Trilliant Food and Nutrition, LLCDownload PDFTrademark Trial and Appeal BoardJun 28, 2018No. 87080202 (T.T.A.B. Jun. 28, 2018) Copy Citation This Opinion is Not a Precedent of the TTAB Mailed: June 28, 2018 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE _____ Trademark Trial and Appeal Board _____ In re Trilliant Food and Nutrition, LLC _____ Serial No. 87080202 _____ Kyle T. Peterson of Patterson Thuente Pedersen, PA for Trilliant Food and Nutrition, LLC Karen Severson, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 117, Michael Baird, Managing Attorney. _____ Before Ritchie, Kuczma, and Lynch, Administrative Trademark Judges. Opinion by Lynch, Administrative Trademark Judge: I. Background Trilliant Food and Nutrition, LLC (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of the mark PRO-TO-GO in standard characters for “protein dietary supplements sold in individual cartridges for use in single serve coffee brewers” in Serial No. 87080202 - 2 - International Class 5.1 The Examining Attorney refused registration under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), based on a likelihood of confusion with the following five registered marks, the last four of which share the same owner: • PROTEIN-2GO for “Nutritional supplement preparations, namely, protein supplement beverages and protein supplement beverage concentrated powders for use as a supplement drink mix, namely, prepackaged individual serving protein supplement beverage concentrated powders, bulk packaged protein supplement beverage concentrated powders, and multi-packs of prepackaged individual serving protein supplement beverage concentrated powders; and nutritional supplements in the form of protein supplement concentrated syrups for addition to other drinks, namely, prepackaged individual serving protein supplement beverage concentrated syrups, bulk packaged protein supplement beverage concentrated syrups, and multi-packs of prepackaged individual serving protein supplement beverage concentrated syrups” in International Class 5; “Milk-based beverages containing protein; mixes for making milk-based beverages containing protein consisting of concentrated powders, namely, prepackaged individual serving concentrated powders, bulk packaged concentrated powders, and multi-packs of prepackaged individual serving concentrated powders; and mixes for making milk-based beverages containing protein consisting of concentrated syrups, namely, prepackaged individual serving concentrated syrups, bulk packaged concentrated syrups, and multi-packs of prepackaged individual serving concentrated syrups” in International Class 29; “Non-alcoholic beverages containing protein, namely, carbonated beverages, non-carbonated beverages in the nature of drinking waters, vegetable juice based beverages, fruit juice based beverages, and malt beverages; concentrated powders for making the above beverages, namely, prepackaged individual serving concentrated powders and syrups, bulk packaged concentrated powders and syrups, and multi-packs of prepackaged individual serving concentrated powders and syrups” in International Class 32.2 • PRO ON-THE-GO for “Dietary and nutritional supplements in powder, capsule, tablet, gel or liquid form, all the foregoing containing protein” in International Class 5.3 1 Application Serial No. 87080202 was filed June 22, 2016 under Section 1(b) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), based on an alleged intent to use the mark in commerce. 2 Registration No. 3463893 issued July 8, 2008; renewed. It includes a disclaimer of PROTEIN. 3 Registration No. 4993530 issued July 5, 2016. Serial No. 87080202 - 3 - • KIDS PROTEIN ON-THE-GO for “Dietary and nutritional supplements, all of which contain protein” in International Class 5.4 • PROTEIN ON-THE-GO for “Dietary and nutritional supplements, all of which contain protein” in International Class 5.5 • PROTEIN ON-THE-GO PREMIUM for “Enhanced dietary and nutritional supplements containing additives, all of which contain protein” in International Class 5.6 After the Examining Attorney made the refusal final, Applicant appealed. II. Likelihood of Confusion The determination under Section 2(d) involves an analysis of all of the probative evidence of record bearing on a likelihood of confusion. In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973) (setting forth factors to be considered, hereinafter referred to as “du Pont factors”); see also In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In any likelihood of confusion analysis, two key considerations are the similarities between the marks and the relatedness of the goods. See In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 71 USPQ2d 1944 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.”). 4 Registration No. 5283617 issued September 12, 2017. It includes a disclaimer of KIDS PROTEIN. 5 Registration No. 5283618 issued September 12, 2017. It includes a disclaimer of PROTEIN. 6 Registration No. 5283619 issued September 12, 2017. It includes a disclaimer of PROTEIN and PREMIUM. Serial No. 87080202 - 4 - We focus our analysis on the first two cited registrations above, Registration No. 3463893 for PROTEIN-2GO (“‘893 Registration”) and Registration No. 4993530 for PRO ON-THE-GO (“‘530 Registration”). If we find no likelihood of confusion as to the marks and goods in these registrations, then it follows there would be no likelihood of confusion as to the other cited registrations, in which the marks are less similar to Applicant’s. See In re Max Capital Group Ltd., 93 USPQ2d 1243, 1245 (TTAB 2008) (confining likelihood of confusion analysis to one of multiple cited registrations deemed closest to the applied-for mark). A. The Relatedness of the Goods As to the goods, we must determine whether their degree of relatedness rises to such a level that consumers would mistakenly believe the parties’ goods emanate from the same source. The test is not whether consumers would be likely to confuse the goods, but rather whether they would be likely to be confused as to their source. In re Anderson, 101 USPQ2d 1912, 1919 (TTAB 2012). In making this analysis of the second du Pont factor, we look to the identifications of goods in the subject application and cited registrations, not to extrinsic evidence of how the marks are actually used. See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Houston Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The subject application identifies “protein dietary supplements sold in individual cartridges for use in single serve coffee brewers,” while the cited ‘893 Registration includes “Nutritional supplement preparations, namely, … prepackaged individual Serial No. 87080202 - 5 - serving protein supplement beverage concentrated powders” as well as “nutritional supplements in the form of protein supplement concentrated syrups for addition to other drinks, namely, prepackaged individual serving protein supplement beverage concentrated syrups,” and the ‘530 Registration identifies “Dietary and nutritional supplements in powder, capsule, tablet, gel or liquid form, all the foregoing containing protein.” The Examining Attorney argues that the goods are legally identical because the “goods are all protein supplements.”7 Applicant did not advance any alleged distinction between dietary supplements and nutritional supplements, and the ordinary meanings of “dietary” and “nutritional” are consistent with finding these types of supplements legally identical.8 The cited registrations both encompass protein dietary supplements in powder9 or syrup/liquid form, therefore including those that might be packaged in cartridges for single serve coffee brewers.10 See In re Linkvest S.A., 24 USPQ2d 1716, 1716 (TTAB 1992) (unrestricted and broad identifications are presumed to encompass all goods of the type described). 7 6 TTABVUE 9 (Examining Attorney’s Brief). 8 We take judicial notice of the definitions of “nutritional” and “dietary” from the online Random House Dictionary, www.dictionary.com. See Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., 213 USPQ 594 (TTAB 1982), aff’d, 703 F.2d 1372, 217 USPQ 505 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Red Bull GmbH, 78 USPQ2d 1375, 1377 (TTAB 2006). “Nutritional” is the adjective form of “nutrition,” defined as “the act or process of nourishing or of being nourished.” “Dietary” means “of or relating to diet,” which in turn is defined as “food and drink considered in terms of its qualities, composition, and its effects on health.” 9 The record includes examples of other protein supplement coffee products, some of which make clear that the goods are in powder form. E.g., TSDR December 28, 2017 Office Action at 20 (“Add 2 tbsp of BuzzFit Protein Coffee powder into an empty mug”); id. at 22 (Truenutrition Protein Coffee displayed in powder form and described as coffee beans “mixed with a single standard serving of True Nutrition’s top-selling protein powder”). 10 See, e.g., TSDR December 28, 2017 Office Action at 30 (Lono Life Protein Coffee K-Cups containing coffee and protein). Serial No. 87080202 - 6 - Applicant’s arguments on this du Pont factor focus only on allegations that the specimens of use for the cited registrations do not show the use on protein supplement cartridges for coffee brewing machines.11 However, the scope of the cited registrations’ identified goods cannot be limited based on the specimens, which are particular examples of use in commerce. Instead, we must consider the goods as they are identified in the registrations. See Paula Payne Prods. Co. v. Johnson Publ’g Co., Inc., 473 F.2d 901, 177 USPQ 76, 77-78 (CCPA 1973) (Board must “give full sweep” to an identification of goods regardless of registrant’s actual business); see also Octocom, 16 USPQ2d at 1787 (identifications are controlling). We find the goods overlapping, and the second du Pont factor therefore strongly weighs in favor of a finding of likely confusion. B. Trade Channels and Classes of Consumers Because the goods are legally identical in part, we must therefore presume that the channels of trade are also identical. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding Board entitled to rely on this legal presumption in determining likelihood of confusion); Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d 1842, 1846 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming Board finding that where the identification is unrestricted, “we must deem the goods to travel in all appropriate trade channels to all potential purchasers of such goods”). Applicant’s argument that the trade channels and consumers differ because the actual goods 11 4 TTABVUE 7-8 (Applicant’s Brief). Serial No. 87080202 - 7 - differ again erroneously relies on alleged marketplace realities not reflected in the identifications of goods. Thus, this argument is unpersuasive, and we find that the overlapping goods travel in the same channels of trade to the same classes of consumers. The third du Pont factor strongly weighs in favor of a finding of likely confusion. C. Number and Nature of Similar Marks for Similar Goods Because the strength of the cited marks under the sixth du Pont factor impacts our comparison of the marks, we next address Applicant’s claim under this factor that “the shared prefix ‘PRO’ and suffix ‘GO’” deserve a narrow scope of protection in view of third-party uses of allegedly similar terms for goods in International Class 5.12 The Federal Circuit has held that evidence of extensive registration and use of a term by others for similar goods can be “powerful” evidence of the term’s weakness. Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH & Co. v. Millennium Sports, S.L.U., 797 F.3d 1363, 116 USPQ2d 1129, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1671, 1674 (Fed. Cir. 2015). If the evidence establishes that the consuming public is exposed to widespread third-party use of similar marks for similar goods, it “is relevant to show that a mark is relatively weak and entitled to only a narrow scope of protection.” Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2005). However, Applicant points to no evidence of third-party actual use, and instead relies only on three third-party registrations that contain the terms 12 4 TTABVUE 12 (Applicant’s Brief). Serial No. 87080202 - 8 - “PRO” and “GO.” Applicant’s record thus does not demonstrate commercial weakness from third-party use, and does not show that consumers are conditioned to distinguish among marks including PRO and GO. Nonetheless, even where the record lacks proof of actual third-party use, third-party registration evidence may show conceptual weakness, in that a term carries a suggestive or descriptive connotation in the relevant industry. See In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393, 1394 (TTAB 1987). In addition to the cited registrations, Applicant relies on the following three use-based third-party registrations:13 • READY TO GO PRO for herbal supplements14 • GO PRO for goods that include dietary supplements for animals15 • FITPRO GO! For dietary and nutritional supplements16 We agree with the Examining Attorney that in the third-party registrations, which are not explicitly directed to protein supplements, the use of the phrase “GO PRO” in the first two marks and “FITPRO GO” in the third mark may create a different commercial impression than the applied-for and cited marks. In particular, 13 We have not considered pending applications, such as Application Serial No. 85867305 (TSDR December 10, 2017 Response to Office Action at 12-14). Pending applications are evidence only that the applications were filed on a certain date; they are not evidence of use of the marks. Nike Inc. v. WNBA Enters. LLC, 85 USPQ2d 1187, 1193 n.8 (TTAB 2007); Interpayment Servs. Ltd. v. Docters & Thiede, 66 USPQ2d 1463, 1468 n.6 (TTAB 2003); In re Juleigh Jeans Sportswear, Inc., 24 USPQ2d 1694, 1699 (TTAB 1992). 14 TSDR December 10, 2017 Response to Office Action TSDR at 9-11 (Registration No. 3811472). 15 TSDR December 10, 2017 Response to Office Action at 15-16 (Registration No. 4663240). 16 TSDR December 10, 2017 Response to Office Action at 18-19 (Registration No. 5073032). Serial No. 87080202 - 9 - because “pro” can be defined as “professional,”17 the “GO PRO” phrase used in those marks can carry the meaning of becoming a professional, such as when an amateur athlete “goes pro.” Similarly, the “FITPRO” phrase may carry the connotation of a fit professional or a fitness professional. By contrast, the applied-for and cited marks PRO-TO-GO, PROTEIN-2GO, and PRO ON-THE-GO, which are limited to protein supplements, seem more likely solely to convey the impression of protein in a portable form, as discussed below, without any double entendre. Regardless, even if the commercial impressions of the third-party marks were more similar to the cited marks, the small quantity of third-party registration evidence by itself does not rise to the level required to show that the terms in the cited marks are conceptually weak and deserving of less protection. However, the record also includes evidence that the terms “pro” and “to go” or “on- the-go” all carry a suggestive or descriptive meaning in reference to the goods.18 The ‘893 and ‘530 Registrations, which have different owners, provide additional evidence that “pro” and “go” have some significance in the industry. Thus, considering the record in its entirety, we find some degree of conceptual weakness of these terms. Yet even if the cited marks contain some descriptive or suggestive terms, they still are entitled to appropriate protection against the registration of confusingly similar marks. King Candy Co. v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ 108, 17 We take judicial notice of the entry for “pro” in the online Random House Dictionary, www.dictionary.com. 18 TSDR October 1, 2016 Office Action at 14 (“pro” as an abbreviation of “protein”), 20 (definition of “to go” as “to be taken elsewhere to be eaten”); TSDR December 28, 2017 Office Action at 30 (third party use of “on-the-go lifestyle” in connection with similar goods). Serial No. 87080202 - 10 - 109 (CCPA 1974); Max Capital, 93 USPQ2d at 1246; see also In re Clorox Co., 578 F.2d 305, 198 USPQ 337, 341 (CCPA 1978) (ERASE for a laundry soil and stain remover held confusingly similar to STAIN ERASER, registered on the Supplemental Register, for a stain remover). D. Similarity of the Marks We turn to comparing the applied-for and cited marks “in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.” Palm Bay, 73 USPQ2d at 1691 (quoting du Pont, 177 USPQ at 567). The test assesses not whether the marks can be distinguished in a side-by-side comparison, but rather whether their overall commercial impressions are so similar that confusion as to the source of the goods offered under the respective marks is likely to result. Coach Servs. Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Edom Labs. Inc. v. Lichter, 102 USPQ2d 1546, 1551 (TTAB 2012). We bear in mind that where, as here, marks would appear on legally identical goods, the degree of similarity necessary to support a conclusion of likely confusion declines. Century 21 Real Estate v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed. Cir.1992); see also Viterra, 101 USPQ2d at 1908; In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010). First, comparing PRO-TO-GO to the cited mark PRO ON-THE-GO, the marks share a strong similarity in sight and sound, as both begin with PRO and end with GO, with minimal wording in between. Applicant’s mark separates PRO and GO with the one-syllable preposition TO, and the cited mark separates PRO and GO with the Serial No. 87080202 - 11 - one-syllable preposition ON and the definite article THE. Both marks also include hyphens between some or all of the words. We find that the use of PRO as the first word of both marks makes it “most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered.” Presto Prods., Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods. Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988). Second, comparing PRO-TO-GO with PROTEIN-2GO, these marks also look and sound similar. While Applicant’s mark begins with PRO, the abbreviation of the word PROTEIN found in the cited mark, the difference does not create a substantial distinction in appearance or sound. The remainder of the marks are phonetically identical and close in appearance, as the use of the numeral “2” as a phonetic substitute for the word “to” and the absence of a hyphen are not significant differences. The substitution of numbers or special characters for words or letters has typically been found to be inconsequential to the sound and meaning. See, e.g., In Home Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n, 213 USPQ 68, 69 (TTAB 1982) (TRAN$ FUND deemed similar to TRANSFUND). Overall, Applicant’s mark and both cited marks look and sound very similar. See In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“in articulating reasons for reaching a conclusion on the issue of confusion, there is nothing improper in stating that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their entireties”); see also Stone Lion Capital Partners 110 USPQ2d at 1161. The meanings and commercial impressions of the marks are essentially the same. In the context of these marks for protein supplements, PRO refers to protein, and TO- Serial No. 87080202 - 12 - GO (or 2GO) refers to it being portable.19 The expression ON-THE-GO can mean “while going from place to place.”20 Thus, both marks have the meaning and impression of protein that can be transported. Given their resemblance in sound, appearance, connotation and commercial impression, Applicant’s mark and the cited marks are very similar. Even taking into account the conceptual weakness of the terms PRO and GO, the overall similarities in the marks result in this factor supporting a finding of likelihood of confusion. While Applicant argues that the coexistence of the ‘893 and ‘530 Registrations, owned by different registrants, weighs in favor of registering its mark, we disagree. We find Applicant’s mark more similar to each of the cited marks than they are to each other, and regardless, each case must be decided on its own merits and record, and the Board is not bound by prior registrations. In re Shinnecock Smoke Shop, 571 F.3d 1171, 91 USPQ2d 1218, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Applicant’s allegations regarding similar marks are irrelevant because each application must be considered on its own merits.”); In re Nett Designs Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 57 USPQ2d 1564, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Even if some prior registrations had some characteristics similar to Nett Designs’ application, the PTO’s allowance of such prior registrations does not bind the Board or this court.”). 19 We take judicial notice of the entry for the idiom “to go” in the online Random House Dictionary, www.dictionary.com (“Informal. (of food) for consumption off the premises where sold: coffee to go.”). 20 We take judicial notice of the entry for the idiom “on the go” in the online Random House Dictionary, www.dictionary.com (“a. very busy; active: She’s always on the go. b. while going from place to place; while traveling.”). Serial No. 87080202 - 13 - III. Conclusion The overall similarity of these marks for in-part identical goods that move in the same channels of trade to the same classes of customers renders confusion likely. Decision: The refusal to register Applicant’s mark is affirmed due to a likelihood of confusion with Registration Nos. 3463893 and 4993530. Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation