Tulsa Sheet Metal Works, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 9, 1964

149 N.L.R.B. 1487 (N.L.R.B. 1964)

TULSA SHEET METAL WORKS, IN C. 1487
WE WILL NOT interrogate employees concerning activities on behalf of the
above-named or any other labor organization, in a manner constituting inter-
ference, restraint, or coercion violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate against employees because
they have given testimony under the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our
employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form organizations,
to join or assist the above-named or any other labor organization, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a)(3)
of the Act.
WE WILL offer to Anna Magee immediate and full reinstatement to her former
or a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to seniority and other
rights and privileges, and make her whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result
of the discrimination against her.
All our employees are free to become, remain, or refrain from becoming or remain-
ing members of Upholsterers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, or
any other labor organization.
THE AMERICAN PAD & TEXTILE COMPANY,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, T6024
Federal Building (Loyola), 701 Loyola Avenue, New Orleans, Louisiana, Telephone
No. 529-2411, Extension 6396, if they have any question concerning this notice or
compliance with its provisions.
Tulsa Sheet Metal Works , Inc. and Sheet Metal Workers Inter-
national Association , Local Union No. 270. Case No. 16-CA-
1872. December 9, 1964
DECISION AND ORDER
On March 12, 1964, Trial Examiner James T. Barker issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent
had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Decision. Thereafter,
the Respondent and the General Counsel filed exceptions to the
Decision and supporting briefs.'
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Leedom and
Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
1 Respondent's motion for oral argument Is denied because, in our opinion, the record,
exceptions, and briefs adequately set forth the issues and positions of the parties.
149 NLRB No. 120.
1488 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
rulings are hereby affirmed . The Board has considered the Decision
and the entire record in this case , including the exceptions and the
briefs , and hereby adopts the findings , conclusions , and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner.
The Trial Examiner found that the Respondent 's withdrawal from
the Tulsa Sheet Metal Contractors Association was untimely, and
that it was therefore obligated to execute the collective -bargaining
agreement subsequently signed by the Charging Union and the
Association . 2 One of the arguments advanced by the Respondent
against the finding of a Section 8(a) (5) violation based on its failure
to sign this agreement is that the Union itself was guilty of failing to
bargain in good faith by insisting on the inclusion in the contract of
unlawful hot cargo 3 and union - security clauses , and by striking the
Respondent to obtain them. We agree with the Trial Examiner that
the Respondent 's contention has no merit because the Respondent's
refusal to sign the Association contract was not in fact based on the
Union's insistence that these clauses be included in the contract, but
was motivated solely by its unwillingness to accept the Union's
(:c.nand for increased wages. We adopt the Trial Examiner 's Recom-
mended Order which conditions the execution by the Respondent of
the Association 's agreement on the deletion of the illegal provisions.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the Board hereby adopts as its Order the Recommended
Order of the Trial Examiner , and orders that Respondent, Tulsa
Sheet Metal Works, Inc., its officers , agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner 's Recommended
Order.4
2Cf Ice Cream, Frozen Custard Industry Employees, D)ivers, vendors and Allied
Worl,ers Union Local 717, IET (Ice Cream Council, Inc ), 145 NLRB 865, in which the
Board (Member Leedom dissenting in relevant part) found the withdrawal of individual
employers from a multiemployer association to be effective because it occurred during an
impasse in baigaining and with the consent of the union ITere, on the other hand, the
Respondent attempted to withdraw while the Association and the Union were actively
negotialing, and without the Union's consent to a breakup of the multiemployer unit.
Although the Union did not protest the withdrawal of other employers from the Associa-
tion, it is clear that the Union did not intend thereby to act in derogation of the Asso-
ciation's bargaining authority or to destroy the multiemployer unit.
3 The General Counsel concedes that the hot-cargo clause proposed by the Union in the
1963 negotiations was illegal It should be noted that the Trial Examiner, in Section
5(b) of his Decision, quoted the provision previously in effect between the parties whose
legality is not in question here, but failed to set out the provision actually proposed by
the Union, and which the Respondent contends exceeds the permissible limits of Sec-
tion 8(e) of the Act
4The words "reinstate and" shall be inserted before "make whole" in paragraph 2(c)
thereof, and the following shall be added at the end of the paragrapb
\VF WILL notify any employees entitled to reinstatement who are presently serv-
ing in the Armed Forces of the United States of their right to full reinstatement
upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal
Military Training and Service Act of 1948, as amended, after discharge from the
Armed Forces
TULSA SHEET METAL WORKS, INC. 1489
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge filed on June 12, 1963, by Sheet Metal Workers International Asso-
ciation, Local Union No. 270, hereinafter called the Union, the Regional Director
of the National Labor Relations Board for Region 16, on July 31, 1963, issued a
complaint against Tulsa Sheet Metal Works, Inc , hereinafter called the Respondent,
alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended, hereinafter called the Act. In its duly filed answer, Respondent admitted
certain allegations of the complaint but denied the commission of any unfair labor
practices.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held before Trial Examiner James T. Barker at
Tulsa, Oklahoma, on September 18 and 19, 1963. All parties were represented at
the hearing and were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to introduce relevant
evidence, to present oral argument, and to file briefs with me. Counsel for Respond-
ent presented oral argument and thereafter, on November 12, 1963, the General
Counsel and the Respondent filed briefs with me.
Upon consideration of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, and upon my
observation of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Respondent is, and has been at all times material herein, an Oklahoma corporation
maintaining its place of business at Tulsa, Oklahoma, where it is engaged in the
business of manufacturing and selling, at wholesale and retail, sheet metal products.
During the calendar year immediately preceding the issuance of the complaint
herein, the Respondent, in the course and conduct of its business operations, caused
to be manufactured, sold, and distributed at said Tulsa, Oklahoma, plant, products
valued in excess of $50,000, of which products valued in excess of $50,000 were
furnished directly to firms situated in Tulsa, Oklahoma, each of which firms sold and
shipped finished products valued in excess of $50,000 to enterprises located outside
the State of Oklahoma.
Upon these admitted facts, I find that at all times pertinent herein, Respondent has
been engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Sheet Metal Workers International Association, Local Union No. 270, is admitted
by Respondent to be a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act, and I so find.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The complaint alleges that Respondent is presently, and at all times material herein
has been, a member of the Tulsa Sheet Metal Contractors Association, hereinafter
called the Association; that at all times material herein the Union has been the
majority representative of the employees in an appropriate multiemployer bargaining
unit, that, commencing on or about February 27, 1963, but more particularly on or
about June 4, 1963,1 the Union requested Respondent as a member of the multi-
employer bargaining unit to bargain collectively with the Union with respect to rates
of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment,
but that, commencing on or about June 4, and at all times material thereafter,
Respondent did refuse and continues to refuse to bargain collectively with the Union
in that, on or about June 4, Respondent untimely withdrew from the Association; on
or about June 21, and at all times thereafter Respondent has refused and continues
to refuse to enter into and/or be bound by and/or execute a written agreement
embodying rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employ-
ment agreed upon between the Association and the Union; on or about June 4, and
continuing until on or about June 21, Respondent refused to bargain through the
Association, its duly designated bargaining agent; and on or about June 5, 10, and 14,
Respondent bargained directly and individually with employees in the alleged appro-
priate multiemployer bargaining unit. The complaint further alleges that on or
about June 3, employees of Respondent ceased work concertedly and went on strike,
' Unless otherwise indicated all dates refer to the calendar year 1963.
770-076-6 5-v of 149-95
1490 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and that since that date the employees have engaged in a concerted work stoppage
and strike, which strike was prolonged by the alleged unfair labor practices of Respond-
ent aforesaid.
Denying the contentions of the General Counsel, the Respondent asserts by way
of defense that its June 3 withdrawal from the Association was timely under the
prevailing circumstances in that on May 31, when the then existing contract expired,
the Association and Union had reached an impasse in bargaining; its June 3 with-
drawal notice to the Association was made at a time before the Association and the
Union had agreed upon the terms of a new collective-bargaining agreement; the wage
terms upon which the Union was insisting during the negotiations were appropriate
only for employers engaged in the construction industry and not for employers, such
as Respondent, engaged in manufacturing, and the wage scale upon which the Union
was insisting would place Respondent at a competitive disadvantage with respect to
other similar firms in the area and would bring about Respondent's bankruptcy; the
Union was engaging in individual bargaining with member firms of the Association
that had agreed to be bound by Association bargaining; the Union was insisting as a
condition of executing the collective-bargaining agreement upon an unlawful union-
security clause and a hot-cargo clause unlawful under Section 8(e) of the Act; and
the Union had failed to give timely notice as required by Section 8(d) of the Act.
A. Association bargaining
Since 1949 Rolland Chaney has been associated with the Respondent. The
Respondent was at first a partnership but in 1960 it incorporated, and Chaney became
its president and served in that capacity at the time of the hearing. The Union has
represented Respondent's employees since 1949.
In 1951 Respondent joined the Tulsa Sheet Metal Contractors Association, and,
from April 4, 1952, until May 31, 1963, was a party to collective- bargaining agree-
ments between the Union and the Association.2 From 1954 through June 4, 1963,
Chaney served as a member of the Association' s bargaining committee.3
B. The 1963 negotiations
1. Bargaining request
The 1961 collective-bargaining agreement between the Association and the Union
terminated by its terms on May 31, 1963. By letter dated February 27, the Union
through its business manager, B. J. Reinhard, and its president, Charles E. Townes,
served upon the Association a notice of its desire to reopen the existing agreement.
The letter contained the names of the firms which had executed the existing 1961
agreement and requested that the Union be furnished with a "list showing the con-
tractors . . . who no longer authorized the Association as its collective bargaining
agent." The name of the Respondent was one of those listed in the letter as having
executed the existing 1961 agreement . Attached to the letter were proposed changes
and modifications that the Union "desired ... be contained in the new agreement."
On March 1, the Association by letter to the Union notified the Union of its desire
to reopen the existing agreement and attached to the letter proposed modifications.
Thereafter, on March 6, Respondent and 19 other firms executed a composite letter
of assent designating the Association as their bargaining agent for the purpose of
negotiating a collective-bargaining agreement. Subsequently, on March 23, the Asso-
ciation by letter to the Union listed 27 firms, including Respondent, that had executed
letters of assent.
2. Collective-bargaining meetings
Representatives of the Union and the Respondent met initially for the purpose of
negotiating the new collective-bargaining agreement on March 25. Thereafter, before
the expiration of the existing contract , nine other collective -bargaining sessions were
held. The first meeting which President Chaney attended was the seventh bargaining
session between the parties which was held on May 21. Negotiations through May 31,
the day on which the 1961 agreement terminated, failed to achieve a meeting of the
minds upon the terms of a new agreement, and, accordingly, pursuant to a May 27
vote of the union membership, the Union struck all members of the Association.
2 While Respondent did not execute the 1959-61 agreement, President Chaney partici-
pated in the negotiations with respect to it and Respondent gave effects to its terms
3 The foregoing is predicated upon the credited testimony of Rolland Chaney and the
pertinent collective-bargaining agreements and related documents in evidence.
TULSA SHEET METAL WORKS, INC. 1491
The Union had on April 16 notified the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
and the Commissioner of Labor of the State of Oklahoma of the proposed termination
or modification of the existing agreement .4
Pursuant to arrangements made at the May 31 collective -bargaining meeting, a
further meeting was held between the representatives of the Union and the Associa-
tion on June 4. The negotiating committees again met on June 5, 6, and 12. Subse-
quently, on June 21, 1963 , the bargaining representatives of the Association and the
Union executed a collective -bargaining agreement to be effective retroactively from
June 1, 1963, until May 31 , 1966. The Respondent refused to execute the agreement
and did not during the period June 21 , 1963, until the date of the hearing herein
give effect to any of its provisions.5
C. The Respondent withdraws from the Association
In the meantime , by letter dated June 3, 1963 , addressed to Albert Ives as president
of the Association , Respondent President Chaney submitted his firm's resignation
from the Association . The letter , in pertinent part , read as follows:
Effective as of this date, please accept my resignation from the Tulsa Sheet-
metal Contractors Association, Inc.
May I please have a letter relieving me of all present and future obligations,
including but not limited to, welfare ' fund trustee , negotiating committee mem-
ber, and any and all future actions taken by the association. -
The following day, June 4, 1963, the Association adopted a resolution complying in
all respects with the Respondent's letter -request of the day previous . At the June 4
bargaining session between representatives of the Association and Union, Respondent's
June 3 letter was read and Association President Ives informed the Union that the
Association was no longer bargaining on Respondent 's behalf. Respondent did not
directly notify the Union of its resignation from the Association until July 5, but
the Union on June 11 advised Respondent by letter that it could not accept its "with-
drawal at this late date...."
The Respondent participated in no group negotiations with the Union after the
May 31, 1963 , meeting . By letter of July 5 , 1963, President Chaney, noting its resig-
nation from the Association and the absence of any requests by the Union to
Respondent to bargain concerning a new contract , suggested a meeting between the
Union and Respondent be held on Monday , July 8 . Charles Townes and President
Chaney communicated telephonically thereafter and a meeting was scheduled for
July 9 , which was held. Townes and Chaney and respective counsel , William Powers
and Carl Hall , discussed the Association 's contract at this meeting, with the Respond-
ent requesting the. Union to deviate from the terms of the agreement consummated
with the Association to the extent of granting the lower wage scale provided for in
the "production agreements " into which the Union had entered with firms engaged
in manufacturing , as contrasted with construction work . Townes took the position,
however, that the Union could not negotiate individually with the Respondent and
asserted further that the Respondent was bound by the Association 's contract signed
on June 21, 1963. Discussion was had with respect to Respondent 's qualifications for
coverage under a production contract and the Union asserted that it could deviate
from the Association 's agreement if the Respondent could establish that it qualified
for a production agreement . The Union , however , insisted that the Respondent had
the "burden of proof" in establishing its qualifications . This matter was not resolved
and Townes adhered to his position that he could not negotiate further with the
Respondent .6
D. Respondent's direct bargaining with employees
Bob Falling , a journeyman sheet metal worker , worked for the Respondent from
May 27 until 31, 1963. Because of the strike which commenced on June 3 , Falling
4 The foregoing is predicated upon the testimony of Charles Townes Townes credibly
testified that the Union did not strike contractors that had executed a collective - bargaining
agreement with it on or before June 1, 1963, but that none of the employer -members of
the Association had executed such an agreement by that date. However, with respect to
this testimony, the record establishes , as found below , that C. G. Thain Company, Inc.,
,an Association member, executed an interim agreement ,with the • Union on Slay 31 after
its withdrawal and prior to the commencement of the strike on June 3.
5 The foregoing is predicated upon the credited testimony of Charles Townes, as ampli-
fied by minutes of pertinent meetings and Ehersupporting testimony , of (President Chaney.
e The foregoing is predicated upon the credited testimony of Charles Townes.' ^ -,
1492 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
did not return to Respondent's employ on that day or thereafter. Subsequently, how-
ever, he returned to Respondent's establishment to secure some handtools and his pay-
check. While there he conversed with President Chaney.? With respect to this inci-
dent, President Chaney testified credibly as follows:
He came in after his paycheck and I went up in the office, got his paycheck and
brought it back down and handed it to him. I turned around, I was busy at
the time, I turned around and started back into the other part of the shop and
he had started toward the outer door and he said,- "What's going on?" And, I
indicated to him that I had men woiking. He said, "Well, what kind of pay
are you paying?" I said, "That all depends on what a man's worth. 'And, it
could be from $2 on up." This was all the conversation between Bob Falling
and myself at that time or any other time.
Falling credibly testified that during this visit to Respondent's shop, he observed
employees working with whom he was-not acquainted.8
Similarly, during this period, Tommy Collins, who had been employed by Respond-
ent from 1957 until June 1, 1963, conversed with President Chaney at Respondent's
shop. Thus, on June 13, 1963, Collins went to Respondent's establishment to return
some borrowed tools. Collins testified credibly concerning this conversation as
follows:
A friend of Mr. Chaney's was there, and when he left, the conversation progressed
and followed on into what we called the coffee room down there. Mr. Chaney
made a proposal to me, would I be interested in a non-union job with his shop
at a scale comparable to what the other Union shops had signed for, the ones
that weren't members of the Contractors Association; along with if business had
been good and he could, he would'pay a week's vacation. Also, in the termi-
nology used was if in a year or so I decided to go back in the Union, he would
help me, or would pay a new card, the cost of a 'new card.
Collins further credibly testified that he had not previously received a paid vaca-
tion while in Respondent's employ; that his wages at the time of the strike on June 3
were $3.82 per hour plus fringe 'benefits and welfare fund payments, and that he
understood the wages Respondent was-offering were'$4 an hour plus fringe benefits.
Collins further credibly testified that he discussed Respondent's offer with his wife
but ultimately rejected it .9 '
President Chaney credibly testified that on June 4, he transferred employee Clarence
Callico, a general laborer, to the sheet metal department. and increased his hourly
wage from $2.65 to $2.75.' Callico was not a member of the Union. His prior experi-
ence in sheet metal work was quite limited. . , I . 1 1, '
According to President Chaney's further testimony which I credit, on June 5, 1963;
he conversed by-telephone with Frank Wheatcraft,'who, prior to the strike, had been a
foreman in Respondent's employ. During the, conversation -he offered to reemploy
Wheatcraft in his former position and informed Wheatcraft that he was going "non-
union." Similarly, President Chaney testified that he conversed by telephone on
June 13 with George Allen. During the conversation Allen stated that he had heard
that Respondent had gone "non-union." Chaney answered that he had.Io
7 These undisputed facts are predicated upon the credited testimony of Bob Falling
8 As I observed them testify at, the hearing, I was convinced that President Chaney's
testimony with respect to the substance of the conversation that occurred on the occasion
in question was more accurate than was Falling's While I am convinced that both wit-
nesses endeavored to recount the event to the best of their recollections President Chaney's
testimony was the more convincing.
0 President Chaney's testimony confirms and supports the credited testimony of Collins
in essential aspects. -
10 The foregoing telephone conversations of President Chaney with Frank Wheateraft
and George Allen are not alleged by the General Counsel as violative of the Act How-
ever, this evidence was offered for the bearing it might have upon Respondent's asserted
intention to go "non-union" and upon the question of its good faith in dealing with the
Union through the Association. When confronted at the hearing with certain statements
in the affidavit given the General Counsel's agent respecting his intention to go "non-union,"
President Chaney testified that the term "non-union" to him meant the hire of employees
without regard to the Union's referral system, and that hires are made regardless of the
union membership of 'the applicant . He further asserted that under such an operation
he "would just as soon hire a man out of the Union ; I don't ask him if he is Union."
TULSA SHEET METAL WORKS, INC. 1493
E. The bargaining issues
1. Summary discussion
As found above, the Union and the Association, respectively, exchanged proposals
for modifying the existing 1961 agreement by virtue of the Union's February 27 com-
munication to the Association and the Association's March 1 response to the Union.
By its February 27 letter the Union proposed modifying the existing agreement by
adoption of the standard form of union agreement (form 9-15-61) except with respect
to graduated wage rates for apprentices; and, additionally, with respect to the adden-
dum of the existing agreement, the Union proposed modification of the minimum
journeyman wage scale to become effective in three steps over a 3-year period, an
increase in 1963 of 5 cents per hour in the employees' contribution to the apprentice-
ship and training fund. Further, the Union sought a provision giving it the option
to divert any part or all of the second- and third-year increases to a vacation plan
or other benefit plans directly benefiting its members. Finally, the Union proposed
the elimination of the most-favored clause (article XIII) from the addendum.
The Association's proposal for modifying the existing agreement was more exten-
sive. The Association's, proposal sought the elimination of article II, the subcontract-
ing clause, and modification of addendum article V relating to establishing of shops
on the job for the purpose of fabricating and erecting sheet metal work; and article
VII, relating to the performance of certain work by shopowners. In addition, the
Association proposed a 21/2-cent-per-hour increase for the local industry fund, the
inclusion of a penalty clause for employers who are delinquent in their payment to
the fringe benefit fund, and the expansion of the free zone area. Further, the Associa-
tion made several recommendations for the modification of the apprenticeship pro-
gram and the age limitations pertaining to the employment of apprentices.
At the April 8 meeting the parties agreed to amendments to the contractual provi-
sions relating to the apprenticeship program along the lines suggested by the Associa-
tion. Further, the parties agreed to an additional minor modification to the apprentice-
ship program. On the other hand, they agreed to retain the apprenticeship age limita-
tion as contained in the expiring agreement. Further, in keeping with the Association's
March 1 proposal, the parties agreed to the deletion of.article VII, section 7-1, of
the addendum to the existing agreement relating to the performance of work by
shopowners and to the expansion of the free zone area from 25 miles to 40 miles.
They "by-passed" discussion of article II, the subcontracting clause.
Further meetings were held between the parties on April 16 and May 7, 13, 16, 21,
28, 29, and 31. The latter meeting was held as the existing contract, by its terms,
was approaching expiration at midnight. At the early stages of the May 31 meeting
the discussion turned to the Association's offer of the previous May 29 meeting of a
5-cent-per-hour increase in wages beginning June 1, 1963, and 71/2 cents per hour
beginning January 1, 1964, which had been coupled with an insistence upon the reten-
tion in the new agreement of the so-called "escape clause" that would permit an
employer to terminate his "union ties anytime after the first year of the contract"
and the further retention of the so-called "most favored nation clause " 11 After fur-
ther discussion of this matter in open meeting and after a recess was taken which had
been called by the Union, the Union returned to the meeting with a signed proposal
for a 2-year contract, providing for wage increases of 25 cents during the first year
and 20 cents during the second year, the elimination of the "most favored nation
clause," the rejection of the Employer's proposal for an escape clause, and the cessa-
tion of any further discussions with respect to the employer's proposal respecting the
industry fund. Thereupon the employers recessed and returned with a proposal for
a 2-year contract with -wage increases of 10 cents each year and the elimination of
the escape clause. Thereupon the Union recessed and upon return announced that
11 The addendum to the existing contract had provided as follows: -
Section 13-1 The Union agrees that it shall not grant or permit any other con-
tractor or any other party any more favorable terms, in whole or in part, than those
applicable to the employer herein including, but not limited to, wages, hours, work-
ing conditions, or job duties In the event the Union shall grant or permit any
more favorable terms as aforesaid, including any variance from any Article herein
or change in handling of work assignments, materials, or conduct of fabrication or
construction, from this agreement or the custom or understanding in this industry,
such favorable terms immediately and forthwith shall become automatically sub-
stituted in the place of the terms herein that are less favorable, and shall become
a part of this contract as if let out at length herein
1494 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
it was adhering to its written proposal advanced earlier in the meeting . The parties
continued to adhere to their positions with respect to the most -favored-nation clause,
the Association insisting upon its inclusion and the Union insisting upon its exclusion
from any new agreement . After a further recess taken at the request of the Associa-
tion, the Association announced that it had no further offer to make "at this time"
and the meeting adjourned . A meeting was scheduled for June 4 , 1963.12
With respect to his participation in the discussions at the May 31 meeting, and with
regard to his position respecting the proposals of the Union and the resultant effect
of them upon his subsequent actions, President Chaney credibly testified as follows:
In February , I really didn 't anticipate a raise. Business had been terrible,
and not being in the construction industry , I didn't review the construction going
on, truthfully . Consequently , I didn't feel that the men would be asking for an
increase, at least it would be a very small increase , if any Consequently, I went
ahead into this thing along with the rest of them. But, as the thing progressed,
it became more definite as to what they were actually going to get. When it
came as of May 31st and they came back in on the final minutes of the meeting
and stated definitely that it was going to be a 2-year contract , twenty-five cents
this year and twenty cents next year, knowing since I had been on several nego-
tiations , I knew what the circumstances were and I knew then that this thing
had come to a head with too much money involved for me.
On June 3rd , when nobody showed up to go to work, and since it would put
me in the condition that I stated before , I decided that I had to go to work and
put people to work in that plant , regardless . That's exactly the way it happened.
Q. Now, was there anything that was said or happened to you in the course
of your participation in the labor negotiations , or in conferences with other
members of the association , that gave you reason to believe that the Union
would obtain the high demands they were seeking?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What?
A. Well, there was two contractors-by the way , they were on the negotiating
committee-that whenever this thing began to draw to a close, which was indi-
cated at this time, that they were going to have to give the rates ; a week out would
be all that they could stand . And, at the end of that time , they were going to
have to go to work. When two of the major contractors that's working a major
portion of men makes that statement , regardless of whether it gets to anyone else
or not, the committee knows
Q Who were those two contractors9
A. That was Southern Sheet Metal and Tom H . Venable.
Q. Are they large major sheet metal shops here?
A. In the construction trade, they are the major contractors.
Q. Is their business different from yours?
A. Yes, they are construction industry, construction sheet metal shops, actually.
Q (By Mr. HALL ) Did you ever , in the course of the negotiations with the
Union prior to June 1st, 1963, Mr . Chaney, explain to them your financial condi-
tion and plight?
A. Yes , sir, I tried to
Q What did you tell them?
A. I told them that business conditions , as far as I was concerned , at least,
didn't warrant a raise at this time; that I was just in no position to give a raise.
I explained that-what I thought was a pretty well explained deal, other than to
going into actual dollars and cents of my business . I made it pretty clear to
these boys even on that last meeting, because of some words that I said to them,
they should have been able to understand at that time that this thing was very
important.
* * -k 9 * * *
And [on May 31] they came back into the room and gave us a-said they
were standing pat. This was earlier that they had went out in the evening. They
came back in and said they were standing pat on their offer, their proposal. At
that time I stated to the boys, now , fellows, let's don't be foolish on this thing.
12 The foregoing is predicated upon the credited testimony of Townes , as supported by
the minutes of the May 31 meeting and the testimony of Ives and Chaney.
TULSA SHEET METAL WORKS, INC. 1495
Let's really get down, because this thing has gotten to where we are only a few
minutes away from a deadline , and let's try to work this thing out to where we
are all at a satisfactory ending; I can't stand it the way it is, and I would like to
do something that-to make this thing good . So, let's don 't kid around with
each other , and here a few minutes away from a deadline , let's don ' t kid, let's
be serious or stop one or the other.
They assured me that they were dead serious. At that time , the contractors
negotiating committee left the room and came back with their final proposal
which is shown there, and then they left after that and came back with theirs, of
twenty-five and twenty cents as stated , which I, at that time , thought I had made
it clear to them that I personally-because I had never before talked to those
boys in just exactly the manner that I did then , and I actually , for the first time
in my life, pleaded with them to be serious and get down to brass tacks on this
thing where we could arrive at something mutually beneficial.
2. The disputed "Hot Cargo" aiid union -security clause
The Association 's March 1, 1963, proposals had provided for the deletion from
the existing agreement of article II , sections 1 and 2. This article provided as follows:
SECTION I. No Employer shall subcontract or assign any of the work described
herein which is to be performed at a job site to any contractor , subcontractor or
other person or party who fails to agree in writing to comply with the conditions
of employment contained herein including , without limitations , those relating to
Union security , rates of pay and working conditions, hiring and other matters
covered hereby for the duration of the project.
SECTION II Subject to other applicable provisions of this agreement, the
employer agrees that he will not subcontract for prefabrication of materials
covered herein , other than catalog items excluding duct work and fittings.
The union -security provision encompassed within the Union's initial proposal and
contained in the standard form of union agreement ( 5-15-63 ) which later in the
negotiations become the basis of the parties' negotiations provided as follows:
ARTICLE V
SECTION 1 . The Employer agrees to require membership in the Union, as a
condition of continued employment of all employees performing any of the
work specified in Article I of this Agreement , within eight ( 8) days following
the beginning of such employment or the effective date of this Agreement , which-
ever is the later, provided the Employer has reasonable ground for believing that
membership is available to such employees on the same terms and conditions
generally applicable to other members and that membership is not denied or
terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the
periodic dues and initiation fee uniformly required as a condition of acqiuring
or retaining membership.
SECTION 2 . If during the term of this Agreement the Labor-Management
Relations Act of 1947 shall be amended by Congress in such manner as to reduce
the time within which an employee may be required to acquire union member-
ship, such reduced time limit shall become immediately effective instead of and
without regard to the time limit specified in Section 1 of this Article.
SECTION 3 . The provisions of this Article shall be deemed to be of no force
and effect in any state , to the extent to which the making or enforcement of such
provision is contrary to law. In any state where the making and enforcement
of such provision is lawful only after compliance with certain conditions prece-
dent, this Article shall be deemed to take effect as to involved employees immedi-
ately upon compliance with such conditions.
Some discussion was had with respect to the subcontracting clause at the April 8
meeting but the parties agreed to bypass this matter and no agreement was reached
with respect to this facet of the Association 's proposal at the April 8 meeting . The
inclusion of this clause , or the substitute clause incorporated in the standard form of
union agreement 5-15-63 (which language was ultimately incorporated in the agree-
ment consummated between the Union and the Association on June 21 ), was not
again a principal issue between the parties . Rather, the question of the inclusion of
this article was left open after the April 8 meeting for further consideration after the
1496 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
principal issues of wages, the most-favored-nation clause, the escape clause, and the
industry fund issue had been resolved.13
The evidence does not reveal that the question of the inclusion of the union-
security provision was ever raised during the negotiations either by President Chaney
or any other member of the negotiating committee.
F. Individual bargaining
Between the period May 31 , the last bargaining session in which Respondent par-
ticipated , and June 21 , when the Union and the Association executed the 1963 col-
lective-bargaining agreement , the Union executed individual agreements with 10
firms which had signed letters of assent authorizing the Association to serve as its
bargaining agent in negotiating a contract with the Union . 14 Thus, on May 31, the
Union executed an individual agreement with C. G. Thain Company, Inc.; on June 3,
with Claude Neon Federal of Tulsa,15 Thorpe Sheet Metal Co., and Lakeland
Roofing & Sheet Metal Co.; on June 4, with Laub Sheet Metal Company; on June 5,
with Monarch Roofing & Sheet Metal Co ; with National Roofing Co. on June 11;
with Southern Sheet Metal on June 14; and with Tom H. Venable Co. and Durkee
Sheet Metal Co. on June 17.
The execution of an individual interim agreement by C., G. Thain Company, Inc.,
on May 31, came about after Thain contacted the Union by telephone and inquired
what steps he could take to keep his plant in operation in the event of a strike. The
Union informed Thain he was represented by. the Association and that the Union
"could not talk contract" with him. Thain informed the Union that he was resigning
from the Association and he was requested to furnish the Union with a copy of his
letter of resignation. The Union further informed Thain that it was not in favor
of Thain withdrawing from the Association. However, upon receiving Thain's letter
of resignation from the Association , the Union mailed an interim agreement to him
which was returned to the Union executed.16
11 The minutes of the meetings between the parties after April 8 do not reflect that the
question of article 11 was again a matter of discussion between the union and the associa-
tion representatives However , President Chaney and Albert Ives , the chairmen of the
Association ' s bargaining committee , credibly testified that the inclusion of article II re-
mained in issue during the latter stages of the negotiations ; and President Chaney credibly
testified that this was a matter that was discussed, during the meetings of late May and
was to be decided after the more fundamental issues separating the parties had been re-
solved however , the evidence does not establish that despite the original intentions of
the parties with respect to the ultimate disposition of article II , the inclusion of article II
ever again became the subject of controversy between the parties during the negotiations
The evidence reveals that the Association 's,May 31 offer to those advanced by the parties
during June did not deal with article II specifically , the Association 's June 19 final
offer did not request its exclusion, and it was ultimately included in the agreement
negotiated.
14 Union Representative Townes credibly testified that at the second negotiating meet-
ing occurring on April 8 , the Union was informediby the Association that Dodson and
Cochran Air -Conditioning Co and Laub Sheet Metal Company , with which the Union
later concluded separate interim agreements , had not executed letters of assent authoriz-
ing- the Association to bargain on their behalf . The minutes of that meeting confirms
Townes' testimony . However, on April 8, Laub Sheet Metal executed a letter 'of assent
and Association President Ives testified that the Union was informed of this fact at the
next bargaining session. The minutes of that or subsequent meetings do not reflect this.
However, I credit Ives' testimony that the , Union was informed of the Association's re-
ceipt of Laub ' s letter of assent.
1e On March 6, 1963, the ' Union had been advised by the National Electrical Contrac-
tors Association , Inc , that it represented this firm for bargaining purposes.
11 The credited testimony of Charles E Townes The interim agreement provided in
part. -
The undersigned employer agrees to accept , without exception or reservation, all
terms and conditions of employment , without limitations , as may be agreed upon in
negotiations now being. conducted by and between Sheet Metal Workers Union #270
and Tulsa Sheet Metal Contractors ' Association for an Area-Wide Multi -Employei
collective bargaining agreement for Employers engaged in the Sheet Metal, Roofing,
Ventilating and Air Conditioning Contracting Divisions of the Construction Industry.
It is agreed that in the interim period , that , is, between the date this agreement is
executed and the date the negotiated agreement between Tulsa Sheet Metal Con-
TULSA SHEET METAL WORKS, INC. 1497
As with Thain, so with the other employers which later signed individual interim
agreements with the Union, the first contact concerning the execution of an individual
agreement was in each instance initiated by the employer. Townes testified credibly
and without contradiction as follows:
When a contractor would contact us, he would contact the Union office, then I
in turn would inform him that we could not, inasmuch as he was a member of
the Association, or he had given a letter of assent to the Association, we could
not talk contract with him. And, in each instance, or in most cases, at least,
these contractors would inform me that they were withdi awing their power of
attorney, or their letter of assent to the Association for them to bargain for
them I so stated that each time I informed these contractors that I was opposed
to them withdrawing from the Association. But, then, they would go ahead and
inform me that that was what they wished to do, was to withdiaw from the Asso-
ciation, and before I would even talk to them, I would have to receive a letter or
assurance from them verbally that they would send us a copy of the letter where
they had resigned from the Association.
A careful analysis of the testimony of R. B. Laub supports the substance of the
testimony of Townes in this respect 17
G. Conclusions
1. The Union's majority status
The parties stipulated at the hearing that on June 1, 1963, and at all prior times
material herein, the majority of the employees of the 28 employers who as of
March 25, 1963, had executed letters of assent authorizing the Association to act as
their bargaining agent in negotiating and executing an agreement with the Union,
was represented by the Union. While the context of the stipulation suggests the
parties intended to stipulate to the union membership of said employees, the stipula-
tion of record is not so explicit. However, in view of the history of bargaining between
the Association and the Union dating from 1952 which, prior to the 1963 negotiations,
had resulted in the consummation of six collective-bargaining agreements; considering
the inclusion in each of the agreements since 1952 of a union-security provision; in
view of the absence of evidence indicating that the Union's majority status at the
time of the execution of any of these agreements, including the then existing 1961
agreement, was ever questioned; and considering the credited testimony of Union
Representative Townes with respect to the employers' virtually exclusive hire of
union journeymen and apprentice sheet metal workers through the Union's referral
system, I make the presumption that the signatories' recognition of the Union during
the period from 1952 through and including June 21, 1963, when the Association's
representatives executed a collective-bargaining agreement with the Union containing
a union-security provision, was lawful, and that the Union continued during that
period to be the majority representative of the employees of the member firms of
tractors ' Association and Sheet Metal Workers Union #270 is consummated, the
terms and conditions of employment of the June 1, 1961-May 31, 1963 , agreement
shall remain in effect with the exceptions of Article XIII of the Addendum (Most
Favored Clause ) which will be deleted and Article II, Article VIII, Article X, Article
Xl, and Article X fII of the Standard Form which will be in effect as set out in
Standard Form A-5-15-63
It is agreed that the terms and conditions of said agreement when consummated
shall become retioactive to June 1, 1963, and any retroactive payments owed on
the part of the employer shall be made within 10 days from the date the employer is
notified that an agreement has been reached
The Union agrees to furnish the Employer with a copy of the negotiated agreement
in its heal form when it is consummated and the terms theieof shall then become a
part of this agreement with the same force and effect as if set forth at length herein
This agieement shall be in full force and effect from the 1st day of June 1963, to
and including the expiration date as will be set forth in the negotiated agreement
"The letters of withdrawal introduced in evidence by Respondent which bear dates
corresponding to those upon which Townes testified the pertinent firms executed interim
agreements , are not deemed to detract from the accuracy or reliability of Townes ' testi-
mony but, on the contrary , are consistent therewith.
1498 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Association, including Respondent. I further find that the Union at all times
material was and has been the majority representative of employees in a bargaining
unit, hereinafter found appropriate.18
2. Appropriate unit
The complaint alleges as appropriate the following described unit of employees:
All employees of employers who are members of the Tulsa Sheet Metal Con-
tractors Association and who have designated the Tulsa Sheet Metal Contractors
Association as their bargaining representative and have authorized the Tulsa
Sheet Metal Contractors Association to negotiate and sign a contract binding on
such members, who are engaged in the manufacture, fabrication,-assembly, han-
dling, erection, installation, dismantling, reconditioning, adjustment, alteration,
repairing and servicing of all ferrous or nonferrous sheet metal work of No. 10
U S. gage or its equivalent or lighter gage and all other materials used in lieu
thereof, all shop and field sketches used in fabrication and erection including
those taken from original architectural and engineering drawings or sketches
but excluding guards and supervisors.
This unit description conforms substantially to the unit of employees covered by
the previous collective-bargaining agreements between the Association and the Union
placed in evidence herein, including the 1961 collective-bargaining agreement.'°
Approximately 90 to 92 percent of Respondent's income is derived from the manu-
facture and sale of items produced at its Tulsa plant for enterprises such as T. D.
Williamson, engaged principally in cleaning pipelines; Coburn Manufacturing, an
optical grinding firm; and other service and manufacturing enterprises which are not
engaged in construction. Approximately one-half of Respondent's manufactured
products are sold to T. D. Williamson. From 8 to 10 percent of Respondent' s income
is derived from maintenance and repair of existing structures, entailing the perform-
ance of duct work similar to that performed in new construction, or from similar
work performed on new structures.
In view of the foregoing, I find that Respondent is not an employer engaged pri-
marily in the building and construction industry, within the meaning of Section 8(f).20
While, as hereinafter found, this determination has remedial application, I do not find
that it affects the appropriateness of the unit herein. Although Respondent, unlike
the other employers comprising the bargaining group, is engaged principally in manu-
facturing rather than construction work, the community of interest of employees
performing sheet metal work and the history of bargaining in the multiemployer unit
militate strongly in favor of the appropriateness of the unit. I find in the circum-
stances that the unit described in the complaint to be a unit appropriate for collective
bargaining.
3. Respondent's membership in the Association
As I view this proceeding , the issue here posed is whether an employer which
engages in group bargaining looking toward the consummation of a collective-
bargaining group may , in mid-negotiations, and in the absence of a bargaining impasse
and before agreement has been reached, but after the previous associationwide agree-
ment has expired and an economic strike against all association members has com-
menced , effect a timely withdrawal from group bargaining.
Well ingrained as a fundamental principle is the rule:
A unit limited to employees of the employer becomes appropriate if the employer
unequivocally manifests its intention to withdraw from multiemployer bargaining
18 See Servette, Inc , 133 NLRB 132, 136, enforcement denied on other grounds 313 F 2d
67 (C A. 9). Any defection by employees of Respondent that may have occurred during
relevant periods herein, was attributable to Respondent's unfair labor practice, as herein-
atter found, and did not relieve the Respondent of its duties to continue to recognize the
Union as the statutory representative of its employees. See Yale Upholstemng Company,
Inc, 127 NLRB 440, 442, footnote 1.
11 In addition to the unit description set forth above, the unit description of the
collective-bargaining agreements was further amplified by the addition of the following
words* " and all other work included in the jurisdictional claims of the Sheet Metal
Workers' International Association "
20 Animated Displays Company, 137 NLRB 999, 1020-1022 ; Frick Company, 141 NLRB
1204.
TULSA SHEET METAL WORKS, INC. 1499
and to pursue an individual course of action after proper notice at an appropriate
time.21
No decisional codification has been attempted precisely defining what constitutes
an appropriate time for effecting a timely withdrawal from group bargaining . 22 How-
ever, precedent has established guidelines . Thus, withdrawals made before the com-
mencement of negotiations but after the expiration of a contract have been found
timely,23 however , untimely are efforts to withdraw after group bargaining has pro-
duced agreement upon terms of a new collective -bargaining contract . 24 The Board,
on the other hand, has not found untimely all withdrawals effected after the com-
mencement of negotiations but before the consummation of a new agreement 25 nor,
has it forced an employer which has not withdrawn from group bargaining to execute
an agreement achieved by virtue of union-initiated individual bargaining, destructive
of the multiemployer unit.26
However, beyond these generalizations , a careful analysis of precedent reveals that
variations in facts and circumstances preclude a per se approach , and demonstrates that
the ultimate determination with respect to timely withdrawal must turn upon a dis-
criminating evaluation of all attendant facts and circumstances.27
Respondent has advanced several grounds which it asserts constitute unusual circum-
stances justifying and rendering permissible its withdrawal from group negotiations.
Considered together or separately they are deficient as a defense to the charges of
the complaint.
The initial consideration raised is that respecting the economic consequences of
Respondent 's accession to the Union 's May 31 wage demands. Some credence is
accorded President Chaney's assertion that he did not anticipate when he embarked
upon group bargaining that the Union 's ultimate wage demands would be as extensive
as they proved to be. However, the Union 's February proposals did hint at this.
But, as negotiations evolved, little opportunity for early evaluation of the full extent
of the Union 's intentions with respect to wages was afforded. Wages did not become
a matter of detailed discussion until late in May, after several preliminary sessions
had defined the other areas of agreement and conflict . When the extent of the
Union's wage demands became known to Chaney , he resisted . However, he acceded
to the Association 's lower wage proposal, coupled as it was with the "most favored
21 MoAnary d Welter, Inc, 115 NLRB 1029 , The Milk and Ice Cream Dealers of the
Greater Cincinnati, Ohio , Area, et al, 94 NLRB 23, 25 ; International Brothel hood of
Electrical Workers, API -CIO , and Local 59, etc ( Teirlite, Inc), 119 NLRB 1792, 1793.
' The dictum of Retail Associates, Inc, 120 NLRB 388, 394-395, appears not to have
achieved this status as observed by Trial Examiner Maher in his Intermediate Report in
Cooks, Waiters and Waitresses Union, Local 527 ; et al . ( Greater Peoria Restaurant Asso-
ciation ), 131 NLRB 198 , 209, footnote 26. Respondent tacitly concedes this and in its
briet suggests that'
. . . the Board should adopt in this case a rule similar to the contract bar rule-
namely, that during the sixty -day period immediately preceding the termination date
of the most recent multiemployer contract , the individual employer may not with-
draw . His withdrawal must precede the sixty-day period or must follow it . In this
way, the Union and the Association would have a reasonable period of sixty days in
which to negotiate the contract . If this is not possible , then the employer should
be given the right to withdraw and negotiate with the Union on an individual basis.
This rule, if adopted by the Board , will give that degree of stability to multi-
employer unit bargaining which it must have if it is to be productive of good labor
relations
28Seattle Automotive Wholesalers Association , 140 NLRB 1393 : Northern Nevada
Chapter, National Electrical Contractors Association and Represented Employers, 131
NLRB 550, 20th Century Press , 107 NLRB 292
"'Donaldson Sales, Inc, 141 NLRB 1303; Quality Limestone Products , Inc, 143 NLRB
589; of International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers , AFL-CIO, and Local 59, etc.
(Texlite, Inc ), 119 NLRB 1792, 1794 , The Kroger Co , 141 NLRB 564
25 See Cooks , lVasters and Waitresses Union , Local 327; of al . ( Greater Peoria Restau-
rant Association ), 131 NLRB 198
s See International Restaurant Associates for and on behalf of its members Nibblers
Crenshaw , Inc and La Harm Corp d/ b/a Lococo's Restaurant, 133 NLRB 1088; see
also Neville Foundry Company, Inc ., 122 NLRB 1187 , Scougal Rubber Mfg. Co., et al.,
126 NLRB 470
27 See, e g., Walker Electric Company, 142 NLRB 1214 ; Detroit Window Cleaners Union,
Local 139 , etc. (Daelyte Service Company ), 126 NLRB 63; see also Anderson Lithograph
Company, Inc and Jeffries Banknote Company, 124 NLRB 920 , Retail Clerks Union,
No. 1550, et al. (The Kroger Company ), v. N L R B , 330 F 2d 210 ( C A D C.).
1500 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
nation" demand so important to Respondent in light of its substantial activity in
manufacturing. When, however, the Union's position with respect to wages hardened,
Respondent at first invoked the Union's understanding of its asserted economic plight,
pleading in effect "inability to pay," although prescinding from the label. Then,
appraising its tactical position in light of an impending strike and the apparent disin-
clination of the Association's two largest members to withstand a prolonged strike,
Respondent withdrew from the bargaining group rather than capitulate to the Union's
wage demands. Respondent contends that in view of the impasse that existed on the
issue of wages at the end of the May 31 meeting, and considering its inability to earlier
assess the extent of the Union's wage demands, its withdrawal was permissible
Thus, raised is the threshold question whether negotiations were at an impasse, and,
if they were not, whether economic grounds alone render permissible a withdrawal
from group bargaining at a time when negotiations are in progress.
I find, contrary to Respondent, no bargaining impasse existed Thus, as revealed
by events transpiring at the May 31 meeting, while the parties were in disagreement
with respect to wages and the inclusion of the "most favored nation clause," the meet-
ing had produced a concession by the Association abandoning its insistence upon an
escape clause, and, indeed, as the meeting terminated the parties fixed a date for
further negotiations, and, as the minutes of that subsequent meeting reveal, further
negotiations based on a modified union proposal ensued. Thereafter, the parties met
three additional times and were able to agree upon terms of a contract In view of
the foregoing, I reject Respondent's impasse contention 28
Was Respondent's withdrawal nonetheless permissible on the economic ground
advanced? I find that it was not.
The statute requires that employers upon request of the majority representative of
its employees in an appropriate bargaining unit meet at reasonable times and confer
in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment. The statute does not require parties to agree to contract proposals or to make
a concession. The test is whether a participant in collective-bargaining negotiations
confers in good faith in an endeavor to reach agreement.
An employer may, of course, join in group rather than individual bargaining When
resort is to group bargaining it is presumed that it is in anticipation of benefits to be
realized from negotiating jointly but in recognition, also, of the concomitant limita-
tions upon individual freedom of action that this mode of bargaining imposes. When
group bargaining is the pattern, while it is not presumed that the identity of each
individual employer participant becomes merged into a single group identity to the
extent that, in all circumstances, its freedom to condition or delimit its acceptance of
the final bargaining product is forfeited,29 its freedom to withdraw while group nego-
tiations are in progress must, of necessity, be severely circumscribed, and, normally
would require it to bargain only through its designated bargaining agent in good
faith to a point of agreement or impasse, and not to terminate negotiations prematurely
in a manner foreclosing full exposure of remaining issues to the moderating influences
of the bargaining table.
By way of dicta the United States Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v Truck Drivers
Local Union No. 449 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America, AFL (Buffalo Linen Supply Co.), 353 U.S. 87,
95, stated the following:
The debates over the proposals [respecting multiemployer bargaining] demon-
strate that Congress refused to interfere with such bargaining because there was
cogent evidence that in many industries the multi-employer bargaining basis was
a vital factor in the effectuation of the national policy of promoting labor peace
through strengthened collective bargaining.
The end sought to be achieved by the Board in its case-by-case fashioning of the ground
rules respecting multiemployer bargaining has been the achievement of stabilized and
free collective bargaining. It is difficult to visualize how this objective could be served
by reaching a result favorable to the Respondent in the circumstances of this case.
Once bargaining has commenced and negotiations are reaching their fruition, it
would appear that stability of the collective-bargaining process would demand that
withdrawal from group bargaining be permitted only under the most unusual circum-
stances. Such circumstances would not arise, it seems apparent, merely because the
evolution of negotiations has indicated to one of the individual participants that its
bargaining agent appears to be moving inexorably toward agreement on contract
s See Central Metallic Casket Co, 91 NLRB 572; Dalton Brick & Tile Corporation, 126
NLRB 473, 486-487.
b See, e g, The Kroger Co , 141 NLRB 564.
TULSA SHEET METAL WORKS, INC. 1501
terms which would be to it economically burdensome. While claims of economic
hardship are not to be lightly considered, the concept of group bargaining would be
rendered ineffectual if withdrawals at the crucial, late stages of negotiations are to be
countenanced upon the ground here advanced by Respondent. Rather, some respon-
sibility must rest upon the employer who invokes the advantages of group bargaining
to assess and assume the responsibilities and limitations inherent therein. When, as
here, there has been no history of individual modifications to the jointly negotiated
resulting agreements, the employer which enters into group negotiations must be pre-
sumed to have entered negotiations with the understanding that his voice may only
contribute to the formulation of final contract terms to which the group bargaining rep-
resentative might ultimately agree, but may not unilaterally define or determine them.
In the light of the foregoing, and considering the 10-year history of Respondent's
participation in Association bargaining, the extensive negotiations that had by June 3
occurred and in which the Respondent actively participated, the absence of an impasse
or breakdown in negotiations, the viability of negotiations as revealed by the schedul-
ing of further meetings which actually occurred, I conclude and find that Respondent
was not free on claim of economic hardship to cease negotiating with the Union
through the Association bargaining committee, but, rather, was obliged to do so until
agreement was achieved or impasse reached. I find that for it to break off negotiations
for the reason advanced and in the circumstances above outlined and found, was to
fail to abide by its statutory duty defined in Section 8 (d) of the Act.
Moreover, when an employer withdraws abruptly from group bargaining because
negotiations have taken a turn to his net disadvantage, an inference is warranted,
which I here make with respect to Respondent's precipitate withdrawal, that its
approach to the bargaining table from the outset was not circumspect but, rather,
ambivalent and lacking in requisite good faith.
Accordingly, I find that Respondent was not free on the ground of economic hard-
ship to withdraw from the Association; and its endeavor to do so was ineffective in
relieving it of its responsibilities to bargain in good faith through the Association bar-
gaining committee.
Similarly, I find no merit in Respondent's further contentions. Initially, Respond-
ent's assertion that it effected its withdrawal over union insistence, upon the inclusion
of unlawful subcontracting and union-security clauses, is not borne out by the record.
While the evidence suggests that on April 8, article II (the subcontracting clause) was
reserved for further but later consideration, there is a paucity of evidence revealing
that union security was ever an issue. While in late May, subcontracting was again
discussed, its exclusion was not advanced by the employers as a condition to executing
an agreement, and the Association's failure to include it in its offer of May 31 or sub-
sequent "final" offers (such as its June 19 offer) suggests that neither on a substantive
or legal basis was subcontracting an issue of paramount or substantial concern to the
employers.
Nor does the record suport a finding that President Chaney, either as a member of
the negotiating committee or on be of his own firm, was insistent or adamant with
respect to the exclusion of the subcontracting clause or union-security clause. Rather
the record reveals, and I find, that he was passive in these respects and that his with-
drawal from group bargaining was predicated, not upon the issue of the legality of
the subcontracting or union-security provisions, but solely upon the issue of wages,
and the Union's rejection of the employers' "most favored nation" proposal
In view of the foregoing, I do not reach the question of Respondent's legal right to
refuse to negotiate concerning the inclusion of provisions it in good faith deemed
unlawful.3o
30 The General Counsel conceded and stipulated that section 2 of article II is a hot-
cargo clause, but contends in his brief that by virtue of the savings clause in the agree-
ment, the section is severable and does not taint the entire contract. He further contends
that section 1 of article II is lawful when applied to the repair and alteration work per-
formed at building sites comprising 8 percent of Respondent's work. With respect to the
manufacturing phase of Respondent's operation, comprising the balance, or 92 percent
thereof, the General Counsel contends its terms are inoperative and not intended to apply
to work performed away from the construction site. In view of the factual determination
made that the alleged illegality of article II was not a causative factor in Respondent's
withdrawal from Association bargaining, only remedial implications, below treated, arise
from the issue raised
Similarly considered in its remedial context is the question whether, as Respondent is
engaged primarily in the manufacture and fabrication of items used in construction and
only to a minor extent in actual installation and construction work, it should be re-
quired to execute the Association agreement containing a union-security provision requir-
ing membership on or after the eighth day of employment.
1502 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Nor is Respondent's belated withdrawal from the Association justified by the fact
that the Union entered into individual agreements with 10 firms that had previously
authorized the Association to bargain on their behalf. Initially important is the
fact that 8 of the 10 agreements were executed after Respondent's June 3 with-
drawal and there is no evidence to suggest that Respondent's withdrawal was predi
cated upon knowledge of an actual or impending breakdown in group bargaining
efforts. Further, contrary to those cases factually distinguishable from the instant one
wherein a union , engaged in collective bargaining with an employer group, has taken
the initiative in requesting employers to bargain separately with it and has additionally
applied economic pressure to force execution of separate individual agreements, thus
contributing to the dissolution of the existing multiemployer unit, here the Union
neither initiated the separate bargaining nor applied threats or separately directed
economic pressure to bring about the execution of the interim agreements. Rather
the initiative was by the employers, and the Union refrained from individual negotia-
tions until the employers had withdraw their consent for the Association to bargain on
their behalf. Thus, the doctrine of an estoppel dispositive of the issues in Neville
Foundry, supra, and Scougal Rubber, supra, is here inapplicable. Further, as the
Respondent, contrary to the other employers with whom the Union came to terms,
sought terms different from the Union's May 31 final offer which ultimately became
the consummated agreement, there is no basis in equity for finding that the Union was
obliged to acquiesce in Respondent's attempt to withdraw from group bargaining
merely because it had previously, or subsequently did, acquiesce in the withdrawal of
other firms which agreed to be bound by the agreement to be negotiated through the
Association. Additionally, there is no persuasive basis for assuming, much less
concluding, that the Union would have declined to execute an interim agreement with
Respondent had Respondent approached the Union on the same basis as the other 10
employers, agreeing to be bound by the agreement to be negotiated with the
Association.
As the role of the Union with respect to the individual interim agreements was
passive, and as the net effect of the separate interim agreements was to adhere fully to
the terms of the agreement to be negotiated through the Association's bargaining
committee , thus recognizing the established pattern of bargaining and honoring the
integrity of the historical unit, I find no validity in Respondent's contention that the
execution of the interim agreements by employers, previously members of the Associa-
tion , constituted unusual circumstances warranting a finding that the Respondent's
withdrawal was timely.
Similarly without merit as an additional factor to be weighed in gauging the time-
liness of Respondent 's withdrawal, or as a self-contained defense to the allegations of
the complaint, is Respondent's contention that the Union failed to comply with the
mandate of Section 8 (d) (3) of the Act. This failure resulted, Respondent contends,
from the Union's asserted dereliction in giving notice to the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service and the Oklahoma State Department of Labor 48 days after
serving notice of its intention to modify the agreement rather than 30 days thereafter,
as provided in the statute. While this notice did not, as Respondent correctly con-
tends, comply with the literal terms of the statute, its filing preceded the termination
date of the agreement as well as the ensuing strike by some 45 days and seven negotiat-
ing sessions. Thus, the period of time that elapsed after its filing appears sufficient in
the circumstances here pertaining to satisfy the statutory objective of providing a
minimum period of 30 days before strike action is taken for the assuaging influences
of mediation to fulfill the role specified under Section 203 of the Act.31 Moreover, to
the extent that motivation for Respondent's withdrawal may be here pertinent, it is
observed that Respondent initially raised the Section 8(d) (3) issue at the hearing and
by way of a third amended answer filed on the second day thereof, and not during
negotiations or prior to its June 3 withdrawal.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, Respondent's defense predicated upon the
Union's noncompliance with Section 8 (d) of the Act is rejected.
In view of the foregoing, I conclude and find that the Respondent did not effect a
timely withdrawal from Association bargaining on June 4, and that as a consequence,
on June 4 and at all times subsequent thereto, including June 21, Respondent remained
legally obliged to bargain through the Association bargaining committee, and its
refusal on June 4 and thereafter to bargain collectively with the Union through the
Association bargaining committee constituted a refusal to bargain within the meaning
31 See Fort Smith Chair Company, 143 NLRB 514; Local Union 219, Retail Clerks Inter-
national Association, AFL-CIO ( Corroll House of Belleville ) v. N L.R B , 265 P. 2d 814,
818-819 (CAD C.), enfg 120 NLRB 272; iInternational Union of Operating Engineers,
Local No . 181 v. Dahlam Construction Co, 193 F. 2d 470, 473 (C.A. 6).
TULSA SHEET METAL WORKS, INC. 1503
of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, as did similarly, its refusal on June 21 and thereafter
to execute the collective-bargaining agreement negotiated by and between the Associa-
tion and the Union.
4. Respondent's direct bargaining with employees
On the basis of the facts found above with respect to the June 13 conversation
between President Chaney and employee Collins, I find this conduct violative of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, in that by offering and discussing with employee
Collins a proposal relating to rates of pay and terms and conditions of employment,
President Chaney engaged in individual bargaining with an employee at a time when
the Union was the majority representative of the employees of Respondent in an
appropriate unit.
On the other hand, I find no violation with respect to Chaney's conversation with
employee Falling.
5. The nature of the strike
In view of findings above made that Respondent 's June 4 withdrawal from the
Association was untimely, and the further finding that its failure and refusal there-
after to bargain by and through the Association constituted an unlawful refusal to
bargain, I conclude and find that the strike which was economic in its inception was,
by Respondent 's June 4 conduct , converted into an unfair labor practice strike with
respect to the Respondent . Moreover , while June 4 delineates the date of the strike's
conversion , subsequent violative conduct on the part of Respondent , occurring on
June 13 with respect to Collins and on June 21 with respect to Respondent 's refusal to
execute the collective -bargaining agreement between the Association and the Union,
establishes additional ground for finding, as I do, that the strike has continued at all
times after June 4 to be , and remains , an unfair labor practice strike.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The conduct of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connec-
tion with the operations described in section I, above, has a close, intimate , and sub-
stantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tends to
lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of
commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
It having been found that Respondent has engaged in and continues to engage in
certain unfair labor practices , it will be recommended that the Board issue an order
requiring Respondent to cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action,
including the posting of appropriate notices, designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
It has been found that Respondent 's attempted withdrawal from the Association on
June 3, 1963 , did not relieve it of its obligation to continue to bargain collectively with
the Union through the Association bargaining committee . It has further been found
that the collective -bargaining agreement entered into on June 21 , 1963, by and
between the Association and the Union contains a subcontracting clause ( article II)
and a union-security clause ( article V ), which latter clause requires membership in
the Union on or after the eighth day of employment . It has also been found, how-
ever, that Respondent 's attempted withdrawal was not on grounds relating to the
alleged illegality of either the subcontracting or union-security clause. Accordingly,
in light of my further findings that ( 1) Respondent is an employer engaged principally
in manufacturing , and conversely , is not an employer engaged primarily in the build-
ing and construction industry , and (2 ) Respondent does some installation and mainte-
nance work at construction jobsites, I shall recommend that, upon the Union 's request,
Respondent execute and give retroactive and prospective effect to a collective-
bargaining agreement with the Union containing all of the terms of the June 21, 1963,
agreement between the Association and Union except article II , section 2, and article
V thereof . However, nothing in this recommendation is intended to preclude the
inclusion in the collective-bargaining agreement of a provision identical or similar to
article II, section 1, or of a union -security provision requiring union membership on or
after the 30th day of employment
It having been found that in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and ( 5) of the Act,
Respondent , without consultation or approval of the Union , engaged in individual
bargaining with its employees at a time when the Union was the majority representa-
tive of Respondent 's employees in an appropriate unit, I shall recommend that
Respondent cease and desist therefrom.
1504 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
I have found that the strike by Respondent's employees which commenced on June 3,
1963, and was in progress at the time of the hearing, was economic at, its inception
but was prolonged by Respondent's unfair labor practices that commenced on June 4,
1963. I have further found that on June 4, 1963, the strike was converted to an unfair
labor practice strike, and, accordingly, the employees who were on strike on June 4
and who struck thereafter became unfair labor practice strikers who were entitled to
reinstatement upon application, irrespective of whether their positions had been filled
by the Respondent's hire of other employees as replacements for them. Accordingly,
I shall recommend in order to restore the status quo as it existed prior to conversion
of the strike on June 4, 1963, and thereby to effectuate the policies of the Act, that
Respondent shall, upon application, offer to all employees who were on strike on and
after June 4, 1963, reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions
without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, dismissing, if neces-
sary, any person hired on or after June 4, 1963. It is also recommended that the
Respondent be ordered to make whole those employees who were on strike on and
after June 4, 1963, for any loss of pay they may have suffered or may suffer by reason
of Respondent's refusal, if any, to reinstate them, by payment to each of them of a
sum of money equal to that which he normally would have earned as wages during
the period from 5 days after the date on which he applied for reinstatement to the date
of Respondent's offer of reinstatement. Loss of pay shall be computed on a quarterly
basis in the manner established by the Board in F. W Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB
289; N.L.R.B. v. Seven-Up Bottling Company of Miami, Inc, 344 U.S. 344, and shall
bear interest as prescribed in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co, 138 NLRB 716.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
2. Tulsa Sheet Metal Contractors Association is, and at all times material herein has
been, an association of employers that exists and has existed for the purpose, inter alia,
of representing employer-members in multiemployer collective bargaining with the
Union.
3. Respondent, at all times material herein, has been a member of the Association,
and Respondent's June 3, 1963, effort to withdraw its authority to the Association to
bargain on its behalf was legally deficient in relieving it of its obligation to bargain
collectively with the Union through the Association bargaining committee, and to
execute a collective-bargaining agreement consummated between the Association and
the Union.
4. Sheet Metal Workers International Association, Local Union No. 270, is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
5. All employees of employers who are members of the Tulsa Sheet Metal Con-
tractors Association and who have designated the Tulsa Sheet Metal Contractors Asso-
ciation as their bargaining representative and have authorized the Tulsa Sheet Metal
Contractors Association to negotiate and sign a contract binding on such members
who are engaged in the manufacture, fabrication, assembly, handling, erection, instal-
lation, dismantling, reconditioning, adjustment, alteration, repairing, and servicing
of all ferrous or nonferrous sheet metal work on No. 10 gage or its equivalent or
lighter, gage, and all other materials used in lieu thereof, all shop and field sketches
used in fabrication and erection including those taken from original architectural and
engineering drawings or sketches, but excluding guards and supervisors, constitute a
unit appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section
9(b) of the Act.
6. Sheet Metal Workers International Association, Local Union No. 270 has been
at all -times material herein, and now is, the exclusive representative of all employees
in the aforesaid appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
7. By refusing to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the employees in the appropriate unit; by refusing on or after June 21,
1963, to execute the collective-bargaining agreement entered into between the Asso-
ciation and the Union; and by dealing directly and individually with an employee
in the aforesaid appropriate unit concerning wages, benefits, and other conditions of
employment, and as a consequence thereof, by offering said employee vacation and
other benefits for the purpose of inducing him to abandon the Union as his repre-
sentative for the purpose of collective bargaining, the Respondent has engaged in and
is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a)(5) and (I)
of the Act.
TULSA SHEET METAL WORKS, INC. 1505
8. The strike that commenced on June 3 was economic at its inception, but by
reason of Respondent's unfair labor practices was converted on June 4 to an unfair
labor practice strike.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon
the entire record in this case, I recommend that the Respondent, Tulsa Sheet Metal
Works, Inc., its officers , agents, successors , and assigns , shall.
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Sheet Metal Workers International
Association, Local Union No. 270, as exclusive bargaining representative of its em-
ployees in the appropriate unit found herein.
(b) Refusing to execute and give effect to the collective -bargaining agreement
entered into between the Association and the Union on June 21, 1963, except to the
extent specified in the section of this decision entitled "The Remedy."
(c) Dealing directly and individually with employees in the aforesaid appropriate
unit concerning wages, benefits, and other conditions of employment, and as a conse-
quence thereof, offering vacation and other benefits without consultation with and
approval by the Union.
(d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in
the exercise of the right to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies
of the Act-
(a) Upon request by the Union, execute a collective-bargaining agreement contain-
ing all of the provisions of the June 21, 1963" collective-bargaining agreement between
the Association and the Union, excluding, as specified in the section of this Decision
entitled "The Remedy," provisions relating to subcontracting (article II, section 2),
and a union-security provision (article V) requiring membership in the Union on or
after the eighth day of employment. Nothing in the recommendations made herein
is to be construed as precluding the inclusion in any collective-bargaining agreement
the Union may as a result of the Recommended Order herein present to the Respond-
ent, of a provision identical or similar to article II, section 1, and a union-security
agreement requiring membership in the Union on 'or after the 30th day of employment.
(b) Upon execution thereof,- give retroactive effect to all the terms of the aforesaid
collective-bargaining agreement, except the specified article of the subcontracting
clause and the union-security clause aforesaid.
(c) In the manner set forth in the ''section, of this Decision entitled "The Remedy,"
make whole its employees in the aforesaid bargaining unit, for any loss of pay which
they may have suffered by reason of the Respondent's refusal to execute and give effect
to the June 21, 1963, collective-bargaining agreement between the Union and the
Association, restoring whatever seniority and other rights and privileges they may
have lost by reason of Respondent's unlawful actions.
(d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for
examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, time-
cards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to determine the
amount of backpay due under the terms of this Recommended Order.
(e) Post at its plant in Tulsa, Oklahoma, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix A." 32 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director
for Region 16, shall, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of the
Respondent, be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by
it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
said Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
(f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 16, in writing, within 20 days from the
date of this Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.33
sa If this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and
Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner"
in the notice If the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of
Appeals, the notice will be further amended by the substitution of the words "a Decree of
the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" for the words "a Decision and
Order "
a3 If this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified
to read: "Notify the Regional Director for Region 16, in writing, within 10 days from
the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
770-076-6 5-vol 149-96
1506 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with Sheet Metal Workers Inter-
national Association, Local Union No. 270 as the exclusive bargaining representa-
tive of the employees in the appropriate unit. The appropriate unit is:
All employees of employers who are members of the Tulsa Sheet Metal
Contractors Association and who have designated the Tulsa Sheet Metal
Contractors Association as their bargaining representative and have author-
ized the Tulsa Sheet Metal Contractors Association to negotiate and sign a
contract binding on such members who are engaged in the manufacture,
fabrication, assembly, handling, erection, installation, dismantling, recondi-
tioning, adjustment, alteration, repairing, and servicing of all ferrous or
nonferrous sheet metal work of No. 10 gage or its equivalent or lighter gage,
and all other materials used in lieu thereof, all shop and field sketches used
in fabrication and erection, including those taken from original architectural
and engineering drawings or sketches, but excluding guards and supervisors.
WE WILL, upon request of the Union, execute a collective-bargaining agreement
containing all of the provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement entered
into between the Tulsa Sheet Metal Contractors Association and the Union on
June 21, 1963, except that said agreement shall not contain the subcontracting
and union-security provisions of said June 21, 1963, agreement between the
Association and the Union. Said agreement may, however, contain a clause
relating to the subcontracting or assignment of work to be performed at the site
of construction or alteration, or at the site of repairing of a building or structure
and may also contain a union-security provision requiring membership in the
Union on or after the 30th day of employment.
WE WILL NOT deal directly or individually with employees in the aforesaid
appropriate unit concerning wages, rates of pay and other conditions of employ-
ment, nor, without the consent of the Union, offer them paid vacation benefits.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our
employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist the above-named or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively
with the representatives of their own choosing, to engage in any other con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent
that such right may be affected by the proviso in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
WE WILL, for its duration, abide by all the terms of any collective-bargaining
agreement entered into between the Union and this Company, and will give
effect retroactively to June 1, 1963, to its terms.
WE WILL, upon application, offer immediate and full reinstatement to their
former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority
or other rights and privileges, to all our employees who were on strike on and
after June 4, 1963, and who have not already been reinstated to their former or
substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other
rights and privileges, dismissing, if necessary, all persons hired on or after
June 4, 1963.
WE WILL make each such employee whole for any loss of pay suffered by
him as a result of our failure to reinstate him within 5 days after his
application.
TULSA SIIEET METAL WORKS, INC.,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Sixth Floor,
Meacham Building , 110 West Fifth Street, Fort Worth, Texas, Telephone No. Edison
5-4211, Extension 2131, if they have any questions concerning this notice or com-
pliance with its provisions.