TRW Automotive US LLCv.Magna Electronics Inc.

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 23, 2015

11936166 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 23, 2015)

Trials@uspto.gov Paper 35
571-272-7822 Date: June 23, 2015

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

TRW AUTOMOTIVE US LLC,
Petitioner,

v.

MAGNA ELECTRONICS INCORPORATED,
Patent Owner.
____________

Case IPR2014-00255
Patent 7,423,248 B2
____________

Before JUSTIN T. ARBES, PATRICK R. SCANLON, and
JO-ANNE M. KOKOSKI, Administrative Patent Judges.

KOKOSKI, Administrative Patent Judge.

FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73

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I. INTRODUCTION
TRW Automotive US LLC (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition (Paper 1,
“Pet.”) to institute an inter partes review of claims 1, 3–5, 8, 9, 11–13, 17–
19, and 21 of U.S. Patent No. 7,423,248 B2 (Ex. 1002, “the ’248 patent”).
On June 26, 2014, we instituted an inter partes review of claims 1, 3–5, 9,
11–13, 17–19, and 21 on four grounds of unpatentability (Paper 17, “Dec. on
Inst.”).
Magna Electronics Inc. (“Patent Owner”) filed a Patent Owner
Response (Paper 22, “PO Resp.”). Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 25,
“Reply”).
An oral hearing was held on February 18, 2015. A transcript of the
hearing is included in the record. Paper 34 (“Tr.”).
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). This Final Written
Decision is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73.
For the reasons that follow, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that claims 1, 3–5, 9, 11–13, 17–19, and 21
of the ’248 patent are unpatentable.
A. The ’248 Patent
The ’248 patent, titled “Automatic Exterior Light Control for a
Vehicle,” is directed to an automatic exterior light control that characterizes
and analyzes light sources to identify headlights of oncoming vehicles and
taillights of leading vehicles, and adjusts the state of the vehicle’s headlights
based on the presence or absence of these light sources. Ex. 1002, 2:18–34.
According to the ’248 patent, the disclosed light control “is exceptionally
discriminating in identifying oncoming headlights and leading taillights” and
“ignores other sources of light including streetlights and reflections of the
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controlled vehicle’s headlights off signs, road markers, and the like.” Id. at
3:20–25.
The ’248 patent describes a vehicle headlight dimming control
comprising an imaging sensor module that senses light from a scene forward
of the vehicle, an imaging control circuit that receives data from the sensor
module, and a vehicle lighting control logic module that exchanges data with
the imaging control circuit and controls the headlights. Id. at 3:62-4:3. The
imaging sensor module includes a spectral separation device for separating
light from the scene forward of the vehicle, an optical device such as a lens,
and a light-sensing array that includes “a plurality of photosensor elements
. . . arranged in a matrix of columns and rows.” Id. at 4:42–55. In a
disclosed embodiment, the light-sensing array is “an array of 512 rows and
512 columns of light-sensing pixels, each made up of a photosensor
element.” Id. at 4:55–57. According to the ’248 patent, the vehicle
headlight dimming control can include an ambient light-sensing circuit,
which “samples a subset of photosensor elements” that “detect portions of
the forward-looking scene that are just above the earth’s horizon” and
supplies an indication of the ambient light level as an input to a lighting
control module. Id. at 5:42–51.
The imaging sensor module can be mounted to, or near, the vehicle’s
windshield, “because the location within the interior of the vehicle
substantially eliminates environmental dirt and moisture from fouling the
light sensor module.” Id. at 4:22–30. The ’248 patent also states that
positioning the sensor behind the windshield, “which typically is kept
relatively clear through the use of washers and wipers and the like, ensures a
relatively clear view of the scene forward of [the] vehicle.” Id. at 4:30–36.
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Claims 1, 9, and 17 of the ’248 patent are independent. Claims 3–5
depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 1, which is reproduced below:
1. An automatic exterior light control, comprising:
an image array sensor, said image array sensor comprising an
array of pixel sensors, wherein said image array sensor is
configured and mounted such that a field of view of said
image array sensor substantially passes through an
associated windshield area that is wiped by a windshield
wiper; and
a controller connected to said image array sensor and
configured to receive at least a portion of at least one
image from said image array sensor that is substantially
free of windshield surface contamination, said controller,
responsive to said image array sensor, generating an
output for controlling at least one exterior light of the
vehicle.
Ex. 1002, 13:12–25.
Claims 11–13 depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 9, which is
reproduced below:
9. An automatic exterior light control, comprising:
an image array sensor, said image array sensor comprising an
array of pixel sensors, wherein said image array sensor is
configured and mounted such that a field of view of said
image array sensor is adjustable electronically; and
a controller connected to said image array sensor configured to
acquire pixel data from a subset of pixels associated with
a desired field of view, said controller, responsive to said
image array sensor, generating an output for controlling
at least one exterior light of the vehicle.
Id. at 13:48–58.
Claims 18, 19, and 21 depend directly from claim 17, which is
reproduced below:
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17. An automatic exterior light control, comprising:
an image array sensor, said image array sensor comprising an
array of pixel sensors; and
a controller configured with an ambient light input, said
controller, responsive to said image array sensor,
generating an output for controlling at least one exterior
light of the vehicle, wherein automatic exterior light
control is enabled when an ambient light level is below a
threshold, wherein manual operation of exterior lights
remains functional.
Id. at 14:24–33.
B. Prior Art
The pending grounds of unpatentability in this inter partes review are
based on the following prior art:
Tadashi Japanese Patent App. Pub.
No. H04-12780
April 28, 1992 Ex. 1004
Yanagawa
1
Japanese Unexamined
Patent Pub. No. S62-
131837
June 15, 1987 Ex. 1006
Meitzler U.S. 4,645,975 Feb. 24, 1987 Ex. 1007

C. Pending Grounds of Unpatentability
This inter partes review involves the following grounds of
unpatentability:

1
We refer to “Tadashi” and “Yanagawa” as the English translations of the
original references. Petitioner provided affidavits attesting to the accuracy
of the translations. See Exs. 1004, 1006; 37 C.F.R. § 42.63(b).
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Reference[s] Basis Claim[s] challenged
Tadashi § 102(b) 1, 4, 5
Tadashi and
Yanagawa
§ 103(a) 3, 9, 11–13
Tadashi and Meitzler § 103(a) 17, 18, 21
Tadashi, Meitzler,
and Yanagawa
§ 103(a) 19
Dec. on Inst. 23.

II. ANALYSIS
A. Claim Interpretation
The claims of the ’248 patent have expired. See Pet. 1; Tr. 24:5–8.
For claims of an expired patent, the Board’s claim interpretation is similar to
that of a district court. See In re Rambus Inc., 694 F.3d 42, 46 (Fed. Cir.
2012). We are guided, therefore, by the principle that the words of a claim
“are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning” as understood
by a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the
invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(en banc) (internal citations omitted). Only those terms in controversy need
to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.
Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
1. “ambient light”
In the Decision on Institution, we interpreted the claim term “ambient
light” as “light of the surrounding environment, not light introduced by any
particular source, such as a headlight that moves in and out of the
environment.” Dec. on Inst. 8. The parties do not dispute this interpretation,
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and we see no reason to modify that interpretation in light of the record
developed at trial. See Tr. 4:14–24, 25:16–26:3.
2. “image array sensor, said image array sensor
comprising an array of pixel sensors”
Patent Owner argues that the term “image array sensor, said image
array sensor comprising an array of pixel sensors” in claims 1, 9, and 17
should be interpreted to mean “a two-dimensional image array sensor
arrangement of pixel sensors.” PO Resp. 10. As support for this proposed
interpretation, Patent Owner cites the Specification’s disclosure of an
“[i]maging sensor module” that includes an array of photosensor elements
“arranged in a matrix of columns and rows.” Id. at 8 (citing Ex. 1002, 4:42–
55 and Figure 4). Patent Owner further contends that it was “well known in
the art that ‘an array of pixel sensors’ means a two-dimensional image array
sensor that has multiple pixels in columns and rows forming a width and
height of the sensor.” Id. at 9 (citing Ex. 2032 ¶ 22). Petitioner responds
that Patent Owner is attempting “to read limitations into the claimed ‘image
array sensor . . . comprising an array of pixel sensors’ by requiring a two-
dimensional array.” Reply 2. According to Petitioner, the Specification
supports a broad construction of the claim term, and the term should “be
construed to include a one-dimensional array since the [claim] language
does not specify a two-dimensional array.” Id. at 2–3.
We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that “image array
sensor, said image array sensor comprising an array of pixel sensors” should
be limited to a two-dimensional arrangement of pixel sensors. Although
Patent Owner directs our attention to an embodiment that shows sensors
arranged in an array of 512 rows and 512 columns, we are not inclined to
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import this specific configuration into the claim. See Arlington Indus., Inc.
v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., 345 F.3d 1318, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (stating it
is improper to read a limitation from the specification into the claims). The
claim itself does not recite a two-dimensional array of sensors, or include
any language indicating that the image array sensor should be defined as
being a two-dimensional array. Moreover, Patent Owner does not identify
anything in the Specification that indicates that the claimed image array
sensor must have a two-dimensional arrangement of sensors.
Patent Owner also contends that it is “well known in the art” that an
array of pixel sensors means a two-dimensional image array sensor. PO
Resp. 9. In support of that contention, Patent Owner’s declarant,
Dr. Matthew A. Turk, states that a person having ordinary skill in the art
would understand “that ‘an array of pixel sensors’ means a two-dimensional
image array sensor that has multiple pixels arranged in columns and rows to
form a sensor having a width and height,” and would further understand that
a one-dimensional image sensor “is typically referred to as a vector, not an
array,” but does not provide any evidence or explain the reasons why that
would be the case. Ex. 2032 ¶ 22. Dr. Turk also acknowledges that “one
might argue that a one-dimensional image sensor has a height of one pixel.”
Id.
Petitioner also notes that the ’248 patent issued from an application
that was a continuation of the application that issued as U.S. Patent No.
7,459,664 (Ex. 1011, “the ’664 patent”), and that the ’248 patent and the
’664 patent include “substantially the same specification.” Reply 2. The
claims of the ’664 patent recite “an imaging sensor,” and further specify that
“said imaging sensor compris[es] a two-dimensional array of light sensing
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photosensor elements.” See, e.g., Ex. 1011, 13:9–14 (claim 1), 15:5–10
(claim 24). Petitioner also notes that the ’248 patent claims priority to U.S.
Patent No. 5,550,677 (Ex. 1009, “the ’677 patent”), which “claims both an
‘array of sensing elements,’ and a ‘two-dimensional array of rows and
columns.’” Reply 2 (citing Ex. 1009, claims 1 and 16). That the ’664 and
’677 patents include claims that specifically recite that the image sensor is a
two-dimensional array further supports the conclusion that “image array
sensor” as used in claims 1, 9, and 17 of the ’248 patent is not limited to just
two-dimensional arrays, as Patent Owner contends. See NTP Inc. v.
Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (When
construing claims in patents that derive from the same parent application and
share common terms, “we must interpret the claims consistently across all
asserted patents.”); see also Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, Civ. Nos. 2014-
1676, 2014-1677, 2015 WL 1781484, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 17, 2015)
(unpublished) (approving of the Board’s claim construction that referred to a
parent and grandparent application that were incorporated by reference).
Accordingly, we interpret “image array sensor, said image array
sensor comprising an array of pixel sensors” to include one-dimensional and
two-dimensional arrangements of pixel sensors. Patent Owner’s
construction is overly restrictive, and Patent Owner does not provide
persuasive reasoning as to why the term must be limited to two-dimensional
arrays.
B. Anticipation of Claims 1, 4, and 5 by Tadashi
To prevail on its patentability challenge, Petitioner must establish
facts supporting its challenge by a preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C.
§ 316(e); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d). Petitioner asserts that claims 1, 4, and 5 are
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unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Tadashi, and relies
on the Declarations of Dr. Jeffrey A. Miller. Pet. 15–21; Reply 1–5, 10–13
(citing Exs. 1010, 1014). Patent Owner disagrees with Petitioner’s
assertions, and relies on the Declaration of Dr. Turk. PO Resp. 7–15, 23–31,
34–37 (citing Ex. 2032).
1. Overview of Tadashi
Tadashi is directed to tunnel-detection apparatuses that apply to auto-
light control devices. Ex. 1004, 1004–006. The disclosed tunnel-detection
apparatus comprises a one-dimensional imaging device, means for
“binarizing” a one-dimensional video signal output from the one-
dimensional imaging device (i.e., creating a video signal with two possible
values for each pixel), and a tunnel-judgment means for judging a tunnel by
processing the binarized signal. Id. at 1004–007.
Figure 1 of Tadashi is reproduced below.

Figure 1 depicts a block diagram of an embodiment of Tadashi’s tunnel-
detection apparatus. The tunnel-detection apparatus includes one-
dimensional imaging device 1, converter 2 as a binarization-processing
means, microcomputer 3 as a tunnel-judgment means, and auto-light control
device 4 that is driven by the microcomputer. Id. at 1004–008. Imaging
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device 1 comprises “[a] 512-pixel [charge-coupled device] linear image
sensor 1b and a lens system 1a . . . disposed in a case.” Id. Imaging device
1 is mounted on a vehicle dashboard facing the direction of vehicle travel, so
that “[l]ight incidented through the front windshield images on the pixel line
of the CCD [charge-coupled device] linear image sensor 1b via the lens
system 1a.” Id. at 1004–008, Fig. 5. CCD linear image sensor 1b outputs a
one-dimensional video signal Vs to converter 2, and converter 2 compares
Vs to a predetermined threshold voltage Vref and outputs a binarized signal
Vd. Id. Microcomputer 3 processes binarized signal Vd and, when a tunnel
is present, “outputs a light signal to the auto-light control device 4.” Id.
2. Claim 1
The parties focus their arguments on two elements present in claim 1
of the ’248 patent: (1) “image array sensor comprising an array of pixel
sensors,” and (2) “field of view of said image array sensor substantially
passes through an associated windshield area that is wiped by a windshield
wiper” such that a controller connected to the image array sensor receives
“at least a portion of at least one image from said image array sensor that is
substantially free of windshield surface contamination.” As to the other
elements of claim 1, we have reviewed the evidence and arguments
presented in the Petition and find that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that
those elements are disclosed. Pet. 15–19. We address the arguments
regarding the disputed elements in turn.
a. Image array sensor comprising
an array of pixel sensors
Petitioner argues that Tadashi discloses an image array sensor
comprising an array of pixel sensors, namely, one-dimensional imaging
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device 1, which comprises 512-pixel CCD linear image sensor 1b. Pet. 17
(citing Ex. 1004, 1004-008). Patent Owner responds that Tadashi does not
meet the “image array sensor comprising an array of pixel sensors”
limitation of claim 1 because “Tadashi discloses a one-dimensional image
sensor comprising a vector of pixel sensors.” PO Resp. 10–11 (citing Ex.
1004, 1004-007–008 and Ex. 2032 ¶¶ 26–28). Patent Owner’s argument is
premised on its contention that the claimed image array sensor requires a
two-dimensional arrangement of pixel sensors. Id. at 8–10. We do not
agree that the claim term should be interpreted in that manner, for the
reasons explained above. See supra Section II.A.2.
Accordingly, we are persuaded that Tadashi discloses an “image array
sensor, said image array sensor comprising an array of pixel sensors” as
recited in claim 1.
b. Field of view of said image array sensor substantially
passes through an associated windshield area that is
wiped by a windshield wiper; and a controller connected
to said image array sensor and configured to receive at
least a portion of at least one image from said image
array sensor that is substantially free of windshield
surface contamination

Petitioner contends that Tadashi discloses this element of claim 1
because one-dimensional imaging device 1 is mounted on a vehicle
dashboard so that light coming through the front windshield images on the
pixel line of CCD linear image sensor 1b. Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1004, 1004-
008). Petitioner contends that Tadashi discloses that it is possible for the
tunnel-detection apparatus to detect rain or the movement of the windshield
wiper blades. Id. (citing Ex. 1004, 1004-010). Petitioner further contends
that Tadashi senses an image that is substantially free of windshield surface
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contamination because the windshield wiper blades clean the windshield in
the same manner that is claimed in the ’248 patent. Id. at 18–19.
Patent Owner asserts that Tadashi does not disclose a sensed image
that is substantially free of windshield surface contamination. PO Resp. 13–
14. According to Patent Owner, the sensor in Tadashi intentionally images
windshield contamination, and “appears to be designed to use images that
specifically include windshield surface contamination.” Id. at 14–15.
Petitioner replies that Patent Owner is characterizing a part of Tadashi
out of context of the disclosure as a whole. Reply 5. Petitioner notes that
Tadashi does disclose an embodiment that can detect the presence of a
tunnel as well as raindrops and windshield wiper blades, but argues that
Tadashi’s tunnel detection function uses an image that is free from
windshield surface contamination. Id. (citing Ex. 1004, 1004-008).
Petitioner further argues that, even when it is raining, the windshield is
substantially free of surface contamination at the point at which the
windshield wiper passes the image array sensor’s field of view. Id.
We agree with Petitioner. Tadashi describes a first embodiment
wherein one-dimensional imaging device 1 is mounted on a vehicle
dashboard, and is arranged to face in the direction in which the vehicle is
traveling. Ex. 1004, 1004-008. Tadashi discloses that light passes through
the windshield and images on CCD linear sensor 1b. Id. After describing
the tunnel detection process, Tadashi states that “[i]t is possible for the
apparatus of this embodiment to detect rain droplets adhering to the front
windshield and windshield wiper blade action.” Id. at 1004-009.
Considered in its entirety, Tadashi’s first embodiment is able to
perform at least two functions: (1) tunnel detection, and (2) detecting rain
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droplets and windshield wiper action. Patent Owner has not directed us to
any disclosure in Tadashi, nor have we identified any, that indicates that the
Tadashi image sensor only senses images when it is raining. Thus, Patent
Owner’s contention that Tadashi is designed to use images that include
windshield contamination ignores the tunnel detection functionality of
Tadashi, the operation of which is not limited to specific weather conditions,
and is unsupported by the record. Petitioner’s argument and supporting
evidence, as a whole, supports its position that Tadashi discloses an image
array sensor that is mounted and configured such that its field of view passes
through a windshield area that is wiped by a windshield wiper. Pet. 18–19;
Reply 4–5.
We also are persuaded that Tadashi discloses a controller connected to
the image array sensor that receives “at least a portion of at least one image
from said image array sensor that is substantially free of windshield surface
contamination.” Tadashi discloses that CCD linear image sensor 1b outputs
video signal Vs to converter 2 after CCD linear image sensor 1b senses light
passing through the windshield. Ex. 1004, 1004-008. The binarized signal
that microcomputer 3 (Tadashi’s “controller”) uses to judge the presence of
a tunnel is based on video signal Vs. Id. Because video signal Vs is a result
of the light imaged on the image sensor, and the image sensor is mounted
and configured such that its field of view passes through a windshield area
that is substantially free of windshield contamination (by virtue of the
windshield wipers), it follows that at least a portion of at least one image
from the image sensor also is substantially free of windshield contamination.
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c. Conclusion
After considering Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s positions, as well as
their supporting evidence, we determine that Petitioner has shown, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that claim 1 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) as anticipated by Tadashi.
3. Claim 4
Claim 4 depends from claim 1, and further requires “an ambient light
level input.” Petitioner asserts that Tadashi discloses an ambient light level
input, because it “utilizes ambient ‘[l]ight incidented through the front
windshield’ to generate a ‘one-dimensional video signal Vs to the converter
2.’” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1004, 1004-008). Petitioner asserts that Tadashi
discloses that video signal Vs is compared to threshold voltage Vref to
generate binarized signal Vd, which is then used to judge the existence of a
tunnel. Id.
Patent Owner contends that Tadashi does not disclose an ambient light
level input because Tadashi’s one-dimensional imaging device images only
in a horizontal direction in order to detect a tunnel. PO Resp. 25. According
to Patent Owner, by focusing only horizontally, Tadashi is not detecting
portions of the forward-looking scene above the earth’s horizon that can be
indicative of the ambient light condition. Id.
Petitioner argues in reply that ambient light does not require detecting
portions of the scene above the horizon. Reply 10. We agree. As set forth
above, we interpreted “ambient light” to mean “light of the surrounding
environment, not light introduced by any particular source, such as a
headlight that moves in and out of the environment,” and the parties do not
dispute that interpretation. See supra Section II.A.1. This interpretation
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does not set any conditions on the direction from which the light of the
surrounding area is to be detected, and there is no indication in claim 4 as to
what part of the imaged scene is to be used in the recited “ambient light level
input.”
Patent Owner further contends that Tadashi’s disclosure of the entire
pixel region being “substantially a white level” demonstrates that Tadashi’s
imaging device cannot differentiate between sourced light and ambient light.
PO Resp. 25. Patent Owner contends that, in order to provide an ambient
light level input, the imaging sensor must have the ability to differentiate
between ambient light and sourced light. Id. at 28. Patent Owner contends
that any source of light, including headlights, taillights, or road lights, is
used by Tadashi in determining whether the entire pixel is substantially a
white level. Id. at 29. Because ambient light is construed to mean “light of
the surrounding environment, not light introduced by any particular source,
such as a headlight that moves in and out of the environment,” Patent Owner
concludes that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have
understood that the claimed ambient light level input must be distinguished
from particularly sourced light. Id.
Petitioner asserts that the construction of “ambient light” does not
require an active step of differentiating between ambient light and
particularly sourced light. Reply 11. Petitioner asserts that “ambient light”
includes all light of the surrounding environment, which “may include
collectively light from the sun, moon, streetlights, [and] headlamps, but does
not include light from a particular source (e.g. one specific headlight).” Id.
Petitioner asserts this understanding of “ambient light” is consistent with the
Specification, relying on the following disclosure as support: “Ambient
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detection circuit 84 samples a subset of photosensor elements and detects
light levels sensed by the subset over a long period of time in order to
produce significant time filtration.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002, 5:42–45).
We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that the imaging
sensor must be able to differentiate between ambient light and particularly
sourced light in order to provide the ambient light level input recited in
claim 4. Patent Owner has not provided a convincing rationale for requiring
an active differentiation step in determining the claimed ambient light level
input. For example, Patent Owner argues that a person having ordinary skill
in the art “would have understood” that “‘ambient light level input’ must be
an input indicative of an ambient light level (light of the surrounding
environment), which has been distinguished from sourced light.” PO
Resp. 29 (citing Ex. 2032 ¶ 74). Patent Owner cites Dr. Turk’s testimony in
support of this contention, but Dr. Turk’s statements regarding what a person
having ordinary skill in the art would have understood are not supported by
any objective evidence or analysis. Neither Patent Owner nor Dr. Turk point
to anything in the Specification that supports Patent Owner’s contention that
“ambient light level input” requires an active step of differentiating ambient
light from sourced light, and claim 4 does not include an express limitation
directed to such an active differentiation step.
Petitioner, in contrast, provides persuasive reasoning as to why a
person having ordinary skill in the art would not have understood “ambient
light level input” to require an active differentiation step. Reply 11–12. For
example, Petitioner argues that the Specification’s description of sampling a
subset of photosensors over time in order to determine ambient light levels
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would include light impinging on the photosensors from any given source.
Id. at 11. Petitioner cites Dr. Miller’s testimony in support of this argument:
Ambient light is detected in the ’248 Specification based
upon [an] ambient detection circuit that “samples a subset of
photosensor elements and detects light levels sensed by the
subset over a long period of time in order to produce significant
time filtration.” This does not involve distinguishing light from
a particular light source such as a headlamp from general light
such as from the moon/sun. Instead, all light impinging on the
imaging array is averaged so that the ambient light is not
indicative [of light] from a particular light source, but all light
in the entire surrounding environment.
Ex. 1014 ¶ 9 (internal citation omitted). We find Petitioner’s arguments and
Dr. Miller’s testimony, supported by the Specification of the ’248 patent,
that “ambient light level input” does not require an active step of
differentiating between ambient light and particularly sourced light, to be
persuasive. Reply 11–12.
After considering Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s positions, as well as
their supporting evidence, we determine that Petitioner has shown, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that claim 4 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) as anticipated by Tadashi.
4. Claim 5
Claim 5 depends from claim 4, and further requires that “automatic
exterior light control is enabled when an ambient light level is below a
threshold.” Petitioner contends that Tadashi discloses turning on the exterior
lights when a tunnel is detected, and extinguishing the exterior lights when
the entire pixel region is substantially a white level. Pet. 21. Petitioner
further contends that the determination as to whether to turn on or extinguish
the lights is made by comparing video signal Vs to predetermined threshold
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voltage Vref, and therefore Tadashi discloses enabling external light control
when the ambient light level is below a threshold, as recited in claim 5. Id.
Patent Owner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art
would have understood claim 5 to mean that when the ambient light level
drops below a threshold, the automatic exterior light control is enabled (or
activated or readied or made available or made operational), “but the
controller may not generate an output for controlling at least one exterior
light of the vehicle.” PO Resp. 35. Patent Owner argues that Tadashi
discloses generating an output for controlling the exterior lights, but does not
disclose enabling the exterior light control when the ambient light level input
is below a threshold. Id. at 36. Petitioner responds that a person having
ordinary skill in the art would understand that when Tadashi’s
microcomputer 3 outputs a signal to auto-light control device 4, the signal
from microcomputer 3 is “activating, making ready, making available, or
making operational” auto-light control device 4. Reply 14–15.
Based on our review of the record, we find Petitioner’s argument to be
persuasive. Patent Owner’s argument that Tadashi does not enable exterior
light control because enabling the exterior light control does not encompass
outputting a signal to the light control is not supported by objective evidence
or analysis. Patent Owner cites to Dr. Turk’s testimony in support of its
argument, but Dr. Turk’s statements are similarly devoid of any reference to
evidence to support the assertion that “enabl[ing]” the exterior light control
and generating an output for controlling the exterior light are different
actions. See Ex. 2032 ¶¶ 91–92, 94–96. Additionally, neither Patent Owner
nor Dr. Turk identify any disclosure in the Specification that indicates that
there is a difference between “enabl[ing]” and generating an output for
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controlling the vehicle’s exterior lights. Petitioner’s argument and
supporting evidence, as a whole, supports its position that Tadashi discloses
an automatic exterior light control that is enabled when an ambient light
level is below a threshold. Pet. 21; Reply 14–15.
Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has shown, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that claim 5 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) as anticipated by Tadashi.
C. Obviousness of Claims 3, 9, and 11–13
over Tadashi and Yanagawa
Petitioner asserts that claims 3, 9, and 11–13 are unpatentable under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Tadashi and
Yanagawa. Pet. 24–29, 31–40; Reply 6–15. Petitioner explains how a
combination of Tadashi and Yanagawa allegedly discloses or suggests the
claimed subject matter, and also relies on the Declarations of Dr. Miller.
Exs. 1010, 1014. Patent Owner disagrees with Petitioner’s assertions and
relies on the Declaration of Dr. Turk. PO Resp. 15–23 (citing Ex. 2032).
A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 if the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the
subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406
(2007). In the Decision on Institution, we adopted Petitioner’s proposed
definition of a person having ordinary skill in the art of the ’248 patent at the
time of the invention, which was supported by Dr. Miller’s testimony. Dec.
on Inst. 8–9. The parties have not disputed this definition, and we see no
reason to modify it in light of the record developed during trial. Therefore,
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we conclude that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had at least
the qualifications of or equivalent to either (1) a master’s degree in electrical
engineering or computer science, with course work or research in vision
systems, or (2) an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering or
computer science with at least two years of work making optical vision
systems. Id. at 8 (citing Pet. 6, Ex. 1010 ¶ 27).
Prior art references must be “considered together with the knowledge
of one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475,
1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). A party that petitions the Board for a determination
of obviousness must show that “a skilled artisan would have been motivated
to combine the teachings of the prior art references to achieve the claimed
invention, and that the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable
expectation of success in doing so.” Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharms.
USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Pfizer, Inc. v.
Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
1. Overview of Yanagawa
Yanagawa is directed to “a recognition device for a traveling vehicle”
that recognizes the headlights of oncoming vehicles and the taillights of
leading vehicles “and is capable of controlling the device vehicle’s
headlights automatically.” Ex. 1006, 1006-007. Yanagawa discloses an
embodiment that comprises a television camera that “is set so as to be able
to image the forward direction of the vehicle,” a decoder that receives the
image signals from the video signal, an image signal processor that extracts
a binary image signal from the image signal, and an executing part that
receives the extracted signal from the image signal processor and “executes
tasks for controlling the headlight beams.” Id. at 1006-008–009. Yanagawa
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further discloses that “[t]he television camera may also be configured such
that the mounting angle of the camera can be varied” and can be
“automatically controlled in response to the angle of steering maneuvers.”
Id. at 1006-011.
2. Claim 3
Claim 3 depends from claim 1, and further requires “an image array
sensor aim is automatically adjusted.” Petitioner asserts that Tadashi
discloses all of the limitations of claim 1, relying on the explanation set forth
with respect to Petitioner’s anticipation challenge of claim 1. Pet. 26.
Petitioner concedes that Tadashi does not disclose “an image array sensor
aim [that] is automatically adjusted,” but states that Yanagawa teaches
automatically adjusting the image array sensor aim. Id. at 26–27. Petitioner
asserts that “Yanagawa provides explicit motivation for adjusting the aim of
the image array sensor such that ‘the camera always faces the steered
direction of the vehicle’ for more effective imaging.” Id. at 27 (citing
Ex. 1006, 1006-011).
Patent Owner makes two arguments with respect to claim 3. First,
Patent Owner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art would
have understood that Yanagawa discloses automatically adjusting an entire
camera assembly to face the steered direction, and that using a similar
system with the Tadashi tunnel detection apparatus “would add considerable
size and complexity to the Tadashi device and would render Tadashi
inoperable as a dashboard mounted image sensor.” PO Resp. 22–23. Patent
Owner’s argument is predicated on Dr. Turk’s testimony that a person
having ordinary skill in the art “would have understood that the camera in
Yanagawa could have been mounted on a gimbal or control arm that
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responds to the vehicle steering angle.” Ex. 2032 ¶ 56; PO Resp. 22–23.
We do not agree, however, that a person having ordinary skill in the art
would have understood that the camera in Yanagawa could be adjusted
automatically only by being mounted on a gimbal or control arm. Yanagawa
discloses that the camera assembly “may be mounted at any location from
which the forward direction of the vehicle can be imaged” (Ex. 1006, 1006-
011), which would include mounting it on the vehicle’s dashboard. See also
Reply 8 (“If, as [Patent Owner] contends, Yanagawa’s automatic
adjustability system required significant size and complexity, Yanagawa’s
camera could not be located in any forward-viewing location.”). Thus, we
are persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that a person having ordinary skill in
the art “would understand that Yanagawa’s automatic adjustability system
does not add significant size and complexity, at least because Yanagawa
teaches location anywhere on the vehicle from which the forward direction
can be imaged.” Id. at 8–9.
Second, Patent Owner argues that moving Tadashi’s image sensor
would blur and distort the sensed images, changing Tadashi’s principle of
operation because it would not be able to detect rain drops or the action of
the windshield wiper blades. PO Resp. 23. Petitioner responds that Patent
Owner’s argument is premised on the assumption that images are sensed
while the image sensor is moving, and contends that any blurring or
distortion of an image sensed during such movement would be negligible.
Id. at 9–10. Dr. Miller explains that “the camera may move between frames
of image data, thereby no blurring or distortion would occur,” and
“Tadashi’s camera utilizes a ‘scanning cycle of 64.5μ seconds,’” which is
“significantly fast such that any blurring or distortion by movement of the
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camera would be negligible.” Ex. 1014 ¶ 7 (citing Ex. 1004, 1004-008).
Based on our review of the record, we find Petitioner’s argument to be
persuasive.
After considering Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s positions, as well as
their supporting evidence, we determine that Petitioner has shown, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that claim 3 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Tadashi and Yanagawa.
3. Claim 9
Petitioner asserts that Tadashi discloses all of the limitations of
independent claim 9 but one, conceding that Tadashi does not disclose an
image array sensor that is mounted and configured such that “a field of view
of said image array sensor is adjustable electronically.” Pet. 32–35.
Petitioner asserts that Yanagawa’s disclosure of automatically adjusting the
mounting angle of the camera assembly in response to the angle of steering
maneuvers meets this limitation. Id. at 33. In response, Patent Owner
argues that Yanagawa does not provide guidance as to how the camera
assembly is adjusted automatically, and a person having ordinary skill in the
art would have understood that such automatic adjustment could be
accomplished using mechanical means. PO Resp. 18. Patent Owner further
argues that Yanagawa does not “make any mention that the automatic angle
control is electronic.” Id. at 16.
Petitioner cites the following disclosure from Yanagawa with respect
to the “image array sensor is configured and mounted such that a field of
view of said image array sensor is adjustable electronically” limitation of
claim 9:
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The television camera for imaging in the forward
direction may be mounted at any location from which the
forward direction of the vehicle can be imaged. The television
camera may also be configured such that the mounting angle of
the camera can be varied, such that, for example, the angle is
automatically controlled in response to the angle of steering
maneuvers. When configured this way, the camera always
faces in the steered direction of the vehicle so as to effectively
monitor vehicles ahead.
Ex. 1006, 1006-011; Pet. 33. Although this portion discloses that the
mounting angle is adjusted “automatically,” we agree with Patent Owner
that Yanagawa does not disclose expressly how to adjust the mounting angle
of the camera automatically. An obviousness analysis, however, “need not
seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the
challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative
steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR, 550 U.S.
at 418.
Petitioner argues, and we agree, that a person having ordinary skill in
the art would have understood that automatically adjusting Yanagawa’s
camera could be achieved either mechanically or electronically. Reply 6–7.
Patent Owner focuses only on mechanical adjustment, contending that a
person having ordinary skill in the art “would have understood that camera
angle could easily have been adjusted” mechanically using a gimbal or
control arm. PO Resp. 18. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that
there were a finite number of identified, predictable ways to adjust
Yanagawa’s camera automatically (mechanically and electronically), and
that it would have been obvious to try adjusting the camera electronically.
Reply 7; see also KSR, 550 U.S. at 421 (where “there are a finite number of
identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason
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to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp,” and “[i]f this
leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but
of ordinary skill and common sense”).
For example, Yanagawa discloses executing part 15, which receives
recognition information from image sensor 14 regarding the presence of
taillights or headlights, as well as signals from vehicle speed sensor 16
(corresponding to the vehicle speed), and headlight switch 17 (indicating the
state of the headlights). Ex. 1006, 1006-009. Yanagawa further discloses
that “executing part 15 then executes tasks for controlling the headlight
beams or issuing a warning to the driver based on the recognition
information, vehicle speed information and headlight information.” Id.
Based on the disclosed functionality of executing part 15, a person having
ordinary skill in the art would recognize that executing part 15 also could be
used to adjust Yanagawa’s camera electronically, and would have a
reasonable expectation that such electronic adjustment would be successful.
Patent Owner also raises an untimely new argument, contending that
“adjustable electronically” as used in claim 9 “is based on choosing specific
pixels to focus on or to emphasize” (Tr. 44:4–6), and is not referring to
“physically moving the sensor itself” (id. at 45:10–11). That argument,
presented for the first time at the hearing, is waived. Compare Tr. 44:1–
49:23, with PO Resp. 15–18 (arguing that Yanagawa does not disclose how
the angle of the camera is automatically controlled, and that a person having
ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the angle could be
adjusted mechanically); see also Paper 18, 3 (“The patent owner is cautioned
that any arguments for patentability not raised in the response will be
deemed waived.”).
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Even if the argument is not waived, it is not persuasive. In support of
this new argument, Patent Owner relies on a portion of the Specification of
the ’248 patent that describes taking into account “spatial differentiation” by
detecting light sources at a lower threshold in the center of the scene, and at
a higher threshold at the periphery of the scene. Tr. 44:20–45:2 (citing
Ex. 1002, 10:13–19). Patent Owner further argues that electronically
adjusting the field of view of the image array sensor, as recited in claim 9, is
different than electronically adjusting the aim of the image array sensor, as
recited in claim 19. Id. at 49:4–50:13. According to Patent Owner, claim 9
excludes physical adjustment of the image array sensor, while claim 19
permits such physical adjustment. Id. at 50:9–13.
Patent Owner does not explain sufficiently, however, how the
Specification’s description of “spatial differentiation” relates to
electronically adjusting the field of view of the image array sensor as recited
in claim 9. Furthermore, Patent Owner does not direct us to anything in the
Specification that indicates that “field of view of said image array sensor is
adjustable electronically” does not encompass physically moving the image
array in response to an electronic signal, but “an image array sensor aim is
adjustable electronically” does encompass such physical adjustment. Based
on the evidence presented, we do not discern a significant difference
between electronically adjusting the aim of the image array sensor and
electronically adjusting the field of view of the image array sensor; when the
aim of the image array sensor is adjusted, the field of view of the image
array sensor (i.e., what is seen by the image array sensor) would be adjusted
as well. We are not convinced, therefore, that the Specification clearly and
deliberately limits “field of view of said image array sensor is adjustable
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electronically” to choosing specific pixels in the image array sensor, as
Patent Owner argues. See In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d at 1480 (“Although an
inventor is indeed free to define the specific terms used to describe his or her
invention, this must be done with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and
precision.”).
After considering Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s positions, as well as
their supporting evidence, we determine that Petitioner has shown, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that claim 9 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Tadashi and Yanagawa.
4. Claims 11–13
Claim 11 depends from independent claim 9. Claim 11 additionally
recites that “said image array sensor is configured and mounted such that a
field of view of said image array sensor substantially passes through an
associated windshield area that is wiped by a windshield wiper,” and
Petitioner contends that this limitation is disclosed by Tadashi. Pet. 37–38.
Patent Owner presents the same argument for this limitation as is set forth
above with respect to the same limitation in claim 1. PO Resp. 13–15.
Claim 12 also depends from independent claim 9, and further requires “an
ambient light level input.” Petitioner contends that this limitation also is
disclosed by Tadashi. Pet. 38–39. Patent Owner presents the same
argument for this limitation as it did for the same limitation in claim 4. PO
Resp. 25–29. We are persuaded, based on the analysis set forth above with
respect to the recited limitations in claims 1 and 4, that Petitioner has shown,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 11 and 12 are unpatentable
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Tadashi and
Yanagawa. See supra Section II.B.2, II.B.3.
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Claim 13 depends from claim 12, and additionally recites that the
“automatic exterior light control is enabled when an ambient light level is
below a threshold.” Petitioner contends that Tadashi discloses this
limitation. Pet. 39–40. Patent Owner presents the same argument for this
limitation as asserted above for the same limitation in claim 5. PO
Resp. 34–36. Our analysis is the same as set forth above with respect to
claim 5, and need not be repeated here. See supra Section II.B.4.
Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that claim 13 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over the combination of Tadashi and Yanagawa.
D. Obviousness of Claims 17, 18, and 21
over Tadashi and Meitzler
Petitioner asserts that claims 17, 18, and 21 are unpatentable under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Tadashi and
Meitzler. Pet. 43–50; Reply 10–15. Petitioner explains how a combination
of Tadashi and Meitzler allegedly discloses or suggests the claimed subject
matter, and also relies on the Declarations of Dr. Miller. Exs. 1010, 1014.
Patent Owner disagrees with Petitioner’s assertions and relies on the
Declaration of Dr. Turk. PO Resp. 7–13, 23–34 (citing Ex. 2032).
1. Overview of Meitzler
Meitzler is directed to “a composite light pickup device in a single
unit which monitors both oncoming headlamp lights and ambient light
conditions.” Ex. 1007, 1:56-59. Meitzler discloses an embodiment that
includes a housing, an oncoming headlight lens, an optical fiber retaining
block, and an ambient light collecting element. Id.at 2:30-34. Meitzler
teaches a logic circuit that automatically controls illumination of the
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vehicle’s headlights. Id. at 3:33-58. Meitzler discloses that “manual
override of either logic circuit is provided by” a conventional headlight
switch and a high beam actuation switch. Id. at 3:58–4:2.
2. Claims 17, 18, and 21
Petitioner contends that Tadashi discloses all of the limitations of
independent claim 17 but one, and concedes that Tadashi does not disclose
that “manual operation of exterior lights remains functional.” Pet. 44–46.
Petitioner contends that Meitzler discloses manual override of exterior light
control, and that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have been
motivated by Meitzler to allow a driver of a vehicle to remain in control of
the exterior lights in Tadashi’s tunnel detection apparatus. Id. at 46.
Patent Owner makes three arguments with respect to claim 17. First,
Patent Owner asserts that Tadashi does not disclose “an image array sensor,
said image array sensor comprising an array of pixel sensors.” PO Resp. 7–
12. Patent Owner’s argument is premised on its contention that the claimed
image array sensor requires a two-dimensional arrangement of pixel sensors.
Id. at 8–10. We do not agree that the claim term should be interpreted in
that manner, for the reasons explained above. See supra Section II.A.2.
Second, Patent Owner argues that Tadashi does not disclose “a
controller configured with an ambient light input, as claimed, for at least the
reasons set forth” with respect to claims 4 and 12, even though “claim 17
recites an ‘ambient light input’ instead of an ‘ambient light level input.’”
PO Resp. 27; see also id. at 23–31. We are not persuaded by Patent
Owner’s argument, for the same reasons as set forth above with respect to
claim 4. See supra Section II.B.3.
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Third, Patent Owner argues that Tadashi does not disclose “wherein
automatic exterior light control is enabled when an ambient light level is
below a threshold,” relying on the same argument as it asserted above with
respect to the same limitation in claim 5. PO Resp. 34–37. Our analysis is
the same as set forth above with respect to claim 5. See supra Section
II.B.4.
Claim 18 depends from claim 17, and further recites “wherein said
ambient light input is derived from said image array sensor.” Petitioner
asserts in the Petition that “Tadashi states ‘[o]ne line of the video signal in
substantially horizontal direction may be obtained with the one dimensional
imaging device that images in the horizontal direction, and it is possible to
use one pixel line of an area image sensor,” and Tadashi therefore “clearly
teaches that a portion of a larger image sensor may be used to obtain the
video signal.” Pet. 48–49 (citing Ex. 1004, 1004-007). Patent Owner argues
that “Tadashi makes no disclosure whatsoever regarding using the one-
dimensional image sensor to detect an ambient light level or to provide an
ambient light input.” PO Resp. 32. We are not persuaded by Patent
Owner’s argument. As set forth above in our analysis of claim 4, Tadashi
discloses the use of “[l]ight incidented through the front windshield” imaged
on the image array sensor to create video signal Vs that is the basis for
determining whether microcomputer 3 detects a tunnel. See supra Section
II.B.3. Based on our review of the record, we are convinced that Tadashi
discloses “said ambient light input is derived from said image array sensor”
as recited in claim 18.
Claim 21 depends from claim 17, and further recites “wherein said
image array sensor is configured and mounted such that a field of view of
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said image array sensor substantially passes through an associated
windshield area that is wiped by a windshield wiper.” Petitioner contends
that this limitation is disclosed by Tadashi. Pet. 49–50. Patent Owner
presents the same argument for this limitation as asserted above for the same
limitation in claim 1. PO Resp. 13–15. Our analysis is the same as set forth
above with respect to claim 1, and need not be repeated here. See supra
Section II.B.2.
After considering Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s positions, as well as
their supporting evidence, we determine that, by a preponderance of the
evidence, Petitioner has shown that claims 17, 18, and 21 are unpatentable
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Tadashi and
Meitzler.
E. Obviousness of Claim 19 over
Tadashi, Meitzler, and Yanagawa
Petitioner asserts that claim 19 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Tadashi, Meitzler, and
Yanagawa. Pet. 57–58. Petitioner explains how a combination of Tadashi,
Yanagawa, and Meitzler allegedly discloses or suggests the claimed subject
matter, and also relies on the Declarations of Dr. Miller. Exs. 1010, 1014.
Patent Owner disagrees with Petitioner’s assertions and relies on the
Declaration of Dr. Turk. PO Resp. 19–20.
Claim 19 depends from independent claim 17, and further recites
“wherein an image array sensor aim is adjustable electronically.” Petitioner
contends that Yanagawa discloses this limitation. Pet. 57–58. Patent Owner
relies on the same arguments with respect to this limitation in claim 19 as it
did with respect to the “a field of view of said image array sensor is
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adjustable electronically” limitation in claim 9. PO Resp. 20. Specifically,
Patent Owner argues that Yanagawa does not provide guidance as to how
the camera assembly is adjusted automatically, and a person having ordinary
skill in the art would have understood that such automatic adjustment could
be accomplished using mechanical means. Id. at 18. Patent Owner further
argues that Yanagawa does not “make any mention that the automatic angle
control is electronic.” Id. at 16. For the same reasons set forth above with
respect to claim 9, we do not find these arguments to be persuasive. See
supra Section II.C.3.
After considering Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s positions, as well as
their supporting evidence, we determine that Petitioner has shown, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that claim 19 is unpatentable under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Tadashi, Meitzler,
and Yanagawa.

III. CONCLUSION
Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims
1, 4, and 5 of the ’248 patent are anticipated by Tadashi.
Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims
3, 9, and 11–13 would have been obvious over the combination of Tadashi
and Yanagawa.
Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims
17, 18, and 21 would have been obvious over the combination of Tadashi
and Meitzler.
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Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim
19 would have been obvious over the combination of Tadashi, Meitzler, and
Yanagawa.

IV. ORDER
In consideration of the foregoing, it is
ORDERED that claims 1, 3–5, 9, 11–13, 17–19, and 21 of the ’248
patent are determined to be unpatentable; and
FURTHER ORDERED that, because this is a Final Written Decision,
parties to the proceeding seeking judicial review of the decision must
comply with the notice and service requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 90.2.

PETITIONER:
Josh Snider
Timothy Sendek
A. Justin Poplin
LATHROP & GAGE LLP
patent@lathropgage.com
tsendek@lathropgage.com
jpoplin@lathropgage.com

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PATENT OWNER:
Timothy A. Flory
Terence J. Linn
GARDNER, LINN, BURKHART & FLORY, LLP
Flory@glbf.com
linn@glbf.com

David K.S. Cornwell
STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN & FOX PLLC
Davidc-PTAB@skgf.com