Tunica Manufacturing Co., Inc

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 26, 1970

182 N.L.R.B. 729 (N.L.R.B. 1970)

TUNICA MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC.
Tunica Manufacturing Company, Inc. and Amalgamated
Clothing Workers of America , AFL-CIO, CLC. Cases
26-CA-3300 and 26-RM-249
May 26, 1970
DECISION AND ORDER
By MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND JENKINS
On December 11, 1969, Trial Examiner Henry L.
Jalette issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceed-
ing, finding that the Respondent had engaged in certain
unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recom-
mending that it cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached
Trial Examiner's Decision. He further found that the
Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair
labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommend-
ed dismissal as to them. In addition, in Case 26-RM-249,
the Trial Examiner ordered that the challenges to six
balots be overruled and the ballots counted. In the
event the revised tally shows that the Union has received
a majority, he recommended that the Respondent's
objections to the election be overruled and the Union
certified; in the event the Union has not received a
majority, he recommended that Union Objections 1,
3, and 4 be sustained, the said election set aside, and
a new election ordered. Thereafter the Respondent and
the General Counsel filed exceptions to the said Decision
and supporting briefs; the Charging Party also filed
exceptions, followed by an answering brief to that of
the Respondent.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National
Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in con-
nection with this case to a three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Exam-
iner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial
error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed.
The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision,
the exceptions, the briefs, and the entire record in
this case , and hereby adopts the Trial Examiner's
findings, conclusions, and recommendations, as modified
herein.'
As found by the Trial Examiner, the conduct of
a rummage sale of unbound quilts, to employees, a
week before the election, was not a benefit to induce
them to vote against the Union, notwithstanding the
fact that employees were permitted to purchase the
material on company time-they were released half an
hour early for this purpose-at a price of 10 cents
a pound. Some pieces were the size of a full-size quilt;
' The Trial Examiner recommended dismissal of the allegation con-
cerning interrogation and threats of discharge by Supervisor Pearl Miller,
but inadvertently included threat of discharge in his Conclusions of
Law and Recommended Order Also in those two sections he did
not reflect the threats of reprisal by Supervisor Alderson on which
he made findings of 8(a)(l) violation These concerned threatened denial
of help in adjusting the sewing machines, such as occasioned by broken
needles and belts, "when you get your Union in here "
729
others were large enough to be sewn together to make
a full-size quilt. The Trial Examiner attached no great
significance to the timing of the sale, without which
he saw no basis whatever for finding a violation. We
do not agree . This sale just I week before the election
occurred at a propitious time for influencing the election,
and the record is replete with the testimony of employ-
ees-before testimony on this subject was cut off as
cumulative-to the effect that the price of 10 cents
a pound was a significant bargain, a factor not discussed
by the Trial Examiner. Individual purchases of quilts
and padding had been permitted by the Respondent
before, on individual request, and the prices charged
were $3 or $4 each for quilts that were seconds, and
$2.75 for mattress pads that were seconds. At the 10-
cent-a-pound sale on February 28, it appears that I
employee bought 12 quilt pieces for a total of $3.30
to $3.40; another 6 for a total of about $3; another
9 for a total of $2.50; and another 11 for a total of
$3.85. The Trial Examiner found that between 30 and
50 employees purchased material at the sale. The sense
of the record is that the pieces were spread out on
a table and made generally available in a manner that
had never occurred before. In the circumstances we
conclude that the evidence demonstrates that the
Employer conducted the sale for the purpose of inducing
employees to vote against the Union. This sale occurred
in the context' of coercive interrogation of employees,
threats of plant closure, threats to withhold incentive
pay increases, and threats of losing the right to present
their own grievances. Thus the employee benefits con-
ferred by this preelection sale were not isolated but
a part of conduct calculated to interfere with employees'
Section 7 rights. Based thereon we find an additional
violation of Section 8(a)(1).2
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations
Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order
of the Trial Examiner, and hereby orders that the
Respondent, Tunica Manufacturing Company, Inc.,
Tunica , Mississippi , its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial
Examiner's Recommended Order, as herein modified:
1. Amend paragraph l(b) as follows: Substitute for
"with discharge" the words "with reprisals in employ-
ment conditions" and at the end add: "and granting
benefits to induce or encourage employees to withdraw
their support for the Union."
2. In the paragraph of the notice which begins: "WE
WILL NOT threaten you with discharge . . ." substitute
"reprisals" for "discharge," and add at the end: "or
2 See N.L R.B. v Exchange Parts Co, 375 U S 405, 410; Regal
Aluminum , Inc, 171 NLRB No ' 181; Tonkawa Refining Co, 175 NLRB
No.102. We distinguish Field Container Corporation, 178 NLRB No
82, cited by the Trial Examiner,, where the Respondent was found
to have a valid explanation for his announcement of benefits during
a prolonged (more than 7 months) organizational campaign which was
the most recent of seven such annual campaigns
182 NLRB No. I11
730 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
grant benefits to encpurage you to withdraw your support
for the Union "
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
in acts of restraint and coercion and made promises
of benefits rendering a free election impossible
Upon the entire record, including my observation
of the witnesses , and after due consideration of the
briefs filed by the parties I make the following 3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HENRY L JALETTE, Trial Examiner These cases
involve allegations of independent 8(a)(1) conduct in
a complaint issued on April 18, 1969,1 pursuant to an
unfair labor practice charge filed on February 28 by
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO,
CLC, herein called the union, and objections to conduct
affecting the results of an election which had been
conducted on March 7, pursuant to a petition filed
by Tunica Manufacturing Company, Inc ,2 on February
14, and a Stipulation for Certification Upon Consent
Election executed on February 18 The revised tally
of ballots indicated that 94 votes had been cast for
the Union and 93 votes cast against it in the election
of March 7, and 6 challenged ballots were determinative
of the results Both the Employer and the Union filed
objections to conduct affecting the results of the election
If the six challenges were all sustained, the Union would
be entitled to certification absent a finding of merit
to the Employer's objections and there would be no
need to rule upon the Union's objections On the other
hand, if one or more of the challenges were sustained
and as a result the tally of ballots were changed so
that a majority of the valid votes had not been cast
for the Union, the Employer's objections would become
moot and it would become necessary to rule upon the
Union's objections
On April 18, the Regional Director issued a report
on challenges and objections to which exceptions were
filed, and on June 9 the Board issued an order directing
a hearing, stating, "If the revised tally of ballots shows
that the remaining 6 challenged ballots are sufficient
in number to affect the results of the election, the
hearing shall be for'the purpose of receiving evidence
with respect to the issues raised by the objections filed
by both the Employer Petitioner and the remaining objec-
tions filed by the Union, and by the challenges to the
[six ballots]
On June 26, the Regional Director issued an order
consolidating Case 26-CA-3300 with the objections in
26-RM-249 The cases were tried at Tunica, Mississippi,
on July 15 through 21
The only issues in the complaint case are whether
the Respondent engaged in certain independent 8(a)(1)
conduct In the representation case, the issues are wheth
er (a) Margaret Still, John Hawkins, P X Frazier,
Dorothy Gilliam, Mildred Parker, and William Wade
are supervisors within the meaning of the Act, (b) the
Employer engaged in acts of interference preventing
the conduct of a free election, and (c) the Union engaged
Unless otherwise noted all dates herein refer to the year 1%9
2 The Comp-iny is referred to either as the Employer or the Respond
ent
FINDINGS OF FACT
I THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT AND THE LABOR
ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Respondent is a corporation with a plant and place
of business in Tunica, Mississippi, where it is engaged
in the manufacture of mattress pads During the 12
months preceding issuance of the complaint, Respondent
in the course and conduct of its business operations
purchased and received at its Tunica, Mississippi, plant
directly from points located outside the State of Missis-
sippi materials and goods valued in excess of $50,000,
and during the same period Respondent sold and shipped
from that plant directly to points located outside the
State of Mississippi products valued in excess of $50,000
Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act The Union is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act
If THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A Introduction
The Respondent learned of the Union's organizational
campaign on January 20 That same day, Plant Manager
Ralph Rubin consulted an attorney and on the next
day, he called in each of his supervisors and gave
them a list of "do's and don'ts" with regard to the
campaign "
On February 5, 12 employees met with Rubin and
told him that they were acting on behalf of the Union
and were going to do what they could to get employees
to sign union cards and to get them to vote for the
Union
On February 14, Respondent filed the petition in
Case 26-RM-249 Prior to filing the petition, Respondent
had assembled its employees for a speech and a viewing
of the film "And, Women Must Weep " According to
Plant Manager Rubin, the employees were assembled
to hear a speech on six occasions Rubin could not
recall the dates of all the meetings, but it appears
three speeches were given before the filing of the petition
9 Respondents motion to dismiss made at the close of hearing
on which I reserved ruling is disposed of in accordance with the
findings apd conclusions herein
" Respondent s issuance of a list of do s and don is to its supervisors
has been considered only in determining whether or not the supervisors
had in fact engaged in the unlawful conduct charged to them in other
words I have weighed this factor in resolving credibility However
this factor has no bearing on Respondent s responsibility for the unlawful
conduct of the supervisors since employees were not notified of the
issuance of the instructions N L R B v Ace Comb Co 342 F 2d
841 (C A 8)
I
TUNICA MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC.
and three after, including two the week of the election,
specifically, March 2 and 6.
B. The Rummage Sale
The complaint alleges that on about February 28,
Respondent conducted a rummage sale wherein it sold
unbound quilts to its employees as a benefit to induce
them to refrain from joining or supporting the Union.
It is undisputed that on about February 28, Respondent
sold quilting material to its employees at the price of
10 cents a pound . Plant Manager Rubin testified that
Respondent purchases scrap material for use in the
production of furniture pads for which it pays 3 cents
a pound. This material normally consists of remnant
strips of quilting material perhaps 3 to 4 inches in
width which are fed into a rag picker which tears the
material and reduces it into lint. This lint forms a batting
which goes into furniture pads. Some time before Febru-
ary 28 , upon opening bales of this material which had
been in the warehouse for about 30 days, it was discov-
ered that there were pieces of quilting material big
enough to make a full-size quilt . Other pieces were
big enough to be sewn together to make a full-size
quilt . Employees learned of this and requested permis-
sion to purchase the material . Because of the number
of employees interested in making purchases and to
avoid undue disruption of production , employees were
advised that the material would be accumulated on a
cutting table where they could purchase it during the
period from 3:30 to 4 p . m. This is the period during
which the work shifts changed . Employees were permit-
ted to quit work a half hour early in order to make
purchases and were paid for the time lost. Between
30 and 50 employees purchased material and several
employees testified that they made finished quilts, which11
were exhibited at the trial.
This was the first time Respondent had had a sale
of such material and on such a scale ,` Respondent
explains this on the fortuitous circumstance of the dis-
covery of the material ' in the ordinary course of produc-
tion. General Counsel contends that the record allows
the inference to be drawn , that Respondent ordered
from its supplier' a shipment containing an unusually
high quantity of large quilt remnant pieces for the pur-'
pose of this sale. Alternatively , General Counsel submits
that even if Respondent had no responsibility for the
contents of the shipment' it had the legal responsibility
to refrain from using this "bonanza " as an inducement
to its employees to dissuade them from voting- for the
Union . Further , General ' Counsel submits that the man-
ner in which the sale was conducted , the fact that
the quilting material was displayed on cutting tables
in view of the employees 1 week prior : to the l election
and that employees were allowed to purchase the material
on company time conveyed a clear message of benefit
to them . I do not agree. ,
I reject the contention that an inference may be
drawn that Respondent ordered the quilting material
for the purpose of such a sale . Although I believe
that Rubin colored his testimony when testifying on
731
the supervisory status of the individuals who cast chal-
lenged ballots , I cannot say that his testimony about
how Respondent happened to have the quilting material
is not credible.
I also reject General Counsel ' s contention that
Respondent should have refrained from selling the mate-
rial at the time it did . There is no evidence in the
record that the bales were opened for any reason other
than use of the scrap material for Respondent ' s produc-
tion of furniture pads, and while it appears that some
bales were opened to search for large quilting remnants,
this was only because of the earlier discovery of large
remnants in parts of the shipment. In these circum-
stances, I can attach no great significance to the timing
of the sale. But if you remove the timing , there is
nothing else on which to base a finding of a violation.
Not a single employee was told that this sale of material
at such a price was related in any way to the forthcoming
election . "It is well settled that an allegation of; Section
8(a)(1) violation and an objection to an election on
the conferral of a benefit can be sustained only where
it is shown that the employer ' s purpose in granting
the benefits was to interfere with employees ' exercise
of their right under the Act to select a representative
of their choice ." Field Container Corporation , 178 NLRB
No. 82 . I conclude that the evidence is insufficient
to warrant a finding that the sale of quilting material
had such a purpose; Accordingly , I shall recommend
that this allegation of the complaint be dismissed.
Threat To Withdraw a Planned Increase in Incentive
Pay Rates
The complaint alleges that on about February 18,
Plant Manager Rubin told an employee that Respondent
had withdrawn its plan to institute increased incentive
pay rates because of the union organizational campaign.
The only evidence ` offered in support of this allegation
was the testimony of employee Rosa Spencer that she
had a conversation with Rubin in mid -February in which
he asked her , inter alia , what she was so mad about
and why she was supporting the Union . Spencer told
him that it was because she did not like the way she
was being treated "that I had sewed B . G., which
were rags , for 4 months , and made $1.60 an hour when
everyone else was making $2 and better . And, so,' he
says, well, that he had just been ready to change produc-
tion on the B. G. when I started the union- mess,
and I says, `Yeah'."
Q. He had been just ready to change production?
A. Well, change the rates , the production rates
to where we would have made more money on
-rags.
Spencer was paid on a piece work basis, and she
testified on cross-examination that prior to this conversa-
tion with Rubin she had no knowledge that the Company
was evaluating the production rates on her work. Asked
if she knew what Rubin was going to do after this
conversation , Spencer stated : "No, I only knew he
said he was going. to , but he didn't•say he was going
to put them through . He was going to change the rates
'732 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
before the union . before I started the union mess,
and after I started it, he didn ' t say after it was over
he was going to change . He didn 't say that."
Rubin did not deny that he had the conversation
described by Spencer . He testified that timestudies are
going on all the time . The production rate on Spencer's
job was changed after the election.
As is readily seen from the foregoing , Spencer could
not verbalize clearly exactly what it was that Rubin
said to her , and Respondent points to Spencer ' s admis-
sion that Rubin did not tell her he was not going to
put the piece rates into effect because the Union had
started . Nevertheless , it is clear that Spencer construed
his remarks as meaning that Respondent had planned
to improve piece rates , but had decided not to do
so because of the union mess; the only question in
her mind was what Respondent intended to do after
the organizational campaign was over . Such a construc-
tion of Rubin 's remarks was not only reasonable, but
also the only construction an employee could likely
place on them . It may be argued that what Rubin intended
was that he had planned to improve piece rates, but
that he could not do so during the preelection period
for fear of being charged with granting a benefit to
induce employees to abandon the Union and thereby
committing an unfair labor practice . Of course, if
Respondent had planned to increase piece rates prior
to the organizational campaign , it was free to put the
plan into effect irrespective of campaign . The May
Department Stores Company, 174 NLRB No. 109. How-
ever , a simpler answer to such an argument is that
Rubin did not testify about what he said and Spencer's
uncontradicted testimony does not,support such a sup-
posititious construction of his remarks. Accordingly,
I find that Rubin ' s remarks constituted a threat and
that Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
D. Threats of Plant Closure
Emma Lee Frazier testified that on either February
24 or 25, Sadie O'Neal, her supervisor, called her away
from her machine and told her "Emma I am not asking
you has you signed a union card, because it is not
my business but I am asking you not to vote for the
Union because if you do the factory will close down
and you and I and everyone here will be out of a
job. I know you need to work because if you hadn't
you wouldn't be here." Frazier's only response was
that she did need to work. Frazier testified that at
the time this happened she observed O'Neal calling
other employees away from their machine one by one
to speak to them, including employee Ruth Welch.
Welch described,a conversation with O'Neal in which
O'Neal asked her if she had been impressed by a speech
given by Rubin that day. Welch replied that she had
understood what Rubin said and O'Neal asked her wheth-
er it had changed her mind about voting for the Union.
Welch replied that she did not know what she was
going to do, whether she was going to vote for the
Union or against it . O'Neal said , "You had better think
twice before you vote for the union because the plant
is going to be closed if the union comes in." O'Neal
added that Rubin had not said this but one of the
bigshots in Tunica had said it. She' did not identify
him.
The conversation described by Welch is sufficiently
similar to that described by Frazier to have occurred
on the same occasion. There is, however, a serious
question about the dates of these two conversations.
As noted, Frazier fixed the conversation as having oc-
curred on or about February 24 or 25, but she was
unable to' explain how she fixed that date. Welch's
testimony about the date is not completely satisfactory,
because her testimony at the hearing was at odds with
her prehearing affidavit. At the hearing, Welch testified
to two conversations about the Union with O'Neal.
She testified the one described above occurred about
a week after her other conversation with O'Neal which
she fixed as having occurred on February 14. In her
prehearing affidavit, Welch had stated that the conversa-
tion described above occurred about a week before
the February 14 conversation which would place it as
occurring on or about February 7.5 For the purposes
of the 8(a)(1) determination the date on which this
conversation took place is not too significant. It is impor-
tant, however to fix the date for purposes of the objec-
tions, which have a cutoff date of February 14, the
date on which the petition was filed.
My conclusion about the date of the threats is inextri-
cably intertwined with my conclusion about the credibili-
ty of the witnesses. Supervisor O'Neal denied that, she
ever spoke to either Frazier or Welch about the Union.
According to O'Neal her only comments about the Union
were made to two or three girls in her department
on the occasion of the showing of the film "And Women
Must Weep" (shown on January 27), and Rubin's remarks
related thereto. O'Neal's only comments were that she
was impressed by the film and what Rubin had said.
I do not credit O'Neal, whose demeanor did not
impress me as favorably as that of Frazier and Welch.
She appeared to be less than candid, particularly when
she disclaimed any recollection of the identity of a
single employee to whom she made her alleged comment.
There were only about 10 employees in her department.
On the other hand, both Welch and Frazier impressed
me favorably. In particular, I was impressed by Welch's
adherence on cross-examination, to her testimony on
direct that the threat of plant ,closure was made in
,her second conversation with O'Neal. I am convinced
that an ,error was made in the taking of her prehearing
statement. It is more logical for a witness to describe
conversations in sequence as Welch did at the hearing,
than to describe them in inverse order. Moreover, Welch
fixed the date of the conversation at the hearing in
relation to the election of March 7, stating the conversa-
tion occurred " . . . a week or two before the election,
say two weeks before the election." Such a date is
consistent with a conversation about the effects of voting
The complaint alleges that the threat was made on or about
February 7
TUNICA MANUFACTURING COMPANY , INC. 733
for the Union . It is unlikely that O ' Neal would have
been talking about a vote before a petition was filed.
Finally , in crediting Welch about the fact and substance
of the conversation , I note the coincidence in the usage
of both Welch and O 'Neal of the word " impressed."
I cannot believe Welch fabricated a conversation using
the same word that O'Neal admitted using in talking
to other employees.
For the foregoing reasons, I find that on about Febru-
ary 21 , 24, or 25 Respondent , by Supervisor O'Neal,
threatened employees with plant closure if they selected
the Union as their collective -bargaining representative
and thereby interfered with , restrained , and coerced
employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
The same conversation is alleged to have been viola-
tive of Section 8(a)(1) because of its interrogatory
aspects, i.e., had Welch been impressed by the speech
and had it changed her mind about voting for the Union.
The coercive nature of such inquiries about an employ-
ee's union sentiments is clear when you consider that
it was preliminary to a threat of plant closure. I find
the interrogation violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
E. Threats of Discharge
The complaint alleges that in January 1969, Supervisor
Pearl Miller interrogated employees concerning their
union membership , activities , and desires and threatened
employees with discharge because of their union activi-
ties and desires.
Carol Jean Spencer testified that about the middle
of January , Pearl Miller, her supervisor , came to her
machine and accused her of passing ` out union cards.
Spencer denied it. Miller replied that Spencer was work-
ing for the Union and her name was at the top of
the list with Lelia Dye and when it was over with
she would be canned.
Spencer stated that Dye was present during this con-
versation . According to Dye, on an evening in the middle
of January , she heard Miller and Spencer having a
conversation and heard Miller accuse Spencer of passing
out union cards. Spencer denied it and Miller accused
her of lying. Dye did not heat much more of the conversa-
tion because she had work to do.
Dye herself had conversations with Pearl Miller. About
a week earlier , Miller had come to her and asked her
if she was one of the union leaders ` on the night shift
and Dye told her she was not. Miller told her she
had heard that Spencer and Dye were the union leaders
on the night shift and Dye told her that they were
not. A week later, Miller had come to her again and
told her that she had heard that Spencer and Dye had
been accused in the office of being the union leaders
on the night shift and she told Dye that they would
be canned for sure when the election was over because
they were the union leaders. It was either that same
night or a night or two later that Dye overheard the
conversation between Spencer and Miller . Pearl Miller
left the employ of Respondent about February 17, and
she did not testify at the hearing. The testimony of
Spencer and Dye stands uncontradicted, and inasmuch
as both Spencer and Dye impressed me as credible
witnesses , I find that Miller interrogated them in the
manner described and threatened them with discharge.
However , this is really not the issue presented with
regard to Miller ' s conduct ; rather , the issue is whether
or not Respondent effectively disavowed her conduct.
On the following the conversation in which Miller
had threatened Spencer with discharge , Spencer and
Dye went to Rubin ' s office and asked to speak to him.
They told him that they had been accused of being
union workers and under his suspicion and wanted to
know if this was true . Rubin told them he did not
have any suspicions about them . He was asked about
the list that he was supposed to have and if their
names were at the top of it, and he replied he did
not have any list , but that he knew who was working
for the Union , mentioning Rosa Spencer , sister- in-law
of Carol Jean Spencer . He told them that if any of
the employees had accused them in any way to please
tell him and he would have it stopped . They told him
that they had been told that they would be fired when
the election was over . Rubin told them that there had
never been anyone fired by Respondent for working
for the Union. He asked them who had told them
they' would be fired , but they told him they would
rather not mention who it was. Rubin told them that
if anything like that ever happened again to come back
in to his office and to tell him about it.
Contrary to the contentions of General Counsel and
the Union , I find that by his statements to Spencer
and Dye Rubin effectively disavowed the coercive
remarks of Pearl Miller . He specifically disclaimed having
a list or that they were on a list as they had been
accused , and he assured them against the reprisal with
which they had been threatened. He did not undertake
other steps to dissipate the effects of Miller ' s statements,
but that circumstance is insufficient to ignore the assur-
ances he gave. He did invite them to come to him
again if anything like that happened again and asked
them who had threatened them. Spencer and Dye's
refusal to reveal that Miller had made the threats suggests
that they were satisfied with Rubin's response.
I
My finding that the, disavowal was effective relates
to the interrogatory aspect of Miller's remarks to Spencer
and Dye as well as the threats . I note Rubin ' s remark
that he knew who was working for the Union and
I attribute this to the fact mentioned earlier that 12
employees had told him they were acting on behalf
of the Union. This included Rosa Spencer who had
told Carol Jean Spencer of her visit to Rubin ' s office.''
For the foregoing reasons, I shall recommend dismissal
of the allegation respecting the statements of Pearl Miller
to Carol Jean Spencer and Lelia Dye.
'' In making this finding, I am also finding that Spencer and Dye's
visit to Rubin ' s office occurred after February 5, the date of the visit
by the 12 employees
734 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
F. Interrogation
1. The facts
The complaint alleges interrogation of employees by
Supervisors Pearl Miller , Jerri Leake, Sadie O'Neal,
Mary Gann , and Peggy Alderson.
I have already disposed of the allegations of interroga-
tion involving Supervisor Miller and employees Carol
Jean Spencer and Lelia Dye. Employee Frances Hodges
also testified without contradiction about a conversation
with Miller in which Miller asked her if she knew
that Spencer and Dye had union cards. Hodges also
testified that Miller asked her several times if she was
for the Union and if any of the girls had signed union
cards. Spencer ' s testimony was undenied and is credited.
However , Spencer was not reliable on dates and since
Miller left Respondent 's employ on February 17, I am
unable to hold that any interrogation of Hodges occurred
after February 14.
As to Supervisor Sadie O'Neal, I have already dis-
posed of her conversation with Emma Frazier and one
of her conversations with Ruth Welch, the second.
The first conversation occurred on February 14 when
O'Neal asked Welch if she had signed a union card
and in which O'Neal stated that Rubin knew she had
signed a union card . For reasons given earlier , I credit
Welch.
The interrogation attributed to Supervisor Jerri Leake
was undenied . Martha Ann Massey credibly testified
that on an unknown date in January Leake came to
her machine and asked her what she thought about
the Union. Massey replied that she could not tell one
way or the other.
As to Supervisor Mary Gann , employee Shirley Cobb
testified that about two days before the election Gann
asked her if she believed the Union would help the
employees any and Cobb told her she did not know
because she had never worked under a union before.
Gann asked her if Rubin had been good to them and
Cobb replied that he had been real nice to her and
had given her a job when she could not find another
one. Gann asked Cobb, "Well, how do you feel about
a union ," and Cobb replied that was for each person
to decide for himself . Gann asked if Cobb believed
it would change working conditions and Cobb replied
she did not know.
Supervisor Gann denied the conversation. She stated
it was not necessary to ask Cobb how she felt about
the Union because at times when she had walked up
to employees having a conversation Cobb had always
spoken for the Company . Cobb impressed me as a
very credible witness and I credit her.
The remaining allegations of interrogation concern
Supervisor Peggy Alderson and employees Judy Redden
and Helen Mills.
Redden , who is Alerson's niece , testified that in the
week of the election , she was approached by Alderson
who said she wanted to talk to her. Redden asked
her to wait until after the election on Friday, but Alderson
said she did not want to wait. She asked Redden what
she thought the Union was going to do for her . Redden
replied that if it did anything it would beat what they
had. Alderson asked if Redden expected eight paid
holidays and Redden replied , she would like to have
four . Alderson expressed the thought that Redden was
just going along for the ride and just to have something
to do. (Redden testified that Dorothy Gilliam was present
during the conversation . Gilliam is one of the individuals
whose status as a supervisor is in issue . She was not
called as a witness by General Counsel , and, although
called as a witness by Respondent , she was examined
only about her duties.)
According to Alderson , she had two conversations
about the Union with Redden, neither of which was
as described by Redden . One occurred about 2 weeks
before the election in the restroom when Judy Redden
and Melba Weeks told Alderson that what they were
doing was not because they had anything against her.
Alderson had replied that she hoped not and she could
not understand why they were so sympathetic toward
the Union . They told her it was because of the benefits
that the Union offered . (Weeks was called as a witness
by the Union to testify about allegations that she had
made threats to employees. None of the parties examined
her about the alleged conversation with Alderson.)
Alderson testified her second conversation with Red-
den occurred on the day of the election when Alderson
was making the rounds of the machines inspecting the
work being done . Redden motioned to her and Alderson
asked her what was wrong . Redden stated that she
would be glad when the day was over and Alderson
said she would be glad when people got to where they
would talk to her again . Redden told Alderson that
the reason she had not been talking to her was not
that she was mad, she was just afraid she might say
something to her that she should not say . Alderson
replied that she just wondered why so many people
were so sympathetic toward the Union.
As is true of most of this case , the issue posed
is one of credibility . From my observation of the witness-
es, I am persuaded that Redden was truthful and I
credit her . I am not finding that the conversations
described by Alderson did not occur . The examination
of Redden was not sufficiently exhaustive to preclude
a finding that she had the conversations with Alderson
which Alderson described , as well as the conversation
Redden described . I discredit Alderson only in her denial
of the conversation described by Redden.
Helen Mills, the second employee alleged to have
been interrogated by Alderson, testified to what appeared
to be three conversations with Alderson. She described
one conversation when Alderson came to her machine
and asked her why she was so strong for the Union
and if it was because of her. Mills told her that they
had had arguments and had been mad at each other
before and if the Union got in they probably still would
be. Mills stated that one reason she wanted the Union
was for seniority.
After stating the foregoing , Mills added that " . . .
not that particular day, though , but later on . . . I
don't know whether it was that day or the day before,"
TUNICA MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC.
the needle on her machine was breaking and Alderson
came up and said, "Well, I guess you know that when
you get your union in here . . . I won't be able to
help you. I won't be able to help you with this."
The foregoing were described by Mills on direct exami-
nation. On cross-examination, she described a conversa-
tion when. a mechanic was working on her machine
fixing a belt and Alderson came up and told him to
let Mills fix the belt, "because when I got my union
in there I would have to . . .
Alderson denied ever speaking to Mills about the
Union. I did not credit Alderson's denial respecting
Redden's testimony, nor do I credit her respecting Mills'
testimony. Mills appeared to me to be testifying truthful-
ly, albeit somewhat disjointedly. Thus, it was not alto-
gether clear from her testimony on direct whether she
had one or two conversations with Alderson, and, if
more than one, when the conversations occurred. The
matter appeared to have been clarified on cross-examina-
tion when she stated, at one point that she had two
separate conversations with Alderson, but, thereafter,
she added the conversation about the mechanic fixing
the belt on her machine. In addition, whereas on direct
examination she had fixed the conversation, first
described above as occurring a day or two before the
election on cross-examination she admitted,, that it
occurred on March 20, 13 days after the election. This
accorded with the date alleged in the complaint, the
only date on which General Counsel alleged interrogation
which involved Mills. Mills persisted in her testimony
that Alderson had spoken to her about the Union before
the election, but it is clear from the record that the
first conversation described above occurred on March
20. I so find.
The conversations about the broken needle and the
belt fixing are threats of reprisals and although not
alleged in the complaint the issue was fully litigated.
Mills' testimony placed Respondent on notice of the
statements attributed to Alderson; in fact, Respondent
elicited testimony of one of the threats on cross-examina-
tion . Thereafter, Alderson was called to testify about
the alleged interrogation and although not specifically
asked by Respondent about the threats described by
Mills, her denial of any conversations with Mills, about
the Union necessarily encompassed a denial of the
threats. In answer to my question Alderson denied the
threats. Since I have not credited her, I find that by
these threats Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
The interrogation of March 20 I find to be noncoercive.
Not only did it occur after the election, but its content
revealed a concern on Alderson's part about her personal'
relationship with Mills, rather than concern over the
exercise by Mills of her Section 7 rights.
2. Summary and conclusions
Although, I have found that Respondent engaged in
the several acts of interrogation described in the preced-
ing section, I have withheld a conclusion about the
coercive nature of the conduct in order' to consider
735
it in context. As is well established, interrogation is
not per se unlawful; the legality of interrogation must
be determined by the surrounding circumstances. In
this case, these circumstances include a threat by
Respondent's top local management official to a leading
union advocate (Rosa Spencer) to withhold an increase
in piece rates, threats of plant closure to two other
employees (Frazier and Welch), and threats of reprisal
to "another employee (Mills). They include, a campaign
of opposition to the Union which included campaign
literature found to have interfered with a free election,
and six antiunion speeches. While "There is, of course,
nothing wrong with `openly opposing the union' or 'con-
ducting an anti-union campaign' so long as it does not
impinge' upon the rights of the employees concerning
their union activities." N.L.R.B. v. M. & W. Marine
Ways, Inc., 411 F. 2d 1070 (C.A. 5), the Respondent's
opposition to the Union must be taken into consideration
in evaluating the effects of interrogation. This is particu-
larly true where, as here, the interrogations had no
legitimate purpose, had some semblance of being system-
atic, and were conducted on the job with employees
being called from their machines. As Frazier testified
on the occasion of the threat made by O'Neal, employees
were called one by one by O'Neal. In the case of
Redden, the supervisor refused her request to put off
the conversation until after the election. In all these
circumstances, I conclude that the acts of interrogation
described in the preceding subsection were coercive
and violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
I
III. THE REPRESENTATION CASE
A. The Challenged Ballots
As noted earlier, the ballots of six individuals were-
challenged on the ground they were supervisors. The
ballots of P. X. Frazier and Mildred Parker were chal-
lenged by Respondent, and those, of Margaret Still,
William Wade, John Hawkins, and Dorothy Gilliam were
challenged by the Union.
Extensive testimony was received with regard to the
supervisory status of each of those individuals, and
repetition of the details of that testimony in this Decision
would serve no useful purpose. As to each individual,
tidbits of evidence were offered, which one party or
the other contended established supervisory status, but
when weighted in the context of the full range of their
duties and authority, the tidbits could not be added
to the measure 'of a supervisor.
Three of the individuals, Margaret Still, Mildred Par-
ker, and Dorothy Gilliam received $1.75, only 15 cents
more per hour than the $1.60 paid employees, disregard-
ing the additional pay received by employees on piece
work. William Wade received $1.80 per hour, 10 cents
more than the four other employees in the freight depart-
ment. Both John Hawkins and P. X. Frazier receive
$3 per hour, significantly more than other employees,
but the former was a sewing machine mechanic and
the latter operated a complicated machine.
736 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The evidence is virtually undisputed that none of
the individuals in question had the authority to hire,
suspend, recall, promote, discharge reward, or discipline
other employees or adjust their grievances, nor did
they have the authority to effectively recommend such
action. Such transfers or assignments as they may have
made did not require the use of independent judgment,
nor did it constitute responsible direction. None of them
receive any of the benefits granted by Respondent to
its admitted supervisors. They do not attend supervisors'
meetings and were not given Respondent's list of do's
and don'ts when the organizational campaign began.
In short, on the basis of the record as a whole,
I find that none of the individuals whose ballots were
challenged meet any of the criteria for supervisory status
set forth in Section 2(11) of the Act, and I shall recom-
mend that the challenges to their ballots be overruled.
B. The Objections
1. The Employer's objections
a. Objections 1, 2, and 3
1. The Union by its agents threatened employees
with bodily harm if they did not vote for the
Union.
2. Threats of personal retaliation and of physical
violence were made to employees creating an atmos-
phere of fear and reprisal rendering a free election
impossible;
3. The Union by its agents indicated to the
employees that it proposed to treat members differ-
ently from non-members if it won the election;
(1) The findings of fact
Employee Lear Mitchell testified that on the day
of the election, before the balloting, she was wearing
a pin with the slogan "Tell it like it is," a pin also
being worn by supervisors. Betty Still, one of the employ-
ees in the group which had given notice to Rubin that
they were going to solicit employees to sign cards,
seeing Mitchell, stated to another employee, "I ought
to kick her ass." Mitchell testified that this remark
made her afraid of being kicked; nevertheless, she
rejoined, "I told her I hope she didn't, because she
would bring back a nub, I would try to bite it off."
Employee Vita Manues testified that she also wore
the same pin, and before the balloting on the day of
the election, Betty Still told her to pull it off and put
on a union button. Manues refused and Still said, "Well,
you are going to get your damn ass whipped after
the election."
Still described a conversation with Manues different
from the above, but she did not specifically deny the
threat attributed to her by Manues. As to the incident
with Mitchell, Manues admitted the remark, "Well, I
could kick her tail." According to Manues, when Mitchell
made a rejoinder, she assured her she was "playing
with you."
I credit both Mitchell and Manues. Still's testimony
essentially constitutes an admission of a threatening
statement to Mitchell, and she appeared to me to be
a very aggressive woman and not the type to make
playful remarks.
Employee Betty Busby testified that on February
14, in the presence of Helen Mills and Hazel Middleton,
Melba Weeks asked her to sign a union card. When
Busby refused, Weeks, said, "Well, you know if you
don't sign a union card you may be getting what some
of the people on the film got." (As noted earlier,
Respondent had shown the film "And Women Must"
Weep" to its employees, and the film showed acts
of violence against nonunion employees.)
Helen Mills testified on other matters, but was not
examined on this point; Hazel Middleton did not testify;
and Melba Weeks denied the allegations. As between
Weeks and Busby, I found the demeanor of Busby
to be more convincing and I credit her.
According to Busby, the same afternoon that Weeks
spoke to her employee Christine Eddington accused her
of running to Supervisor Mary Gann to tell her about
the union activity that was going on and Eddington
told Busby, "If you know what's good for you, you
had better keep your damn mouth shut."
A week later, Eddington referred to Busby's presence
at a union meeting and told her she had better not
tell what went on at these meetings because if she
did, "the government men would be down my neck
hot apd heavy."
Busby had attended a union meeting a day or two
earlier and she testified that at this meeting Rosa Spencer
and Mildred Miles asked Union Representative Woody
Biggs if he was going to send someone "to rub down
the knocks and bruises that their husbands were going
to give Rubin." Biggs replied, "Yeah, I may even send
somebody to help."
Eddington described an incident when Busby ques-
tioned her about the Union and later another employee
reported to her that Busby had been telling Supervisor
Gann about it. According to Eddington, after that she
did not tell Busby anything. Eddington denied making
the statements attributed to her by Busby and denied
"hearing" any threats at the union meeting at Mills'
house. I was not impressed by Eddington and I credit
Busby.
Busby's testimony about the threats to Rubin at the
union meeting involved Helen Mills, Mildred Miles,
Rosa Spencer, and Woody Biggs . Helen Mills was a
very credible witness, but her testimony on this issue
is insufficient to deny credence to Busby. All she testified
to was that she could not recall statements threatening
Rubin and no threats were made in her presence; admit-
tedly, Mills was in and out of the room.
Both Rosa Spencer and Mildred Miles denied threaten-
ing anybody about the Union, but neither was asked
about the alleged statements at the union meeting threat-
ening Rubin. I consider such general denials inadequate
to contradict Busby's testimony.
Woody Biggs testified that no threats were made
in his presence at any union meeting and that he did
TUNICA MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC.
not remember the statement "we are going to rub knots
into their heads " and the response attributed to him
by Busby . Considering the form of the questions posed
to him on this issue , I am not certain of the meaning
of his testimony , and while I believe it was intended
as a denial of the Busby accusations , I deem it insufficient
to overcome the credibility which I have attached to
Busby's testimony as a whole.
In short , upon consideration of the testimony of all
of the witnesses on this issue , I conclude that statements
such as described by Busby were made at a union
meeting.
Employee Nell Mosley testified that in the last week
of January she received a telephone call from an uniden-
tified man who asked her if she was for or against
the Union . She replied that was her own business,
and he told her if you know what is good for you,
you would be for it. Then he hung up. Mosley went
to the plant and reported the matter to Plant Manager
Rubin who suggested she call the sheriff . On returning
home , Mosley received another telephone call from the
same unidentified man who said he knew she had been
to see her boss and that if she knew what was good
for her , she would keep her mouth shut.
On February 14, Mosley received a telephone call
at work in which a woman said to her "Bitch we
have warned you our last time, next time it will be
your kids ." Then she hung up.
Employee Linda Parker testified that about a week
or two before the election , she received a telephone
call from an unidentified caller who said, "You are
going to get your damn ass beat ." Thereafter , Parker
testified she received many telephone calls, day and
night , this continued until the Sunday after the election.
In none of the calls was the Union ever mentioned.
Employee Vita Manues testified that on February
5 she received the first of four telephone calls. Manues
recognized the voice of the caller as that of Dan Still,
husband of employee Betty Still. Still asked Manues
to join the Union . When she told him she was against
the Union , he said , "Well, you are going to be sorry.
How would you feel if you would wake up and find
your shack on fire?"
Still called again on February 26 and when told again
that Manues was against the Union , he called her a
damn bitch.
On March 5 , Betty Still called and told Manues that
she would be presented with a union card that morning
and she had better sign it , stating, "If you will stick
with the Union , we will throw Ralph Rubin out in
the road ." Still also referred to Manues ' retarded child,
saying something about "mobbing my retarded child."
Both Betty and Dan Still denied making any of the
calls attributed to them by Manues . I credit Manues.
I have previously discredited Betty Still with regard
to the threats attributed to her by Lear Mitchell and
there appears to be no reason to credit her over Manues.
As to Dan Still , his demeanor on the witness stand
convinced me his testimony was not worthy of credit.
Jo Ann Swann testified that early in February, she
started receiving "dead line " telephone calls; that is,
737
the telephone would ring , she would answer and hear
the sound of people at the other end, but no one would
speak and the telephone would be hung up. Swann
did not specify how many such calls she received,
nor to what date in February they extended.
Employee Lillie Mae Frederick testified that about
a week before the election Mildred Miles visited her
home and asked her to sign a union card She refused
and Miles told her " . . . the ones that didn't sign
cards wouldn ' t have a job if the union went in."
Miles gave only a general denial of threats, which
I consider inadequate to overcome the specific testimony
of Frederick , who appeared to me to be a truthful
witness.
Employee Susan Williams testified that Mildred Miles
and Peggy Frazier visited her home about 2 weeks
before the election and that Miles asked her if she
would sign a union card , and when she refused Miles
said , "Well, you might . . . things might get tough with
you if you don't sign the card . You could lose your
job." When Williams replied that this could not be
so because of Mississippi ' s right to work law, Miles
said , "Well, we could do away with that ," by Federal
Government action.
Miles specifically denied telling Williams things might
get tough , and by implication , that she threatened her
with loss of job . I do not credit her. Apart from the
inconsistencies between her prehearing statement and
her testimony before me , Miles was not an impressive
witness. Peggy Frazier did not testify.
Employee Shirley Butler testified that about the third
week in February employee Peggy Barber told her that
if the Union should go in , "You and the ones" that
had not helped them could lose their jobs and could
not get promotions and things they were entitled to,
if the Union saw fit.
Barber denied the statements attributed to her by
Butler. I have carefully considered the record testimony
and the prehearing statements of both Barber and Butler.
Although Butler was opposed to the Union , I sense
no hostility towards Barber in her testimony (as a matter
of fact, she stated in her prehearing statement that
she did not consider Barber ' s remarks to be a threat).
Although there is a suggestion of inconsistency between
the prehearing statement and her record testimony, I
am not persuaded that it reflects on her credibility.
Butler appeared to me to be sincerely attempting to
relate what happened . While I find nothing specific to
warrant not crediting Barber , in balance , I find Butler
the more credible witness.
Employee Earl Pearson testified that about 2 weeks
before the election while on his way home at I a.m.
he was flagged down by some individuals , including
employee Clint Jennings who asked him to sign a union
card . Pearson refused and Jennings referred to the fact
Pearson was a part -time worker and said , "Well, you
might lose your job." Pearson replied , "Well, it is
all right with me."
Pearson's testimony was undenied. Although Pearson
was less then candid about the identity of the individuals
738 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
with Jennings , I consider that insufficient to reject his
testimony and I credit him.
Employee Jo Ann Swann testified that about 2 or
3 weeks before the election employee Linda Tyler told
her that those who did not join the Union would not
be working if the Union went in. Tyler denied making
such a statement to Swann . I credit Tyler. Swann
appeared to me to be very hostile toward the Union
and I am persuaded she substituted her subjective inter-
pretation for whatever it was Tyler said to her.
(2) Conclusions of law
Like the Employer in its brief, I have grouped objec-
tions 1, 2, and 3 for discussion because of the common
thread that binds them, namely, alleged union coercion.
I use that phrase advisedly, with no intent to convey
a finding of union responsibility for the conduct
described. Since several of the incidents described were
attributable to employees who had assembled themselves
in a group to notify Rubin of their organizing intentions,
the Employer characterizes the group as an organizing
committee and argues that the conduct of its members
is attributable to the Union. However, there is no evi-
dence that the employees were other than a self-appoint-
ed organizing committee, and "The mere fact that
employees prominent in the Union's organizing campaign
may have engaged in unlawful conduct, without more,
is not sufficient to establish agency" Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corporation, 179 NLRB No. 39. This does
not mean the Employer's objections based on the con-
duct of rank-and-file employees and anonymous tele-
phone calls must be rejected as without merit, because
the test is not one of agency, but rather whether the
conduct in question "created an environment of tension
or coercion such as to preclude employees from exercis-
ing a free choice." N.L.R.B. v. Zelrich Company 344
F.2d 1011, 1015 (C. A. 5). "It is necessary, however,
to give some weight to whether the conduct complained
of was committed by the parties to the -proceeding,
or by rank-and-file employees. This is so, because `the
conduct of third persons tends to have less effect upon
the voters than similar conduct attributable to the
employer who has, or the union which seeks, control
over the employees' working conditions'." Owens-Corn-
ing Fiberglas Corporation, supra.
In the final analysis, it must be determined whether
the election was conducted under conditions which meet
the Board's "laboratory" standard as explained in Mor-
ganton Full Fashioned Hosiery, 107 NLRB 1534, 1538,
and in Liberal Market, Inc., 108 NLRB 1481, 1482.
Unfortunately for the trier of the facts, there is no
measure, quantitative or qualitative, by which he can
gauge the "probable effect upon the employees' action
at the polls." N.L.R.B. v. Zelrich Company, Supra.
The "Probable effect" of any misconduct must take
into account all of the attendant circumstances.
One very troubling circumstance in this case is the
possibility that the misconduct occurred in a setting
stage managed by the Employer and that the Employer
is taking "advantage of wrongdoing for which he has
an operational responsibility." N.L.R.B. v. Air Control
Products, Inc. 335 F.2d 245 (C.A. 5). Thus, it was
the Employer who at the very outset of the organizational
campaign sowed the seed of the fear of violence by
showing "And Women Must Weep." According to Plant
Manager Rubin the first four or five instances of threats
"all seemed to happen shortly after around the time
the movie was broadcast a second time on February
24 when the Employer read and distributed a letter
to its employees with regard to the Excelsior list. (See
Union's Objection 3, infra.)
In my judgment, by reason of the foregoing 'the
Employer should be foreclosed from relying on acts
of misconduct such as anonymous telephone calls;
whether or not the Board's laboratory conditions have
been maintained should be decided on the basis of
evidence of misconduct by identified individuals.
In this case, we have instances of both types of
misconduct, and my conclusion has been based on the
totality of the evidence, or to put it another way, on
the combined effect of all the objectionable acts. Home
Town Foods, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 413 F.2d 392 (C.A.
5).; Trade Winds Company v. N.L.R.B., 413 F.2d 1213
(C. A. 5). In determining the combined effect of objec-
tionable conduct, however, it appears to me that there
is no escaping a scrutiny of the individual instances
of misconduct. For example, I find nothing coercive
in Eddington 's remarks to Busby, because they did
not relate to Busby's right to refrain from supporting
the Union, but to Eddington's belief, communicated
to Busby, that Busby was an informer.
As to the threats of loss of jobs for nonsupport
of the Union, it appears to me that such threats by
one employee to another are capable of evaluation and
cannot reasonably be held to be coercive. Shirley Butler
admitted as much in her prehearing statement where
she stated that she did not consider Barber's remark
to be a threat. As to Susan Williams, her admitted
knowledge of her rights under Mississippi's right to
work law indicates her ability to evaluate the validity
of Miles' remark.
The statement at the union meeting about rubbing
down the knocks and bruises to be given to Rubin
cannot be regarded as contributing to an atmosphere
of fear. Not only was it not directed to employees,
but also it was made in a group of employees presumably
of like mind about the Union, and the connotation
was one of idle banter rather than an intended threat.
Biggs' response was clearly his contribution to the per-
siflage.
In the final analysis, if there existed an atmosphere
of fear which destroyed the desired laboratory condi-
tions, it had to be an outgrowth of the threat of physical
violence and telephone calls directed to employees. The
evidence regarding such threats indicates that five
instances involved Vita Manues, who, despite four
threatening telephone calls from individuals she was
able to identify on the morning of the election, openly
wore the badge of those opposed to the Union. Even
then, Manues replied to Still's threat to whip her that
she did not think Still' was big enough. Such conduct
TUNICA MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC. 739
and such a remark affirmatively establishes that the
telephone calls and the threats had no probable effect
upon the employees' action at the polls. Lear Mitchell's
rejoinder to Betty Still indicates a similar attitude towards
Still's threat. (Compare the reaction of employees herein
with that of employees in Owens-Corning Fiberglas Cor-
poration, supra.)
The probable effect of the anonymous telephone calls
and threats to Nell Mosley and Linda Parker is much
more difficult to gauge. As serious as these calls were,
and despite the fact that the threats to Mosley became
known to at least three other employees, I am not
persuaded that they warrant a finding that there existed
a general atmosphere of fear and tension on the date
of the election. It cannot be overlooked that of the
three telephone calls received by Mosley, the last, and
most serious, occurred on February 14, the date the
petition was filed and 3 weeks before the election.
Neither before Mosley received the calls, contemporane-
ously with, nor after, was there a single act of violence
against any employee. I see a marked difference between
the conditions existing at the time of the election in
this case and those for example in Home Town Foods,
Inc., supra, wherein the Court found preelection miscon-
duct by union supporters, and election day misconduct
by the union agent, union supporters, and the Board
agent. The facts of this case have a greater resemblance
to those of N.L.R.B. v. Golden Age Beverage Co.,
415 F.2d 26 (C. A. 5).
In short, under all the circumstances, and viewing
the evidence of misconduct cumulatively and separately,
I connclude that the acts of coercion found herein
were insufficient to destroy the atmosphere necessary
to the employees' exercise of a free choice in the
election. Accordingly, I shall recommend that the
Employer's objections 1,2, and 3 be overruled.
b. Objection 4
4. The Union offered life insurance coverage
to all prospective voters who applied for union
membership.
The Employer bases this objection on a statement
in a letter mailed by the Union to all employees in
the unit on February 18, which contained a series of
questions and answers, including the following:
Q. Is it true that the Union has its own insurance
program that is free to all members and their
dependents?
A. It is true! Amalgamated members are covered
by a good hospitalization, surgical and life insurance
policy, and also a weekly sick benefit program.
Dependents are covered also by the hospitalization
and surgical benefits at no cost to you. You will
save more than $4.00 a month union dues by being
able to cancel your present policy. '
In addition, the Employer offered evidence that
employees were told by,union solicitors that the insur-
ance coverage was free to union members. Thus, Vita
Manues testified she was visited by two women she
could not identify who told her if she joined the Union
she would recieve free hospitalization and life insurance.
Pat Manues testified that she was visited by Union
Representative Merle Davis who told her insurance ben-
efits would be included in the monthly $4 dues. Christine
Simmerman testified she was told she would receive
insurance benefits if she belonged to the Union.
The record indicates that the organizational campaign
consisted in large part of home visits by employee
union supporters and union representatives . It was the
practice of the union solicitors to give a pamphlet to
the employees they visited labelled "Information about
Insurance and Retirement Program for ACWA Members
in the Cotton Garment and Allied Industries ."7 This
pamphlet describes the various medical and life insurance
benefits received by covered employees . The description
of the benefits is preceded by a "story " about the
program which includes the following statement:
The program is part of your union contract,
but no part of the cost is paid by you-either
through contributions or through your union dues.
The entire cost is financed through a percentage
of payroll contributions paid by the employers.
The Employer contends that the foregoing constitutes
an offer of free life insurance to prospective voters
which destroyed the laboratory conditions necessary
for employees to exercise a free choice in the election.
I do not agree . Wagner Electric Corporation , Chatham
Division, 167 NLRB 732, relied upon by the Employer,
is clearly distinguishable . In Wagner, there was a present
gift of insurance to employees who became members
of the Union by a certain date. In this case , the question
and answer in the letter of February 18, notifies employ-
ees of the existence of an insurance program free to
all members, but neither in the letter , nor in any of
the statements to employees were employees ever offered
a gift of free insurance.
Rather, it is clear from the record as a whole that
the insurance benefits were held out to employees as
one of the benefits of union representation. The pamphlet
given to employees by union solicitors stated that the
insurance program was "part of your union contract."
Although employee Christine Simmerman , a witness
called by Respondent, stated that she understood the
insurance was free automatically if you belonged to
the Union and answered "Right " to the question "Did
they [the union representatives] tell you that," it is
clear to me that Simmerman was substituting her under-
standing for what she was in fact told . This is clear
from her testimony on cross-examination that she read
the Union ' s pamphlet and that the union representatives
told her a contract would have to be signed before
the insurance went into effect . In my opinion , the same
situation is presented by the testimony of Vita and
Pat Manues. I do not believe that they were offered
free insurance if they joined the Union, and if that
was their understanding it was unwarranted . Respondent
adverts to the testimony of employee Melba Weeks
that she told employees she visited that insurance would
' The practice was not invariably followed as admitted by Union
Representative Merle Davis
740 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
be free and that she did not mention that a contract
would have to be negotiated The impression I get
from reviewing Week's testimony is that she told employ-
ees they "would have a better insurance" in the same
way that employees are urged to join a union with
the argument that they will get higher wages In all
the circumstances, I find no merit to Objection 4
2 The Union' s objections"
a Objection I
I During the campaign the Employer distributed
many leaflets to his employees These leaflets con-
tained threats of reprisals and promises of benefits
in violation of the Act which did effect the outcome
of this election
On about January 24, 1969, the Employer posted
the following notice on its bulletin board, and it remained
posted until January 29, 1969
TO ALL EMPLOYEES
We have received several complaints from some
of our employees who are working for the Union
in the plant and attempting to get people to sign
their cards They are annoying, and in some cases,
abusing employees who are trying to do their work
This is to advise all of you that this Company
will not stand for any employee to annoy-threaten
abuse-or disturb any other employees or in any
way, keep them from doing their job, or as long
as they are on Company property
Notice-This is the first and final notice that
any employee guilty of the above-whether they
are for or against the Union-will be discharged
at once
The Company will not tolerate such actions any-
more than they would from any outsider
The Union contends that by this notice the
Employer established an invalid no-solicitation rule
I do not agree The notice says nothing about
solicitation as such, rather, it clearly speaks of
annoying and abusing employees "trying to do their
work " It prohibits annoyance, threats, abuse, and
disturbance and applies both to union adherents
and those opposed to the Union There is no evi-
dence that it was intended to prohibit solicitation
which did not exceed permissible limits, or that
it was invoked against employees engaged in lawful
solicitation
On March 6, 1969, the Employer sent a letter to
all employees setting forth its opposition to the Union
The letter stated , inter alia , "Bear in mind that you
now have the individual right and freedom to come
in and settle with us personally any problems you may
have But if this Union were to get in here, this freedom
and this right, which you now have, would be taken
away from you and placed in the hands of the Union "
The Union contends this statement constitutes a misre-
presentation of the law in that Section 9(a) of the Act
preserves the right of any individual employee to present
a grievance to his employer and have such gievance
adjusted so long as the Union is given an opportunity
to be present and the adjustment does not violate the
collective-bargaining agreement
In Henry I Siegel, et al v NLRB , 417 F 2d
1206 (C A 6) decided November 4, 1969, the Court
characterized a statement essentially indistinguishable
as "inaccurate" because of its misrepresentation of
rights of employees under Section 9(a) of the Act
But the interference with a free election arising out
of such a statement is not merely its inaccuracy, it
is the express threat that a "right, which you now
have, would be taken away from you " [Emphasis
supplied I I do not know that an employer is required
by Section 9(a) of the Act to permit his employees
to present their grievances individually, however, where
he has granted them that right or privilege, it becomes
a condition of their employment and a threat to take
that right away from them if they select a union to
represent them is interference within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act This was the finding of
the Board in Henry I Siegel, 172 NLRB No 88, which
the Court affirmed, and a similar finding was made
in N L R B v Graber Mfg Co 382 F 2d 990 (C A
7)
Based on the foregoing, I find merit to this part
of Objection I Moreover, since such a threat violates
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, I shall recommend an
appropriate remedy Although the issue was not litigated
as a violation of Section 8(a)(1), it was fully litigated
as an objection
The Union contends that the same letter contained
"hidden threats," pointing to the following excerpts
The question to be decided in this election is
important It is important to you-and to those
who are dependent on you-important to your job
and to your entire future here
Yet the truth is at many places where the people
have had a Union, they now do not have any
jobs at all There are various Companies where
the employees have paid dues to a Union for years
and yet today those people are out of work, for
many of those Companies are now closed down
and out of business
N The Board appears to have arrived at a different conclusion in
Worzalla Publishing Co 171 NLRB No 34 where the statement
The Union filed six objections In his Report on Challenges and was made that employees would no longer be able to discuss gripes
Objections the Regional Director recommended inter alia that objection and trouble directly with management if a union got into the plant
be overruled As no request for review of such recommendation was In light of the cases cited above I can only conclude that in total
made the Board did not include Objection 5 in its order directing context the Board felt that the statement did not justify setting aside
hearing the election
TUNICA MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC. 741
The plain and simple truth is that they did not!
Economic and competitive conditions control such
matters and a Union cannot control them-no mat-
ter what Union organizers may tell you.
We are striving to maintain and build up this
operation , in an effort to assure its success on
into the future and thereby also to assure jobs
for you and security for you and your families.
But a successful future for this plant and security
for you and your jobs here cannot be accomplished
by any Union. It can only be accomplished through
your loyalty and cooperation-and by all of us
working and pulling together-not by our pulling
apart.
As matters now stand, you have a good job
with steady earnings and a good place here to
work . We all hope to make things even better.
Do you see any good reason to bring this outside
Union in , pay your money to it, and at the same
time run the risk of tearing apart everything that
you now have?
That you stand to lose if this Union were to
get in here and that you stand to gain by keeping
it out!
In addition, the Union relies on a leaflet distribut-
ed by the Employer and posted on the bulletin
about 10 days before the election . In large print,
the leaflet posed the following questions:
WHERE WERE YOU WORKING BEFORE YOU CAME TO
TUNICA MFG. CO.?
WHAT WERE YOUR YEARLY EARNINGS?
COULD YOU GO BACK TO YOUR OLD JOB?
HOW MUCH WOULD YOU GET NOW AT YOUR OLD JOB (IF
YOU COULD GET IT)?
THINK ABOUT THIS
During the preelection period , supervisors and employ-
ees opposed to the Union wore a cartoon pinned to
their clothes entitled "Don't Run the Risk" which depict-
ed hands above the surface of water grasping for lifesav-
ers just out of reach . The record does not indicate
the source of the cartoon, nor was any testimony
proffered about its meaning.
Analysis of the Employer's March 6 letter in its
entirety persuades me that it did not exceed the permissi-
ble limits of campaign propaganda. The principal thrust
of the letter is that the Union is not the source of
the employees ' employment (an observation readily rec-
ognizable by employees ); that the Company is that source
and it can only continue to be so as economic and
competitive conditions permit ; and that the Union can
do nothing to enhance those economic and competitive
conditions . I am unable to find in any of the statements
of the letter an implied threat of loss of employment
if the employees select'the Union as their exclusive
representative.
The same finding is not justified, however, with regard
to the "Where, What, Could, and How" leaflet and
the "Don't Run the Risk" cartoon. Neither of these
is related to the economic condition or competitive
position of the Employer . Their message is undiluted
by explanations about their meaning . Mindful of the
question "what did the speaker intend and the listener
understand," Cox, Law and the National Labor Policy
44 (1960), cited with approval by the Supreme Court
in N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Company, 395 U.S. 575,
I can see no other intention on the Employer's part
or understanding on the part of the employees than
that selection of the Union would inevitably cause them
to lose their jobs. The "Where, What, Could, and How"
questions have no relevance except to employees without
jobs. An inkling of the significance of this message
to the employees can be seen in Shirley Cobb's reply
to Supervisor Mary Gann's question whether Rubin
had been good to them. Cobb said he had been real
nice to her and had given her a job when she could
not find another one.
The "Don't Run the Risk" cartoon obviously did
not refer to' a literal drowning , but while its exact
meaning is not clear, it is difficult to conjure up an
innocuous message out of the illustration . The compelling
idea is one of serious harm if the Union is selected,
and taken in conjunction with the threats of plant closure
found to have been made by supervisors, and the threat
of loss of jobs contained in the " Where , What , Could,
and How " leaflet , the conclusion is inescapable that
the -employees would construe the cartoon as a threat
of loss of jobs if they selected the Union.
In short, I find merit to Objection I insofar as it
relates to the leaflet and cartoon.'"
b. Objection 2
2. The Employer prevented the existence of the
laboratory conditions necessary to conduct a valid
election when it grossly misrepresented to the
employees on the day of election the amount of
the Union's dues.
On the day of the election, before the opening of
the polls, employees received their paychecks with an
attachment-of which the following is typical:"
Your gross earnings this week are $19.20
"' The source of the cartoon was never identified, but as Respondent's
supervisors wore the cartoon pinned to their clothes, Respondent must
be held accountable -
" Other attachments showed gross earnings of $ 104 reduced to $86 66,
and $51 70 reduced to $32 32
742
If we had deducted union dues your checks
would have been reduced to at least $11.53
Aren't there enough deductions?
VOTE
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
NO
It is undisputed that the Union's dues are $4 a month.
The record also shows that attached to the paycheck
was a stub which itemized deductions as follows:
Gross F.I.C.A. - Insurance
.92 $ 2.75
Net Pay
$19.20 $15.53
Thus, the attachment above showing a reduction of
earnings to $11.53 accurately provided for a deduction
of $4 in union dues. while at first blush the attachment
appears to misrepresent the amount of the Union's
dues, the check stub clarified the matter, and I am
not persuaded that employees were not fully capable
of figuring out with great ease exactly how much of
the deduction was hypothesized for union dues.
The Union argues that the $4 amount may have been
readily ascertainable but the frequency of the deduction
was not so readily ascertainable and the attachment
created the impression that the $4 would be deduced
from each week' s earnings . As noted earlier in discussing
the employer's objections relating to its allegations of
an offer by the Union of free insurance, the union
solicitors included in their presentation of the insurance
benefits to be obtained from union representation the
information that union dues were $4 a month. Admitted-
ly, the Union visited two-thirds of the employees, and
it is a reasonable inference that the amount of the
Union's dues was common knowledge. In my view,
the attachment to the paycheck was campaign propagan-
da readily recognizable as such by employees. Accord-
ingly, I find no merit to objection 2.
c. Objection 3
3. [The Employer] further grossly misrepresented
to the employees the purpose and consequences
of the Excelsior list.
On February 24, 1969, the Employer read and distrib-
uted to its employees the following letter:
Dear Employee . .
Recently under pressure from the Unions, the
National Labor Relations Board decided that we
must give the Union the names and addresses of
all employees eligible to vote in the election March
7, 1969. Today this list was turned over to the
Labor Board who immediately gave the Union a
copy. I use the words "immediately gave" because
the Union could not even wait for the Board to
mail them a copy, and had one of their henchmen
standing there to pick it up immediately.
This means that we no longer have control of
this information, and that we cannot guarantee
into whose hands this information will fall. This
also means that you cannot be sure of who may
be knocking on your door tonight, or what kind
of mail you may find in your box. We have no
way of knowing from now on if people selling
books, cosmetics, magazines , vacuum cleaners,
union cards, or dirty literature," will be calling
on you personally.
When you first come to work for this Company
You gave us information about yourself that
we need in order to fill out Government Reports.
Many of you may not realize this . . . but a list
of names and addresses is something that can be
sold to many different people and businesses. This
list is not only worth, money . . but can be
sold over and over again.;
This Company always considered this,information
as something that you are trusting us to handle
in your best interest . . . and we have always
made every effort to do just' that!, We get many
calls and letters from time to time about people
who work in this factory from retail stores, credit
bureaus, etc., asking for all kinds of information
about you. Our policy has always been to give
out no information except for the fact that you
work here unless .you have given us permission
to do,otherwise.
We think that it is a flagrant violation of your
rights and ours, because the Union has forced
the Labor Board to give them this information.
This information that the Union wants, is not ours
It Is Yours! When you gave us information
about yourself in confidence you have a right to
assume that we will respect your privacy and will
not hand over this information tofjust anyone who
asks for it.
This is why we are giving you this letter. We
think it is important that whoever remains at home
while you are at work, knows that this information
we have always tried so hard to keep away from
strangers is now out of our hands. With all of
the killing . . . robbing . . . and violence going
on around us, and the threats we hear that some
of you have already received from union organizers
we don't think it is right that your names
and addresses be turned over to strangers but yet
there is nothing we could do in this matter except
what the Union has forced, the Labor Board to
do. We ask that you do not treat this lightly,
TUNICA MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC.
and that the members of your families who are
left at home are also made aware of how serious
this can be, so that you can protect yourself from
any strangers who may come knocking at your
door.
The Union contends that this letter not only contains
gross misrepresentations, but also, that it destroyed
the very purpose of the Excelsior list by frightening
employees to refuse to receive union solicitors. More-
over, the Union contends such a misrepresentation could
not be explained away to people afraid to answer their
doors. I agree. ,
"The Board is necessarily concerned with the protec-
tion of its procedure designed to provide fair elections.
It particularly looks with disfavor upon any attempts
to misuse its processes to secure partisan advantage."
This quotation from Mallory Capacitor Co., 161 NLRB
1510, is particularly apt when applied to Respondent's
letter. The Excelsior list was born out of the Board's
judgment that in discharging its trust to conduct elections
fairly, it was essential that "employees, have the opportu-
nity to cast their ballots for or against 'representation
under circumstances that are free not only from interfer-
ence, restraint or coercion violative of the Act, but
also from the elements that prevent or impede a free
and reasoned choice. Among the factors that undoubted-
ly tend to impede such a choice is a lack of information
with respect to one of the choices available. In other
words, an employee who has had an effective, opportunity
to hear the arguments concerning representation is in
a better position to make a more fully informed and
reasonable choice. Accordingly, we think that it is
appropriate for us to remove the impediment to commu-
nication to which our new rule is directed." Excelsior
Underwear, Inc., 156 NLRB 1236, 1240.
By its February 24 letter, the Employer effectively
restored the impediment. That the letter repeated the
same arguments rejected by the courts is not significant,
and it is reasonable to assume that employees could
evaluate those arguments. There was'no warrant whatso-
ever , however , for the references to " . . . killing
. . . robbing . . . and violence going on around us
. . ." and the reference to threats we hear that some
of you have already received from union organizers"
can only be interpreted as an attempt to create an
atmosphere of fear which would impede communications
between the Union and the employees. Significantly,
no contention was made at the trial of, any abuse of
any Ibuse of the Excelsior list. In my judgment, the
Employer made a mockery of the Board's processes
by its February 24 letter, and I will recommend that
Objection 3,be sustained.
d. Objection 4
4. [The Employer] further threatened and interro-
gated its employees.
This objection is based on the same conduct alleged
in the complaint as violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the
743
Act. To the extent that I have found that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) during the period following the
filing of the petition, I find merit to Objection 4. Included
in this finding are the threat to Rosa Spencer to withhold
any improvement in piece rates because of the "union
mess," the threats of plant closure by Sadie O'Neal
and her interrogation of Welch; Gann's interrogation
of Cobb, Alderson's interrogation of Redden; and Alder-
son's threats of reprisal to Mills.
e. Objection 6
6. By the foregoing acts and conduct alleged
in-paragraph I through 5 above and by other acts
and conduct engaged in during the period of cam'
paign including and after the election held on March
7, 1969, the Employer, by its agents and representa-
tives destroyed the laboratory conditions necessary
to a free and untrammeled vote by the unit employ-
ees thereby constituting grounds for setting the
,election aside. The acts committed by the Employer
blatantly manifest an intent to destroy the necessary
conditions required for a free election.
Under this objection , the Union offered evidence
about the raffle of a color TV set. According to Rosa
Spencer , about 8 days before the election, a sign was
placed in a corner of the plant stating "Watch this
spot , in 8 days you will be glad you did." The number
of days was reduced daily until about the, fourth day
before the election a color TV set was placed ip the
corner on a platform with a sign "One week ' s union
dues will buy this " and "Vote No ." A notice was
placed on the bulletin board stating that when an employ-
ee had voted he could pick up his raffle ticket . Spencer's
testimony was of contradicted.
Plant 'Manager Rubin stated the purpose of the raffle
was to get everyone to vote. On March 5, a notice
was posted stating. "The purpose of this raffle is only,
to get everyone to vote. Everyone is eligible regardless
of whether he votes Yes or No. But of course we
hope you will vote . . . No.
The Union is aware of the Board's decision in Buzza-
Cardozo, 177 NLRB No. 38, but would distinguish it
on the basis of the value of the' prize ($84 in groceries
versus a $350 to $400 TV set) and on the basis of
the antiunion propaganda surrounding the announcement
of the raffle. The raffle of a TV set is not new,12
and the antiunion propaganda described by Spencer
does. not justify a distinction between the raffle in this
case and the raffles in the cited, cases. Accordingly,
I find no merit to Objection 6.
12 Austin Concrete Works Inc , 132 NLRB 184, Elgin Butler Brick
Company, 147 NLRB 1624 It was not new with the Employer either,
the Employer conducted a similar raffle in an election held several
years earlier
744 TUNICA MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
RECOMMENDED ORDER
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section
II above, occuring in connection with its operations
described in section 1, above, have a close, intimate,
and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States, and tend to lead to labor
disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the
free flow thereof.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act, I recommend that it be ordered to cease
and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
In accordance with the Board's Order directing hearing
in Case 26-RM-249, I recommend that the challenges
to the ballots of Margaret Still, John Hawkins, P. X.
Frazier, Dorothy Gilliam, Mildred Parker, and William
Wade be overruled and that their ballots be opened
and counted. In the event that the revised tally of
ballots shows that the Union has received a majority
of the valid votes cast I recommend that Respondent's
Objections 1, 2, 3, and 4 be overruled and that a certi-
ficate of representative be issued. In the event that
the revised tally of ballots shows that the Union has
not received a majority of the valid votes cast, I recom-
mend that the Union's Objections 2 and 6 be overruled
and that Objections 1, 3, and 4 be sustained. Since
the conduct of the Employer described in such objections
made it impossible for employees to exercise a free
choice in the election, I recommend that the election
be set aside and that a new election be held at such
time as the Regional Director deems appropriate. 13
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. By threatening employees with withholding incen-
tive pay increases, with plant closure, with discharge,
and with loss of the right to present their own grievances,
and by coercively interrogating employees, Respondent
has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employ-
ees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section
7 of the Act and thereby engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
4. Respondent has not engaged in other unfair labor
practices as alleged in the complaint.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and the entire record in this case,
I hereby issue the following:
Respondent, Tunica Manufacturing Company, Inc.,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Interrogating its employees concerning union activ-
ities or desires in a manner constituting interference,
restraint, or coercion in violation of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
(b) Threatening employees with withholding incentive
pay increases, with plant closure, with discharge,,and
with loss of the right to present their own grievances,
because of their union activities.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise
of their right to self -organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection as guaran-
teed by Section 7 of the Act or to refrain from any
or all such activities.
2. take the following affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its plant in Tunica, Mississippi, copies
of the notice attached marked "Appendix. 1114 Copies
of said notice on forms provided by the regional Director
for Region 26, shall, after being signed by representatives
of the Respondent, be posted by Respondent immediately
upon receipt thereof and be maintained for 60 consecu-
tive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent
to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, with-
in 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Trial
Examiner's Decision what steps Respondent has taken
to comply herewith."
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that those allegations of
the complaint alleging violations of the Act not found
herein be dismissed.
" In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46
of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board,
the findings, conclusions, recommendations, and Recommended Order
herein shall, as provided in Section 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations,
be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and
order, and al: objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a judgment of
a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading
"Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be
changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board "
" In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the
" Attention of the parties is drawn to the Board 's Order directing Board, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional
hearing and the provision therein for filing exceptions to this decision Director, in writing within 10 days from the date of this Order, what
within 10 days from the date of its issuance. steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
TUNICA MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC. 745
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a trial at which all sides had the chance to give
evidence the • National Labor Relations Board found
that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and
ordered us to post this notice and we intend to carry
out the Order of the Board , and abide by the following:
The law gives you the right:
To form , join , or help unions.
To choose a union to represent you in bar-
gaining with us.
To act together for your common interest
or protection.
To refrain from any or all of these things.
WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes With
those rights.
WE WILL NOT question you about your union
membership , desires or activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with discharge or
plant closure , or threaten to withhold improvements
in piece rates because of your membership desires
or activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten to take away from you
the right to come in and settle problems with us
personally in the event you select the Amalgamated
Clothing Workers of America , AFL-CIO, CLC as
bargaining representative.
You are free to become and remain members of
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America , AFL-CIO,
CLC, or any other labor organization.
TUNICA
MANUFACTURING
COMPANY
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced
by anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
defaced , or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance
with its provisions , may be directed to the Board's
Office , 746 Federal Office Building , 167 North Main
Street , Memphis, Tennessee 38103 , Telephone 901-
534-3161.