Trump Marina Casino Resort

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 31, 2009

354 N.L.R.B. 1027 (N.L.R.B. 2009)

354 NLRB No. 123
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Trump Marina Associates, LLC d/b/a Trump Marina
Casino Resort and International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Im-
plement Workers of America, UAW. Case 4–
CA–36528
December 31, 2009
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN LIEBMAN AND MEMBER SCHAUMBER
On August 27, 2009, Administrative Law Judge
Robert A. Giannasi issued the attached decision. The
Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and
the General Counsel filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board1 has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, find-
ings,2 and conclusions and to adopt the recommended
Order.

1 Effective midnight December 28, 2007, Members Liebman,
Schaumber, Kirsanow, and Walsh delegated to Members Liebman,
Schaumber, and Kirsanow, as a three-member group, all of the Board’s
powers in anticipation of the expiration of the terms of Members Kir-
sanow and Walsh on December 31, 2007. Pursuant to this delegation,
Chairman Liebman and Member Schaumber constitute a quorum of the
three-member group. As a quorum, they have the authority to issue
decisions and orders in unfair labor practice and representation cases.
See Sec. 3(b) of the Act. See Narricot Industries, L.P. v. NLRB, ___
F.3d ___, 2009 WL 4016113 (4th Cir. Nov. 20, 2009); Snell Island
SNF LLC v. NLRB, 568 F.3d 410 (2d Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed
78 U.S.L.W. 3130 (U.S. Sept. 11, 2009) (No. 09-328); New Process
Steel v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted ___ S.Ct.
___, 2009 WL 1468482 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2009); Northeastern Land Ser-
vices v. NLRB, 560 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed 78
U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. Aug. 18, 2009) (No. 09-213); Teamsters Local
523 v. NLRB, ___ F.3d ___, 2009 WL 4912300 (10th Cir. Dec. 22,
2009). But see Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB,
564 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed 78 U.S.L.W. 3185
(U.S. Sept. 29, 2009) (No. 09-377).
2 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
We agree with the judge that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by
maintaining and enforcing unlawfully broad rules prohibiting employ-
ees from releasing statements to the news media without prior approval,
and authorizing only certain representatives to speak with the media.
The Respondent argues that the judge erroneously conflated the rules,
but the Respondent acknowledged in its posthearing brief that the rules
are part of a bifurcated approach to limit employee statements to the
media. Further, the judge found that after Shift Manager Karen Lew
asked employee Mario Spina if he had spoken to the media, Lew refer-
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Trump Marina Associates,
LLC d/b/a Trump Marina Casino Resort, Atlantic City,
New Jersey, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the Order.
Dated, Washington, D.C. December 31, 2009
______________________________________
Wilma B. Liebman, Chairman
______________________________________
Peter C. Schaumber, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Emily DeSa, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Brian A. Caufield, Esq., of Roseland, New Jersey, for the Re-
spondent.
Cassie R. Ehrenberg, Esq., of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for
the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ROBERT A. GIANNASI, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on June 3, 2009. The
complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act by maintaining and enforcing rules restricting employ-
ees from speaking to the media about protected concerted and
union activities within the meaning of Section 7 of the Act.
The complaint also alleges that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) by interrogating an employee concerning his communi-
cations with the media about the decision of an NLRB adminis-
trative law judge in a case involving Respondent, and advising
the employee that the communication violated Respondent’s
rules against speaking to the media. Respondent filed an an-
swer denying the essential allegations of the complaint. The

enced both rules. The credited testimony was that Lew asked Spina if
Spina represented the Respondent, and reminded him that in the future
he would need prior approval before speaking to the media, thus invok-
ing both rules to “restrict Section 7 activity.” See Crowne Plaza Hotel,
352 NLRB 382, 383 (2008), citing Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia,
343 NLRB 646, 646–647 (2004).
Member Schaumber agrees that the Respondent’s questioning of
Spina constituted an unlawful interrogation, not necessarily because the
Respondent attempted to enforce rules the Board is now finding overly
broad, but because the Respondent was clearly inquiring into his Sec. 7
activity.
In support of his finding that the rules are unlawfully overbroad, the
judge cited Saginaw Control & Engineering, Inc., 339 NLRB 541
(2003). However, in that case there were no exceptions to the Board on
that finding. Accordingly, Saginaw Control has no precedential value
and we do not rely on it. However, Brunswick Corp., 282 NLRB 794,
795 (1987), also cited by the judge, has precedential value and supports
his finding.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
General Counsel and Respondent filed posthearing briefs,
which I have read and considered.
Based on the entire record in this case, including the testi-
mony of the witnesses, and my observation of their demeanor, I
make the following
Findings of Fact
Jurisdiction
Respondent, a New Jersey corporation, is engaged in the op-
eration of a hotel and casino in Atlantic City, New Jersey.
During a representative 1-year period, Respondent received
gross revenues in excess of $500,000, and purchased and re-
ceived, at its casino, goods valued in excess of $5000 directly
from points outside the State of New Jersey.
Accordingly, I find, as Respondent admits, that it is an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
The Charging Party Union (the Union) is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
The Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
Background
On July 18, 2008, Administrative Law Judge Earl Shamwell
issued his decision in Cases 4–CA–35334, et al., involving the
same Respondent and Union that are involved in the instant
case. Judge Shamwell found that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act in several respects; recommended
dismissing other complaint allegations; and sustained certain
objections to a Board representation election held on May 11,
2007, among Respondent’s casino dealers. Among the unfair
labor practices he found were that Respondent’s Shift Manager
Karen Lew discriminatorily issued employee Mario Spina, a
leading and open union supporter, a suspension and final warn-
ing, after summoning Spina into her office on April 27, 2007.
Judge Shamwell also found that Respondent’s unlawful con-
duct warranted setting aside the election.
On February 17, 2009, the Board affirmed most of Judge
Shamwell’s findings, including those involving the suspension
and warning of employee Mario Spina. The Board also found,
contrary to the judge, that Respondent had additionally violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when a supervisor made two coercive
statements to Spina. In addition, the Board affirmed Judge
Shamwell’s order that the election be set aside and a new elec-
tion take place. As of the time of the hearing in this case, the
new election had not been held, because the Respondent filed a
petition to review the Board’s Order. That petition was still
pending at the time of the hearing.
Respondent’s Handbook Rules on Talking to the Media
It is stipulated that Respondent’s handbook contains the fol-
lowing rules:
EMPLOYEE CONDUCT
Violation of, disregard for, or any departure from a
posted or known Company policy or departmental rule, or
commission of any prohibited conduct as outlined below
will subject employees to disciplinary action up to and in-
cluding discharge:
. . . .
36. Releasing statement to the news media without
prior authorization.
. . . .
PUBLIC SPEAKING/MEDIA REQUESTS
It is the policy of Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts that
only the following employees, Chief Executive Officer,
the respective property’s Chief Operating Officer, General
Manager or Public Relations Director/Manager is author-
ized to speak with the media.
Employee Spina Comments on Judge Shamwell’s Decision
After the issuance of Judge Shamwell’s decision, a union
representative called employee Mario Spina and asked for his
comment on the decision. Spina, who understood that the
comment would be used in a union publication, said that the
judge had gotten “it exactly right,” referring to the determina-
tion that the Respondent had discriminated against him. Sub-
sequently, on July 29, 2008, the Union issued a press release
describing Judge Shamwell’s decision in favorable terms. In
that release, Spina was quoted as saying, “The judge got this
one exactly right.” He was also quoted as saying, “[T]he com-
pany broke all kinds of rules and interfered with our right to
vote—and we’re not going to allow them to get away with it.”
As a result of the Union’s press release, an Associated Press
article appeared in the Atlantic City Courier Post about Judge
Shamwell’s decision. The article used the quotations of Spina
that appeared in the Union’s press release. Several of Respon-
dent’s management officials saw the story and expressed con-
cern that Spina might have violated Respondent’s policy, set
forth in its rules above, against talking to the media without
permission. Spina had not been authorized by Respondent to
talk to the media about Judge Shamwell’s decision. Shift Man-
ager Karen Lew, who had issued Spina the earlier discrimina-
tory warning and suspension, took the lead in investigating
Spina’s possible violation of Respondent’s media policy. She
first consulted Respondent’s vice president and the director of
employee relations and obtained approval to talk to Spina about
the possible infraction.
Respondent Confronts Spina About His Comments
On August 12, 2008, Respondent summoned Spina from his
work station to Shift Manager Karen Lew’s office. The office
is one of several in an area off the casino floor. It is used by
different shift managers and is also the site of some training
meetings, although it is a relatively small office, about 12 feet
by 12 feet. Between the time Spina was summoned to the of-
fice and the time he reported, Casino Administrator Mark Wal-
ter arrived in the office to talk to Lew about some scheduling
matters. He remained in the office after Spina arrived and
throughout the short meeting between Lew and Spina, although
he did not say anything. Lew sat at one of the two desks in the
Shift Manager’s office and Spina sat across from her about 5
feet away.
Lew mentioned the Courier Post article to Spina and referred
to his quoted statement in the article. She also mentioned Re-
spondent’s policy against talking to the media. She asked
Spina if he had talked to the media and Spina responded that he
had talked only to a union representative. Lew also asked if
TRUMP MARINA ASSOCIATES 3
Spina was a representative of the Trump dealers or of Trump
and he said that he had made no such statement. Lew then
reminded Spina that in the future he would have to receive prior
approval before speaking to the media.
The above is based on the composite testimony of Spina,
Lew and Walter, all of whom testified about the meeting. Ex-
cept in one respect, to the extent that their testimony conflicts, I
rely primarily on the testimony of Spina, whom I viewed as a
candid and reliable witness.1 There are two significant con-
flicts in the testimony of the three witnesses to the meeting.
Walter and Lew testified that Lew asked whether Spina was
aware of Respondent’s policy against talking to the media
without authorization and Spina responded that he was not
aware of it. Spina did not testify that the specific question was
asked or that he responded he was not aware of the policy. His
testimony is that Lew asked whether he talked to the media and
affirmatively stated that he had violated the policy. In addition,
Spina testified that Lew asked him if he was a representative of
the Trump dealers or Trump and he said that he had made no
such statement. Lew denied asking Spina whether he was a
representative of the Trump dealers. Walter did not testify
about that matter; thus, he did not corroborate Lew.
As indicated above, I found Spina the most credible witness
of the three who testified about the meeting. Neither Walter
nor Lew impressed me as reliable witnesses. Walter’s testi-
mony was very conclusory and he could not even recall
whether Lew mentioned the newspaper article to Spina. Lew’s
testimony was likewise conclusory, not corroborated by Walter
in one respect, and implausible in other respects. For example,
on cross-examination, she testified that Spina volunteered,
without prompting or responding to a question by her, that he
did not make the statement to the press, but made it to a union
representative. It seems obvious to me that Spina’s statement
was in response to a question from Lew. In addition, Lew testi-
fied that she did not ascertain from Spina whether he permitted
himself to be quoted. Again, that seems to me implausible, in
view of her stated purpose in calling Spina into her office.
Moreover, I perceived in Lew’s demeanor a reluctance to tes-
tify in detail about her remarks to Spina. She seemed more
interested in summarily testifying that she simply wanted to
make Spina aware of the Respondent’s policy and nothing
more, thus exculpating herself from the allegations in this case.
Discussion and Analysis
Respondent does not dispute that Spina’s comments to his
union representative, which were then repeated in a press re-
lease by the Union and carried in at least one newspaper,
amounted to protected concerted activity within the meaning of
Section 7 of the Act. See generally, Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437
U.S. 556 (1978). The question then is whether the maintenance
and enforcement of Respondent’s rules were unlawful and

1 I do not accept Spina’s testimony that Lew did not reference Re-
spondent’s written policy in their meeting. He testified that Lew sim-
ply stated that he had violated Respondent’s policy. I find it more
plausible that she did at least reference Respondent’s written rules,
contained in the handbook, in accordance with her testimony and that
of Walter.
whether Respondent’s interrogation of Spina about his possible
violation of the rules was coercive.2
The Unlawful Maintenance and Enforcement of
Respondent’s Rules
In Crowne Plaza Hotel, 352 NLRB 382 (2008), the Board
faced an issue similar to that presented in this case: whether a
rule prohibiting employees from talking to the press was unlaw-
fully broad and thus violative of the Act. Citing Valley Hospi-
tal Medical Center, 351 NLRB 1250, 1252 (2007), the Board
affirmed that Section 7 of the Act protects “employee commu-
nications to the public that are part of and related to an ongoing
labor dispute.” Id. at 386 fn. 21. In Crowne Plaza, the Board
found that the rule in that case could reasonably be construed as
“prohibiting all employee communications with the media re-
garding a labor dispute;” at the very least, the rule could be
viewed as “ambiguous.” The Board concluded that the rule
was facially overbroad and thus the maintenance of the rule
was violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Id. at 386. See also,
with respect to interfering with the protected right to talk to the
media about labor disputes, St. Luke’s Episcopal-Presbyterian
Hospitals, 331 NLRB 761, 762 (2000); and Hacienda de Salud-
Espanola, 317 NLRB 962, 966 (1995).
Applying Crowne Plaza to the facts of this case, I find that
Respondent’s rules likewise interfere with the Section 7 right of
employees to communicate with the public concerning an on-
going labor dispute. Indeed, this is a stronger case than Crowne
Plaza because the communication involved an earlier Board
case between Respondent and the Union and the communica-
tion was made by an employee who was found by an adminis-
trative law judge to have been discriminated against in that
case. The employee’s comment that the judge’s decision was
“exactly right” is surely the type of comment that the Act pro-
tects. Moreover, the meeting at which Shift Supervisor Lew
made clear that Respondent’s rules applied to his comments
shows in dramatic fashion that Respondent not only maintained
its unlawfully broad rules against talking to the media, but that
it was enforcing them—indeed enforcing them specifically to
encumber communication related to an ongoing labor dispute.
Accordingly, I find that Respondent violated the Act by main-
taining and enforcing unlawfully broad rules prohibiting em-
ployee communication with the media.3

2 Although it appears that only one of Respondent’s rules specifi-
cally prohibits employees from talking to the media without permis-
sion, it is clear that another ancillary rule limits the individuals who are
authorized to speak with the media. Thus, although sometimes only
one rule is referenced in the testimony, it is clear that both rules operate
to limit protected concerted or union activity and both were mentioned
in the complaint. As discussed more fully below, Respondent ac-
knowledges that the two rules are to be read together as a single policy,
which Respondent characterizes as bifurcated.
3 The fact that the prohibition was conditioned on not first obtaining
Respondent’s permission does not save the rules. To the extent that an
employee is required to obtain permission before engaging in protected
activity, that requirement is an impediment to the full exercise of an
employee’s Sec. 7 rights. See Saginaw Control & Engineering, Inc.,
339 NLRB 541, 553 (2003); and Brunswick Corp., 282 NLRB 794, 795
(1987).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
As noted, Respondent describes its media policy as bifur-
cated (Br. 15–16). According to Respondent, the rule set forth
in its handbook under the heading, public speaking/media re-
quests, contains no prohibition, but merely defines who is au-
thorized to speak to the media on behalf of Respondent. Simi-
larly, Respondent contends that rule 36, set forth in the hand-
book under the heading, employee conduct, contains no sub-
stantive prohibition, but merely establishes an authorization
procedure for media statements by employees not speaking on
behalf of Respondent. Respondent’s characterization is at odds
with the facts. As set forth above, Respondent’s public speak-
ing/media requests rule states that only certain specified offi-
cers and managers are “authorized to speak with the media.”
The employee conduct section of Respondent’s rules makes
violations or disregard of any posted or known policy or rule
ground for “disciplinary action up to and including discharge”
and rule 36 of that section specifically prohibits “[r]eleasing
statement[s] to the news media without prior authorization.”
Contrary to Respondent’s contentions (Br. 13, 15), the very
nature of the Lew-Spina meeting shows that the rules did not
simply amount to an authorization policy; the rules were ap-
plied to and enforced against Spina. Although he was not dis-
ciplined, Spina was reminded of the rules against unauthorized
talking to the media and the clear implication was that he
should not violate those rules again or he would be disciplined.
Indeed, as noted, the handbook clearly states that violation of
any known or posted rule or policy “will subject employees to
disciplinary action up to and including discharge.” Nothing in
Lew’s remarks to Spina contradicted the handbook’s discipli-
nary statement, or limited application of the rules to conduct
other than protected concerted or union activity. In these cir-
cumstances, Respondent’s attempt to distinguish Crowne Plaza
(Br. 15) is unavailing.
Respondent’s contention that its rules are justified by busi-
ness considerations is also without merit. The breadth of the
rules far exceeds the reasons offered to justify them. Barbara
Hulsizer, Respondent’s director of employee relations and di-
versity, testified that the reason for the rules is “[t]o prevent any
statements that have anything to do with proprietary informa-
tion or confidential information.” Tr. 91. Examples, she ex-
plained, were “[a]ny sort of financial data that has not come to
the point of being released, customer lists, marketing plans,
new table game products, new slot products. . . .” Tr. 91–92.
Those reasons have nothing to do with the Section 7 activities
Spina was engaged in. Nor do those reasons provide a legiti-
mate business reason to infringe on Section 7 activities gener-
ally. Thus, here, as in Crowne Plaza, the “scope of the rule” is
“not commensurate with” the limited intent suggested by Re-
spondent’s reasons for the rule. 352 NLRB at 386.
The Unlawful Interrogation
Lew’s remarks at the meeting with Spina also constituted
unlawful interrogation. As indicated above, the meeting
amounted to an interview that probed into Spina’s protected
union and concerted activity. Lew admittedly asked if Spina
was aware of the no-talking-to-the-media policy, and, as found
in my credibility determination above, she went further and
asked another question—whether he represented Respondent or
the dealers. In the circumstances, the questions were coercive.
Those circumstances included an effort to enforce an unlaw-
fully broad rule in an office setting that brought into play a
previous disciplinary action against Spina by the very supervi-
sor who was previously found to have issued an unlawful warn-
ing and suspension against him in that very office. The ten-
dency to coerce in those circumstances far outweighs the fact
that Spina was a known supporter of the Union. This is not a
situation where an employer asks a known union supporter
whether or why he supports a union. It was because Spina was
a known and active union supporter that Respondent raised its
media rules with him. Lew was concerned that Spina’s pro-
tected statements, reported in the media, were a violation of
Respondent’s rules; she sought to confirm the possible viola-
tion; and to warn against such conduct in the future. Intent, of
course, is not a necessary element in an unlawful interrogation;
rather, the test is the reasonable tendency of the questioning to
restrain protected concerted activity. But, where, as here, an
employer seeks to confirm particular protected activity and to
restrain it in the future, the obvious tendency of the questioning
is to have the restraining effect sought. Accordingly, I find that
Respondent also violated the Act by interrogating Spina about
his possible violation of its rules in an effort to inhibit continua-
tion of his protected concerted activity. See Brighton Retail,
Inc., 354 NLRB No. 62, slip op. 1 fn. 4 (2009); and M.V.M.,
Inc., 352 NLRB 1165, 1175 (2008).
Conclusions of Law
1. Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
maintaining and enforcing rules that prohibit an employee from
releasing statements to the media without prior permission or
limit employees authorized to speak with the media and by
interrogating an employee about the application of those rules.
2. The above violations are unfair labor practices within the
meaning of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act, I shall order that it cease and desist from the conduct
found to be unlawful and to rescind its unlawful rules, remove
them from its handbook, and advise employees in writing that
its unlawful rules are no longer being maintained and enforced.
Nothing shall prevent Respondent from reissuing similar rules
to achieve legitimate business purposes that do not infringe on
the Section 7 rights of employees. See Crowne Plaza Hotel,
352 NLRB 382, 388 fn. 33 (2008).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law, and on the
entire record herein, I issue the following recommended4
ORDER
The Respondent, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall
1. Cease and desist from

4 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
TRUMP MARINA ASSOCIATES 5
(a) Maintaining or enforcing rules in its employee handbook
that prohibit employees from releasing statements to the news
media without prior authorization and limiting the employees
who are authorized to speak with the media.
(b) Interrogating employees about violating rules that in-
fringe on their protected Section 7 activities under the Act.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the employee handbook’s rules with respect to
employees releasing statements to the news media without prior
authorization and limiting those who are authorized to speak
with the media.
(b) Furnish all current employees with inserts for the current
employee handbook that (1) advise employees that the unlawful
rules have been rescinded, or (2) provide the language of lawful
rules; or publish and distribute revised employee handbooks
that (1) do not contain the unlawful rules, or (2) provide the
language of lawful rules.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in Atlantic City, New Jersey, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”5 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 4, after being signed by the
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places, including all places where notices to employ-
ees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, de-
faced or covered by any other material. In the event that, dur-
ing the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has
gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its
own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and
former employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since August 12, 2008.

5 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. August 27, 2009
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT maintain or enforce rules in our employee
handbook that prohibit employees from releasing statements to
the media without prior authorization and limit their authority
to speak with the media.
WE WILL NOT interrogate employees about their Section 7
rights.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you in
Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL rescind the rules set forth above from the employee
handbook.
WE WILL furnish all of you with inserts for the current em-
ployee handbook that (1) advise you that the unlawful rules
have been rescinded, or (2) provide the language of lawful
rules; or publish and distribute revised employee handbooks
that (1) do not contain the unlawful rules, or (2) provide the
language of lawful rules.
TRUMP MARINA ASSOCIATES, LLC TRUMP MARINA
CASINO RESORT