Tri-M Group, LLC

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Apr 10, 2007

04-CB-009713 (N.L.R.B. Apr. 10, 2007)

JD–17—07
Philadelphia, PA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD
OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS,
LOCAL UNION NO. 98
and Case 4—CB—9713
TRI-M GROUP, LLC
Bruce G. Conley, Esq., for the General Counsel.
William T. Josem, Esq., of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
for the Respondent.
Stephen J. Sundheim, Esq., of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
for the Charging Party.
DECISION
Statement of the Case
PAUL BUXBAUM, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, on January 25, 2007. The charge was filed June 20, 2006,1 and the complaint
was issued October 17. 2
The complaint alleges that the Union, through the actions of its agents, violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by blocking an employee of the Company from entering a jobsite in order to
perform a work task. In addition, the complaint provides notice that the General Counsel seeks
imposition of a broad remedial order requiring the Union to cease and desist from blocking
employees’ ingress and egress from worksites or impeding employees from performing work
duties, or in any other manner restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. The Union filed an answer denying the material allegations
of the complaint.
As described in detail in the decision that follows, I find that, on June 16, the Union,
through its agents, Raymond Della Vella, Craig Cummings, and Mike Quinn, blocked an
employee of the Company, Sean Muth, from accessing a portion of a worksite and prevented
that employee from performing a work task. The Union’s conduct violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of
the Act. I further conclude that the totality of circumstances demonstrates that the Union’s

1 All dates are in 2006 unless otherwise indicated.
2 At trial, counsel for the General Counsel moved to amend the complaint to reflect the
Charging Party’s correct name and form of organization under Pennsylvania law. This motion
was unopposed, and I granted it.
JD–17—07
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
2
agents have a proclivity to violate the Act to the extent that an extraordinary remedial measure
is required. As a result, I concur in the General Counsel’s request for relief and recommend
imposition of a broad cease-and-desist order.
On the entire record,3 including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and
after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel, the Company, and the Union, I make
the following
Findings of Fact
I. Jurisdiction
The Charging Party, a Pennsylvania limited liability company with offices in Kennett
Square, Pennsylvania, is engaged as an electrical contractor in the construction industry. It
annually performs services valued in excess of $50,000 outside the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. The Union admits4 and I find that the Company is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act, and that the Union is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
A. The Facts
This case involves an incident occurring at the Genesis Health Care facility, a nursing
home located on Edison Avenue in Philadelphia. Starting in January 2006, Genesis underwent
major renovation, including installation of a new electrical distribution system. The general
contractor for this project was Delran Builders Company, Inc. Their project superintendent was
Steve Herman. The electrical subcontracting work was performed by the Company. Their
foreman at this location was Joseph Prego. The Company’s work force is not represented by
any labor organization.
Beginning in early April, the Union picketed the Genesis worksite, contending, in the
words of its placards, that the Company was “Destroying Building Industry Standards” by “Not
Observing Our Wage and Benefit Standards.” (GC Exh. 6.) At the commencement, picketing
was conducted on a daily basis. Once other unions began similar activities at the site, the
Union generally restricted its own activities to Fridays. Picketing was conducted on
approximately 20 Fridays, from 7 am until 2 pm. The person responsible for directing this
activity was Raymond Della Vella. He has been a business representative and organizer for the
Union since 1998. Della Vella confirmed that, in the words of counsel for the General Counsel,
he was “the official designated by Local 98 to be in charge of the picketing” at the Genesis
Health Care construction project site.5 (Tr. 23.)

3 Counsel for the General Counsel has filed a Motion to Correct the Transcript. His page
reference numbers differ from those in the official transcript furnished to the Board by the
reporting service. As a result, I am unable to verify his suggested corrections. Fortunately, as
is apparent from the brevity of his motion, there are very few transcription errors. Having
performed my own examination of the transcript, I determine that those errors that do exist are
neither significant nor material.
4 See the Union’s answer to the complaint, paragraphs 2 and 3. (GC Exh. 1(e).)
5 The Union concedes that Della Vella was its agent within the meaning of the Act. See the
Union’s answer to the complaint, paragraph 4. (GC Exh. 1(e).) In addition, counsel for the
Continued
JD–17—07
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
3
Because it is important to an assessment of one of the key issues in this case, it is
necessary to describe the location, manner, and purpose of the Union’s picketing activities. The
Genesis facility has a parking lot with two entrances. Since the nursing home continued to
operate during the renovations, a variety of people entered and left the property through those
entrances, including employees of Genesis, delivery persons, and employees of the various
contractors engaged in the construction activities.6
Of the 2 entrances to the facility, it is the eastern one that is involved in this case. That
entrance has a wide section of concrete connecting Edison Avenue to the Genesis parking lot.
This concrete entryway crosses the pedestrian sidewalk. The sidewalk continues past the
entrance for a short distance. It comes to an end at a wooded area traversed by a creek. At
this place, Delran stationed dumpsters for storage of construction debris. The outer dumpster is
located parallel to the sidewalk and its end is adjacent to the woods. All of this is well illustrated
in the photographic record that forms a large part of the documentary evidence in this case. In
particular, Herman testified that he took a series of photos during the incident at issue. These
pictures constitute General Counsel’s exhibits 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15.7 Of these
photos, General Counsel’s exhibit 12 contains the best view of the geography that is involved in
the parties’ controversy. In the foreground of the photo, one can see a portion of the wide piece
of concrete that forms the eastern entrance to the facility. Beyond that, the sidewalk extends to
the wooded area, where it terminates. Parallel to the sidewalk is the outermost of the
dumpsters.
Della Vella testified about the manner and purpose of the Union’s picketing. He reported
that the Union located pickets at each of the entrances to the facility. Typically, 2 pickets would
be placed at each of those entrances. Significantly, Della Vella explained that the reason for the
picketing activity was to publicize the Union’s dispute with the Company by enabling persons
who were driving onto the facility’s property to read the placards carried by the pickets. Thus,
the evidence demonstrated that the Union’s pattern of conduct was to station a set of two
pickets at the eastern entrance to the facility in order to bring to the attention of the interested
public the nature of its dispute with the Company.
On Friday, June 16, the Union engaged in this customary picketing activity. As was its
practice, the Union had notified the Civil Affairs Division of the Philadelphia Police Department
that it would be picketing on that day. The Department assigned Officers Edward Braceland
and Ira Watterson to observe the situation. They parked their vehicle in the facility’s lot,
adjacent to the dumpsters.8
Della Vella testified that pickets were placed “at both entrances” to the Genesis facility.
(Tr. 111.) The two pickets at the east entrance were Union Members Cummings and Quinn.
Della Vella was stationed across the street. As he described it, “I was keeping an eye on both
_________________________
Union agreed that, on the day in question, Della Vella “was supervising the pickets” at the
Genesis site. (R. Br. at p. 2.)
6 While there was no testimony on this point, it is reasonable to assume that other members
of the public also accessed the facility, including visitors to the residents.
7 The Union also introduced photos showing the area in question. Respondent’s exhibit 1 is
a satellite photo showing the east entrance to the facility. Respondent’s exhibit 2 shows the
placement of the dumpsters parallel to the sidewalk and adjacent to the woods.
8 The location of the unmarked police vehicle is shown in Respondent’s exhibit 2, a photo
taken shortly after the incident had concluded.
JD–17—07
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
4
picket signs and I was taking care of . . . general things I had to do.” (Tr. 111.)
Sean Muth testified that he is a longtime employee of the Company. He is not a
supervisor, nor is he a member of any labor organization. He works as an electrician and
sometimes operates a backhoe. At approximately 1 p.m. on June 16, Muth placed a load of
construction debris in the bucket of a backhoe. He planned to drive the backhoe out onto
Edison Avenue so that he could approach the dumpster and drop his load into it. He testified
that he was required to use this route because it afforded the only practical access to the
dumpster that would permit him to properly dispose of his load.
Muth testified that he had a coworker stop traffic on Edison Avenue so that he could
“swing out.” (Tr. 92.) As he explained, he “went to swing out and pulled up towards the
dumpster and the pickets walked in front of me.” (Tr. 92.) Because the movements of the
pickets are a key aspect of this case, it is important to note that Muth was repeatedly questioned
on this point. He clearly testified that, prior to the commencement of the incident, the pickets
had been stationed “towards the driveway” leading into the parking lot. (Tr. 101.) As he
phrased it, “[t]hey walked down in front of the dumpster when I got turned towards it.” (Tr. 94.)
The following additional discussion precisely illustrates Muth’s contention regarding the pickets’
movements:
COUNSEL: Before the incident started when you got in the backhoe
with the debris, where were the pickets standing and
perhaps you can show us on the General Counsel’s
Exhibit GC-8?
MUTH: More towards this end of the dumpster.
COUNSEL: In other words[,] towards the driveway?
MUTH: Yes.
JUDGE: So[,] as we’re looking at it, that’s towards the right of the
dumpster?
MUTH: Yes.
COUNSEL: [T]hen a[s] you went into the street to approach the dumpster
to make the dump, did the pickets then move in front of the
backhoe so that they were between—so that they were now
between the backhoe and the dumpster?
MUTH: Yes, they walked down from there to that point.
COUNSEL: They walked from the original position which was to the right
of the dumpster so that they were no[w] positioned directly in
front of the dumpsters so that you could not make the dump?
MUTH: That’s correct, in front of the machine.
(Tr. 101-102.)
On this point, Della Vella’s testimony stands in sharp contrast to that of Muth. I asked
JD–17—07
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
5
him, “[w]hat about immediately prior to when the backhoe first came out onto the street, where
were [the pickets] then?” He responded that, “[t]hey were in front of the dumpster.” (Tr. 126.)
This assertion forms the basis for Della Vella’s explanation for what occurred next. He
concedes that he instructed the pickets to maintain a position in front of the dumpster. He
described his reasoning as follows:
I felt that the backhoe was interfering with us. We had been on that
sidewalk standing in that very position for months and we thought we
were being interfered with, that we weren’t interfering with anybody,
we just thought we were being harassed.
(Tr. 116.) In other words, the Union’s contention is that its pickets had been standing in front of
the dumpster when Muth first drove out onto the street. According to this version, Muth’s
actions would have had the effect of dislodging the pickets from their preexisting station in front
of the dumpster.
There are a number of reasons why I credit Muth’s account and discredit that of Della
Vella. First and foremost, Muth testified in an impressively calm, dispassionate manner that left
me with a sense of his fundamental neutrality in this dispute. Second, although Della Vella
claims that the pickets were standing in front of the dumpster when Muth arrived, he earlier
testified that, in the phrasing of counsel, the 2 pickets were “picketing at that east entrance.”
(Tr. 111.) In other words, they would have been standing at some distance from the dumpster.
Furthermore, the placement of the pickets at the entrance comports with logic and common
sense. The purpose of the picketing was to alert the public about the terms of the Union’s
dispute with the Company, particularly those members of the public with a potential interest in
the matter, such as employees of the firms performing the construction work and persons
having business with the nursing home. Picketing at the entrance is designed to facilitate this
purpose. Picketing at the dumpster would be comparatively ineffective at accomplishing this
objective. That locale is at the edge of the property, adjacent to woods and a creek. It simply
defies logic to believe that the Union would choose the dumpster as a primary locus for its
pickets.9
I also note that the precise location of the 2 pickets as of the commencement of this
incident is key to the Union’s defense in this case. Despite this, the Union did not call as
witnesses either of the pickets themselves. Cummings and Quinn are members of the Union
and no explanation was offered as to why their testimony was not presented.10 Because one
would have reasonably expected that their testimony would have supported Della Vella’s
contentions, the unexplained failure to produce them as witnesses leads me to draw an adverse
inference. See, Daikichi Sushi, 335 NLRB 622 (2001), enf. 56 Fed. Appx. 516 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(adverse inference drawn against employer who failed to produce testimony from the only

9 I recognize that Prego testified that the Union’s pickets sometimes stood in front of the
dumpster. However, he also reported that this was not their typical behavior. Della Vella
testified that “[m]ost of the time” his pickets were placed in front of the dumpster. (Tr. 126.) As I
have indicated, this would make little sense and I do not credit it. As counsel for the Charging
Party observed, “If they were actually picketing at this out-of-the-way location, this would have
been a considerable distance from the entrance and would have defeated the Union’s aim of
getting its message to those entering and exiting.” [Footnote omitted.] (C.P. Br. at p. 6.)
10 Interestingly, counsel for the Charging Party cross-examined Della Vella regarding the
failure to produce the testimony of the pickets. Despite this, the Union presented no explanation
for its failure to call them as witnesses.
JD–17—07
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
6
management official present at a key meeting) and NLRB v. Iron Workers, 124 F.3d 1094, 1101
(9th Cir. 1997) (Board’s “well established” use of adverse inference for failure to produce
testimony was properly applied to a respondent labor organization).
In sum, my finding that Muth’s account is credible is based on my assessment of his
demeanor and motivation as reinforced by the contradiction in Della Vella’s testimony, the
unexplained absence of other pertinent testimony, and the inherent logic of the situation. I
conclude that, upon observing Muth’s approach in the backhoe, the pickets moved from their
prior station at the east entrance and assumed a new position directly in front of the dumpster.
General Counsel’s exhibits 7 and 12 clearly illustrate the situation as it existed once the
pickets moved into place in front of the dumpster. In these photos, Union Members Cummings
and Quinn, accompanied by Della Vella, are shown standing directly between the backhoe’s
bucket and the dumpster.11 There is no dispute regarding the remaining events. Muth testified
that he waited in his machine. After 5 to 10 minutes, his foreman, Prego, arrived. Prego
instructed him to return the backhoe to the facility’s parking lot. He complied. At this juncture,
Herman also arrived on the scene. He told the police officers that Muth needed to dump the
debris. Officer Watterson told him to proceed. He instructed Muth to start the backhoe. Prego
stopped the traffic on Edison Avenue. Muth moved the backhoe into position. At that point,
Cummings and Quinn were still posted in front of the dumpster. Della Vella had moved away
and was standing on a bridge over the creek talking on his cell phone. Herman asked the
pickets to move. Cummings told him “to go talk to the boss and he pointed down to the picketer
that was over at the bridge talking on his cell phone.”12 (Tr. 69.)
According to Herman, at this point Della Vella approached and told the police to instruct
Herman to “shut up.” (Tr. 69.) He then joined the other pickets in front of the dumpster. Officer
Watterson told Herman he was going to instruct the pickets to move. He had a conversation
with Della Vella that lasted “a few minutes.” (Tr. 71.) Watterson directed Muth to move the
backhoe forward. Muth complied, but was again required to stop because the pickets did not
step out of the way. The officer again instructed Muth to move forward. Muth inched another
foot or so closer to the dumpster. After some minutes, Della Vella “directed his guys to move
away.” (Tr. 73.) Watterson instructed Muth to make his dump and Muth complied. There were
no further problems at the site on that day.
As may be anticipated whenever multiple witnesses provide estimates of elapsed time,
there was some variance in the description of how long the incident lasted. Prego estimated
that 15 to 20 minutes elapsed between the time he first observed the pickets blocking the
dumpster and the end of the episode. Herman reported that “about 20 minutes elapsed.” (Tr.
80.) Muth testified that it was between 30 to 35 minutes from his first attempt to dump until he
was able to accomplish his mission. Della Vella estimated that the entire incident took “no more
than ten minutes.” (Tr. 119.) Under questioning by counsel for the Company, Della Vella was
asked whether “you and the other two pickets refused to move from your position in front of the

11 The other individuals shown in General Counsel exhibit 7 are Officers Braceland and
Watterson. Officer Watterson is also shown in exhibit 12.
12 Della Vella was conversing with one of the Union’s attorneys. Counsel for the Union cites
this behavior as evidence that Della Vella was acting in good faith and “with the utmost attempt
to comply with the law.” [Footnote omitted.] (R. Br. at p. 6.) The Union did not offer testimony
regarding the substance of this conversation. Naturally, I draw no adverse inference from the
failure to present testimony regarding privileged communications. By the same token, I decline
to speculate as to the possible relevance of the conversation to any issues in this case.
JD–17—07
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
7
dumpster for at least, you said five to ten minutes, so that the dumpster could not be reached or
gotten to by the backhoe, correct?” He responded, “[t]hat’s correct.” (Tr. 127.) Ultimately, it
must be recalled that only two individuals who testified were present throughout the events,
Della Vella and Muth. For reasons already discussed, I credit Muth’s account and find that the
incident, in its entirety, last approximately one-half an hour.
To summarize, I have found that an employee of the Company, Muth, was engaged in a
work task requiring that he bring his backhoe into position to dump debris into a dumpster. The
Union’s pickets observed Muth maneuvering into place. They moved from their prior station at
the parking lot entrance to a new location designed to block Muth’s access to the dumpster.
They remained in that blocking position for a period of approximately 30 minutes before
stepping aside to allow Muth to complete his task.
B. Legal Analysis
The General Counsel contends that the Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act
when its pickets, in the words of counsel’s opening statement, “moved and stationed
themselves on the public sidewalk running parallel to the dumpster directly in front of the path of
the backhoe.” (Tr. 11.) The pertinent portion of the statute makes it an unfair labor practice for
a labor organization or its agents “to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 7.”13 The Board’s venerable test for application of this standard is
whether the conduct in question is “reasonably calculated to coerce anti-union or non-union
[employees] in the exercise of their right, under the amended Act, to refrain from joining the
Union.” Ladies Garment Workers (Seamprufe, Inc.), 82 NLRB 892, 894 (1949), enf. 186 F.2d
671 (10th Cir. 1951), cert. denied 342 U.S. 813 (1951). See also, Randell Warehouse of
Arizona, Inc., 347 NLRB No. 56 (2006), slip op. at p. 6 (describing the standard as “reasonable
tendency to coerce employees”).
Over the years, the Board has consistently found that the blocking of access to an
employee’s workplace constitutes unlawful restraint and coercion. Early on, it held that pickets
who placed themselves in the path of employees’ vehicles attempting to enter an employer’s
plant violated Section 8(b)(1)(A). Longshoremen ILWU/Local 6 (Sunset Line & Twine Co.), 79
NLRB 1487, 1506 (1948). Similarly, blocking the door of a facility so as to prevent an employee
from entering was also found to violate that Section. Metal Polishers, Buffers, Intern. Local 67,
200 NLRB 335 (1972). Much more recently, this principle was again upheld by the Board while
affirming a judge’s observation that “efforts to prevent employees from reporting to work by
impeding access to an employer’s facility [are] proscribed by this Section.” Service Employees
Union Local 525, 329 NLRB 638, 685 (1999), aff’d 52 Fed. Appx. 357 (9th Cir. 2002).
Furthermore, the prohibition against blocking access is not limited to conduct directed against
employees who are arriving for, or departing from, work. The Board has also found it unlawful
for pickets to block “employees from entering the [employer’s] facility to perform assigned
tasks.” Mine Workers Dist. 17 (Dehue Coal), 275 NLRB 715 (1985).
In applying these principles, the Board has been clear that the mere absence of violence
is not a defense. Thus, in Carpenters (Society Hill Towers Owners’ Assn.), 335 NLRB 814, 815
(2001), the Board reversed a judge’s finding of no violation premised on the fact that there was
“no hint of violence” in the union’s conduct. In a case involving conduct similar to that at issue
here, the Board held that,

13 There are certain provisos that limit coverage of this section in ways that are not material
to this case.
JD–17—07
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
8
[t]he absence of physical violence does not lessen the restraining
effect of Respondent’s conduct. Here . . . [t]he car drivers were
faced with the choice of running down the pickets, at the risk of
inflicting serious injury, or driving away. This interposition of
passive force to prevent employees from going to work is, we
believe, a form of restraint proscribed by Section 8(b)(1)(A).
Metal Polishers, Buffers, Intl. Local 67, 200 NLRB 335 (1972), at fn. 10. See also, Service
Employees Local 525, supra, at 685 (nonviolent conduct that includes prevention of access to
employer’s facility violates the Act).
The Board has also held that the short duration of prohibited conduct of the type at issue
in this case is not a defense. See, Longshoremen ILWU/Local 6 (Sunset Line & Twine Co.),
supra, at 1506 (preventing non-striker’s cars from entering parking lot “for only a short period of
time” constituted restraint and coercion within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A)). Indeed, the
Board has reversed a conclusion that “a delay of one to five minutes under peaceful
circumstances hardly constitutes blocking or barring ingress so as to constitute a violation of the
Act.” Instead, the Board held that, “[s]uch a construction is at variance with established Board
law.” Metal Polishers, supra, at p. 336. Counsel for the Union argues that the short duration
and nature of the conduct in this case rendered it “de minimis.” (R. Br. at p. 5.) This is
premised on his acceptance of Della Vella’s testimony that the incident lasted no more than 10
minutes.14 Having found that the entire blocking episode had a duration of approximately 30
minutes, it cannot be seriously contended that it was of too short a duration to be legally
cognizable as an unfair labor practice.
Finally, the Board has declined to withhold administrative action simply because the
conduct at issue implicated the interests of state or local law enforcement. In 1199, National
Health & Human Service Employees Union, 339 NLRB 1059, 1062 (2003), the Board rejected a
contention that the employer should have “looked to a state court lawsuit or to the police for
assistance, rather than to the Board.” As a result, the fact that the Philadelphia police
successfully defused the situation in this case is immaterial.
With this background in mind, it is readily apparent that the Union’s conduct in moving
from a position by the entrance to the Genesis facility to a location clearly intended to preclude
Muth from accessing his worksite to complete a job task and in maintaining that blocking
position for approximately 30 minutes constituted the sort of restraint and coercion made
unlawful by Section 8(b)(1)(A). Muth was presented with precisely the type of situation
discussed by the Board in Sunset Line & Twine Co., supra. He could either take the risk of
inflicting serious bodily injury on the pickets or refrain from accessing the dumpster to complete
his task. The imposition of such a dilemma on a nonunion employee is the sort of restraint and
coercion prohibited by the Act.15

14 Counsel for the Union also suggests that the reference in the police officer’s report of the
incident to a 5 minute delay in making the dump supports Della Vella’s estimate. I agree with
counsel for the General Counsel’s contrary view. The police officers did not testify. Considering
the credible evidence of what transpired and how long it took, I conclude that the police report’s
terse mention of a 5 minute period refers to Muth’s final attempt to make his dump under police
supervision, not to the duration of the entire incident.
15 Indeed, as I will discuss in another context later in this decision, the Board has
determined that a virtually identical blocking episode committed by another official of the Union
Continued
JD–17—07
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
9
Conclusion of Law
By moving its pickets into a position designed to preclude an employee of the Company
from accessing his worksite in order to complete a work assignment and by maintaining that
blocking position for approximately 30 minutes, the Union has engaged in an unfair labor
practice affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act.
Remedy
Having found that the Union has engaged in an unfair labor practice, I find that it must be
ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act. The appropriate relief includes the imposition of a cease-and-desist order
and the requirement for the posting of a notice.
In his complaint, the General Counsel served notice that he would be seeking a broad
order requiring the Union to cease and desist from blocking employees’ ingress and egress to
jobsites, impeding employees from performing services at their jobsites, or, in any other
manner, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section
7 of the Act. Because it both broadens the types of misconduct enjoined and the scope of
coverage to include employees of all employers, this proposed remedy goes beyond the relief
that is typically granted.
The Board’s power to impose a remedy for unfair labor practices stems from the
language of Section 10(c) of the Act, which provides that, upon a finding that a respondent has
committed an unfair labor practice, it shall issue “an order requiring such person to cease and
desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action . . . as will effectuate
the policies of this Act.” The Supreme Court has observed that this is a Congressional grant of
authority that is broad and yet rather vague. The Court held that, “at a minimum it
encompasses the requirement that a proposed remedy be tailored to the unfair labor practice it
is intended to redress.” Sure-Tan v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 900 (1984). Put another way, the
Court has instructed that the validity of any remedial measure imposed by the Board must be
“examined in light of the appropriateness in the circumstances of th[e] case.” NLRB v. District
50, Mine Workers, 355 U.S. 453, 458 (1958).
The Supreme Court has also addressed the standards for imposition of the precise type
of relief being sought in this proceeding. In NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426, 437
(1941), it held that the justification for a broad order must be that its provisions “bear some
resemblance to that which the [respondent] has committed or that danger of their commission in
the future is to be anticipated from the course of his conduct in the past.”
Applying the Court’s teachings, the Board has developed a test for gauging the
appropriateness of any request for a broad order. In Hickmott Foods, 242 NLRB 1357 (1979), a
case involving violations of the same section of the Act as found here, the Board held that a
broad order:
is warranted only when a respondent is shown to have a proclivity to
_________________________
violated the Act. The incident is described by the Board and the administrative law judge at
Electrical Workers, Local 98 (MCF Services), 342 NLRB 740, pp. 741 and 751 (2004).
JD–17—07
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
10
violate the Act or has engaged in such egregious or widespread
misconduct as to demonstrate a general disregard for the employees’
fundamental statutory rights. Accordingly, each case will be analyzed
to determine the nature and extent of the violations committed by a
respondent so that the Board may tailor an appropriate order.
[Footnote omitted.]
242 NLRB at 1357. It concisely summarized its test by noting that “repeat offenders and
egregious violators” would be subject to imposition of a broad cease-and-desist order. 242
NLRB at 1357. Very recently, the Board has provided an additional commentary on its Hickmott
Foods standard. In Five Star Manufacturing, Inc., 348 NLRB No. 94 (2006), slip op. at 1, it
noted that, while considering imposition of a broad order under Hickmott, “the totality of
circumstances” must be examined to determine whether the respondent’s behavior manifests,
“an attitude of opposition to the purposes of the Act to protect the rights of employees generally,
which would provide an objective basis for enjoining a reasonably anticipated future threat to
any of those Section 7 rights.” [Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.]
Turning to the application of these principles, I begin by noting that the General Counsel
and the Company do not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the violation
committed in this case, standing alone, was of such an egregious nature as to justify imposition
of a broad order. In fact, the violation, while clearly implicating important Section 7 rights, was
confined to a single episode and employed passive force rather than any form of overt threat or
violence. Furthermore, following intervention by local law enforcement authorities, the Union
terminated its unlawful behavior. Thus, imposition of broad relief must be justified, if at all, by an
overall determination of whether the Union is a recidivist offender of such magnitude as to
require an extraordinary response. In order to make this assessment, it is necessary to provide
a detailed account of the Union’s past behavior.
The record contains the following undisputed documentation regarding the Union’s past
misconduct and Della Vella’s unlawful activities on its behalf, with specific focus on those
incidents involving behavior similar to that which occurred in this case.16 In 1996, the General
Counsel filed a series of complaints alleging that the Union had engaged in a variety of unfair
labor practices, including the blocking of employees’ ingress to a facility of Bell Atlantic—
Pennsylvania, Inc., and blocking employees’ ingress to two separate construction sites of
Lucent Technologies, Inc. (GC Exh. 2(a).) On July 18, 1997, the Board entered an Order
premised on a settlement stipulation providing that the Union cease and desist from “[b]locking
or impeding the ingress of employees to facilities” of the two employers. The order also directed
the Union to cease and desist from threatening employees in various manners, videotaping
them, or “[p]ushing, surrounding, bumping or spitting on employees.” It also prohibited any like

16 In his brief, counsel for the Union argues that consideration of prior unlawful acts must be
limited to those involving violations of the same section of the Act. (R. Br. at fn. 6.) He cites
Teamsters Local 166 (Shank/Balfour Beatty), 327 NLRB 449 (1999). In that case, the Board
affirmed a judge’s observation that, “[i]n general,” proclivity must be based on prior adjudications
of “similar unlawful conduct in the past.” 327 NLRB at 455. In my view, it is important not to
confuse “similar” with “identical.” I will consider past adjudications for unlawful picketing
activities under any portion of Section 8(b). It is the Union’s picketing behavior that is the proper
focus of scrutiny. To confine examination only to adjudications under the precise subsection of
the statute alleged in this case would be to exalt form over substance and to ignore the Board’s
instruction to consider the totality of the relevant circumstances when fashioning an appropriate
remedy. See, Five Star Manufacturing, Inc., supra.
JD–17—07
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
11
or related violations of the Act directed against employees of Bell or Lucent.17 (GC Exh. 2.) On
November 25, 1997, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit entered a
Judgment enforcing the Board‘s Order. (GC Exh. 3.)

On July 7, 1998, an administrative law judge issued a decision finding that, in March
1997, the Union, through its agents, violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by physically
assaulting employers and destroying their property in the presence of employees and by
pushing an employee against a wall. The judge also found other violations of Section 8(b)
involving threats and inducements to an employer to cease doing business with another entity
and unlawful picketing activities designed to accomplish the same objective. Many of these
additional unlawful acts were found to have occurred in October 1997, just 3 months after the
Board had entered its order in the previously cited case. In her decision, the judge also granted
the General Counsel’s request for a recommendation of a broad cease-and-desist order as to
future violations of Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) and (ii)(B). She explained her reasoning as follows:
Respondent’s unlawful actions toward 10 separate neutral employers
in a 19-month period, involving picketing, threats to picket, and work
stoppages at six locations in the Philadelphia area, demonstrates
Respondent’s proclivity for violating the Act and its general disregard
for the fundamental rights of employees and neutral employers. A
narrow order, confined to the instant case, would not sufficiently deter
further misconduct. I therefore recommend that the Board issue a
broad order requiring the Respondent to cease and desist from
infringing in any other manner on rights guaranteed employees by
Section 7 of the Act. [Citations omitted.]
Electrical Workers Local 98 (The Telephone Man), 327 NLRB 593, 602 (1999). The judge’s
proposed broad order enjoined the Union from restraining or coercing employees of any
employer by engaging in various specified forms of misconduct.18 On February 12, 1999, the
Board affirmed the judge’s findings and conclusions and adopted her recommendations,
including the broad cease-and-desist provisions. 327 NLRB at 593. On September 29, 2000,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued a judgment enforcing the Board’s
broad order. (GC Exh. 4.)

17 Counsel for the General Counsel submitted copies of portions of the record from this case
as an appendix to his brief. The submission was unopposed and I accept it into the record as
GC exhibit 2(a). I note that the settlement stipulation contains the following provision:
“Respondent agrees that for the purpose of determining the proper scope of an order to be
entered against it in any future proceeding before the Board or a Court in which the Board or its
General Counsel is a party, the Board Order and Court Judgment issued pursuant to this
Stipulation shall have the same force and effect as a litigated adjudication of the Board enforced
by a United States Court that Respondent engaged in the conduct alleged in Complaints One
through Three.” (GC Exh. 2(a), Settlement Stipulation, p. 7.) This provision of the settlement
stipulation is also cited at Electrical Workers Local 98 (The Telephone Man), 327 NLRB 593,
602 (1999). A provision containing this language renders the conduct underlying the settlement
agreement cognizable when considering the question of a proclivity to violate the Act. See,
Teamsters Local 70, 261 NLRB 496, 503 (1982) and Carpenters Local 1622, 262 NLRB 1211
(1982), enf. 786 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1986).
18 The judge reported that the General Counsel did not seek a broad remedial order with
respect to conduct prohibited by Section 8(b)(1)(A). 327 NLRB 593, at fn. 6.
JD–17—07
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
12
Just months after the Board issued its decision in Electrical Workers Local 98 (The
Telephone Man), infra., the Union engaged in a series of unlawful acts of the same nature as
those alleged in this case.19 In May 1999, it prevented employees of Wohlson Construction
Company from entering or leaving a jobsite. In the following month, Della Vella, on behalf of the
Union, threatened to block ingress and egress of a facility of the United Parcel Service.
Consistent with these threats, Union pickets prevented vehicles from entering and leaving that
facility. Two months later, in conduct virtually indistinguishable from the unlawful act committed
by the Union in this case, an official of the Union drove his automobile into a position so as to
block an employee of MCF Services, Inc., from using a forklift to dump waste into a dumpster.
In January 2000, the Union, through Della Vella, engaged in unlawful blocking activity at
a worksite of Swartley Brothers Engineers, Inc. Shortly thereafter, in February 2000, Della
Vella, again acting as the Union’s agent, gained unauthorized access to a secure worksite of
Swartley Brothers. The worksite was at a facility of Verizon Wireless Corp. When asked to
leave by a Verizon employee, Della Vella “struck the Verizon employee in the face.” Electrical
Workers Local 98 (Swartley Bros. Engineers, Inc.), 337 NLRB 1270 at 1271, 1273 (2002). On
September 12, 2002, the Board issued a decision in this Section 10(k) case involving the Union.
Although this involves a different sort of proceeding against the Union, it is relevant here for a
number of reasons. In Swartley, the Board issued a broad order based on its determination
that, “Local 98 has a proclivity to engage in wrongful conduct in order to obtain work similar to
the work in dispute in this case.” 337 NLRB at 1273. In reaching this conclusion, the Board
observed:
In this regard, we note not only that the record in this case supports
the conclusion that Local 98 has a proclivity to engage in wrongful
conduct in order to obtain disputed work, but also that the record in
other recent cases before the Board underscores this as well. See,
e.g., Electrical Workers Local 98 (Total Cabling Specialists), 337 NLRB
1275 (2002); Electrical Workers Local 98 (NFF Construction, Inc.),
332 NLRB 1262 (2000); Electrical Workers Local 98 (Honeywell, Inc.),
332 NLRB 526 (2000); Electrical Workers Local 98 (AIMM, Inc.), 331
NLRB 1075 (2000); Electrical Workers Local 98 (Kastle Security),
324 NLRB 728 (1997); Electrical Workers Local 98 (LaSalle University),
324 NLRB 540 (1997); Electrical Workers Local 98 (Lucent Technologies),
324 NLRB 226 (1997) (Board issues broad areawide award against
Local 98 because of likelihood of dispute’s recurrence and union’s
proclivity to violate the Act); and Electrical Workers Local 98 (Lucent
Technologies), 324 NLRB 230 (1997) (Board issues broad areawide
award against Local 98 because of likelihood of dispute’s recurrence
and union’s proclivity to violate the Act).
337 NLRB at 1273, fn. 7.
This case is also significant because the Union’s misconduct was committed by Della
Vella. Finally, it is noteworthy because the Board took pains to report that, based on its
conclusion that the misconduct also violated the broad order that it had issued in Electrical
Workers Local 98 (Telephone Man), supra, it was pursuing civil contempt proceedings against

19 The unfair labor practices about to be described are all taken from the judge’s findings in
Electrical Workers Local 98 (MCF Services), 342 NLRB 740 (2004), at 757-758, 758-760, and
751.
JD–17—07
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
13
“both Local 98 and Della Vella.” 337 NLRB at 1273, fn. 7. It concluded by emphasizing that,
“[t]he Board has now determined that Local 98’s conduct underlying the instant case is in direct
contempt of the Third Circuit’s 2001 consent order.” 337 NLRB at 1273, fn. 7.
Approximately a year later, on September 16, 2003, the Third Circuit entered a Consent
Order implementing the parties’ stipulation resolving the contempt proceedings against Local 98
and Della Vella. As part of that Order, Della Vella was required to pay to the Board the sum of
$5,000 “representing a compromised amount of fines, compensatory damages and/or attorneys’
fees caused by Della Vella’s failure to comply with the picketing and other provisions of the
Court’s prior order.” (C.P. Exh. 1, Consent Order, p. 1.) The Court further directed that the
amount paid by Della Vella could not be reimbursed to him by the Union. It also required the
posting of a notice to be “signed by appropriate officers on behalf of Local 98, and by Raymond
Della Vella individually.” (C.P. Exh. 1, Consent Order, p. 3.) Furthermore, it required that the
Union convene a “special meeting of business agents, organizers and officers” at which the
notice was to be read aloud. (C.P. Exh. 1, Consent Order, p. 3.) Lastly, it established certain
procedures designed to provide assurance that any future picketing activity by the Union would
be lawful.
While all this litigation was underway, the General Counsel was also prosecuting another
highly relevant case against Local 98. On June 23, 2000, an administrative law judge issued a
decision in Electrical Workers Local 98 (MCF Services), 342 NLRB 740 (2004). The judge’s
detailed description of the Union’s conduct is significant for two reasons. First, some of that
conduct mirrors the Union’s behavior in the case before me. For example, as I indicated earlier,
the judge reported that an employee:
testified that as he drove his forklift to the dumpster, [Local 98
Organizer] Browne drove his vehicle, a black Lincoln Continental,
between the forklift and the dumpster . . . Browne kept his car in
the same blocking position for about 15-20 minutes, thus preventing
him from completing his chore, after which he drove away.
342 NLRB at 751. The judge credited this testimony and found a violation of Section
8(b)(1)(A).20 He also found additional violations based on misconduct that was similar in nature
to the events that transpired here, including blocking activity by pickets that prevented an
employee from “reentering the jobsite after he had exited momentarily to retrieve something
from his truck” and preventing employees from driving their vehicles into the entrance to a
worksite. 342 NLRB at 757 and 758.
The second reason that MCF Services is of significance to the issue under consideration
by me is that, once again, one of the Local 98 officials involved in unlawful picketing activities
was Della Vella. As the judge described, an employer’s representative,
asked if Della Vella was going to let any of UPS’ vehicles in or
out of the Oregon [Pennsylvania] facility, the latter replied, “No
way, no fucking thing’s coming in and out of this building.” . . .
Consistent with Della Vella’s remarks, certain vehicles seeking

20 It is worthwhile to note that the judge’s detailed and persuasive reasoning and citation to
numerous pertinent authorities regarding the unlawfulness of the Union’s blocking tactics
applies equally to the misconduct involved in this case. See, 342 NLRB at 752.
JD–17—07
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
14
to enter and leave the Oregon facility were in fact prevented from
doing so by Local 98 pickets.
342 NLRB at 760. The judge found this conduct to be unlawful and formally concluded that,
“Local 98 has further violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by blocking the egress and ingress of
employees and vehicles at the UPS and PPH jobsites.” 342 NLRB at 762.
As in The Telephone Man, the General Counsel requested that the judge recommend a
broad order directed at potential future violations of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act, but
did not seek such relief as to possible misconduct in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A). The judge,
citing the Union’s past history, granted the request, noting that:
[a]s evident by its conduct here, Local 98 has not changed its
ways. Indeed, Local 98 has, by its conduct herein, demonstrated
a deliberate and near contemptuous disregard for the Board’s
processes and remedial orders, and has again shown its proclivity
to violate the Act as well as a general disregard for the fundamental
rights of employees and neutral employers. In these circumstances,
a broad order is both appropriate and necessary. [Footnote omitted.]
342 NLRB at 763.
On July 30, 2004, the Board affirmed, in pertinent part, the judge’s findings and
conclusions, including the finding that “Browne used his vehicle to block [an employee] from
operating a forklift for about 15-30 minutes.” [Footnote omitted.] 342 NLRB at 741. In addition,
the Board adopted the judge’s proposed order. That order required that Local 98 cease and
desist from:
[i]nterfering with, restraining, or coercing employees of employers
performing work at the Cheltenham, PPH, and UPS jobsites, or of
any other employer, by threatening them with physical harm,
photographing them as they enter and leave their workplace, and
blocking them and their vehicles from entering or leaving their
jobsites or, in any other manner interfering with the rights guaranteed
to employees by Section 7 of the Act.
342 NLRB at 763. On September 14, 2006, the Board petitioned the Third Circuit for
enforcement of this order. (GC Exh. 5.) That matter is pending.21
With this dismal record of misconduct as background, I must now determine whether the
Union has manifested a proclivity to violate the Act because of an attitude among its officials of
opposition to the purposes of the Act and a hostility to the Section 7 rights of nonunion or anti-
union employees. See, Hickmott Foods and Five Star Manufacturing, Inc., supra. The Board

21 The fact that this order has not yet been enforced is of some significance. In Postal
Service, 345 NLRB No. 25 (2005), enf. of pertinent part denied, 477 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2007),
the Board’s majority rejected an argument that the Board should have initiated contempt
proceedings against a violator rather than imposing a broad order. It noted that, “proceeding in
contempt was not an option inasmuch as the acts alleged as unfair labor practices here took
place prior to the court’s enforcement of the order in the prior case.” 345 NLRB No. 25, slip op.
at fn. 9. The same would be true here.
JD–17—07
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
15
has repeatedly found that the Union’s officials have a proclivity to violate a range of provisions
of the Act, including participation in conduct that is essentially identical to the misconduct proven
in this case. In decisions upheld by the Board, two judges found that the Union had a “general
disregard for the fundamental rights of employees.” See, The Telephone Man, supra, 327
NLRB at 602, and MCF Services, supra, 342 NLRB at 763, both employing identical language.
In addition, the judge in MCF Services noted that the Union had “a deliberate and near
contemptuous disregard for the Board’s processes and remedial orders.” 342 NLRB at 763.
In response, counsel for the Union cites significant Board precedents establishing the
Board’s general unwillingness to impose broad relief based on prior acts of misconduct that
occurred many years earlier. See: Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 243 NLRB 425 (1979)
(misconduct committed 6 to 14 years earlier is too remote to warrant broad order); Operating
Engineers, Local 12 (Hensel Phelps), 284 NLRB 246, fn. 2 (1987) (similar); Service
Merchandise Co., 299 NLRB 1125, fn. 7 (1990) (similar); Teamsters Local 456 (Peckham
Materials), 307 NLRB 612, fn. 4 (1992) (similar). While it has not articulated a precise time limit,
the Board appears to draw the appropriate demarcation at the passage of approximately 4
years without evidence of misconduct. Thus, in Plumbers Local 388 (Daily Heating), 280 NLRB
1260, 1280 (1986), it affirmed a judge’s conclusion that a union’s “hiatus in engagement of any
illegal activity for 4 to 5 years . . . is a significant intervening period of indicated compliance with
the statutory scheme.” Similarly, the Board declined to impose a broad order in Sheet Metal
Workers International Association, Local Union 19 (Delcard Associates), 328 NLRB 80 (1999),
noting that, although the union had demonstrated a past proclivity to violate the Act, “the
Respondent apparently has not violated the Act in any similar respect in the intervening four
years.” [Footnote omitted.]
In the case before me, the misconduct occurred on June 16, 2006. The most recent
related prior misconduct by both the Union in general and Della Vella in particular was found to
have taken place on January 4, 2002. Electrical Workers Local 98 (Swartley Bros.), supra., at
1271. This represents a period of 4-1/2 years of apparent compliance with the Act. While
representing a close question, I conclude that the passage of this period of time insulates the
Union from a finding of proclivity based solely on a history of prior misconduct.22
I, nevertheless, conclude that it is necessary and appropriate to recommend the
imposition of a broad order in the unique circumstances of this case. I do so for two reasons.
First, I take note that labor organizations, just as corporations, are not independent actors
possessed of their own free will. Rather, they operate in the world through the decisions of the
human beings who hold the power to direct and control them.23 I have considered this reality in
assessing the proper remedy for this violation. I recognize that it would be unfair to
overemphasize the meaning of old violations by such an organization in the absence of
indications that the attitudes underlying such violations persist among the persons who currently

22 In this regard, I recognize that the appropriate standard for assessing this issue is a policy
concern of the type uniquely entrusted by Congress to the Board. I also note that a period of 4
years is a quantum of time that possesses considerable significance in our society. It
represents the customary time during which students are expected to enter and complete both
high school and college and is the term fixed for service in various government positions
including the presidency of the United States. It is clearly a substantial period in the lifespan of
individuals and institutions.
23 See, Longshoremen ILWU/Local 6 (Sunset Line & Twine Co.), 79 NLRB 1487, 1507-1508
(1948) (“we are to treat labor organizations as legal entities, like corporations, which act, and
can only act, through their duly appointed agents”).
JD–17—07
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
16
manage their affairs. The converse of such a recognition also applies with equal force. It is
particularly appropriate to hold such an organization to account for the harmful attitudes of its
officials where the evidence shows continuity of tenure and behavior by those same individuals.
Thus, it is of particular probative weight that the “boss” of the pickets who directed and
controlled the activities that prevented Muth from performing his job was the same person who
has a substantial prior history of violations of the Act. (Tr. 69.) The record demonstrates that
the Board’s remedial measures have not led to a change of attitude on the part of Della Vella.
Nor have they resulted in a change in the Union’s decision to entrust Della Vella with the
authority and responsibility to supervise its picketing activities. This is a powerful argument for
imposition of the strongest measures that can reasonably be calculated to deter any further
related misconduct by the Union and protect the Section 7 rights of employees.
In addition, I find it highly significant that Della Vella’s recidivist conduct occurred less
than 3 years after the Third Circuit’s entry of a Consent Order against him. That judgment
provided a broad range of rather inventive remedies designed to achieve future compliance with
the law. In addition to the punitive sanction, it included strong remedial measures intended to
educate the Union’s leaders regarding the manner in which picketing activities must be
conducted so as to protect the fundamental rights of employees under the Act. As counsel for
the General Counsel observes:
Respondent and Della Vella were also on notice as a result of
the Consent Order issued in 2003, even though the conduct
underlying that matter did not involve issues of Section 8(b)(1)(A)
of the Act, that they still [had] to take precautions in conducting
any future picketing.
(GC Br. at p. 20.) Alas, these measures appear to have been less than fully effective.
As I have noted earlier, the Board has very recently stressed the need for a
comprehensive assessment of the totality of circumstances when deciding whether a
respondent’s attitude of hostility to the purposes of the Act provides a proper basis for
imposition of broad relief. Five Star Manufacturing, Inc., supra. In my view, the passage of less
than 3 years since the imposition of a contempt judgment against the Union, and against Della
Vella personally, before the commission of further picketing misconduct by them constitutes a
compelling circumstance requiring broad relief. In this regard, I agree with counsel for the
General Counsel, who cites Electrical Workers Local 3 (Teknion, Inc.), 329 NLRB 337 (1999).
In that case, the Board relied “particularly” on the fact that the respondent union had consented
to entry of judgment against it by the Court of Appeals and, yet, had committed another related
violation “just a little more than 2 years later.” 329 NLRB 337, at fn. 2. Standing alone, this
history was found to “sufficiently demonstrate[ ] that the Respondent has a proclivity for violating
the Act, and thus warrants our adoption of the judge’s recommended broad order.” 329 NLRB
337, at fn. 2.
In concluding that the broadest form of relief consistent with the Act’s remedial purposes
is necessary and appropriate in this case, I have placed particular emphasis on the Union’s
demonstrated conduct and attitude as manifested through its response to the Third Circuit’s
Consent Order and its continued assignment of Della Vella to a position of responsibility for
picketing activities. In my view, the situation is similar to that presented in Iron Workers Local
378 (N.E. Carlson Construction), 302 NLRB 200 (1991). In Carlson, a case involving picketing
conduct found to be unlawful under Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act, the Board modified
the judge’s order by substituting broad cease-and-desist language. It noted that the case
involved the second adjudicated episode of such misconduct. Beyond this, it took special
JD–17—07
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
17
cognizance that the business agent who directed the misconduct in both cases was the same
individual, one Trujillo. In delineating its reasons for imposing a broad order, the Board held
that:
We further find that the Respondent’s violations in this case,
considered against the background of similar events in [the
prior case] and giving particular emphasis to the behavior of
the Respondent’s business agent Trujillo, are so egregious as
to manifest a general disregard for the rights of neutral employees
and employers. This unlawful conduct convinces us that, without
proper restraint, the Respondent is likely to engage in similar
conduct in the future against employers other than those
involved here. Accordingly, a broad remedial order is appropriate.
[Footnote omitted.]
302 NLRB at 201. In my view, it is equally likely that Local 98 and its agent, Della Vella, may
engage in various types of misconduct against employees of this employer and other employers
in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act and in contravention of the Section 7 rights of
employees of this employer and other employers.
Finally, in reaching this conclusion, I have weighed the limited nature of the violation in
this case and the evidence showing that the conduct, standing alone, was not violent or
otherwise egregious. While significant, this cannot override the compelling weight of the
evidence demonstrating an extensive history of misconduct, an ingrained hostility to the Act’s
purposes, and a persistent disregard of the remedial measures previously imposed by the
Board and the Court of Appeals. It is those considerations which impel me to recommend
imposition of the relief requested by the General Counsel.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended24
ORDER
The Respondent, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 98,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Restraining or coercing employees of Tri-M Group, LLC, or any other employer,
by blocking them from entering a jobsite or performing a work task.
(b) In any other manner restraining or coercing employees of Tri-M Group, LLC, or
any other employer, in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the
Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.

24 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
JD–17—07
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
18
(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its union office in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”25 Copies
of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 4, after being signed
by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where
notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(b) Sign and return to the Regional Director sufficient copies of the notice for posting
by Tri-M Group, LLC, if willing, at all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a
sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to
the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. April 10, 2007
____________________
Paul Buxbaum
Administrative Law Judge

25 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in
the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
JD–17—07
Philadelphia, PA
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO MEMBERS
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this Notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf with your employer
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
WE WILL NOT restrain or coerce employees of Tri-M Group, LLC, or any other employer, by
blocking them from entering a jobsite or performing a work task.
WE WILL NOT, in any other manner, restrain or coerce employees of Tri-M Group, LLC, or any
other employer, in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them by Federal labor law.
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL UNION NO. 98
(Labor Organization)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
615 Chestnut Street, One Independence Mall, 7th Floor
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106-4404
Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
215-597-7601.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST
NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, 215-597-7643.
JD–17—07
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
20