TRW Automotive US LLCv.Magna Electronics Inc.

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 13, 2014

13204106 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 13, 2014)

Trials@uspto.gov Paper 17
Tel: 571-272-7822 Entered: August 13, 2014

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_______________
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
_______________
TRW AUTOMOTIVE US LLC,
Petitioner,

v.
MAGNA ELECTRONICS INC.,
Patent Owner.
_______________

Case IPR2014-00265
Patent 8,222,588 B2
_______________

Before JUSTIN T. ARBES, BARRY L. GROSSMAN, and
BEVERLY M. BUNTING, Administrative Patent Judges.

GROSSMAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION
ON REQUEST FOR REHEARING
37 C.F.R. § 42.71

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I. INTRODUCTION
TRW Automotive US LLC (“Petitioner”) filed a Request For Panel
Rehearing (Paper 16, cited as “Req. Reh’g.”) requesting rehearing of our decision
(Paper 15, cited as “Decision”) declining to institute inter partes review of claims
28–38 of U.S. Patent No. 8,222,588 B2 (“the ’588 patent”).
For the reasons stated below, we deny Petitioner’s request.
II. DISCUSSION
When rehearing a decision on institution, the Board reviews the decision for
an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). The burdens and requirements of a
request for rehearing are stated in 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d):
(d) Rehearing. . . . The burden of showing a decision should be
modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request
must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board
misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter
was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.
Petitioner identifies three distinct issues on which we are alleged to have
abused our discretion:
(1) the construction of “spatial filtering” in independent claim 28 (Req.
Reh’g. 1) and independent claim 35 (id. at 15) is based on an erroneous
interpretation of the law;
(2) the determination that Yanagawa (Ex. 1004) does not disclose the
claimed “spatial filtering” is based on factual findings unsupported by substantial
evidence (Req. Reh’g. 10, 12); and
(3) the determination that Kenue (Ex. 1005) and Tadashi (Ex. 1006) do not
disclose “spatial filtering” is wrong because spatial filtering does not require
evaluation of spectral signatures and does not require consideration of color (Req.
Rehg. 12).
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Petitioner’s First Contention—Claim Construction of “Spatial Filtering”
In its Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”), Petitioner stated that “even if the Board
interprets the term [“spatial filtering”] differently [than proposed by Petitioner],
Petitioner maintains that the invalidity arguments and analysis contained [in the
Petition] will remain sound; claim construction in this matter is not viewed as
likely to affect the merits of the case.” Pet. 9 (emphasis added). Petitioner now
takes a different position asserting that failure to institute trial is an “abuse of
discretion” based on an erroneous interpretation of the law in the Board’s
construction of the claim term “spatial filtering.” Req. Reh’g. 1.
In our Decision, we adopted a construction of “spatial filtering” based on a
definition that appeared in the Specification of the ’588 patent, stating that the
“Specification . . . expressly defines the term ‘spatial filtering.’” Decision 8. The
Specification states that, “[b]y spatial filtering is meant consideration of not only
whether a particular pixel, or pixel group, is detecting a light source having a
particular spectral signature, but also what adjacent, or closely related, pixels or
pixel groups, are detecting.” Ex. 1002, col. 10, ll. 55–59. We adopted this
definition of the claim term spatial filtering as “the broadest reasonable
construction in light of the Specification.” Decision 8. The adopted definition is
the definition proposed by Patent Owner. Paper 7 (“Prelim. Resp.”), pp. 29–30.
In our Decision, we stated the general principles governing our claim
construction. Decision 6–7. The general principles we stated are that:
(1) a claim is “given its broadest reasonable construction in light of the
specification of the patent in which it appears” (id. at 6–7, citations omitted);
(2) “words of the claim are generally given their ordinary and accustomed
meaning, unless it appears from the specification or the file history that they were
used differently by the inventor” (id. at 7, citation omitted); and
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(3) “[a]ny special definition for a claim term must be set forth in the
specification with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision (id.).
In its Request for Rehearing, Petitioner asserts that, contrary to our claim
construction, the “ordinary and customary meaning” of “spatial filtering” does not
require consideration of a spectral signature. Req. Reh’g. 3 (emphasis added).
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Petitioner also asserts that our construction of the term “spatial filtering is “far
removed from the ordinary meaning of the term.” Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
Neither the Request for Rehearing nor the Petition cite to any evidence of record as
to what is the ordinary and customary meaning of the term “spatial filtering.”
Moreover, Petitioner’s focus on the ordinary and customary meaning is
inconsistent with the applicable and controlling law that we applied in our
Decision. Claim terms do not always receive their “ordinary and customary”
meaning. As stated in our Decision, “[i]n an inter partes review, ‘[a] claim in an
unexpired patent shall be given its broadest reasonable construction in light of the
specification of the patent in which it appears.’” Decision 6–7 (citing 37 C.F.R. §
42.100(b)).
It is true that the words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and
customary meaning. See In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (“The ordinary and customary meaning is the meaning that the term
would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question.”) (citation omitted
and internal quotation marks omitted); In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed.
Cir. 1994). The specification, however, may reveal a special definition given to a
claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise

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Petitioner also asserts, without citation of any evidentiary or other support, that
“Magna does not dispute this” ordinary and customary meaning. Req. Reh’g. 3.
We give no probative weight to such unsupported statements.
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possess. Paulsen, 30 F.3d at 1480. In such cases, the inventor’s lexicography
governs. Id. “Although an inventor is indeed free to define the specific terms used
to describe his or her invention, this must be done with reasonable clarity,
deliberateness, and precision.” Id.
Petitioner proposed that the claim term “spatial filtering” should be
construed to mean “categorization of data that involves an assessment of
information obtained from both a first pixel or group of pixels and a second pixel
or group of pixels, wherein the first pixel or group of pixels is adjacent or closely
related to the second pixel or group of pixels.” Pet. 9. In the Petition, Petitioner
noted that the “’588 Patent uses the term ‘spatial filtering’ numerous times, and to
connote varying subject matter.” Id. at 7. Petitioner cited four examples of the
“numerous times” the Specification used the term “spatial filtering.” Petitioner
cited the Abstract, which states that spatial filtering “may, at least in part, identify
atmospheric conditions” and “may include analysis of a spectral signature.” Id.
Petitioner also cited the portion of the Specification on which our adopted
definition is based. Id. at 7–8 (citing Ex. 1002, col. 10, ll. 53–67). Petitioner also
cited the portion of the Specification describing how spatial filtering “can also be
useful in identifying atmospheric conditions by detecting effects on light sources
caused by particular types of atmospheric conditions.” Id. at 8 (citing Ex. 1002,
col. 11, ll. 15–26). Additionally, Petitioner cited Figures 11a–11c, and the related
text, which illustrate and describe “different forms of spatial filtering.” Id.
Spatial Filtering in the Specification
The definition we adopted from the Specification is introduced by the
general statement that “[t]he present invention is capable of utilizing spatial
filtering to even further enhance the ability to identify light sources.” Ex. 1002,
col. 10, ll. 53–55 (emphasis added). The Specification then provides a specific
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example of what is meant by the provided definition of “spatial filtering.” The
Specification states:
For example, it can be concluded that very closely
adjacent red and white light sources are not of interest as
oncoming headlights or taillights. An example where such
pattern could be observed is a streetlight observed with a system
having imperfect color correction, which can produce a white
light surrounded by a red halo. By evaluation of adjacent pixel
groups, a closely proximate red light source and white light
source can be identified as a streetlight and not either a headlight
or a taillight.
Ex. 1002, col. 10, ll. 59–67.
Our adopted definition of “spatial filtering” from the Specification is
consistent with the entirety of the Specification, which emphasizes the role of
“spectral signatures.” For example, the Specification states “[t]he present
invention is exceptionally sensitive to sources of light having spectral signatures of
oncoming headlights and leading taillights. By recognizing the spectral signature
of the light sources, many non-relevant light sources may be ignored. Id. at
col. 10, ll. 22–26 (emphasis added). The Specification also states “[t]he present
invention takes advantage of the spectral signatures both of light sources which
must be detected in a headlight dimming control as well as the spectral signatures
of light sources which must be rejected in a headlight dimming control.” Id. at col.
10, ll. 38–42 (emphasis added); see Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. ITT Indus., Inc., 452
F.3d 1312, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“On at least four occasions, the written
description refers to the fuel filter as ‘this invention’ or ‘the present invention.’ . . .
The public is entitled to take the patentee at his word and the word was that the
invention is a fuel filter.”). Thus, spectral signatures are important to the claimed
“invention,” which is consistent with the explicit definition of “spatial filtering” we
adopted from the Specification.
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Our claim interpretation is based on the entire patent and specification.
Petitioner’s emphasis on a single passage in the Abstract (Req. Reh’g. 5) and
selective citation of other passages is not persuasive of an abuse of discretion based
on an error of law in our claim interpretation.
Claim Differentiation
Petitioner states that “[p]erhaps the claim construction error is best
highlighted by the claims.” Req. Reh’g. 7. According to Petitioner, the doctrine of
claim differentiation between claims 1 and 5 “further supports that the claimed
‘spatial filtering’ [in challenged claims 28 and 35] need not include consideration
of spectral signature of detected light.” Id. at 7–9.
It is axiomatic that the claim construction process entails more than viewing
the claim language in isolation. Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson &
Co., 653 F.3d 1296, 1305(Fed. Cir. 2011). “Claim language must always be read
in view of the written description, . . . and any presumption created by the doctrine
of claim differentiation ‘will be overcome by a contrary construction dictated by
the written description or prosecution history.’” Id. (citations omitted). The
definition we adopted is required to “tether the claims to what the specification[]
indicate[s] the inventor actually invented.” See id. (“we strive to capture the scope
of the actual invention, rather than . . . allow the claim language to become
divorced from what the specification conveys is the invention”).
In the ’588 patent, claim 1 requires the image processing to comprise
“spatial filtering.” Claim 5, dependent from claim 1, states that the “spatial
filtering comprises analysis of a spectral signature representative of at least one
detected light source present in said forward field of view of said imaging sensor.”
According to Petitioner, when “spatial filtering” is construed as in our Decision,
claim 5 “becomes redundant.” Req. Reh’g. 8. We disagree. Our definition states
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that “spatial filtering” includes consideration of “whether a particular pixel, or
pixel group, is detecting a light source having a particular spectral signature.”
Decision 8. Claim 5 specifies that the analysis of a spectral signature from claim 1
is an analysis “representative of at least one detected light source present in said
forward field of view of said imaging sensor.” Thus, claim 5 further limits the
spectral signature consideration of the “spatial filtering” in claim 1. It is not
redundant of claim 1. See also Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d 1305 (“While the
patents contain an independent claim that recites a ‘body,’ . . . with a dependent
claim that limits the ‘body’ to a ‘one-piece body,’ . . . none of the claims expressly
recite a body that contains multiple pieces. Thus, while the claims can be read to
imply that a ‘body’ is not limited to a one-piece structure, that implication is not a
strong one.”) Here also, the implication that claim 5 is redundant of claim 1 “is not
a strong one.”
Conclusion Regarding Claim Construction
Based on the analysis above, the facts in this case and the controlling law on
claim construction fully support the construction of the claim term “spatial
filtering” adopted in our Decision. Petitioner has not persuaded us that our
construction of the claim term “spatial filtering” was an abuse of discretion.
Petitioner’s Second Contention—Yanagawa
Petitioner asserts that our determination that Yanagawa detects light sources
based on the physical height of the light source, not based on spatial filtering as
required by the claims of the ‘588 Patent, was an abuse of discretion because the
determination is not supported by substantial evidence. Req. Reh’g. 10.
Our Decision provided an extensive analysis of Yanagawa. Decision 9–12.
As part of this analysis, we explained that image signal processor 14 in Yanagawa
includes features extraction unit 141 and recognition unit 143. Id. at 10–11. We
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further stated that recognition unit 143 determines whether the image is a taillight.
Id. at 11. We further stated that “[r]ecognition unit 143 makes this determination
according to whether there are two red images at the same height.” Id. Based on
our detailed analysis of Yanagawa, we concluded that Petitioner “has not pointed
us to sufficient evidence showing that Yanagawa discloses or suggests spatial
filtering as required by claims 28 and 35.” Id. at 11–12.
Our analysis and determination concerning the Yanagawa disclosure are
supported by substantial evidence in Yanagawa. Yanagawa discloses clearly the
system for detecting taillights:
In step 106, the image data stored in the memory 142 are sent to
a recognition unit 143, which determines whether the image from
which features have been extracted is a taillight. As
determination criteria, the determination is made according to
whether there are two red images 52 and 53 at the same height
within a setting range 51 on a screen corresponding to the range
of the traffic lane in which the device vehicle is traveling.
Ex. 1004, 1004-003, col. 2 (emphasis added). Yanagawa does not further explain
the “setting range 51,” which is shown in Figure 5.
Yanagawa also discloses clearly the system for detecting headlights:
In this step 112, headlights are recognized by determining
whether there are two white luminescent colors 62 and 63 at the
same height in a setting range 61 corresponding to an oncoming
traffic lane on a screen.
Id. at 1004-004, col. 1 (emphasis added). Yanagawa does not further explain or
illustrate the “setting range 61.”
As shown above, the determination that Yanagawa detects light sources
based on the physical height of the light source rather than by “spatial filtering” is
fully supported by the disclosure of Yanagawa.
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Petitioner paraphrases the Yanagawa disclosures quoted above and
concludes “[s]o the proposed combination of references meets the ‘spatial filtering’
limitation even under the adopted claim construction.” Req. Reh’g. 11. Petitioner
has not directed us to any persuasive disclosure in Yanagawa to support its
conclusion.
In its Request for Rehearing, Petitioner asserts that it “had already
acknowledged that Yanagawa does not expressly identify its color TV camera and
had substituted Yanagawa’s camera with the pixelated CMOS array of Vellacott.”
Req. Reh’g. 11. This statement does not persuade us that our reading of Yanagawa
was an abuse of discretion because it was not supported by substantial evidence.
The fact that we determined that Yanagawa does not disclose “spatial filtering,” as
asserted in the Petition, is unrelated to whether Yanagawa includes “a two-
dimensional array of light sensing pixels,” as required in claims 28 and 35.
Petitioner’s Third Contention—Kenue and Tadashi
Petitioner appears to have anticipated our determination based on
Yanagawa. In its Petition, Petitioner states “if the Board disagrees with Petitioner
and determines that Yanagawa (’837) does not disclose spatial filtering, Petitioner
respectfully submits that each of Kenue (’653) and Tadashi (’280) may be
combined with Yanagawa (’837) to cure this deficiency.” Pet. 21. Petitioner then
asserts that “[t]o use spatial filtering as taught by both Kenue (’653) and Tadashi
(’280) in the image sensing system of Yanagawa (’837) would merely be a use of
known techniques to improve similar devices in the same way.” Id.
In the Decision, we analyzed Kenue and concluded that “the algorithms in
Kenue rely on intensity or shape, not color, to identify objects of interest.”
Decision 13. We also determined that “[b]ecause Kenue does not detect color,
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Kenue does not consider any ‘spectral signature’ and, therefore, does not provide
‘spatial filtering,’ as required by claims 28 and 35.” Id.
Regarding Tadashi, we stated that Tadashi discusses detecting black level
and white level regions of an image to detect the presence of tunnels, but
“Petitioner does not direct our attention to any disclosure in Tadashi that provides
‘spatial filtering,’ as required by claims 28 and 35.” Decision 13. We concluded
that Petitioner’s arguments regarding Tadashi were not persuasive “that Tadashi’s
black and white image processing constitutes ‘spatial filtering’ as required by
claims 28 and 35.” Id.
In its Request for Rehearing, Petitioner summarizes the determination in our
Decision and then states “[a]s shown above, however, ‘spatial filtering’ does not
require evaluation of spectral signatures, and does not require consideration of
color. Each of Kenue and Tadashi meet ‘spatial filtering’ because they consider
adjacent or closely related pixels.” Req. Reh’g. 12.
As stated in our Decision (Decision 8) and as discussed above, the
construction of “spatial filtering” requires consideration of (1) not only whether a
particular pixel, or pixel group, is detecting a light source having a particular
spectral signature, but also (2) what adjacent, or closely related, pixels or pixel
groups, are detecting. Petitioner’s assertion that Kenue and Tadashi disclose one
of these two elements (considering adjacent or closely related pixels) is not
persuasive of an abuse of our discretion in our Decision.
Petitioner also asserts an abuse of discretion based on our determination that
“Petitioner does not provide a persuasive explanation as to why a person of
ordinary skill would combine the technologies of Kenue or Tadashi with
Yanagawa to defeat patentability of claims 28 and 35.” Decision 13. As we
determined in our Decision and herein, neither Yanagawa, Kenue, nor Tadashi
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disclose “spatial filtering.” The combination of these references does not
compensate for their individual deficiencies. In our Decision, we considered
Petitioner’s arguments, and those of its Declarant, Dr. Miller, and concluded that
Petitioner did not “provide a persuasive fact-based analysis to support the proposed
combination of references.” Id. at 14. The fact that Petitioner disagrees with our
determination does not establish an abuse of discretion.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has not demonstrated that we abused
our discretion in denying institution of an inter partes review of claims 28–38 of
the ’588 patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71. The request for rehearing is denied.

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FOR PETITIONER:
Josh Snider
Timothy Sendek
A. Justin Poplin
LATHROP & GAGE LLP
patent@lathropgage.com
tsendek@lathropgage.com
jpoplin@lathropgage.com

FOR PATENT OWNER:
Timothy A. Flory
Terence J. Linn
GARDNER, LINN, BURKHART & FLORY, LLP
Flory@glbf.com
linn@glbf.com

David K.S. Cornwell
STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN & FOX PLLC
davidc-PTAB@skgf.com