Trustees of Boston University

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 29, 1974

210 N.L.R.B. 330 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

330 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Trustees of Boston University and Building and
Service Employees' International Union, Local
254, AFL-CIO. Case 1-CA-9296
April 29, 1974
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS JENKINS
AND KENNEDY
On January 29, 1974, Administrative Law Judge
Paul Bisgyer issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed
a brief in support of the Administrative Law Judge's
Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,
and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge
and to adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Respondent, Trustees of Boston
University, Boston, Massachusetts, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns , shall take the action
set forth in the said recommended Order.
whether the Respondent since on or about August 17,
1973, has failed to perform its statutory bargaining
obligation by refusing to furnish to Building and Service
Employees' International Union, Local 254, AFL-CIO,
herein called the Union, the exclusive representative of the
Respondent 's maintenance and servicing employees, cer-
tain requested information alleged to be relevant and
necessary to the processing of a grievance under the
parties' current collective-bargaining agreement and there-
by violated Section 8(aXl) and (5) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended .2 At the close of the hearing,
the parties waived oral argument but thereafter the
General Counsel and the Respondent submitted briefs in
support of their respective positions.
Upon the entire record,3 and from my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses , and with due consideration
being given to the arguments advanced by the parties, I
make the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. JURISDICTION
The Respondent operates a private nonprofit education-
al institution in Boston, Massachusetts, where it also has its
principal office. From these operations, it annually derives
gross revenues, for use with no restrictions, in excess of $1
million. In the regular course and conduct of the
institution, the Respondent annually purchases goods and
materials valued in excess of $50,000 which are transported
to its Boston location directly from sources outside the
Commonwealth.
It is conceded , and I find, that the Respondent is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Admittedly, the Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PAUL BISGYER , Administrative Law Judge: This proceed-
ing, with all parties represented, was heard on November
19, 1973, in Boston , Massachusetts , on the complaint of the
General Counsel issued on October 11, 1973,1 and the
answer of Trustees of Boston University, herein called the
Respondent or the University. In issue is the question
i The complaint is based on a charge filed by Building and Service
Employees' International Union, Local 254, AFL-CIO, on Aug. 24, 1973, a
copy of which was duly served on the Respondent by registered mail on
Aug. 27, 1973.
2 Section 8(a)( I) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to interfere with , restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in section 7." Insofar as pertinent, Section 7 provides
that "[e ]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations , to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ...."
Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees"
designated by a majority of them in an appropriate unit.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Evidence
For the past 20 years, the Union has been the collective-
bargaining representative of the Respondent's mainte-
nance and servicing employees .4 Included in the bargain-
ing unit, among others , were seven painters assigned to the
paint shop which was one of several subdepartments of the
physical plant supervised by Director John J. Hoban and
3 No opposition having been filed to the General Counsel's motion to
correct the record, a copy of which was duly served on the parties, the
motion is granted and the transcript of testimony is accordingly corrected in
the respects indicated in Appendix A of this Decision [omitted from
publication J.
4 The bargaining unit, as described in the complaint and conceded to be
appropriate, consists of:
All full-time and regular part-time employees employed by Respondent
in the maintenance and servicing of Boston University in the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, exclusive of student employees,
employees directly assigned to academic departments , office clerical
employees, professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined
in Section 2(11) of the Act.
210 NLRB No. 48
TRUSTEES OF BOSTON UNIVERSITY
Assistant Director Nathan H. Poor . As discussed below, it
was the elimination of the paint shop and the permanent
layoff of six employee -painters which gave rise to the filing
of a grievance and the Union's demands for assertedly
relevant and necessary information to enable it to handle
and process the grievance intelligently . The pertinent facts
are undisputed and may be summarized , as follows:
On August 13, 1973 ,5 six of the seven employee-painters6
received separate letters signed by Assistant Director Poor,
stating:
Due to a budget reduction , the Boston University
Physical Plant is eliminating the Paint Shop work force.
Therefore, this date will mark your notice of layoff,
which will be effective on August 31, 1973.
If you desire to be placed on a re -employment list and
apply for other University positions, please contact the
Personnel Services Department ... .
It appears that, in eliminating the paint shop and laying off
the painters, the Respondent acted in reliance upon article
VI, the management rights section of its current collective-
bargaining contract with the Union ,7 which provides:
The parties agree that the operation of Boston
University, including the supervision of the employees
and of their work , is the right of the University.
Accordingly , the establishment of reasonable rules to
assure orderly and effective work , the determination of
what, when and where duties will be performed, the
right to lay off employees due to lack of work, the
determination of employees ' competency, the hiring,
transfer, promotion , demotion, layoff, discipline or
discharge of employees for just cause , and working
schedules, are rights of the University alone, subject to
other provisions of this Agreement . The University shall
S All dates refer to 1973 unless otherwise indicated.
6 One painter was retained in the Respondent 's employ but his retention
has no bearing on the issue before me.
I This contract was executed on January 31, 1973 , for a term expiring on
October 31 , 1974, and yearly thereafter in the absence of 60-day written
notice of termination.
6 Art. VII provides, in pertinent part , as follows:
1. The representatives of both the University and the Union shall be
responsible for making prompt and earnest efforts to adjust grievances
or misunderstandings between employees and the University.
3. Grievances other than those handled directly by the individual
affected shall be handled as follows:
Step 1: The grievance shall be taken up by the Union 's Steward
with the Foreman within seven (7) days of the alleged
infraction . If no satisfactory settlement is reached within two (2)
days thereafter, then:
Step 2: The grievance shall be reduced to writing and submitted
to the other side . The written statement of the grievance shall
specify the provision or provisions of the Agreement claimed to
be violated . The grievance shall be taken up at a conference
between representatives of the Union and the authorized
representative of the University . Such conference shall be held
within five (5) days after it has been requested.
331
not exercise these rights arbitrarily, capriciously or in bad
faith. [Emphasis supplied.]
Upon the painters' receipt of their layoff notices, Shop
Steward Demers telephoned the Union and informed
Assistant Business Agent James C. Moore of the Respon-
dent's action. The next day (August 14), the Respondent
sent the Union copies of the layoff letters quoted above.
Acting in accordance with the four-step grievance-
arbitration procedure prescribed by the parties ' contracts
the shop steward promptly protested the layoff to the
painters' foreman who summarily rejected their complaint.
A written grievance dated August 14 was thereupon
drafted by the Union and signed by the laid-off painters,
alleging that the elimination of the paint shop and their
layoff violated articles I (purpose of agreement), II
(recognition), V (seniority), VI (management rights), and
XX (antidiscrimination) of the contract .9
At a union-management meeting held in Poor 's office on
August 17 , as the second step in the grievance procedure,
Moore presented the written grievance to Poor. In the
ensuing discussion , Poor explained that Director Hoban
had made the decision to discontinue the paint shop and to
lay off the six painters on account of a reduction in the
physical plant budget ; that the paint shop was selected for
elimination because it performed the "least essential"
services ; and that the Respondent 's action was sanctioned
by the above-quoted management rights clause in the
bargaining contract. When the shop steward asserted that
he had observed an increase in painting work being
performed by subcontractors at that time ,10 Poor denied
that the moneys expended for this year's subcontracted
painting jobs exceeded such expenditures during the past 2
or 3 years . Admittedly, the Respondent has for years
employed contractors to perform painting work at the
University , in addition to that regularly done by its own
painters, without objection from the Union . It also appears
Step 3 : In the event the grievance is not settled, the authorized
representatives of the Union shall meet with the Personnel
Director. Step 4: If no settlement is arrived at within five (5)
days following such conference , then either party may submit
the grievance to arbitration under the rules of the American
Arbitration Association . The decision of the arbitrator shall be
final and binding except that he shall have no authority to add
to, subtract from, change or disregard any of the terms or
provisions of this Agreement ....
The word "grievance" shall not be interpreted to include questions of
general wage rates throughout the bargaining unit. These questions are
reserved to the University and the Union.
9 Specifically, the grievance stated that "Our rights under arts. 1, 11, V,
VI, and XX have been violated in that Boston University has notified us
that they are going to eliminate the Building and Grounds Paint Shop, while
the services of painters are still going to be required to maintain the
University." Art. V relates to the Respondent 's retention of a seventh
painter, concerning which no information was requested and therefore is
not involved in this case.
10 Moore similarly testified that between August 17 and 23 he, too, had
observed a great number of outside painters working at the University and
that after August 31 , the effective date of the layoff, he also saw a
contractor's painter finishing jobs which lard-off painters had previously
started . Moore further testified that he believed that the painting
subcontracts were entered into about June and July and that he had no
knowledge whether any were executed after the effective date of the layoff.
332 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that this contracting practice never resulted in the past in
the layoff of any of the University's own painters."
In the course of these discussions, Moore sought from
the Respondent substantiation of the reason advanced for
the layoff and information concerning subcontracted
painting work. Accordingly, he requested of Poor copies of
the physical plant budget for the current and the 2 previous
years and copies of the painting subcontracts executed
during the same years.12 Moore testified that he needed
this material to verify and evaluate the asserted budget cut
and the extent of subcontracted painting work by compar-
ing the current physical plant budget and subcontracts
with those of the past 2 years in order to ascertain whether
the elimination of the paint shop and the layoff were
justifiable or whether the Respondent had acted arbitrarily
and in bad faith. 13 Poor, however, declined to provide the
requested data solely on the ground that the Union was not
entitled to it. The meeting ended with Poor's denial of the
grievance.
Not having received satisfaction of the grievance on this
level, the Union proceeded to the third step of the
grievance procedure . On August 23, Moore , accompanied
by the shop steward and a painter, both of whom had also
attended the prior meeting, met with Personnel Director
Ritchie, his assistant, Jack Schnieder, Physical Plant
Director Hoban, and Poor. In response to Ritchie's
inquiries, Moore undertook to clarify in what respects he
believed the contract was violated by the Respondent as
set forth in the written grievance . He explained that article
I (purpose of agreement) was violated in that good
relations between the parties could not be promoted by
eliminating the paint shop while retaining outside painters
to perform painting work . Article II (recognition) was
breached because employees represented by the Union
were laid off and thereby were removed from the unit.
Article VI (management rights) was violated because the
Respondent acted arbitrarily and in bad faith in discontin-
uing the paint shop while "quite a bit of painting" was
being carried on by contracting firms . Finally, article XX
(antidiscrimination ) was breached in that the painters were
selected from among all the employees to be terminated. In
response to Moore's contention that article VI was
violated, Ritchie insisted that the elimination of the paint
shop with the consequent layoff was due to a cut in the
physical plant budget. Hoban confirmed Ritchie, adding
that the paint shop was discontinued because it was the
"least essential" service. On this occasion , Moore reiterated
the Union's request for copies of the physical plant budget
and the painting contracts for the current and 2 previous
years.14 Ritchie, however, adhered to the University's
position that the Union was not entitled to such informa-
tion. At this point, the shop steward asked Hoban whether
he had any painting contracts which were costing the
11 Of course , the question whether the subcontracting was actually a
factor in the elimination of the paint shop relates to the meets of the
controversy between the parties , which is now pending before an arbitrator,
and manifestly is not an issue before me.
is Moore also requested copies of the budget for the same years for the
entire University covering departments other than those comprising the
physical plant. The complaint , however, does not allege the Respondent's
refusal to furnish such information to violate the Act and, hence , is not an
issue in this proceeding.
is As indicated above , art. VI of the contract entitled "Management-
University $80 a day per man. Hoban answered in the
negative . Ritchie then denied the grievance on the ground
of management rights and the meeting closed . It is noted
that at neither the August 17 nor August 23 meeting did
the Respondent claim that the requested information was
nonexistent or too burdensome to produce.
The Respondent's refusal to furnish the requested
information prompted the Union to file the next day
(August 24) the unfair labor practice charge in this case,
alleging that this information was relevant and necessary
for the Union's intelligent and effective representation of
the employees in question regarding their layoff. In
addition, pursuant to the contractual grievance procedure,
the Union submitted its grievance to arbitration , manifest-
ly the appropriate forum for the resolution of the parties'
dispute on the merits. It appears that at the subsequently
held arbitration hearing the question of the Union's right
to the material involved in the present unfair labor
practices case was not raised but that , after evidence was
taken pertaining to the merits of the dispute, the arbitrator
decided to keep the proceeding "open pending further
advice from the Parties" regarding the disposition of the
unfair labor practice case . 15 It is unclear whether or not the
arbitrator committed himself to receive as evidence any
documents or information the Board might order the
Respondent to furnish to the Union.
In justification of the discontinuance of the paint shop
and the termination of the six employee-painters and in
defense of the Respondent 's withholding of the requested
material, Director Hoban testified that it was he who made
the decision to eliminate the paint shop and to terminate
the employee-painters ; 16 that this decision was based on
his opinion that it was not efficient to paint the Universi-
ty's buildings during the academic year but that this work
should be performed during the vacation period from May
through August; and that for this reason it was unnecessar-
y to maintain a regular painting crew . It is undisputed that
the foregoing reason was not conveyed to the Union or the
laid-off painters . Hoban further testified that for the past 2
fiscal years the amount of subcontracted painting work
remained substantially the same ; that most of those
contracts for the current year were let in June and a few in
July and August; and that, although those contracts called
for completion dates prior to August 31, contractors
remained on the job after that date for the sole purpose of
finishing up work which they should have completed
before.
B. Concluding Findings
The General Counsel contends that the information
sought by the Union is relevant and reasonably necessary
for the proper performance of its statutory function to
Rights," expressly provides that 'qt the University shall not exercise these
rights arbitrarily , capriciously or in bad faith."
14 On this occasion , too, Moore unsuccessfully sought copies of the
University's budget pertaining to departments other than the physical plant.
is According to Assistant Business Agent Moore, his initial request to
the arbitrator to postpone the arbitration hearing pending the outcome of
the instant Board case was denied.
is As of the time of hearing herein, the terminated painters were not
replaced.
TRUSTEES OF BOSTON UNIVERSITY 333
administer the bargaining agreement and intelligently to
evaluate and process the layoff grievance thereunder and
that therefore the Respondent's refusal to comply with the
Union's requests constitutes a breach of the Respondent's
bargaining obligation violative of Section 8(aX5) and (1) of
the Act. The Respondent, on the other hand, argues that
the Union is not entitled to the requested information
because such material "bears no relevance to the issues in
dispute, is privileged and, if made public, could result in
substantial damage to the University." To demonstrate the
irrelevancy of the requested data, the Respondent urges
that it exercised in good faith its managerial rights under
article VI of the parties' agreement to eliminate the paint
shop and lay off its employee -painters and that no work
normally performed by these painters was contracted out.
However, no evidence was adduced showing the confiden-
tial nature of the requested information or the damage the
Respondent would likely suffer as a consequence of
disclosure.
It is now settled law that the duty to bargain in good
faith imposed upon an employer by Section 8(aX5) of the
Act includes the obligation to provide the employees'
representative with information relevant and reasonably
necessary to the intelligent performance of its function as
bargaining agent . 17 Since "the duty to bargain," as the
Supreme Court has observed, "unquestionably extends
beyond the period of contract negotiations and applies to
labor-management relations during the term of an agree-
ment," 18 the employer's obligation to furnish information
extends with equal force to material needed by the Union
for the effective administration of an existing contract and
the processing of grievances thereunder even through
arbitration.19 Certainly, the production of relevant infor-
mation with respect to a grievance serves the additional
worthwhile purpose of enabling the bargaining representa-
tive to evaluate prudently the merits of the asserted claim
with the view of deciding whether to pursue the grievance
through arbitration or to drop it 20 And where binding
arbitration is pursued under the parties' contract, the
foregoing "discovery-type standard decide[s] nothing
about the merits" of the controversy, which still remains as
a matter for the arbitrator 's ultimate resolution unaffected
by "the Board's threshold determination concerning the
potential relevance of the requested information." 21
Applying these principles to the present case , I find,
contrary to the Respondent's contention, that the Union is
entitled to copies of the physical plant budget for the
current and 2 prior years and copies of the painting
subcontracts entered into during these years and that the
Respondent 's asserted good-faith reliance on its contractu-
al right unilaterally to discontinue the paint shop and to
lay off its painters does not relieve it of the statutory duty
to produce this material. The requested information, I find,
has potential relevance to the employee-painters' grievance
17 NL.R B v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-436 (1967); The
Prudential Insurance Company of America v. N.LR.B., 412 F.2d 77, 81 (C.A.
2), cert denied 396 U.S. 928 (1969); The Timken Roller Bearing Company Y.
N LR B, 325 F 2d 746, 750 (C.A. 6, 1963), cert, denied 376 U.S. 971(1964).
18 N L R. B v Acme, supra 436.
19 Fn 17, supra
20 It is not, nor can it be validly, contended that the Board is without
jurisdiction to decide the relevancy of the requested material. As the
and must be supplied to the Union as their bargaining
agent.
As indicated above , the Respondent bases its right to
discontinue the paint shop and lay off the painting crew on
the management rights clause in the contract . Significantly,
this asserted right is not without qualification . Article VI
expressly provides that the "University shall not exercise
these rights arbitrarily, capriciously or in bad faith."
Moreover, in their notice of layoff, the employee-painters
were advised by the Respondent that its action was due to
a budget reduction . This reason was reiterated by the
Respondent in the subsequent union-management discus-
sions in the second and third steps of the contractual
grievance procedure . By thus attributing the elimination of
the paint shop and the layoff to cutbacks in the physical
plant budget, the Union's requests for the copies of the
physical plant budget for the current and past 2 years had
a definite bearing on the validity of the employees'
grievance and the question whether the Respondent acted
"arbitrarily, capriciously or in bad faith ." 22 Manifestly,
these documents would enable the Union to compare and
evaluate the physical plant budgets for these years to
ascertain whether there was, in fact, a budget cut
warranting the elimination of the paint shop and the layoff.
Furthermore, as the Respondent also denied at a grievance
meeting that the moneys expended during the current year
for painting subcontracts did not significantly exceed the
amount normally allowed for such purposes in prior years,
the potential relevance of the budgetary information is
readily apparent as well . Whether or not the evidence thus
developed would be sufficient to persuade the arbitrator to
sustain the grievance is beside the point . Under settled law
recited above, it is the potential relevance of the requested
information to the grievance that governs the Union's right
to disclosure.
With respect to the Union's requests for copies of the
painting subcontracts for the current and 2 previous years,
I similarly find that such information has potential
relevance to the grievance in question and should therefore
be produced. Conceivably, an unusual increase in painting
subcontracts could adversely affect the amount of work
available to employee-painters and their job security. This
being the case, a disclosure of the requested material would
give the Union the opportunity to appraise the situation
and determine whether the Respondent had actually
increased subcontracting work at the expense of the laid-
off employee-painters or whether the subcontracting
practice had remained relatively stable during the past few
years, as the Respondent claims. This information, in turn,
would have some relevance to the question whether the
Respondent acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and in bad faith
when it eliminated the paint shop and laid off the
employee-painters and thereby violated the contractual
limitation on its managerial prerogatives.
Supreme Court observed in N.LRB. v. Acme, supra, 436, the Board is not
required to "await an arbitrator 's determination of the relevancy of the
requested information before it can enforce the union's statutory rights
under Section 8(aX5)." See also Timken Rolla Bearing, sirpra 751-754; The
Fafnir Bearing Company v. N.LR. B., 362 F.2d 716, 721-722 (C.A. 2, 1966).
21 N.LRB. v. Acme, supra 437-438.
22 Cf. Puerto Rico Telephone Company v. N.LR.B., 359 F.2d 983 , 986-987
(CA. 1, 1966).
334 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
It is thus clear that disclosure of the foregoing informa-
tion, in all probability, "would be of use to the union in
carrying out its statutory duties and responsibilities." 23
Doubtlessly , as the exclusive representative of the Respon-
dent's employees , the Union has a real interest and, indeed,
the duty to see that its constituents are treated fairly by
their Employer and that their contractual rights are
respected and vindicated . Without the requested informa-
tion, the Union is hampered in effectively and intelligently
performing this duty and making an informed judgment of
the merits of the employee -painters' grievance whether to
pursue it further or drop it . The law no longer requires the
bargaining representative "to play a game of blind man's
bluff" 24 in its effort to protect the employees ' interests.
Had the Union here been furnished with the information
when first requested , it might well have been persuaded to
forego processing the grievance to arbitration. Lastly, I
find nothing in the record or the special circumstances of
the University, as an employer, which warrants depriving
the Union of its right to disclosure because of the asserted
confidential nature of the requested documents or the
possible damage the University might suffer as a result of
disclosure.
In sum, I find that, by refusing to supply the requested
material to the Union during the second and third steps of
the grievance procedure and the pendency of the arbitra-
tion proceeding, the Respondent breached its bargaining
obligation in violation of Section 8(aX5) and (1) of the Act.
In so ruling, I, of course, do not determine the merits of the
employee-painters' grievance or the propriety of the
Respondent's elimination of the paint shop and the
termination of the six painters . Matters of this nature are
clearly the province of the arbitrator whom the parties
have designated to resolve their dispute in accordance with
the terms of their contract.
IV. THE REMEDY
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, as amended, it is
recommended that the Respondent be ordered to cease
and desist from engaging in the unfair labor practices
found and in any like or related conduct and take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act. As I have found that the Respondent has unlawfully
failed to perform its bargaining obligation by denying the
Union, as the exclusive representative of the Respondent's
employees in an appropriate unit, copies of the physical
plant budget for the current and 2 prior years and copies of
the painting subcontracts let during these periods, which
the Union has repeatedly requested , I recommend that the
Respondent be ordered promptly to furnish such informa-
tion to the Union. The posting of an appropriate notice is
also recommended.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
upon the entire record in the case , I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All full-time and regular part-time employees em-
ployed by the Respondent in the maintenance and
servicing of Boston University in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, exclusive of student employees , employees
directly assigned to academic departments , office clerical
employees, professional employees , guards and supervisors
as defined in Section 2(11) of the Act, constitute a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. At all times material herein, the Union has been the
exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the
aforesaid appropriate unit within the meaning of Section
9(a) of the Act.
5. By refusing to furnish the Union with copies of the
physical plant budget for the current and 2 prior years and
copies of the painting subcontracts let during the same
years, for use in connection with the prosecution of the
grievance of the Respondent's laid-off employee-painters,
the Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(aX5) and (1) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, as amended, I hereby issue the following recommend-
ed:
ORDER 25
The Respondent , Trustees of Boston University, Boston,
Massachusetts, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to perform its statutory bargaining obliga-
tion owing to Building and Service Employees' Interna-
tional Union, Local 254, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive
representative of the Respondent's employees in the unit
described below, by refusing to furnish the Union with
information relevant and necessary for the proper prosecu-
tion of the grievance filed by its six employee-painters:
All full-time and regular part-time employees employed
by the Respondent in the maintenance and servicing of
Boston University in the Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts, exclusive of student employees, employees direct-
ly assigned to academic departments , office clerical
employees, professional employees , guards and super-
visors as defined in Section 2(11) of the Act.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
23 N LR.B. v. Acme, supra, 437. conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
24 The Fafnir Bearing Company v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 716, 721 (C.A. 2, 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
1966). its findings , conclusions , and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
25 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the deemed waived for all purposes.
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
TRUSTEES OF BOSTON UNIVERSITY 335
bargaining rights through the above-named Union, which
are guaranteed to them in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Furnish the above-named Union with copies of the
physical plant budget for the current and 2 previous years
and copies of the painting subcontracts entered into with
outside contractors during the same years, for use in
connection with the prosecution of the grievance filed by
the Respondent's laid-off employee-painters which is now
pending before an arbitrator.
(b) Post at its physical plant office in Boston, Massachu-
setts, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix
B."26 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 1, after being duly signed by
the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted
by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and
be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in writing,
within 20 days from the receipt of this Order, what steps
the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
26 In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX B
appropriate unit described below, by refusing to
furnish the Union with information relevant and
necessary for the proper prosecution of the grievance
filed by our laid-off employee-painters:
All full-time and regular part-time employees
employed by the Respondent in the maintenance
and servicing of Boston University in the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts , exclusive of student
employees, employees directly assigned to aca-
demic departments , office clerical employees,
professional employees, guards and supervisors as
defined in Section 2(11) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of their bargaining rights
through the above-named Union, which are guaranteed
to them in Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL furnish the above-named Union with
copies of the physical plant budget for the current and
2 previous years and copies of the painting subcon-
tracts entered into with outside contractors during the
same years, for use in connection with the prosecution
of the grievance filed by our laid-off employee- painters
which is now pending before an arbitrator.
Dated By
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT refuse to perform our statutory
bargaining obligation owing to Building and Service
Employees' International Union, Local 254, AFL-CIO,
as the exclusive representative of our employees in the
TRUSTEES OF BOSTON
UNIVERSrrY
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office,
Seventh Floor, Bulfinch Building, 15 New Chardon Street,
Boston, Massachusetts 02114, Telephone 617-223-3300.