .. .
Fletcher also testified that Mitchell then mentioned
something about him having a union card and told
Fletcher that he did not "need it here." Mitchell testified
that he merely talked to Fletcher about his work, and that
he had no conversation with him about the Union. As
aforestated , Fletcher testified that he had a conversation
with Mitchell a week or two before the election which
was on July 14 and, therefore, it is difficult to believe that
their talk occurred in April 1966 , as alleged in the com-
plaint. Fletcher's testimony is further confused and in-
consistent on whether or not Mitchell mentioned
anything about the IAM , and the only specific statement
he could attribute was Mitchell 's remark that they did not
need a union or did not need it at Carbide. There is no
testimony that Mitchell threatened , warned , coerced, or
made any promises of benefits . Fletcher did testify that
Mitchell made some remarks about a union book or card,
but Fletcher did not claim that Mitchell in any questioned
him about it, nor did he inquire as to how Fletcher was
going to vote. It is pointed out also, that Fletcher was
continually confused as to whether or not he would sup-
port the Union , and further whether he even wanted the
Union at all to represent him inasmuch as Fletcher
testified that he had also signed an authorization card for
the IAM sometime prior to the election of July 14. I
agree that, in light of the confusing state of Fletcher's
changeable mind, it seems doubtful any conversation con-
cerning the Union , even in the limited way as expressed
by Fletcher, did in fact occur. Upon the above and upon
my observation and demeanor of the witnesses, I must
therefore , credit the testimony and denials of Mitchell.
It is further alleged that on or about July 5, Supervisor
Frank Eggelton violated the Act by the following con-
duct: "Interrogating an employee about his sympathy for
the Union, in threatening the said employee that other
union members could take his job , and in approving the
conduct of Jack Steele, an inspector of Respondent, in in-
terrogating the aforesaid employee about his Union sym-
pathies, and in threatening the said employee with loss of
benefits if the employees select the Union to represent
them , in the said Eggelton's presence , in an attempt to
dissuade the employee from his union adherence." Em-
ployee Guthrie Mack testified that on or about July 5,
Eggelton asked him how he felt about the Union, if Mack
thought they needed a union , mentioned that Mack's
union book was not any good, and also informed Mack of
the disadvantages he would have working "outside" com-
pared to what he would have working for the Company.
Mack further testified that Eggelton also told him of the
company advantages he had in the event of a long layoff,
and if the plant was organized Mack would not enjoy the
same benefits. Mack stated that a week before the elec-
tion he also had a conversation with Jack Steele. Accord-
ing to Mack , Steele then asked him why he felt the em-
ployees needed a union , told Mack how "well he had it"
compared to the outside (vacations and other company
benefits). Mack then testified about a conversation he had
with Supervisor Mitchell in April. Mack stated that
Mitchell asked him why he felt the Company needed a
union, inquired whether or not the Union was going to be
successful , and also asked "how many books had been
bought."
Eggelton admitted a conversation with Mack prior to
the July 14 election, but stated that they only discussed
seniority and denied that he asked anything about union
books or whether or not Mack belonged to the Union.
Steele stated that he talked to Mack after Eggelton had
talked to him , but that they only discussed company
benefits.
The interrogation by Supervisors Eggelton and
Mitchell as to whether or not an employee thought a
union was needed , how employees felt about the Union,
how many union books or cards were out, and inquiries
as to whether or not the Union would be successful goes
beyond the permissible sanctions of the Act, and I find
such conduct constitutes unlawful interrogations.
It is alleged that Clifford Allen on or about July 7 inter-
rogated an employee by making disparaging remarks
about two union adherents , and in promising an increase
in benefits if an employee would vote against the Union.
It is also alleged that on July 12, Allen interrogated an
employee in regard to his union sympathy by giving the
UNION CARBIDE CORP. 449
impression of having engaged in surveillance of union ac-
tivites, and in admonishing the employee to cast his ballot
against the Union. Kenneth Loar stated that Allen talked
to him in July and inquired about his union card, asked
what he had ever done to Loar, told Loar about company
benefits and about 2 employees (Farmer and Cornell)
who he had given jobs to and who were now trying to or-
ganize , and informed Loar that if the Union came in he
(Allen) would lose his job and he needed help .14 Shirley
Cavender testified that in July, Allen talked to him along
with several other employees , and told them that the men
had turned against him, that he had given jobs to em-
ployees who were now trying to organize , and that he
hoped Cavender would vote for him.
Allen admitted in his testimony that he did have a con-
versation with Loar in July and stated that at this time he
also talked individually not only to Loar but to three other
employees as well - Neal, D. L. Snodgrass, and Shirley
Cavender. In these conversations Allen stated that the
basic conversation he had concerned the incident involv-
ing Loar and Cavender with Supervisor Marcum when
Marcum criticized them for not working outside during a
rainstorm . Allen denied asking Loar how he was going to
vote in the election , and denied that he in any way
promised Loar anything if he voted against the Union.
From my observation and demeanor of the witnesses
I believe Loar and Cavender. In accordance therewith,
I find that Allen engaged in unlawful interrogations of
Loar, and also gave the impression to Loar, Cavender,
and Snodgrass of having engaged in surveillance of union
activities.
The complaint alleges that Respondent Supervisor
Marvin Stuart on or about July 11 interrogated an em-
ployee about his sympathies and membership in the
Union in soliciting the employees to cast his ballot against
the Union in the representation election.
Loan testified that in July Supervisor Stuart told him,
"I don 't think we need a union at Carbide ... ," and then
went on to talk about benefits. Loar also stated that
Stuart told him that he did not blame Loar for "buying"
a union card, but that when he voted Loar could still vote
no. Even assuming everything Loar testified is true, I am
unable to detect anything which could be deemed viola-
tive of the Act, and certainly, the mere discussion of cur-
rent employee, benefits without the promise of any addi-
tional benefits is not violative. Words are not spoken in a
vacuum, but gust be analyzed in the context of the cir-
cumstances surrounding their issuance . See N.L.R.B. v.
Zelrich Co., 3''44 F.2d 1011, 1013 (C.A. 5); N.L.R.B. v.
Plant City Steel Corp., 331 F.2d 511, 513 (C.A. 5).
There is an additional allegation in the complaint that
on July 11, Supervisor Clifford Allen admonished an em-
ployee to forsake his union adherence . Alfred Blanken-
ship testified that in July he and Allen were alone, and
that Allen just patted him on the back and said, "You
better change you mind about voting," and Blankenship
replied "what mind ," and that Allen then just walked
away. Blankenship also testified that on July 12 he was
guilty of smoking on company property and he was very
much aware that this was an infraction of the rules. There
was no allegation or showing that the written reprimand
Blankenship received as a result of his smoking was not
in furtherance of known company policy or Blankenship's
treatment was different than that of other employees
guilty of the same infraction . Insofar as Allen's statement
to Blankenship is concerned , there is an insufficient
showing that Allen was referring to Blankenship 's union
adherence in view of no testimony that Allen knew of
Blankenship 's union affiliation or that Blankenship com-
municated that union affiliation to him . As pointed out the
conversation was only about voting in the election and
contains no reference as to which way Blankenship was
to vote, and there is also no showing that this short con-
versation transpired with any surrounding threats or coer-
cion or promise of benefits or that any fear of reprisal was
left with Blankenship.
It is also alleged that Respondent Supervisor Harry
Statts interrogated an employee regarding his sympathy
for the Union on or about June 1. James Waldron
testified that in June Statts asked him what he thought
about the election, and that Statts also inquired if Wal-
dron thought the Union would do any good at Carbide. I
agree with the Respondent that this conversation did not
take place in connection or in relationship with any
threats or promises or under an air of intimidation in any
way. Waldron further testified that during safety meetings
4 or 6 weeks preceding the representation , Statts com-
pared the benefits that employees presently had with the
benefits Respondent 's unionized employees had. There
was clearly nothing improper in this conduct as there is
no showing of any threats or any promises that if the
Union was defeated in the representation election, addi-
tional benefits would be forthcoming , nor is there any
paragraph in the complaint making or setting forth such
an allegation.
N. C. Debord testified that on July 13 Supervisor E.
C. Shipley told him that he did not feel the employees
needed a union , that "more" depended on qualifications
instead of seniority, and on this occasion also told De-
bord that when he voted at the representation election to
"be selfish ." Shipley stated that in July he and Debord
did have a conversation about the Union, but that he
merely told Debord that in his opinion he did not think
the employees needed a union . There is no showing that
this conversation between Debord and Shipley took place
under any circumstances surrounded with threats or coer-
cion , and Shipley's initial statement to Debord was
nothing more than his own personal opinion and there-
fore, cannot be deemed violative of the Act. Debord even
admitted that Shipley in no way asked him how he was
going to vote.
Debord also testified that prior to the election he had
a conversation with Supervisor Robert Mitchell. Debord
stated that Mitchell inquired if he thought the Union
would win in the election, and further told Debord that if
the Union won it looked to him like the Company "are
going to contract all the work and make inspectors out of
a few of us." Debord testified that Mitchell then informed
him that he (Debord) did not have a thing to worry about.
Mitchell denied having any union conversation with De-
bord , and the record shows that Mitchell was temporarily
transferred to another location between April 18 and
June 27. Debord places this conversation about 2-1/2
months before the election . On cross-examination De-
bord again dated this conversation as 2-1 /2 months before
the election , and later on Respondent 's cross-examina-
14 Loar also testified that Allen talked to D L. Snodgrass in a separate
conversation and related that when Snodgrass rejoined Loar and the
others he stated that he was going to vote against the Union because Allen
said he would take care of lurn.
450 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tion, dated the conversation as a period of time between
1-1/2 or 2-1/2 months before the election, and further
agreed that he thought it was in May. Taking any of the
dates testified to by Debord, it still places the conversa-
tion in a period of time when Mitchell was not physically
working at Respondent's plant in West Virginia, prior to
April 18 or after June 27. However, even accepting De-
bord's testimony to the effect that Mitchell mentioned
contracting the work out does not, under the prevailing
circumstances here, violate the Act. There is no
testimony that this remark was anything but Mitchell's
own personal opinion beyond his control and authority
and certainly it was not surrounded with any threats of
warnings and this is especially true in the admission of
Debord that Mitchell also informed him that he had
nothing to worry about. Based on the above, and my ob-
servations of the witnesses and their demeanor, any other
conclusion would be mere speculation and without any
adequate foundation.
The complaint further alleges the following: "The con-
duct of Respondent, on or about May 16 in transferring
an employee and a known union adherent from his regular
job to a less desirable job and location because of his ex-
ercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act."
N. R. Lilly has been a welder for the Respondent since
1948. He regular assignment was welding in the Institute
plant or shop, but about 2 years ago Lilly was assigned to
the job of field welding in connection with Respondent's
South Charleston plant. Lilly testified that during the
middle of May his field foreman, Boggs, informed him
that although there was nothing wrong with his work he
had to return Lilly to the Institute plant because Super-
visor Allen had told Boggs that Lilly was "agitating" for
the Union. Lilly then went back to his regular welding of
pipe fabrication and cutting at the Institute plant. Lilly
stated that this change was hard on him because he had
been out in the fresh air and that the Institute shop was
dirty and hot, and also upon his return he was not as-
signed to his old welding table by a window but given a
table in the middle of the shop. Lilly also related that
when welders go out on field jobs they "sometimes" stay
a long time and "sometimes" they stay just for one job
and then return to their regular work. A day or so after
Lilly returned from the field he also had a conversation
with Supervisor Allen about his reassignment. Lilly
testified that he then asked Allen the reason for the
change and that Allen told him he had heard rumors that
Lilly had been "agitating up there pretty bad." Lilly
further testified that Allen explained to him that since his
transfer he had found out differently, that he was having
some trouble with Charlie Martin, and that Allen was
"beginning to think" that it was not all Lilly's fault. Lilly
testified that Allen then informed him that he would see
to it that Lilly was returned to the field. Lilly also
revealed in his testimony that 3 or 4 weeks later he was
asked by the Respondent's assistant director of engineer-
ing, Joseph Fallon, if he wanted to go back to the field as
a welder, and that he told Fallon he did not wish to do so
since he had again become used to working in the shop.15
Respondent's pipefitter foreman, Charles Marcum,
15 There is no allegation or contention that Lilly suffered any loss of pay
due to his reassignment back to the shop.
16 It appears that the pipefitters in that area reported to two separate su-
pervisors, Eggelton and Marcum.
19 Fallon asked Lilly if he had any more questions or problems and then
said he was going to try to straighten out some of the past mistakes the
testified that Lilly was working in his area and was as-
signed to work for pipefitters working under various
foremen. According to Marcum the pipefitters under his
supervision were having trouble getting Lilly to do their
work. Lilly told his fitters (Marcum's) that he would not
perform any of their work unless Foreman Eggelton
directed him to do the work. Marcum then reported this
trouble with Lilly to Allen.
Allen testified that Marcum informed him that he was
having trouble with Lilly and that he would not perform
his work unless a certain foreman would direct him to do
so.16 Allen asked another supervisor, G. A. Roth, to
check into the trouble that Marcum was having with
Lilly. Allen stated that he then decided that under the cir-
cumstances Lilly and Marcum were not getting along, and
that Lilly should be brought back to the Institute shop.
Allen further related his conversation with Lilly upon his
return. According to Allen, Lilly told him that he was
being transferred because of his agitating for the Union.
Allen testified that he then informed Lilly that this was
wrong, and that he was transferred because Lilly was not
compatible with Foreman Marcum. Allen also told Lilly
that he considered him to be one of his best welders and
that anytime he had another field job with any other
foreman except Marcum they would be happy to get
Lilly. C. A. Jarvis, Respondent's shop superintendent of
the pipe fabrication shop, has direct control of all Re-
spondent's welders, including Lilly. Jarvis testified that
he was aware that Lilly was being reassigned to the-shop.
Foreman Boggs informed Jarvis that Lilly was being
returned to the shop because he was not performing his
work satisfactorily. Jarvis stated he had a conversation
with Lilly several days after he returned to the shop. The
conversation was about Lilly's assignment to a particular
table in the welding shop and not about the transfer in
general. Lilly told Jarvis that he wanted his regular table
that he had worked on previously. Jarvis indicated there
was no particular reason that he could not have his old
table and that if it made any difference to him, he could
return to his former spot. Lilly indicated that he did desire
his former table and it was given to him a day or so after
his request.
Joseph Fallon testified that in the course of a group
meeting in June, Lilly brought up the subject of his
transfer to the welding shop from the field. Lilly's
question was why management did not review the situa-
tions such as his when an employee was transferred
because a foreman complained about the employee's
work. Fallon and Lilly also had a later private conversa-
tion about various complaints Lilly had including alleged
favoritism, but they do not involve any specific alleged
violation.17
Lilly was identified by Dryden as one of the members
of the employees' organizing committee. Lilly also
testified himself that while no supervisor ever questioned
him as to whether he belonged to the Union, he felt that
all knew it or that they should have known it because he
did not try to hide the fact that he was on the organizing
committee from anyone. Lilly stated, "I think everyone
knew it." Supervisor Jarvis stated that Lilly did a lot of
Company had made. Fallon also told Lilly that there were several jobs
opening up for some of the men in the near future at different sites outside
of Charleston. In October, Lilly was asked by Fallon and Jarvis to take a
test to become a foreman. Fallon told Lilly that he should have no trouble
passing it . This would appear to contradict Jarvis' testimony that Lilly's
work out in the field just a few months earlier was unsatisfactory
UNION CARBIDE CORP. 451
talking. There can be no serious question but that the
Company knew of Lilly's activity for the Union, and the
Company actually concedes the same.
Briefly, this is a situation where we have an employee
who is doing good work, but who becomes actively in-
volved in attempts to assist the Union in its organiza-
tional campaign, and then suddenly finds himself in the
disfavor of management. Lilly may have well contributed
to his potential or ultimate transfer by his opposition to
the apparent overlapping of supervisor authority and ju-
risdiction of the various field foremen , as aforestated, but
I am convinced that his open and continued activity for
the Union was the real motivating factor which actually
triggered his reassignment , and I so find. We have
testimony in this record that Supervisor Boggs specifi-
cally informed Lilly that his transfer was because of his
agitation for the Union. When Lilly confronted Allen with
this reason for reassignment, Allen then suggested that he
had another man who was causing trouble, and also in-
formed Lilly that he would be returned to the field. It is
further noted that the best witness to refute the above
statement attributed to Allen that Lilly was being
returned to the shop because of his agitation for the
Union would be Supervisor Boggs, who carried out Al-
len's instructions. Boggs did not testify, and Supervisor
Eggelton, also involved with Marcum and Boggs as field
foreman, gave no testimony whatsoever as to any difficul-
ties he might have had in overlapping authority with
Lilly's field duties and assignments. The Respondent's
conduct in this situation interfered with Lilly's rights
under the Act.
The last remaining independent 8(a)(1) allegation in the
complaint again is in reference to the conduct of Allen,
and alleges that Allen violated the Act by the following:
"On or about July 13, 1966, in issuing a written discipli-
nary reprimand to an employee who was a known union
adherent while failing to take similar action against an em-
ployee whose union sympathy was unknown to Respond-
ent although the lattcr employee had engaged in the
same conduct for which the known union adherent
received the written reprimand."
Marvin McCallister testified that on or about July 13
his foreman, Don Estep, told him to report at 6 the next
morning instead of the usual 7:30. McCallister told Estep
he could not be there at 6 and the following morning
showed up at 7:30. Estep said nothing to McCallister
when he arrived but Paul Price, supervisor over the
pipefitters, came over and asked why he did not show
up. McCallister told him he had informed Estep he would
be there at 7:30 and then, according to Price, he
"smilingly" said his wife did not set the alarm clock. Price
then took McCallister over to an office and called on
Allen to ask what they should do with him. McCallister
was then permitted to go to work, but that afternoon Al-
len, himself, located McCallister on the job and handed
him a written reprimand for failing to show up at 6 a.m.'8
Foreman Estep also told the rest of his crew, including
Bud Snodgrass, to show up at 6 am. Snodgrass ap-
parently told Estep the night before that he had other
commitments and he arrived at 7:30. According to Price,
Estep made it clear to Snodgrass that he was to report at
6 a.m. However, when Snodgrass reported at 7:30 he was
allowed to-go to work and Price did not get around to talk-
ing to Snodgrass until late in the day.19 Snodgrass did not
receive a written reprimand while McCallister did, as
aforestated.
Allen testified that he received a call from Price on the
morning in question to the effect that McCallister had
refused to report for work at 6 a.m. Allen stated he then
called Estep and received the same report from him so
that afternoon he gave McCallister a written reprimand.
Allen stated that on the same day he also learned from
Price that Bud Snodgrass, in the same crew, had not re-
ported at 6 a.m. Allen testified that Price informed him
that the circumstance surrounding Snodgrass were not as
"circumvent" as the other involving McCallister-as
Snodgrass was not directly instructed to report to work
and had not refused to report to work in the same manner,
but that Price felt there was reason for some type of
discimplinary action. Allen then checked out the
Snodgrass situation with Estep, and stated that Estep in-
formed him that Snodgrass had told Estep that he had a
previous commitment and would like to be excused.
Allen testified that a week later he verbally reprimanded
Snodgrass and told him that there was some "shadow of
doubt" as to whether he was insubordinate or not because
of the "casual way" in which his foreman had told him to
report. Allen admitted that he asked Snodgrass his side of
the story, but did not ask McCallister.
Supervisor Price stated that McCallister told him he
was late for work be ause of his alram clock. Price
replied to McCalliste that he would be more inclined to
believe this if he ha not told Estep the day before that he
would not be at work until 7:30.20 Price testified that
Snodgrass told him he did not report on time because he
did not actually understand that he had to report to work
early. Price then asked Estep about this and Estep con-
firmed that Snodgrass had told him that he had made
other commitments, but Estep reaffirmed that he had in-
structed Snodgrass to report at 6 am. Price stated that he
then so informed Allen.
Fallon testified that he talked to Price about this matter
on the morning in question, and that he told Price lie did
not have enough information so he advised putting them
to work and then have Allen look into the situation.
The Charging Party points out that the conclusion to be
drawn from these facts establishes a case of discriminato-
ry treatment against a strong union adherent just prior to
the election while the same conduct engaged in by
another employee, whose views were not known, was
treated differently. Furthermore, the union adherent was
given a written reprimand immediately and the
nonaligned employee was not even verbally reprimanded
by the Company until after the election. I agree, and so
find.21
D. Final Conclusions
On the record in the instant case, I am unable to con-
clude that the Respondent acted in rejection of the collec-
tive-bargaining principle or to gain time, in which to un-
dermine the Union and dissipate its purported majority.
18 It appears that McCallister was the main employee organizer for the
Union Allen admitted that he knew McCallister was one of the "strongest
men" trying to help the Union.
19 There is no evidence that Bud Snodgrass was active for the Union.
10 The work crew involved here was attempting to correct a gas separa-
tion shut down in the polyethylene area which Price classified as a rush
job.
21 It has been long settled that discriminatory treatment against an em-
ployee who is a union supporter is unlawful and violates Section 8(a)(1)
452 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Since it appears that the violations of the Act here found
are not truly inconsistent with a good-faith doubt that the
Union represented a majority of the employees, I am una-
ble to conclude that the Respondent's refusal to bargain
was unlawful. Accordingly, I shall dismiss the complaint
insofar as it alleges that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) of the Act. As the Board stated in Hercules
Packing Corporation, 163 NLRB 264, "The burden is
upon the General Counsel to establish that the employer
in bad faith declined to recognize and bargain with the
Union." Upon consideration of the entire record, I find
that the General Counsel has not sustained his burden.
While an employer's right to a Board election is not ab-
solute, it has long been established Board policy that an
employer may refuse to bargain and insist upon such an
election as proof of a union's majority unless its refusal
and insistence were not made with a good-faith doubt of
the union's majority.22 An election by secret ballot is nor-
mally a more satisfactory means of determining em-
ployees' wishes, although authorization cards signed by
a majority may also evidence their desires. Absent an af-
firmative showing of bad faith, an employer, presented
with a majority card showing and a bargaining request,
will not be held to have violated his bargaining obligations
under the law simply because he refuses to rely upon
cards, rather than an election, as the method for determin-
ing the Union's majority.
This record shows that the Company has a long history
of organizational attempts in its design and construction
department. The Company introduced exhibits showing
that in previous organizational drives the unions involved
lost elections. The Charging Party here was involved in
a 1957 organizing attempt, in 1962 and 1963 Boiler-
makers Local No. 667 was involved, and the Charleston
Building and Construction Trades Council, to which the
Union is affiliated, was involved in two elections, the
latest in 1965. Such background underscores a reason or
basis for Respondent's good-faith doubt that exists in this
case, to wit, this Union as well as other unions, have lost
previous representation elections following written de-
mands for recognition and bargaining. Testimony given
in the instant case illustrated that experience in similar
situations over the years has demonstrated to Respond-
ent that a bare written claim by a union of majority
status is extremely dubious, including claims by the
Charging Party.
As previously detailed herein, the IAM in 1966 was
also seeking to represent the employees involved here,
and several landmark cases lend strong support to the
ru that an employer's knowledge of rival union or-
ganizational campaigns is ground for good-faith doubt
concerning the majority claims of one of the rivals. As
pointed out the IAM organizational campaign paralleled
the Charging Party's campaign and was a direct challenge
for support to many of the employees here involved, and
it also appears that the IAM campaign had as a prime pur-
pose the change of employee allegiance from the Charg-
ing Party to the IAM. The General Counsel attempted to
show that the demand letter of July 2 from the IAM had
nothing to do with the Respondent's good-faith doubt
relative to the demand for recognition made by the Charg-
ing Party on March 10. Joseph Fallon openly admitted
that the demand letter itself from the IAM had nothing to
22 Joy Silk Mills , Inc., 85 NLRB 1263 , 1264 , enfd. 185 F.2d 732
(C.A.D C ), cent. denied 341 U.S. 914
do with the Respondent's good-faith doubt as to the
Union's majority because the Charging Party had made
their written demand some 3 months earlier. However,
the additional testimony by Fallon and the exhibits previ-
ously referred to herein, clearly show that early in 1966,
and most definitely by March 3, the Respondent was well
aware of the organizational efforts by the IAM which
were being announced over a well-publicized public
telephone number, as aforestated. The most that can be
said is that by April 1 the Company knew that the IAM
had no interest in the smaller unit involved here as a
result of the March 31 representation hearing on the
Union's petition (see Charging Party (Exhibit 1)). In the
final analysis, however, this cannot seriously detract from
the Respondent's contention that it had a good-faith
doubt as to the Union's majority.
In addition to the above, it is noted also that the
Union's letter for recognition on March 10 did not con-
tain any reference to a willingness on their part for a card
count by an impartial third person or party. It merely
stated that a majority of the employees in the unit had in-
dicated that they wished to be represented by the Charg-
ing Party (General Counsel's Exhibit 4). To this the
Company replied that they had a good-faith doubt and
that the matter could best be resolved through the orderly
process of the National Labor Relations Act after a
representation petition was filed. The Board's efficient
machinery for an election was then invoked, and although
the representation hearing on March 31 established the
unit, and served to notify the Company that the IAM was
not interested in the smaller unit, nevertheless, the overall
impact from the prior and intensive IAM campaign,
possibly resulting in the defection or reduction of em-
ployee supporters for the Union, still largley remained.
Therefore, even after the March 31 representation hear-
ing the Respondent had received adequate prior notifica-
tions and knowledge of the IAM campaign to continue its
good-faith doubt as to whether or not the IAM had
diverted some of the union supporters, and it appears to
me that this colorable knowledge by the Company was
sufficient to warrant its continued good-faith doubt, espe-
cially since the Union had placed in motion the Respond-
ent's request to settle the matter by a Board election.
See Weather Seal Incorporated, 161 NLRB 1226.
Moreover, while the IAM expressed no interest in the
smaller unit, there were no indications whatsoever that
they were relenting in their organizational drive for all the
employees in the department, and this is obviously so
because on July 2 the IAM requested recognition.
Whether an employer is acting in good faith or bad faith
in questioning the Union's majority is a determination
which of necessity must be made in the light of all the
relevant facts of the case, including any unlawful conduct
of the employer, the sequence of events, and the time
lapse between the refusal and the unlawful conduct.
Where a company has engaged in substantial unfair labor
practices calculated to dissipate union support, the
Board, with the courts' approval, has concluded that em-
ployer insistence on an election was not motivated by a
good-faith doubt of the union's majority, but rather by a
rejection of the collective-bargaining principle or by a
desire to gain time within which to undermine the union. 23
However, this does not mean that any employer conduct
23 Joy Silk Mills, Inc., supra
UNION CARBIDE CORP.
found violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, regardless of
its nature or gravity, will necessarily support a
refusal-to-bargain finding. For instance, where an em-
ployer's unfair labor practices are not of such a character
as to reflect a purpose to evade an obligation to bargain,
the Board will not draw an inference of bad faith.24
In the instant case the Respondent engaged in conver-
sations with 4 or 5 employees out of a unit of 225 em-
ployees, was guilty of one illegal transfer (Lilly), and is-
sued a wntten reprimand to McCallister while giving
Snodgrass a verbal reprimand. This 8(a)(1) conduct,
while unlawful, was not so flagrant that it must necessari-
ly have had the object of destroying the Union's majority
status. While unfair labor practices committed at or about
the time of the employer's refusal to bargain often demon-
strates the bad faith of the employer's position, not every
act of misconduct necessarily vitiates the respondent's
good faith.25 Whether or not the conduct involved
adequately reflects on the good faith of the employer
requires an evaluation of the facts in each case, and I
have concluded that the unlawful 8(a)(1) violations here
were not of such serious nature as to warrant a finding
that the conduct had the objective of dissipating the
Union's majority.
The unlawful interrogations by Eggelton, Mitchell, and
Allen-along with creating the impression of engaging in
surveillance by Allen-were in no way coupled with any
threats, warnings, or promises. The transfer of Lilly from
the field to the shop had some elements of justifiable
grounds, and there is no testimony whatsoever that it
directly effected, in any manner, the union sentiments or
loyalties of any other employee including Lilly 26 When
Lilly asked questions about his transfer at the group
meeting in June with Fallon, as aforestated, his testimony
was to the effect that he mentioned on this occasion what
Foreman Boggs had told him was the reason for his
transfer. Lilly admitted, however, that at this June meet-
ing Fallon had the employees do most of the talking, and
for the most part Fallon only answered their questions. It
would seem to me that under these circumstances this
isolated incident, merely stemming from a prior event,
cannot be successfully classified as unlawful conduct suf-
ficient for a finding that the Company was seriously dis-
sipating or undermining the Union's majority, as admit-
tedly the contents of the subject matters discussed were
left largely in the hands of the employees present. There
is no allegation or contention that anything said by Fallon
at this meeting was violative of the Act, and if any union
sentiments or supporters were adversely affected there is
no proof in this record of the same. As to the written
reprimand to McCallister, the Charging Party argues that
the Company was very anxious to reprimand him so that
the employees could see what was in store for union ad-
herents, and that the message was brought home to the
employees when Fallon showed up with Allen at the
presentation of McCallister's censure. The reasoning and
the theory of the Charging Party is clearly stated, but in
my opinion this record will not support it I n the first
place there is no testimony that any employee knew any-
thing about McCallister's wntten reprimand, or in any way
24 Hammond & Irving, Inc, 154 NLRB 1071 Also see John P Ser-
pa, Inc , 155 NLRB 99
25 See Cosmodyne Manufacturing Co, 150 NLRB 96, fn 29 (adopted
by the Board without comment)
26 Actually, Lilly was transferred back to his regularjob as a welder in
the shop at the Institute, and it was only the timing of his transfer that was
discriminatory
453
knew that Bud Snodgrass had not also received a written
reprimand. In the second place, the entire crew had been
instructed to report at 6 a.m., and I think it can be safely
assumed that any employee disregarding this instruction
would not be deemed in the highest regard by his fellow
employees as certainly 6 o'clock in the morning cannot
be classified as the most desirable time to start working.
Thirdly, under the usual circumstances, most employees
would generally expect a reprimand for being 1-1 /2 hours
late on an emergency rush job, and, therefore, even
though the Company violated the Act in giving union ad-
herent McCallister a written reprimand and Snodgrass a
verbal agreement several days later, it cannot be said that
such conduct, even combined with the other 8(a)(1) viola-
tions, were sufficient to result in the destruction of a vot-
ing atmosphere which would materially effect the true
desires of the employees at the July 14 election.27
Furthermore, it is pointed out that Fallon only went
along with Allen to the place where McCallister was
working for the purpose of checking the progress of the
shutdown in the gas separation area, and was so engaged
at the time Allen gave McCallister his wntten reprimand,
and McCallister's own testimony adequately reflects the
same.
In the concluding summary of this case, there is no
evidence that Respondent had completely rejected the
collective-bargaining principle or that it refused to recog-
nize and bargain merely to gain time within which to un-
dermine the Union and dissipate its majority. The
Respondent's request for invoking the procedures of the
Board and for an election, and the absence of substantial
unfair or open gauged conduct, and for all other reasons
given herein, are more consonant with the finding that the
Company had a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section
III, above, occurring in connection with the operations
described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and
substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States and tend to lead to labor
disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the
free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices , it will be recommended that it
cease and desist therefrom and that it take certain affirm-
ative action designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
upon the entire record in the case , I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
21 The burden is on the party urging that an election be voided to over-
come the "strong presumption that the ballots cast in secrecy under the
safeguards regularly provided by [Board ] procedures , reflect the true
desires of the participating employees " Maywood Hosiery Mills, Inc , 64
NLRB 146, 150
308-926 0-70-30
454 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL
2. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section
7 of the Act, as found herein, the Respondent has en-
gaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8 (a)(1) of the Act.
3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
4. The Respondent's refusal to bargain was not viola-
tive of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law and upon the entire record in the case,
I recommend that Union Carbide Corporation, Olefins
Division, Engineering Department Design and Construc-
tion, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Interrogating its employees concerning their union
sympathies and activities or concerning their knowledge
as to the union views and activities of other employees.
(b) Engaging in or creating the impression of surveil-
lance of activities for the Union, or by any other labor or-
ganization.
(c) Transferring a known adherent for the Union from
one job to a less desirable job.
(d) Issuing a written reprimand to a known union ad-
herent while failing to take similar action for the same of-
fense against another employee whose sympathy for the
Union is unknown.
(e) In any other manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing their employees in the exercise of the right to
self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or
assist the above-named labor organization or any other
labor organization, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain
from any or all such activities, except to the extent that
such rights may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of em-
ployment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as
modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act of 1959.
2. Take the following affirmative action which I find
will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its plants in the vicinity of Charleston, West
Virginia, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen-
dix."28 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Re-
gional Director for Region 9, after being duly signed by
the Respondent or its authorized representatives, shall be
posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof,
and be maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 9, in writ
ing, within 20 days from the date of the recipt of this
Decision, what steps it has taken to comply herewith.29
29 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further
event that the Board'ss Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap-
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Ex-
aminer of the National Labor Relations Board, and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amened, we hereby notify our em-
ployees that:
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees concern-
ing their union sympathies and activities or concern-
ing their knowledge as to the union views and activi-
ties of other employees.
WE WILL NOT engage in or create the impression
of surveillance of activities for the Union, or in any
other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT transfer a known adherent for the
Union from one job to a less desirable job.
WE WILL NOT issue a written reprimand to a
known Union adherent while failing to take similar
action for the same,offense against another employee
whose sympathy for the Union is unknown.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of
their right to self-organization, to form labor or-
ganizations, to join or assist the Union, or any other
labor organization, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from
any or all such activities, except to the extent that
such rights may be affected by an agreement requir-
ing membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Report-
ing and Disclosure Act of 1959.
All our employees are free to become or remain, or
refrain from becoming or remaining, members of any
labor organization, except to the extent that this right may
be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a
labor organization as a condition of employment as
authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
UNION CARBIDE CORPORA-
TION, OLEFINS DIVISION,
ENGINEERING DEPART-
MENT DESIGN AND
CONSTRUCTION
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting, and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, Room 2407
Federal Office Building, 550 Main Street, Cincinnati,
Ohio 45202, Telephone 684-3663.
peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order."
49 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read : "Notify said Regional Director,
in writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Re-
spondent has taken to comply herewith."