Truck Drivers and Chauffeurs Union

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 30, 1951

92 N.L.R.B. 1715 (N.L.R.B. 1951)

In the Matter of TRUCK DRIVERS AND CHAUFFEURS UNION, OIL DRIVERs
AND FILLING STATION EMPLOYEES, LOCAL UNION No. 705, INTER-
NATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSE-
MEN & HAULERS OF NORTH AMERICA, AFL and DIRECT TRANSIT LINES,
INC.
Cases Nos.13-CD-13 and 13-CD-14.-Decided January 30,1951
DECISION AND DETERMINATION OF DISPUTE
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding arises under Section 10 (k) of the Act, as amended
by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, which provides that
"Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair
labor practice within the meaning of paragraph 4 (D) of section 8
(b), the Board is empowered and directed to hear and determine the
dispute out of which such unfair labor practice shall have arisen, . . ."
On July 10 and 14, 1950, Direct Transit Lines, Inc., herein called
the Company, filed with the Regional' Director for the Thirteenth
Region of the Board a charge and an amended charge alleging in
substance that Truck Drivers and Chauffeurs Union, Oil Drivers and
Filling Station Employees, Local Union No. 705, International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Haulers of North
America, AFL, herein called Local 705, had violated Section 8 (b)
(4) (D) of the Act in that on and after January 25, 1950, the said
Local, by its officers and agents, had induced and' encouraged various
employees of the Company to engage in a concerted refusal to perform
certain work in order to force or require the Company to assign par-
ticular work to the members of Local 705 rather than to the Company's
own employees.
Thereafter, pursuant to Sections 102.74 and 102.75 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, the Regional Director investigated the charge
and provided for an appropriate hearing, upon due notice to all the
parties. The hearing was held on August 29 and 30, 1950, before
Gerald P. Leicht, a hearing officer of the Board. All parties appeared
at the hearing and were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to
examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to adduce evidence bearing
on the issues. The rulings of the hearing officer made at the hearing
92 NLRB No. 257.
1715
1716 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed. All the par-
ties were afforded an opportunity to file briefs with the Board.
Upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The Company's business
Direct Transit Lines, Inc., a Michigan corporation, with its prin-
cipal place of business in Grand Rapids, Michigan, is a motor car-
rier engaged in the transportation of various commodities from points
located in the State of Michigan to points located in other States.
It holds a "Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity," issued
to it by the Interstate Commerce Commission, providing for the trans-
portation of specific commodities in interstate commerce, and also
holds intrastate operating rights within the State of Michigan. The
Company's gross annual business amounts to approximately $250,000,
of which approximately 95 percent is derived from the pickup and
'delivery of commodities across State lines.
We find that the Company is engaged in commerce within the mean-
ing of the Act, and that, as it operates as an instrumentality of com-
merce, it will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction)
2. The dispute
a. The facts
The Company has 17 drivers in its employ who operate "over-the-
road" trucks . In the performance of their duties , the drivers haul
commodities over appreciable distances , and pick up and deliver com-
modities at warehouses and other points of consignment throughout
the Central States area , including metropolitan Chicago.
Sometime before this controversy arose, an agreement was made
between a number of over -the-road carriers and the Central States
Drivers Council, covering several central and midwestern , States,
which provided , among other things, that "operations shall be dock
to dock and there shall be no pickups or deliveries permitted at either
end of the run . . . when local conditions do not now permit any such
pickups and/or deliveries . . . ." In keeping with this provision,
which presumably was designed to prevent the use of over-the-road
drivers in connection with work performed by "city drivers ," 2 it has
been the practice in the Chicago area for over -the-road carriers to
1 WBSR, Inc., 91 NLRB 630.
2 A "city man," according to the record, is a member of Local 705, which has jurisdiction
in the city of Chicago.
TRUCK DRIVERS AND CHAUFFEURS UNION 1717
have their own terminals or to use the facilities of a local Chicago
cartage concern. As a result, drivers employed by carriers who are
parties to the Central States Agreement make no city deliveries away
from the carrier's terminal, such pickups and deliveries being made
by drivers employed by local cartage concerns.
. The Company never became a party to the Central States Agree-
ment, has no terminal of its own in the Chicago area, and has not
made arrangements for using the facilities of local Chicago cartage.
concerns. Nevertheless, it has engaged in over-the-road hauling, and
has had its trucks come into the Chicago area for the purpose of mak
ing deliveries and pickups there. Because it is not a party to the,
Central States Agreement and has not conformed its practices to those
which apparently prevail in this respect in the Chicago area, a con-
flict arose between it and Local 705. The following series of incidents,
all in the Chicago area, grew out of this conflict:
1. January 30,1950-at Jewel Food Stores-involving driver Ray-
mond: Conino, Local 705's business representative, demanded of Ray-
mond that a city man be hired to unload a load of salt. After a con-
ference between Conino and an official of the consignee, the latter
advised Raymond that he (the consignee) could not accept the load
"because if we do they threaten to throw a picket line around our
place." Pursuant to arrangements between the consignor, the Com-
pany, and Local 705, the truck was unloaded the following day, but
the unloading was done by a Local 705 man designated by Conino;
it was not done by Company's driver Raymond.
2. January 31, 1950-at Kelmar Warehouse-involving driver
Stowe: Conino told Stowe, after ascertaining that Stowe was not a
city man, that he (Stowe) could not back in and unload the truck;
that he would have to hire a city man to do it. Stowe explained this
over the telephone to the Company's president at its headquarters in
Grand Rapids. The latter then spoke to Conino, also over the tele-
phone, and arranged for the hiring and compensation of a Local 705
man. Driver Stowe did most of the unloading and the Local 705
man only a minor portion of it.
3. February 1950-at C & A Terminal-involving driver Baker:
Baker was told by Conino and another Local 705 business representa-
tive that he (Baker) would have to hire a city man to unload a load
of beans which had been hauled from Michigan. When Baker disre-
garded Local 705's representatives and attempted to unload, he was
informed by the terminal dock foreman that he would have to wait.
He was also advised by the consignee that the business agents had
"tied up the help there." As a result of arrangements over the tele-
phone for the hiring and payment of a Local 705 man, Baker and an
1718 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employee of the C & A Terminal started unloading but before this
was completed, one of the business agents again stopped them. The
balance of this load was unloaded by a Local 705 man, who also went
along with Baker and helped unload two other consignments, also
in Chicago.
4. Later in February 1950-at National Tea Company Warehouse
involving driver Stowe:' Conino, according to Stowe, "would not leave
me work." The Company, during the course of a telephone call, ar-
ranged to hire and pay a Local 705 man. The latter then did the
-unloading.
5. March 1950-at John Sexton Warehouse-involving driver
Baker: Although Local 705's business representative, Himber, per-
mitted Baker to unload, he told Baker not to "come back in again
without a union man. We will tie you up the next time."
6. July 1950-at Rival Dog Food Company-involving driver
&S'towe: Although Conino permitted Stowe to continue unloading, he
told him that he (Stowe) "couldn't load there again," that the Com-
pany would have to hire one of the members of Local 705 to load.
The Company's president testified that loading and unloading was
part of the drivers' normal work assignment, but that the extent of
such loading or unloading varied with the warehouse; thus, in some
instances, the drivers did all of it, and in others, employees of the
warehouse where the commodities were delivered would either assist
in unloading or do it themselves. Company drivers were paid on a
mileage basis and allowed 2 hours for loading and 'unloading. In the
course of the described incidents, the Local 705 man who was hired and
paid by the Company actually performed work; at such time the
Company's driver either worked with him or stood by. In most in-
stances, the Company's driver was obliged to remain idle while waiting
for "arrangements" to be completed.
At the hearing, Local 705 explained-through the testimony of
two of its business agents-that on several occasions business agents
of the Local approached the Company's drivers who were making
deliveries or pickups in Chicago and told them about the provisions
of the Central States Agreement as they affected over-the-road truck-
ing; that the drivers were requested to ask the Company to secure
a Chicago terminal or to use the facilities of a Chicago cartage con-
cern; that on two occasions it was suggested that the Company employ
a member of Local 705 in connection with the Company's Chicago
operations; and that a member of Local 705 was employed on those
occasions, that he performed the work, and was paid the union scale.
The'Company's president testified that as a result of these inci-
dents the Company was obliged to discontinue those customers "where
TRUCK DRIVERS AND CHAUFFEURS UNION 1719
we had difficulty unloading," and that the Company's drivers have
since refused to come into the Chicago area.
b. Contentions of the parties
The Company contends that Local 705 violated Section 8 (b) (4)
(D) by engaging in conduct designed to induce and encourage the
Company's drivers to engage in a concerted refusal to perform load-
ing and unloading operations in the Chicago area, and by insisting
that the loading and unloading be assigned to members of Local 705
rather than to the Company's regular drivers, despite the fact that
the Company's drivers were assigned to perform such work by the
Company and were paid for it.
Local 705 contends that the facts alleged in the charge, and testi-
fied to at the hearing, do not constitute an unfair labor practice within
the meaning of Section 8 (b) (4) (D) or a dispute within the mean-
ing of Section 10 (k) ; that a jurisdictional dispute must of necessity
involve two rival unions, and that no other labor organization is in-
volved in this proceeding; that there is no conflict over work assign-
ment with any other "trade, craft, or class," as those terms are used
in the statute, as both the members of Local 705 and the Company's
drivers are "truck drivers" ; that there is therefore no dispute over the
assignment of work, particularly as "Local 705 never has disputed the
right of drivers employed by the Company to do all these things in
and about Chicago and the Company's drivers have been and are
performing all of these tasks"; and finally, that there was no induce-
ment or encouragement within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (4), as
Local 705 did no picketing, did not engage in a strike, but merely
sought to explain their "point of view to the drivers of the Company."
c. Applicability of the statute
The charge, which was duly investigated by the Regional Director,
alleges a violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (D) of the Act, and the
Regional Director was satisfied that upon the basis of such investiga-
tion, a violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (D) has been committed. Al-
though we have held that the Board is not required in a Section 10
,(k) proceeding to make a finding that Section 8 (b) (4) (D) has
been violated,-3 we have in the past quashed the notice of hearing where
the record in the Section 10 (k) proceeding failed to establish a prima
facie case of violation, i. e., if, even assuming the facts in support of
the charge, and their reasonable inferences, as true, no violation is
3 Moore Drydock Company , 81 NLRB 1108 ; Juneau Spruce Corporation, 82 NLRB 650;
Ship Scaling Contractors Association, 87 NLRB 92.
1720 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
indicated 4 Thus, we must find that on the record before us there is
reasonable cause to believe that Local 705 induced and encouraged
employees to engage in a concerted refusal to perform work for the
purpose-proscribed by Section 8 (b) (4) (D) -of forcing or requir-
ing the Company "to assign particular work to employees in a par-
ticular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class rather
than to employees in another labor organization or in another trade,
craft, or class...."
Local 705, in asserting that the record in the Section 10 (k) proceed-
ing does not establish such prima facie case of violation of Section 8
(b) (4) (D), urges that there is no unlawful object present as no
two rival unions are involved in the controversy. The same conten-
tion was made in New London Mills 5 and rejected by a majority of
the Board, who stated :
If any ambiguity exists in the words "trade, craft, or class" which
were added to the original version of the Senate bill, S. 1126,
such ambiguity is completely removed for us by Senator Taft's
explanation of the section prior to the present Act's passage to the
effect that "this subsection applies not only to strikes over the
assignment of work to one particular union rather than another,
but also to the assignment of work to one union rather than to
.another group of employees. [Emphasis added.]
Local 705 also urges a related contention that the facts in this
case do not involve any efforts "to force or require the Company to
assign particular work to employees `in a particular trade, craft, or
class'. . . ." The argument is made that the "trade, craft, or class"
involved here is that of truck drivers and "the record reveals no dis-
tinguishable differences between one group and another." With re-
spect to this contention, New London Mills is also apposite. The
Board majority held in that case that "class" as used in the statute is
broad enough to be given the meaning of "group." s
We cannot agree with our dissenting colleague's view that the Com-
pany's employees are not materially concerned in this dispute and
for that reason the element of a clash of interests between two conflict-
ing groups is lacking. Clearly, the efforts of Local 705 were directed
at displacing the Company's drivers with members of Local 705 in
the loading and unloading work-work which the Company had as-
signed to its own drivers. There is nothing in the record to indicate
4 Ship Scaling Contractors Association, supra; Albers Milling Company, 90 NLRB 1015;
Lumber Dealers, Inc., et al., 92 NLRB 632.
New London. Mills, Incorporated, 91 NLRB 1003.
In this connection, see also Moore Drydock Company, supra, where the dispute was
between two groups of machinists.
TRUCK DRIVERS AND CHAUFFEURS UNION 1721
that the Company either did or did not pay its drivers less because
it hired members of Local 705 to this work as this matter was not liti-
gated. But it seems clear to us that a diminution in the amount of
work assigned could very well result in a diminution in pay, a matter
of vital concern to the Company's drivers.
But even if this were not so, we find no indication in the legislative
history of Section 8 (b) (4) (D) that the prescriptions of that section
were to apply only where it was shown that the employees whom the
union was seeking to replace. would have been prejudiced by such re-
placement, any more than it need be shown, for example, that the
employees of a secondary employer are in fact injured by a secondary
boycott within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (4) (A). Accordingly,
we find no basis for the distinction our dissenting colleague draws on
the ground that the over-the-road truck drivers had nothing to lose
by being replaced by city drivers. The function of Section 8 (b)
(4) in protecting employers as well as employees against certain pro-
scribed conduct cannot be read out of the statute by noting, as Member
Murdock does, that an employer's cost of operations are frequently
increased as a consequence of lawful union activity.
In addition to contending that an unlawful object is lacking, Local
705 denies that the conduct in question constitutes inducement or
encouragement of employees to engage in a "concerted" refusal to
perform work, within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (4). It takes the
position that as only one driver figured in each incident there could
be no "concerted" refusal to perform work, and for that reason no
inducement or encouragement to achieve such result. We find no
merit in this contention. According to the record, in the period Janu-
ary-July 1950, there were at least six incidents involving three differ-
ent company drivers. While it is true that only one driver figured
in each incident, it would be manifestly unrealistic not to take into
consideration the total pattern of conduct engaged in by Local 705
in connection with this controversy. We do not believe that each
incident should be viewed in isolation. On the contrary, in our opin-
ion, each incident was, as we said in the Wadsworth 7 case under
analogous circumstances, "part of those total activities." We are sat-
isfied that Local 705's conduct though it took the form of an approach
to specific individuals, was aimed at inducing all of the Company's
drivers to take the kind of action it was successful in obtaining from
the individuals it approached.
T United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America , et al., Wadsworth Building
Company, Inc. and Klassen A Hodgson, Inc., 81 NLRB 802. Cf. Denver Building and
Construction Trades Council, et al. ((could & Preisner ), 82 NLRB 1195 , where only a single
employee was involved and the Board held a single employee could not engage in a strike
which is "a combined effort ." In that case there was no question of a pattern of conduct
or a series of related incidents as is present here.
929979-51-vol. 92-110
1722 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Moreover, we find no merit in the contention that in contacting the
individual drivers Local 705 was doing no more than explaining its
point of view. Presumably, in so contending, Local 705 suggests that
the decision to have the disputed work done by Local 705 rather than
by the Company's drivers was made by the Company and did not re-
sult from any pressure brought upon the drivers. It is clear, however,
that in several instances the drivers were specifically directed by the
representatives of Local 705 to cease performing the work which that
union regarded as properly belonging to the city drivers. That the
Company may have made the final decision to allow Local 705 men
to perform the work does not in any way detract from the fact that
Local 705 induced and encouraged the drivers to refrain from the
performance of their duties in order to attain its ultimate objective s
Having rejected the contentions made by Local 705, we conclude
that the record before us establishes that there is reasonable cause to
believe that Local 705 induced and encouraged employees to engage in
a concerted refusal to cease work to force or require the Company
to assign certain work to members of Local 705 rather than to the
Company's own employees. We therefore find that the dispute in
question is properly before us for determination in a proceeding under
Section 10 (k).
d. The merits of the dispute
It is clear from the record that Local 705 has no immediate or
derivative rights under any existing contracts upon which it could
predicate any lawful claim to the work in dispute. As indicated
above, the Company was not a party to the Central States Agreement,
and had no bargaining relations with Local 705 or any other union.
-Nor. does it appear that Local 705 has any rights in any outstanding
Board certification or order 9 affecting this work. The Company had
assigned the work in question to its own employees. Indeed, Local
705 now acknowledges "the right of drivers employed by the Company
to do all these things [loading and unloading] in and about Chicago
and the Company's drivers have been and are performing all of these
tasks."
These facts are determinative of the present dispute. The Board
has specifically held that Sections 8 (b) (4) (D) and 10 (k) do not
deprive the employer of the right to assign work to his own employees,
and that these sections were not intended to interfere with the em-
ployer's freedom to hire, subject only to the requirement against dis-
8 See Western Express Company, 91 NLRB 340.
8 Section 8 (b) (4) (D) contains a proviso as follows : ". , unless such employer is
railing to conform to any order or certification of the Board determining the bargaining
representative for employees performing such work.. ' "
TRUCK DRIVERS AND CHAUFFEURS UNION 1723
crimination- as contained in Section 8 (a) (3).10 Consequently, in
determining this dispute, it is sufficient on the facts before us that the
Company assigned the work to its own employees and that Local 705
acted to force or require the Company to assign this work to their own
members.
Accordingly, we find that Local 705 is not lawfully entitled to force
or require Direct Transit Lines, Inc., to assign the work in dispute
to members of Local 705 rather than to employees of Direct Transit
Lines, Inc.
DETERMINATION OF DISPUTE
On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and the entire record
in this case, the Board makes the following determination of the dis-
pute, pursuant to Section 10 (k) of the amended Act:
1. Truck Drivers and Chauffeurs Union, Oil Drivers and Filling
Station Employees, Local Union No. 705, International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Haulers of North Amer-
ica, AFL, and its agents, are not, and have not been lawfully entitled
to force or require Direct Transit Lines, Inc., to assign the work of
loading and unloading and making pickups and deliveries to mem-
bers of Local 705 rather than to employees of the Company.
2. Within ten (10) days from the date of this Decision and Deter-
mination of Dispute, Local 705 may notify the Regional Director for
the Thirteenth Region, in writing, as to what steps Local 705 has taken
to comply with the terms of this Decision and Determination of
Dispute.
MEMBER MURDOCK, dissenting :
This case illustrates the extremity to which a broad interpretation
of what was originally intended to be a means of settling jurisdictional
disputes can be carried. When the first case 11 involving Section 8 (b)
(4) (D) and 10 (k) came before this Board I took the position in a
dissenting opinion that Section 8 (b) (4) (D),.as its-legislative his-
tory indicated,. should be limited to the determination of jurisdictional
disputes. A majority of the Board held, however, that the literal
language of Section 8 (b) (4) (D) included disputes between rival
unions competing :for representation in the very same occupational
group. Again, in the Juneau Spruce case 12 that followed .I pointed
out, in substantial agreement with Board Member Houston, that Sec-
tions 8 (b) (4) (D) and 10 (k) gave the Board the function of arbi-
10 Juneau Spruce Corporation, 82 NLRB 650; United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America, at at. (Stroh Brewery Company), 88 NLRB 844.
" Moore Drydock Company, supra.
n Supra.
1724 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
trating jurisdictional disputes, a function that could not properly be
exercised in that case because the employer was not a neutral victim
in an inter-union struggle for work assignment. Although I have
since considered myself bound by the majority's decisions in these
cases, I made still another attempt in the New London Mills case 13 to.
confine the application of Section 10 (k) at least to disputes of the
type related to those known as "jurisdictional" by dissenting with
Board Member Styles from the majority's conclusion that Sections
8 (b) (4) (D) and 10 (k) encompassed disputes between a labor or-
ganization and an unorganized group of employees. Assuming, how
ever, the validity of the majority's position in that case too, I think:
the majority's determination of the instant case represents an even
broader interpretation of the term "dispute" within the meaning of
Section 10 (k). To say, as the majority do, that the facts in this case
are sufficient to invoke the Board's processes under Section 10 (k) as
an arbitrator of an actual dispute between rival unions or at least;
as the Board has held in New London Mills, between a union and
another group of employees for the right to hold a job, approaches a
reductio ad absurdum.
The alleged "dispute" here under consideration is based upon state-
ments of the Respondent Union to three drivers of the Employer to
the effect that their Employer would have to hire a union man to un-
load produce in the Chicago area. In some instances it appears that
the drivers hired a union man themselves, acting, it must be assumed,
as agents of the Employer. In other instances the Employer was
contacted through the driver-employee and a union man was put to
work by direct agreement between the Employer and the Respondent
Union. In no instance did the hiring of a union man result in a loss
to employees of the Employer, who were paid on a mileage basis.
The latter stand out as neutrals in a primary dispute between the
Employer and the Respondent Union. They had nothing to lose and,
indeed, something to gain if the Employer agreed to the Union's re-
quest that it hire union drivers to assist the over-the-road drivers in
terminal activities. Of course, such a practice would increase, as the
Employer asserts, the cost of its operations. But that is sometimes a
consequence of union activity. Certainly, the Employer is not pro-
tected from such results by the provisions of Sections 8 (b) (4) (D)
and 10 (k). Those provisions contemplate the Board's intercession
in a work dispute of a tri-partite nature, that is, one in which two
competing groups of employees and an employer are concerned. The
Board has held, as indicated above, that the Employer need not be a
neutral in this dispute. It would now appear from the majority's
" Supra.
TRUCK DRIVERS AND CHAUFFEURS UNION 1725
decision in this case that it is also immaterial that one of the two
competing groups of employees is not materially concerned in the
controversey over work assignment.
It is significant to me that the statement of Senator Taft explaining
the amendment to Section 8 (b) (4) (D) (a statement quoted in part
when it was relied upon by the majority in New London Mills, which,
in turn, is cited by the majority as controlling in this case) suggests
that the addition of the words "trade, craft or class" to the original
version of the Senate bill, S 1126, was intended as protection to em-
ployees from discrimination or discharge by their employer in order
to provide work for union members. That element is completely lack-
ing in this case.
While the majority appear to rely upon the above statement of Sena-
tor Taft in disposing of the contentions of Local 705 that no two rival
unions are here involved, they argue thereafter that Section 8 (b) (4)
(D) is much broader than that statement implies and, indeed, is paral-
lel to the proscription against secondary boycotts contained in Section 8
(b) (4) (A). The majority find nothing in the legislative history to
indicate that Congress intended Section 8 (b) (4) (D) to be limited to
situations in which the employees whom the union was seeking to
replace would have been prejudiced by such replacement. I invite
attention to the concluding sentence of Senator Taft's statement : "In
other words all that this amendment [the addition of the term `another
trade, craft, or class' to Section 8 (b) (4) (D) ] to the Senate bill does
is to make it illegal for unions to coerce employers into doing something
which an employer is already prevented from doing by the operation of
Section 8 (3) of the Wagner Act." -
Having already disregarded the numerous statements of both pro-
ponents and opponents of the bill during the course of its legislative
history to the effect that Section 8 (b) (4) (D) was designed to settle
jurisdictional disputes in which employers were caught between com-
peting groups of employees vying for work assignment, the majority
now take the position that the literal language of Section 8 (b) (4) (D)
further protects employers from disputes in which only two parties,
the employer and a Union, are substantially involved. The majority's
comparison with Section 8 (b) (4) (A) may be completed by noting
that the literal language of that Section does not limit it to a proscrip-
tion against secondary boycotts. A reasonable interpretation of the
amended Act, however, in the light of its legislative history has
impelled the Board to such a conclusion. I would adopt the same
reasonable approach with regard to Section 8 (b) (4) (D).
My review of the facts in this case raises a serious doubt in my mind
14 93 Cong . Rec. 7002, June 12, 1947.
1726 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
whether the three drivers contacted by the Respondent Union as indi-
viduals can be considered properly •a "group of employees" who were
induced to engage in a "concerted refusal" to perform work for the
Employer. But I do not need to reach that question. For I am con-
vinced in the light of the extensive legislative history on this subject
that the term "dispute" under Section 10 (k) cannot mean a dispute in
which, as here, individual drivers in one of the two alleged "groups"
of employees have no real stake in the outcome, but find themselves in
alliance with the Employer either as agents or necessary go-betweens.