TRUSTONE FINANCIAL FEDERAL CREDIT UNION

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Apr 13, 2016

18-CA-158210 (N.L.R.B. Apr. 13, 2016)

JD–29–16
Plymouth, MN
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
TRUSTONE FINANCIAL FEDERAL
CREDIT UNION
Respondent,
and Cases 18–CA–158210
18–CA–163034
18–CA–165634
OFFICE AND PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES
INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 12,
Charging Party.
Ashok C. Bokde, Esq. and
Rachel Simon-Miller, Esq.,
for the General Counsel.
Robert C. Castle, Esq. and
Elizabeth A. Patton, Esq.,
of Minneapolis, Minnesota,
for the Respondent.
Traci E. Murphy of Roseville, Minnesota,
for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
CHRISTINE E. DIBBLE, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Minneapolis,
Minnesota, on January 11 and 12, 2016. The consolidated complaint1 alleges that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by changing the contractual unit set forth in an
existing collective-bargaining agreement between it and the Charging Party Union (hereafter the
Union), without the Union’s consent; withdrawing recognition from the Union and refusing to
bargain with it, in connection with unit employees who were transferred to two different

1 There are three separate complaints in this case, each titled differently (GC Exh. 1(g), (k) and (p)).
In addition, at the hearing, the General Counsel added amendments and withdrew one allegation.
JD–29–16
2
locations that replaced locations included in the bargaining unit; dealing directly over the
transfers with bargaining unit employees instead of the Union; and making unilateral changes in
employee wages and benefits for the transferred unit employees and failing to apply the existing
bargaining agreement to those employees. The complaint also alleges that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by promising increased wages and different benefits and making5
coercive statements and issuing coercive communications to employees, in connection with the
alleged unlawful bargaining violations mentioned above. Two similar allegations were added in
an amendment at the opening of the hearing. Two other 8(a)(1) violations allege that
Respondent interfered with a union steward’s representative duties in an incident that is
unrelated to the relocation allegations. Finally, the complaint alleges that Respondent announced 10
that unit employees could not continue to be represented by the Union and work at one of the
relocated facilities, thus causing four named employees to opt against moving to that facility, all
in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.2
After the trial, the General Counsel and the Respondent filed briefs, which I have read 15
and considered. Based on those briefs and the entire record, including the testimony of the
witnesses and my observation of their demeanor, I make the following
Findings of Fact
20
I. Jurisdiction
Respondent is a federally regulated credit union that provides banking and other financial
services at a number of locations in Minnesota and Wisconsin. During a representative 1-year
period, Respondent derived gross revenues in excess of $500,000 and purchased and received, at 25
its Minnesota facilities goods and services valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points
outside Minnesota and derived revenues in excess of $50,000 from its operations in states other
than the State of Minnesota. Accordingly, I find, as Respondent admits, that it is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
30
I also find, as Respondent also admits, that the Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. The Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
35
A. The Facts
Background
Respondent and the Union have had a longstanding collective-bargaining relationship, 40
culminating in successive bargaining agreements, the last of which is effective, by its terms,
from October 1, 2014 to September 30, 2016, in the following bargaining unit originally certified
as appropriate by the Board (GC Exhs. 2 and 22):

2 At the hearing, the General Counsel withdrew an allegation that an employee had been
constructively discharged in violation of Sec. 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
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3
Full Time and Part Time office and clerical Employees; excluding Field
Representatives, Managerial Employees, Temporary Employees, Student
Work Employees, Professional Employees, Watchmen, Guard, Confidential Employees
and Supervisors as defined in Act per Case No. 18-RC-12178.
5
The above unit description contains no geographic limitation, and, as of August 2015, the
contract covered a total of some 100 unit employees at 7 different locations in the greater
Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area. Those locations are: The Plymouth corporate center;
Minneapolis; Roseville; Maple Grove; Golden Valley; Apple Valley; and St. Cloud. This case
involves the relocation of the Golden Valley facility and the Apple Valley facility.10
Respondent also operates other branches that are not included in the bargaining unit
represented by the Union. Most are in Wisconsin, but two of them, entirely new branches that
opened sometime in 2011, are located in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area. Both were
the subject of neutrality agreements between Respondent and the Union essentially providing15
that those two specific locations would not be covered by the existing bargaining agreement;
those neutrality agreements expired by their terms 1 year after they were signed.
The Relocations of Golden Valley and Apple Valley
20
On July 24, 2015, Respondent’s general counsel, Philip Young, sent a letter to Union
Representative Traci Murphy, notifying her that Respondent had decided to close the Golden
Valley branch.3 The letter stated that the “Branch bargaining unit employees” would be free to
exercise their contractual right to “transfer to other” bargaining unit locations or to “seek
employment” at a new location that was going to be opening at Boone Avenue. Respondent 25
offered to bargain about closing Golden Valley, but made it clear that the employees at the
Boone Avenue location would not be represented by the Union or covered by the existing
contract. The letter stated that current Golden Valley employees would be provided with
information as to the wages and benefits offered to those who elected to move to the Boone
Avenue location. (GC Exh. 5.) 30
In early August 2015, such information was provided to unit employees (GC Exhs. 8 and
19). During the last weekend in August, the Golden Valley branch was closed and relocated to
Boone Avenue. Customers were informed that safe deposit boxes would be physically
transferred over the weekend to the Boone Avenue location, which was described as “just 1.7 35
miles down the road.” (GC Exh. 18.) In another document, Respondent said the Boone Avenue
location was 2 miles from the Golden Valley location. The document shows that the Golden
Valley branch that operated on Saturday reopened on the following Monday as the Boone
Avenue branch. (GC Exh. 20.) Golden Valley had 10 unit employees before the relocation.
Five of them transferred to Boone Avenue and those were the only employees initially offered 40
transfers. There is no evidence of significantly changed duties or responsibilities because of the
relocation. According to Human Resources Director Gary Maki, there was no training of the
five transferred employees in connection with their duties at the Boone Avenue facility. (Tr.
172–173.) Four of the Golden Valley employees transferred to other unit positions and one

3 The Golden Valley facility is also referred to as the Olsen Memorial Highway facility.
JD–29–16
4
employee left for unrelated reasons. At some point, five additional employees were added to
Boone Avenue, either by internal transfers or external hires. The two managers at Golden Valley
also transferred to Boone Avenue. (Tr. 19, 29–30, 67–68, 78, 174–176, GC Exhs. 9 and 10.)4
At the end of July or early August, Respondent held meetings with Golden Valley 5
employees to announce the above move. The first meeting was a general one with all Golden
Valley employees and was conducted by Human Resources Director Maki, who told the
employees that the Boone Avenue branch would be nonunion or out of the unit. He also told
employees that there would be increases in pay and different health insurance costs for
employees who chose to transfer. The employees were also given written documents describing 10
the options for employees and the new wages and benefits. The options were described in a
document distributed to employees as either transferring to an existing bargaining unit location
or becoming “an employee” at Boone Avenue. (Tr. 69–71, 75–76, 173–174, GC Exhs. 6, 7, 8
and 9.) The day after the general meeting, Respondent held one-on-one meetings with
employees, at which they were given details on their new wages and benefits should they choose 15
to transfer to Boone Avenue. Tr. 72–75, 220–222, GC Exh. 7. The Union was not invited to and
did not participate in these meetings with employees.5
On September 15, 2015, Respondent’s general counsel sent another letter to Union
Representative Murphy, notifying her that Respondent had decided to close the Apple Valley 20
branch. The letter again stated that the unit employees would be free, under the contract, to
transfer to other locations or to seek employment at a new location that was referred to as the
Burnsville branch. The letter again made clear that the employees transferred to Burnsville
would have new wages and benefits and would not be represented by the Union or covered under
the existing contract. Respondent again offered to bargain over the closing of the Apple Valley 25
branch. (GC Exh. 12.)
The employees at Apple Valley were subsequently provided the information necessary to
determine whether to transfer to Burnsville or to transfer to other locations in the bargaining unit.
The Apple Valley facility closed on October 24 and was relocated to Burnsville, which began 30
operating on October 26, with no break in service for the employees who transferred from one
location to the other. (Tr. 128.) All five of the existing Apple Valley unit employees chose to
transfer to Burnsville. (GC Exh. 14, Tr. 34.) Burnsville also hired one additional employee who
had previously worked as a manager at Apple Valley. Tr. 137–138. Thus, five of the six
employees at Burnsville had been unit employees at Apple Valley. The manager and assistant 35
manager at Apple Valley also transferred to Burnsville and they and the previous Apple Valley
unit employees have essentially the same duties and responsibilities at Burnsville. (Tr. 129–130.
New training was not offered to the transferred employees before they reported to Burnsville.
(Tr. 175.)6

4 The four unit employees who opted to transfer to other unit locations rather than to transfer to
Boone Avenue were: Joann Chamlongsong; Colin Menth; Shannon Johnson, and Liza Krizer. (GC Exh.
10.)
5 The above is based primarily on the reliable testimony of employee Colin Menth, who testified
candidly and clearly. His testimony about what Maki said was consistent with what was said in
documents distributed to employees at these meetings; indeed, except for a difference in referring to the
new location being nonunit instead of nonunion, his testimony was essentially corroborated by Maki.
6 The General Counsel represents (Br. 6, fn. 4) that, according to Google Maps, the Burnsville facility
JD–29–16
5
Sometime in late September, Respondent held meetings at Apple Valley with those unit
employees similar to the employee meetings described above with Golden Valley employees.
The move of Apple Valley to Burnsville was announced; the differences in wages and benefits
were presented both orally and in a written document, with the same options offered to 5
employees, as described above for the Golden Valley employees. Tr. 131–137, 155–157, 220–
222, 276–277, GC Exhs. 13, 14.) As in the meetings with the Golden Valley unit employees, the
Union was not invited to and did not participate in these meetings.7
It does not appear that any existing unit employees lost their jobs due to the relocations10
(Tr. 223), although there were changes in wages and benefits due mostly to the failure of
Respondent to apply the existing agreement to the unit employees who were transferred. The
Union did not seek to bargain over the closings, but, as Respondent admits (Tr. 239), the Union
did ask for recognition in connection with the Boone Avenue and Burnsville facilities. The
Union also filed grievances under the collective-bargaining agreement over the relocations and 15
the failure to apply the agreement to the employees who transferred to the new locations. It also
filed charges that resulted in the issuance of the complaints in this case.8
Discussion and Analysis
20
The 8(a)(5) and (1) Violations
It is well settled that the description and composition of a bargaining unit is not a
mandatory subject of bargaining. Thus, once a bargaining unit has been defined by either Board
action or the consent of the parties, the employer cannot unilaterally modify the unit without first 25
securing the consent of the bargaining representative or the Board. An employer who does so
violates Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Wackenhut Corp., 345 NLRB 850, 852–853 (2005),
citing authorities. More specifically, an employer must apply an existing collective-bargaining
agreement to a relocated facility if the operations at the new facility are substantially the same as
those at the old facility and if the transferees from the old facility constitute a substantial 30
percentage, not necessarily a majority, of the employee complement at the new facility. An
employer who does not apply the agreement in these circumstances violates Section 8(a)(5) and
(1). King Soopers, Inc., 332 NLRB 32, 37 (2000), enfd. 254 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2001), citing
authorities.
35

is about 4.2 miles from the former Apple Valley location.
7 The above is based on the composite testimony of employee Karen Knudsen and Human Resources
Manager Karen Weber, to the extent that it is consistent with the documentary evidence of Respondent’s
communications about the transfers, particularly G.C. Exh. 14.
8 On August 12, 2015, the Union filed a grievance asserting that the Golden Valley relocation
violated the existing collective bargaining agreement and asking for certain information about the
transferred employees. The Respondent in effect denied the grievance, while supplying the names and
job positions of the employees transferred and their wages and benefits at the new location. Tr. 27-29,
G.C. Exhs. 9-11. On October 13, 2015, the Union filed a similar grievance regarding the relocation of the
Apple Valley facility and received a similar response as that in the Golden Valley matter. Tr. 35, G.C.
Exhs. 14, 15, and 16. No further action has been taken on either grievance. Tr. 44-45, 58-59.
JD–29–16
6
It is also well settled that an employer violates Section 8(a)(5) and (1) if it bypasses the
union representing its employees and instead deals with them directly on mandatory subjects
such as wages, benefits, and working conditions. Direct dealing by its very nature undermines
employee confidence in the effectiveness of their bargaining representative. Gene’s Bus Co.,
357 NLRB 1009, 1011 fn. 13 (2011). In El Paso Electric, Co., 355 NLRB 544, 545 (2010), 5
citing relevant authority, the Board restated the following established criteria for determining
whether an employer has engaged in unlawful direct dealing:
(1) That the [employer] was communicating with union-represented employees;
(2) the discussion was for the purpose of establishing or changing wages, hours10
and terms and conditions of employment or undercutting the union’s role in
bargaining; and (3) such communication was made to the exclusion of the union.
As shown in the factual statement, Respondent unilaterally relocated two facilities
specifically covered in the unit description of the existing bargaining agreement and failed to 15
apply the agreement to the relocated facilities, thus partially withdrawing recognition from the
Union and failing to apply the contract to the relocated facilities. It is clear that the relocated
facilities, which reopened after a hiatus of 2 days, were substantially unchanged from the
previous locations and employed a substantial number of the employees at the old locations.
Both the services offered and the duties of the employees were substantially the same. And the 20
relocated facilities were only short distances away from the old facilities. In written
communications and meetings, Respondent also presented the unit employees at the old locations
with the option of continuing to be represented by the Union and covered by the bargaining
agreement in the remaining unit or to forsake representation by the Union and lose contract
coverage at the new locations. These meetings and communications dealt with mandatory 25
subjects and the Union was not a participant, in derogation of its bargaining rights. Under the
applicable authorities and principles set forth above, such conduct, described in perhaps more
detail than was necessary in paragraph 11 of the original complaint (GC Exh. 1(g)) and
paragraph 10 of the last complaint (GC Exh. 1(p)), clearly violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act.30
Respondent’s faulty semantic construct—that the Golden Valley and Apple Valley
facilities, locations clearly included in the bargaining unit, were closed and the relocated Boone
Avenue and Burnsville facilities were “new” facilities—infuses its defense in this case.
However, assertions based on that faulty construct are without merit. The facts show that these 35
were relocations, essentially transferring unit work to nearby locations with most of the
employees in the new locations transferring from the old locations; indeed, they and the
managers who also transferred were doing the same work in the new location as they did in the
old location. It is significant that no new training was offered to the employees who transferred
to the new locations, thus confirming that the work would be and actually was the same in the 40
new location as in the old. In these circumstances, as shown above, Respondent was not
permitted to
JD–29–16
7
withdraw recognition from the Union or fail to apply the contract with respect to the moved unit
locations.9
Except in one instance (the reference to the King Soopers case, which is discussed later),
Respondent’s brief does not meet directly the case law cited above. Instead, it argues that it had 5
the right to close the Golden Valley and Apple Valley branches under section 15.02 of the
existing collective-bargaining agreement. The contention is without merit. It was not even
advanced by Respondent’s general counsel when he notified the Union of the relocations and
invited bargaining over the closures. Section 15.02, which is titled: “permanent reassignment”
and sets forth the procedure by which employees may be reassigned when a branch is closed or 10
restructured, does not permit the Respondent to remove branches from the unit by relocating
them. The thrust of the permanent reassignment provision is to retain the employees within the
unit, not to move them out of the unit.
Respondent also alleges that what it calls its “final neutrality agreement” excludes the 15
Boone Avenue and Burnsville locations from the bargaining unit (Br. at 27–30). The allegation,
as indicated, improperly treats those locations as new facilities rather than relocations of facilities
clearly set forth in the contractual bargaining unit. By reference to a “final neutrality
agreement,” Respondent means to invoke an unsigned document in evidence as Respondent’s .
Exhibit 5. The document marked Respondent Exhiit 5 follows the general format of the two 20
location-specific neutrality agreements entered into by the parties in 2011 for 1-year periods, but
with significant additions that purport to apply generally, with a 2-year term, to all “new”
branches opened by Respondent. Perhaps this is why Respondent is careful to describe Golden
Valley and Apple Valley as having closed and the facilities at Boone Avenue and Burnsville as
having opened as “new” facilities. However, Respondent’s arguments in connection with 25
Respondent’s Exhibit 5 do not provide a defense to its actions in this case.
First, the document is unsigned and undated, except for a notation that it is effective as of
October 1, 2012. Most of the new terms are underlined changes from earlier neutrality
agreements. Respondent’s general counsel, Philip Young, testified that he had an oral 30
understanding with an official of the Union, who is no longer employed by the Union, as to the
substance of the document. But I cannot make findings on the efficacy of that document, based
only on Young’s testimony, in the absence of a signed document or other corroboration. It
would strain credulity to conclude that the Union, which had signed previous neutrality
agreements that were location-specific and had 1-year termination dates, would agree to an open-35
ended agreement with a 2-year term, such as that reflected in Respondent’s Exhibit. 5.

9 In its brief (Br. 27, fn. 4), Respondent cites the testimony of employee Knudsen in an apparent effort
to suggest that the duties of the relocated employees changed in a substantive way, at least as to the
transfer from Apple Valley to Burnsville. I cannot agree. The new location offered safe deposit boxes,
which the old location did not; and the Burnsville branch offered full-time investment services and
mortgage lending services, which the Apple Valley did not offer on a full-time basis. But these
differences were not significant and insufficient to counter my finding that the services offered at the old
and the new locations and the job duties of the transferred employees were substantially the same. This
finding is reinforced by the fact that Respondent saw no need to train the transferred employees in any
new responsibilities at the new locations.
JD–29–16
8
Even if I could consider the document, it would not take precedence over the parties’ last
collective-bargaining agreement, which runs from October 1, 2014, through September 30, 2016.
R. Exh. 5 purports to cover a 2-year period from October 1, 2012 to September 30, 2014. The
last bargaining agreement of the parties makes it clear that the Golden Valley and Apple Valley
branches are in the bargaining unit. Indeed, Respondent’ s Exhibit 5 also defines the bargaining 5
unit as including Golden Valley and Apple Valley, thus making clear that any “new” facilities
covered in Respondent’s Exhibit 5 would not include relocation of those facilities.
Respondent apparently recognizes that King Soopers is adverse to its position so it seeks
to distinguish the case. But this effort also fails. It is not only the case itself that supports the 10
violations in this case, but the principles set forth in the decision and those cases it cites. The
case itself is not distinguishable, certainly not on the grounds asserted by Respondent—its view
(Br. 34) that the Union bargained away its right to continue to represent the employees at the
relocated facilities by virtue of Respondent’s Exhibit 5, the “final neutrality agreement.” Indeed,
as counsel for the General Counsel fully explains in his brief (Br. 10–12) King Soopers is not 15
distinguishable from the situation here, either on the facts or the law, in any meaningful sense.
Apropos is the following passage from the Eighth Circuit’s decision enforcing the Board’s order
in King Soopers (254 F.3d at 742), citing and quoting relevant authorities, which cites and quotes
are omitted here:
20
. . . [F]or the life of a collective bargaining agreement the status of the union as exclusive
bargaining representative may not ordinarily be questioned . . . . This longstanding rule
prohibits employers from petitioning the Board for decertification of a union and from
repudiating the contract or withdrawing recognition from and refusing to bargain with
a union during the term of the collective bargaining agreement absent proof of unusual25
circumstances. A workplace relocation, the scenario at issue here, is not considered the
type of unusual circumstance which prevents the application of this rule . . . . [To]
conclude otherwise would permit any employer to push the Union . . . out the door
whenever an employer might opt to modernize its facility.10
30
The 8(a)(1) Violations
Paragraphs 5(c)-(g) of the original complaint (GC Exh. 1(g)) allege that Human
Resources Director Maki violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when, in meetings with employees
at Golden Valley in early August 2015, he informed them that the Golden Valley facility would 35
be closing and the soon-to-be-opened Boone Avenue facility would be nonunion (or nonunit); 11
if they wanted to remain in the unit represented by the Union, they would have to bump other
unit employees and transfer to other unit facilities; they would be guaranteed positions at the new

10 The Eighth Circuit’s decision in King Soopers also noted that an incumbent union’s right to
continued representation after a relocation is not waived by the union unless such waiver is shown to be
clear and unmistakable, a showing that was not successfully made by the employer in King Soopers. 254
F.3d at 743–744. To the extent that Respondent makes a similar argument here, it likewise has not made
such a showing on this record.
11 As indicated above, there is a dispute as to whether Maki said nonunion or nonunit. In my view
there is no substantive difference because nonunit in the context of this case meant non-union—the Union
would no longer have bargaining rights at the relocated facility.
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9
facility, if they chose, and, if they did, they would receive a wage increase and different health
benefits.12
It is clear from the factual statement, which also references documents distributed to
employees at these meetings, that the complaint allegations described above are supported by the 5
record. In view of my findings as to the unlawful bargaining violations in connection with the
relocation of the Golden Valley facility, Respondent’s statements to employees were coercive
because they suggested removing the unit employees from union representation and promised
them benefits should they choose to transfer to the Boone Avenue facility without representation
by the Union. The Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.10
Paragraphs 5(e)-(g) of the third complaint (GCExh. 1(p)), allege that, in a September 21,
2015 memorandum to Apple Valley employees, Maki told employees that the Apple Valley
facility would be closed; if they wanted to remain in the bargaining unit they would have to seek
a transfer to an existing bargaining unit facility; and, if they chose to transfer to the new15
Burnsville location, they would not have contract benefits, but would have new wages and
benefits determined by Respondent. This is the substance of the September 21 memorandum in
evidence and essentially the same message that was given to Golden Valley employees. (GC
Exh. 13.) As shown in my findings above with respect to the meetings and communications with
Golden Valley employees, Respondent’s enforcement of its unlawful bargaining positions forced 20
employees to choose between remaining in the unit or forsaking representation by the Union,
thus violating Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.13
Paragraphs 5(h)-(j) of the third complaint (GC Exh. 1(p)) allege that the managers at
Respondent’s Apple Valley and Burnsville locations prohibited employees from discussing the 25
closing of the Apple Valley facility with customers; threatened an employee that the employee
should not have gone above them to discuss scheduling concerns related to the relocation of
Apple Valley; and repeatedly instructed employees not to discuss with customers ongoing
picketing by the Union at Burnsville. These allegations are apparently based on the testimony of
employee Karen Knudsen (see Tr. 139–149 and GC Br. at pp. 7 and 14–15). I thought 30
Knudsen’s testimony on this aspect of the case was confusing and unreliable. I am thus not able
to make findings of fact as to exactly what was said to her in these conversations. In any event,
contrary to the General Counsel, I do not view Knudsen’s testimony as showing a coercive
prohibition against engaging in protected concerted activity. I shall therefore dismiss this part of
the complaint. 1435

12 I find that pars. 5(h) and (i) are redundant and I shall therefore dismiss those specific allegations.
Findings on these allegations would not appreciably alter the remedy in this case.
13 I shall dismiss the allegations in pars. 5(a)-(d), which apparently involve conversations between
employee Knudsen and Respondent’s agents, Maki and Weber. Because those conversations basically
involved the same matters set forth in Respondent’s September 21 memorandum discussed above, I view
these allegations as redundant and findings on them would not appreciably add to the remedy in this case.
The same is true of the amendment offered at the hearing concerning similar statements by management
representatives.
14 The record also contains a memorandum from Assistant Manager Rebecca Taxis to Apple Valley
employees dated September 21, 2015, asking employees to describe the closing and relocation as “AV
closing, BV is opening. Do not use the word move as we want to keep them separate.” GC Exh. 23.
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10
The 8(a)(3) and (1) Violations5
Paragraph 6(a) of the original complaint (GC Exh. 1(g)) alleges that Respondent told
employees both orally and in writing that they could not continue to be represented by the Union
and work at the soon-to-be opened Boone Avenue facility; and paragraph 6(c) in the second
complaint (GC Exh. 1(k)) amends the original complaint to add that, as a result, employees 10
Johnson, Menth, Krizer and Chamlongsong were denied the right to transfer to Boone Avenue,
all in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.15
As shown in the factual statement, Respondent’s handling of the transfers forced unit
employees at the Golden Valley facility to choose whether to remain in the Union-represented 15
unit or to transfer to the relocated facility at Boone Avenue as nonunit employees and
unrepresented by the Union or covered under the bargaining agreement. It was a Hobson’s
choice, given the unlawful bargaining violations I have found in connection with the relocation.
The four employees mentioned above, who chose to remain in the Union-represented unit, had to
transfer to other facilities in the unit and could not transfer to Boone Avenue without giving up 20
their contractual benefits and union representation. They were thus discriminated against
because of union considerations in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
The Alleged Interference with Duties of a Union Steward
25
Paragraphs 5(a) and (b) of the original complaint (GC Exh. 1(g)) allege that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when Human Resources Manager Karen Weber prohibited
Union Steward Benique Williams from “asserting a contractual right” during a disciplinary
meeting and disparaged the steward in the presence of the employee being disciplined. This
occurred during a meeting on July 31, 2015, at the Apple Valley facility, and involved the 30
presentation of a verbal warning to employee Lisa Sheppard. A subsequent meeting took place
immediately after this meeting between Williams and Weber over a similar verbal warning
issued to another employee. No violations were alleged concerning that second meeting, which,
so far as the record shows, took place without incident or rancor. Indeed, Williams filed a
grievance over both verbal warnings, and, after another meeting between Williams and Weber 35
over the grievances, the verbal warnings for both employees were rescinded.
Relying on the testimony of Williams, the General Counsel alleges that Weber precluded
Williams from asking questions and unduly criticized her during what Williams described as a
15-minute meeting, thus preventing Williams from “asserting a contractual right.” The General 40
Counsel does not assert that this meeting was required under the Supreme Court’s decision in
NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975). Respondent had already decided to discipline

Another memorandum from Manager Kristina Schack asked the employees not to give the exact dates of
the closing of Apple Valley. (GC Exh. 24.) But these memoranda are not alleged to be unlawful.
15 The complaint spells Krizer’s name as “Kryzer.” However, GC Exh. 10, a document generated by
Respondent, spells her name as Krizer. I shall use Krizer in this decision.
JD–29–16
11
Sheppard and was simply announcing the imposition of the discipline. The General Counsel
concedes that Williams was allowed to participate in the meeting pursuant to a provision in the
parties’ collective-bargaining agreement permitting union stewards or representatives to be
“present” during the type of meeting held here (Br. 8, citing to GC Exh. 22). However, there is
no evidence as to the meaning of the word “present” in either the agreement or the parties’ past 5
practice with respect to the type of meeting involved here. There is thus no way to determine
whether Respondent’s alleged restriction of Williams in the July 31 meeting violated a
“contractual right,” as alleged in the complaint. Moreover, Weber disputed some of the
conclusory aspects of Williams’ testimony. Weber’s testimony was clearer and more detailed
than that of Williams. She testified that Williams was permitted to ask two questions during the 10
meeting, but then Williams kept interrupting Respondent’s presentation of the discipline and
became aggressive and confrontational. I credit Weber’s testimony in this respect. According to
Weber, who had previously participated in similar meetings with Williams, this conduct on the
part of Williams was unusual and different from her conduct in previous meetings. Indeed, the
next disciplinary meeting was not marred by interruptions and disruptions. The subsequent 15
meeting in which the verbal warnings were rescinded was civil and uneventful so far as the
record reflects. In these circumstances, I shall dismiss the allegations that Weber committed
violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act during the July 31 meeting with Union Steward Williams.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW20
1. In connection with its relocation of the Golden Valley and Apple Valley facilities that
were part of the existing contractual bargaining unit to Boone Avenue and Burnsville, by
withdrawing recognition from, and refusing to bargain with, the Union as to the relocations of
the above facilities to Boone Avenue and Burnsville, making unilateral changes in employee 25
wages and benefits for unit employees transferred to those locations, dealing directly with
employees instead of the Union over such transfers, and failing to apply the existing bargaining
agreement to Boone Avenue and Burnsville, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act.
30
2. In connection with the above relocations, by telling employees they could not be
represented by the Union if they transferred to the new locations and by promising wage
increases and different benefits if they transferred to the new locations without union
representation, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
35
3. In connection with the above relocations, by telling employees they could not continue
to be represented by the Union and transfer to the Boone Avenue location, thus denying four
employees the right to transfer to Boone Avenue, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of
the Act.
40
4. The above violations constitute unfair labor practices that affect interstate commerce
within the meaning of the Act.
5. Respondent has not otherwise violated the Act.
45
JD–29–16
12
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent committed the unfair labor practices set forth above, I
shall order it to cease and desist from its unlawful conduct and to post an appropriate notice and
take other affirmative action designed to effectuate the purposes of the Act. More specifically, 5
Respondent will be ordered to apply the collective bargaining agreement to the Boone Avenue
and Burnsville facilities and bargain with the Union over the wages, hours and working
conditions at those facilities. Respondent shall also be ordered to offer the four employees who
were unlawfully denied transfers to those facilities immediate transfers to those facilities, if they
so choose. In addition, Respondent shall be ordered to make affected employees at Boone 10
Avenue and Burnsville whole for any losses of earnings or benefits they may have suffered
because of the failure to apply the bargaining agreement to them, provided that they shall not be
deprived of any increase in earnings or benefits accruing to them by virtue of their past
employment at those facilities. Any computation of monies owed to such employees shall be
made in accordance with Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970), enfd. 444 F.2d 502 15
(6th Cir. 1971).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law, and on the entire record herein, I issue
the following recommended16
20
ORDER
The Respondent, Trustone Financial Federal Credit Union, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall
25
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Modifying an existing contractual bargaining unit without the consent of the
Union.
30
(b) Refusing to bargain with, or withdrawing recognition from, the Union as the
exclusive bargaining representative of the employees at Respondent’s Boone Avenue and
Burnsville facilities.
(c) Refusing or failing to apply the terms and conditions of its existing collective 35
bargaining agreement with the Union to Boone Avenue and Burnsville.
(d) Bypassing the Union and dealing directly with bargaining unit employees
concerning wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment.
40
(e) Making unilateral changes to the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of
employment of bargaining unit employees.

16 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulation, the
findings, conclusions and recommended order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be waived for all purposes.
JD–29–16
13
(f) Preventing bargaining unit employees from transferring to facilities relocated
from facilities included in the bargaining unit unless they forsake representation by the Union.
(g) Promising employees wage increases and different benefits if they transfer to
facilities relocated from facilities included in the bargaining unit.5
(h) Telling employees that they could not transfer to a relocated bargaining unit
facility unless they gave up their right to representation by the Union.
(i) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees 10
in the exercise of right guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from a request, bargain collectively with the Union as the 15
exclusive bargaining representative of employees employed at Respondent’s Boone Avenue and
Burnsville facilities.
(b) Apply the terms of the existing collective bargaining agreement to the employees
at the Boone Avenue and Burnsville facilities.20
(c) Immediately offer transfers to the Boone Avenue facility to employees Joann
Chamlongsong, Colin Menth, Shannon Johnson, and Liza Krizer.
(d) Make the employees at Boone Avenue and Burnsville whole for any losses they 25
may have suffered due to the failure to apply the collective-bargaining agreement to them in
accordance with the remedy portion of this decision, provided that nothing in this order shall
require that any increase in wages or benefits be rescinded.
(e) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the Regional 30
Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board
or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records
and reports, and all other records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored in
electronic form, necessary to analyze any monies due under the terms of this order.
35
(f) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at all the facilities covered by its
bargaining agreement with the Union, including the Boone Avenue and Burnsville facilities,
copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”17 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 18, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in 40
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,

17 If this order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice
reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board.”
defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these
proceedings, the Respondent has
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to
all current employees and former employees employed at those facilities by Respondent at any
time since August 18, 2015.5
(g) Within 21 days after service by the Region file with the Regional Director a
sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the
steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
10
Dated at Washington, D.C., April 1
15
14
gone out of business or closed the facilities involved in these
3, 2016.
Christine E. Dibble
Administrative Law Judge
JD–29–16
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT modify the existing bargaining unit in our collective-bargaining agreement with
Office and Professional Employees International Union, Local 12 (the Union), without the
consent of the Union.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with, or withdraw recognition from, the Union as the
exclusive bargaining representative of the employees at Respondent’s Boone Avenue and
Burnsville facilities.
WE WILL NOT refuse or fail to apply the terms and conditions of our existing collective-
bargaining agreement with the Union to Boone Avenue and Burnsville.
WE WILL NOT bypass the Union and deal directly with bargaining unit employees
concerning wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment.
WE WILL NOT make unilateral changes to the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of
employment of bargaining unit employees.
WE WILL NOT prevent bargaining unit employees from transferring to facilities relocated
from facilities included in the bargaining unit unless they forsake representation by the Union.
WE WILL NOT promise employees wage increases and different benefits if they transfer to
facilities relocated from facilities included in the bargaining unit.
WE WILL NOT tell employees that they cannot transfer to a relocated bargaining unit facility
unless they give up their right to representation by the Union.
WE WILL NOT, in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain or coerce employees
in the exercise of right guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from a request, bargain collectively with the Union as the
exclusive bargaining representative of employees employed at our Boone Avenue and Burnsville
facilities.
WE WILL apply the terms of the existing collective-bargaining agreement to the employees at
the Boone Avenue and Burnsville facilities.
WE WILL immediately offer transfers to the Boone Avenue facility to employees Joann
Chamlongsong, Colin Menth, Shannon Johnson, and Liza Krizer.
WE WILL make the employees at Boone Avenue and Burnsville whole for any losses they
may have suffered due to our failure to apply the collective-bargaining agreement to them, but
any increase in wages or benefits will not be rescinded.
TRUESTONE FINANCIAL FEDERAL CREDIT UNION
(Employer)
Dated __________________________By ________________________________________
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the
National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want
union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To
find out more about your rights under the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak
confidentially to any agent with the Board’s Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain
information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
Federal Office Building, Suite 200, 212 Third Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55401
(612) 348-1757, Hours: 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/18-CA-158210
or by using the QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive
Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273−1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND
MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS
CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE
REGIONAL OFFICE’S COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (612) 348−1770.